• If you are having problems logging in please use the Contact Us in the lower right hand corner of the forum page for assistance.

AMI full of crap yet again

Sandhusker

Well-known member
Cattle Producers, Consumers See Benefits to COOL;

AMI Continues Misrepresentation of COOL Law

Washington, D.C. – R-CALF USA has been forced, once again, to clean up false and misleading comments by the American Meat Association (AMI) regarding mandatory country-of-origin labeling (COOL).

In a second letter to Rep. Rosa DeLauro, D-Conn., and Sen. Herb Kohl, D-Wis., sent yesterday, R-CALF USA President/Region VI Director Max Thornsberry said he was particularly concerned with AMI’s erroneous trade implications it mentioned in a letter to DeLauro and Kohl dated June 5, 2007. He also asked the congressional members to consider expediting the implementation of COOL.

“AMI first claimed that a country-of-origin labeling regime would not impact food safety or the integrity of food products,” Thornsberry said. “R-CALF pointed out that AMI’s claim was disproved by the origin-based food safety standard the U.S. currently applies to beef imported from Uruguay. AMI objected to R-CALF USA’s example, claiming the standard addressed issues of animal disease, not food safety.”

In Thursday’s letter to Congress, R-CALF USA stated that Congress’ Animal Health Protection Act mandates the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to prevent animal diseases for the express purpose of protecting both animal and human health. AMI’s argument that the prevention of animal diseases, as is accomplished by origin-related restrictions on food imports from Uruguay, is not intrinsically tied to the protection of the nation’s animal-based food supply – hence food safety – is a contradiction of Congress’ mandate. AMI’s effort to discount the importance of disclosing the origins of food products, as provided in the 2002 COOL law, for purposes of enhancing food safety and the integrity of food products is baseless.

“AMI did not, nor could it, contest R-CALF’s example of how COOL could have benefited consumers in 2003 when beef from a Canadian cow with BSE had to be recalled from the U.S. human food chain,” Thornsberry noted. “AMI did, however, attempt to refute R-CALF’s reference to the melamine problem, which demonstrates that consumers need COOL to distinguish food products based on the particular production regime to which the food product was subjected.

“While AMI did not contest this benefit, AMI did suggest that even greater benefits would be derived from certifying the ingredients included in feed fed to domestic animals,” he pointed out. “This suggestion goes well beyond the scope of the 2002 COOL law and in no way does it distract from the fact that the 2002 COOL law as presently written would provide consumers a choice based on their knowledge of the animal feeding practices in various countries.”

AMI’s second claim was that the safety of imported meat was assured due to the requirement that foreign plants shipping product to the U.S. must meet the same requirements as are met in domestic federally inspected plants. However, a December 2005 report from the Office of Inspector General (OIG) indicates this requirement is not always enforced, and was not enforced for nearly two years in Canadian plants.

“AMI attempted to dismiss the relevance of the OIG’s findings by claiming that COOL would not cure the failure by USDA to properly enforce meat import requirements,” Thornsberry explained. “It is important to note, however, that R-CALF USA made no such claim. Instead, R-CALF concluded that COOL would afford consumers the ability to achieve an additional level of protection against breaches in food safety inspection systems in foreign countries.

“This conclusion remains valid and was uncontested by AMI because COOL would provide consumers with information as to the origin of their food, enabling them to avoid food from countries where enforcement of food safety standards is uncertain,” he asserted.

AMI’s third claim was that COOL is unnecessary because USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection System (FSIS) has had for many years mandatory COOL requirements for red meat that enters the United States. However, a 2003 General Accounting Office (GAO) report indicates that country-of-origin labels on imported meat were not being maintained all the way to the consumer.

“AMI did not contest the fact that consumers are presently deprived of country-of-origin labels on imported meat,” Thornsberry noted. “Instead, AMI raises the new argument that imported meat that undergoes further processing in the U.S. should be considered a domestic product. Congress, however, has already addressed this issue by specifying in the 2002 COOL law that only beef, lamb, and pork from animals exclusively born, raised, and slaughtered in the U.S. are eligible for the USA label.

“This requirement reflects Congress’ understanding that the act of processing a final red meat product reflects but a fraction of the time, resources, and management that went into the growth and development of the animal from which the meat was derived,” he explained. “For example, beef is derived from animals that are reared, fed, and managed by farmers and ranchers over the course of 15 months or longer, while the subsequent slaughter and processing of cattle into beef is completed in a matter of weeks, if not days.”

AMI’s fourth claim is that the 2002 COOL law is not compliant with the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). However, AMI provided absolutely no support for its claim. The U.S. and other WTO members retain the authority to require labeling of imported products as a condition of entry into a WTO members’ market under Article IX of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) 1994 and the WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin, provided certain conditions are met. AMI’s rebuttal, in which it asserts that the 2002 COOL law violates the “substantial transformation” rule of the WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin, is incorrect and misleading. Both Article IX of GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin address conditions for entry of imported product into the United States and other WTO members’ markets.

“Nowhere in the 2002 COOL law is there any restriction against the labeling of imported products, upon their entry into the U.S. market, with the name of the country in which the product was substantially transformed, so, obviously the treatment of imported product under the 2002 COOL law is entirely consistent with U.S. trade obligations,” Thornsberry added.

AMI also falsely asserts that the 2002 COOL law “requires that a meatpacker and retailer trace the places at which the animals were born and raised, as well as the place of slaughter, and mark the meat package with all of that information.” The 2002 COOL law contains no such requirement. Instead, the 2002 COOL law allows imported products to be labeled consistent with existing trade obligations while reserving the USA label only for products exclusively derived from animals born, raised, and slaughtered in the