hypocritexposer
Well-known member
This is a very long article, so I'll just post the conclusion and notes.
The website it comes from is well worth a look.
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=13957
Notes
Barry Newhouse, "Afghanistan Promotes Crop More Profitable Than Poppy," VOA News (December 3, 2008)
[ii] This essay builds upon previous work as "America’s Afghan War: The Real World versus Obama’s Marketed Imagery," RAWA News (April 12, 2009) and in "What do Obama’s First 100 Days Mean to Common Afghans?" Global Research (May 1, 2009)
[iii] Discussed in Michael Winship, "The Privatization of ‘Obama’s War’," Online Journal (June 8, 2009)
[iv] Al Pessin, "New Commander Pledges to Protect Afghan Civilians in ‘Winnable War’," VOA News (June 2, 2009)
[v] Noah Schachtman, "New Top General Could Mean Changes for Afghan Airstrikes," Wired.com (June 5, 2009)
[vi] "New Strategy, New Commander," Boston Globe (May 13, 2009)
[vii] "Editorial Measuring Success in Afghanistan," New York Times (June 8, 2009)
[viii] Jeff Huber, "Our McMan in Bananastan," Antiwar.com (June 8, 2009)
[ix] Where I wrote, "I believe the argument goes deeper and that race enters the calculation. The sacrificed Afghan civilians are not 'white' whereas the overwhelming number of U.S. pilots and elite ground troops are white. This 'reality' serves to amplify the positive benefit-cost ratio of certainly sacrificing darker Afghans today [and Indochinese, Iraqis yesterday] for the benefit of probably saving American soldier-citizens tomorrow. What I am saying is that when the "other" is non-white, the scale of violence used by the U.S. government to achieve its state objectives at minimum cost knows no limits."See my "A Dossier on Civilian Victims of United States’ Aerial Bombing of Afghanistan: A Comprehensive Accounting [revised]," Cursor.org (March 2002)
[x] See my "What do Obama’s First 100 Days Mean to Common Afghans?" op. cit.
[xi] by the defence editor of the London Times, Michael Evans, "The Yanks and Their Firepower are coming…’ but not to destroy the Taliban," Times (May 12, 2009)
[xii] see "America’s Afghan War," op. cit and Ken Fireman, "Obama’s Afghan Troop-Surge Plan May Prove Too Much, Too Late," Bloomberg.com (December 23, 2008)
[xiii] the difficulty for U.S occupation forces to isolate villagers from the Taliban is described in Philip Smucker, :"US Soldiers’ Limited Options Limited to Protect Afghans from Taliban," McClatchy Newspapers (May 25, 2009)
[xiv] See Jason Motlagh, "After Gunfire, U.S., Taliban Swing PR Cudgel," ABC News (May 16, 2009)
[xv] On the other hand, in Europe sharp criticisms are more common, see the excellent analysis by Alejandro Pozo Marin, Alliance of Barbarities. Afghanistan 2001-2008 10 Reasons to Question (and Rethink) Foreign Involvement" (Barcelona: J.M. Delas Centre for Peace Studies – Justice and Peace, December 2008), 44 pp.
[xvi] well analyzed in Justin Raimundo, " ‘Progressive’ Warmongers," Antiwar.com (April 7, 2009)
[xvii] Chris Hughes, "We Witness the Dangers Our Troops Face in Afghanistan Minefield," The Daily Mirror (June 1, 2009) )
[xviii] see my account on the Afghan Victim Memorial Project data base
[xix] Bruce Rolfsen, "Record Bombs Dropped in Afghanistan in April," The Navy Times (May 4, 2009)
[xx] Michael M. Phillips, "Army Deploys Old Tactic in PR War," Wall Street Journal (June 1, 2009)
[xxi] See for example his "Afghanistan: Chaos Central," Counterpunch (February 25, 2009)
[xxii] Chris Sands, "Afghan Anger Grows at Slaughter of the Innocents," The National (May 19, 2009)
[xxiii] in The New York Times (February 18, 2009)
[xxiv] Mentioned in Adam B. Ellick, "Uncertainty Clouds British Report of Taliban Leader’s Death," New York Times (June 3, 2009)
[xxv] The UNAMA’s Human Rights Unit has around six people in each of the mission’s eight regional offices. The unit collects data on civilian casualties from various available sources and tries to verify the data. See "Afghanistan: UN Trying to Verify Civilian Casualties with Limited Resources," IRIN NEWS (September 20, 2007)
[xxvi] from Brendan Nicholson, "Australian Troops Kill 5 Afghan Children," The Age (February 14, 2009)
[xxvii] The 2008 mid-point figures for Herold is 939. I we assume that 20% of the deaths caused by pro-government forces were caused by Afghan farces, then the adjusted UNAMA figure is 662 (which is about 70% of 939).
[xxviii] for example, by Dave Markland and Tom Engelhart, see Dave Markland, "Afghanistan Past & Present," ZNews (June 9, 2009)
[xxix] This figure is almost exactly identical to that (72%) for the first eight months of 2008, see Marc Herold, "Truth as Collateral Damage. Civilian deaths from US/NATO air strikes in Afghanistan are not accidents or mistakes – they are calculated and predicted," The Guardian (October 22, 2008)
[xxx] Gilles Dorronsoro, "Focus and Exit: An Alternative Strategy for the Afghan War," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace report (January 2009)
[xxxi] "60 Drone Hits Kill 14 Al-Qaeda Men, 687 Civilians," The News (April 10, 2009)
[xxxii] Christina Lamb, "The Taliban Will ‘Never be Defeated’," Times (June 7, 2009)
[xxxiii] Graham E. Fuller, "Obama’s Policies Making Situation Worse in Afghanistan and Pakistan," The Huffington Post (May 11, 2009)
The website it comes from is well worth a look.
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=13957
About Global Research
The Centre for Research on Globalisation (CRG) is an independent research organization and media group of writers, scholars, journalists and activists.
The CRG is based in Montreal. It is a registered non profit organization in the province of Quebec, Canada.
The Global Research webpage at www.globalresearch.ca publishes news articles, commentary, background research and analysis on a broad range of issues, focussing on social, economic, strategic and environmental processes.
Conclusion
Having inherited a war in Afghanistan, the Obama administration nonetheless had choices. Some for instance like Gilles Dorronsoro argued that the very presence of foreign forces was inflaming the conflict and that what was called-for was a scaling-down of military action, focusing and exiting.[xxx] Instead, the Obama team which includes many members of the former Bush regime, decided to fight the "good war" in Afghanistan. During the past five months, the conflict has further escalated and promises to do more of the same.
By the announced metric of protecting Afghan civilians, the Obama team has failed miserably even more so than its predecessor. What is different is the public relations which began with in the words of Michael Stewart "Operation Redefinition." One can redefine as much as one wants, the reality for Afghans pursuing their daily lives has deteriorated as documented herein. Since taking office and assuming the position of Commander-in-Chief, Obama and his NATO allies have killed at the very least some 338-419 Afghan civilians (compared to 278-343 under the Bush clock during the first six months of 2008). In addition, deadly CIA drone attacks within Pakistan have continued since Obama took command. Of the sixty cross-border U.S drone attacks upon Pakistan between January 14, 2006 and April 8, 2009,
Only 10 were able to hit their actual targets, killing 14 wanted al-Qaeda leaders, besides perishing 687 innocent Pakistani civilians. The success percentage of the US predator strikes thus comes to not more than six per cent.[xxxi]
Simple arithmetic shows that in some eighty days in office, Obama has managed to raise the monthly average kill rate in drone attacks achieved by Bush from 32 during 2008 to 45 per month (for February-March 2009).
The Obama team might well head the words of the Pakistani intelligence agent, ‘Colonel Iman,’ who after training at Fort Bragg’s Special Forces base, oversaw the training camps for jihadis (including Mullah Omar) during the late 1970’s and 1980’s. Iman told Christina Lamb (another fine independent British journalist), that he left Afghanistan in late 2001 and claims he has not returned, but
"I can go any time on my old routes, even the Americans cannot stop me, but there is no need," he said. "I have friends roaming all over there. At times they give me a call, they like to hear my voice. I’m quite happy with the current situation because the Americans are trapped there. The Taliban will not win but in the end the enemy will tire, like the Russians."[xxxii]
The ex-CIA station chief in Kabul, Graham Fuller is emphatic that Obama’s policies are aggravating the situation in Afghanistan (and Pakistan),
Only the withdrawal of American and NATO boots on the ground will begin to allow the process of near-frantic emotions to subside within Pakistan, and for the region to start to cool down. Pakistan is experienced in governance and is well able to deal with its own Islamists and tribalists under normal circumstances; until recently, Pakistani Islamists had one of the lowest rates of electoral success in the Muslim world. But U.S. policies have now driven local nationalism, xenophobia and Islamism to combined fever pitch. As Washington demands that Pakistan redeem failed American policies in Afghanistan, Islamabad can no longer manage its domestic crisis.[xxxiii]
Notes
Barry Newhouse, "Afghanistan Promotes Crop More Profitable Than Poppy," VOA News (December 3, 2008)
[ii] This essay builds upon previous work as "America’s Afghan War: The Real World versus Obama’s Marketed Imagery," RAWA News (April 12, 2009) and in "What do Obama’s First 100 Days Mean to Common Afghans?" Global Research (May 1, 2009)
[iii] Discussed in Michael Winship, "The Privatization of ‘Obama’s War’," Online Journal (June 8, 2009)
[iv] Al Pessin, "New Commander Pledges to Protect Afghan Civilians in ‘Winnable War’," VOA News (June 2, 2009)
[v] Noah Schachtman, "New Top General Could Mean Changes for Afghan Airstrikes," Wired.com (June 5, 2009)
[vi] "New Strategy, New Commander," Boston Globe (May 13, 2009)
[vii] "Editorial Measuring Success in Afghanistan," New York Times (June 8, 2009)
[viii] Jeff Huber, "Our McMan in Bananastan," Antiwar.com (June 8, 2009)
[ix] Where I wrote, "I believe the argument goes deeper and that race enters the calculation. The sacrificed Afghan civilians are not 'white' whereas the overwhelming number of U.S. pilots and elite ground troops are white. This 'reality' serves to amplify the positive benefit-cost ratio of certainly sacrificing darker Afghans today [and Indochinese, Iraqis yesterday] for the benefit of probably saving American soldier-citizens tomorrow. What I am saying is that when the "other" is non-white, the scale of violence used by the U.S. government to achieve its state objectives at minimum cost knows no limits."See my "A Dossier on Civilian Victims of United States’ Aerial Bombing of Afghanistan: A Comprehensive Accounting [revised]," Cursor.org (March 2002)
[x] See my "What do Obama’s First 100 Days Mean to Common Afghans?" op. cit.
[xi] by the defence editor of the London Times, Michael Evans, "The Yanks and Their Firepower are coming…’ but not to destroy the Taliban," Times (May 12, 2009)
[xii] see "America’s Afghan War," op. cit and Ken Fireman, "Obama’s Afghan Troop-Surge Plan May Prove Too Much, Too Late," Bloomberg.com (December 23, 2008)
[xiii] the difficulty for U.S occupation forces to isolate villagers from the Taliban is described in Philip Smucker, :"US Soldiers’ Limited Options Limited to Protect Afghans from Taliban," McClatchy Newspapers (May 25, 2009)
[xiv] See Jason Motlagh, "After Gunfire, U.S., Taliban Swing PR Cudgel," ABC News (May 16, 2009)
[xv] On the other hand, in Europe sharp criticisms are more common, see the excellent analysis by Alejandro Pozo Marin, Alliance of Barbarities. Afghanistan 2001-2008 10 Reasons to Question (and Rethink) Foreign Involvement" (Barcelona: J.M. Delas Centre for Peace Studies – Justice and Peace, December 2008), 44 pp.
[xvi] well analyzed in Justin Raimundo, " ‘Progressive’ Warmongers," Antiwar.com (April 7, 2009)
[xvii] Chris Hughes, "We Witness the Dangers Our Troops Face in Afghanistan Minefield," The Daily Mirror (June 1, 2009) )
[xviii] see my account on the Afghan Victim Memorial Project data base
[xix] Bruce Rolfsen, "Record Bombs Dropped in Afghanistan in April," The Navy Times (May 4, 2009)
[xx] Michael M. Phillips, "Army Deploys Old Tactic in PR War," Wall Street Journal (June 1, 2009)
[xxi] See for example his "Afghanistan: Chaos Central," Counterpunch (February 25, 2009)
[xxii] Chris Sands, "Afghan Anger Grows at Slaughter of the Innocents," The National (May 19, 2009)
[xxiii] in The New York Times (February 18, 2009)
[xxiv] Mentioned in Adam B. Ellick, "Uncertainty Clouds British Report of Taliban Leader’s Death," New York Times (June 3, 2009)
[xxv] The UNAMA’s Human Rights Unit has around six people in each of the mission’s eight regional offices. The unit collects data on civilian casualties from various available sources and tries to verify the data. See "Afghanistan: UN Trying to Verify Civilian Casualties with Limited Resources," IRIN NEWS (September 20, 2007)
[xxvi] from Brendan Nicholson, "Australian Troops Kill 5 Afghan Children," The Age (February 14, 2009)
[xxvii] The 2008 mid-point figures for Herold is 939. I we assume that 20% of the deaths caused by pro-government forces were caused by Afghan farces, then the adjusted UNAMA figure is 662 (which is about 70% of 939).
[xxviii] for example, by Dave Markland and Tom Engelhart, see Dave Markland, "Afghanistan Past & Present," ZNews (June 9, 2009)
[xxix] This figure is almost exactly identical to that (72%) for the first eight months of 2008, see Marc Herold, "Truth as Collateral Damage. Civilian deaths from US/NATO air strikes in Afghanistan are not accidents or mistakes – they are calculated and predicted," The Guardian (October 22, 2008)
[xxx] Gilles Dorronsoro, "Focus and Exit: An Alternative Strategy for the Afghan War," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace report (January 2009)
[xxxi] "60 Drone Hits Kill 14 Al-Qaeda Men, 687 Civilians," The News (April 10, 2009)
[xxxii] Christina Lamb, "The Taliban Will ‘Never be Defeated’," Times (June 7, 2009)
[xxxiii] Graham E. Fuller, "Obama’s Policies Making Situation Worse in Afghanistan and Pakistan," The Huffington Post (May 11, 2009)
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=13957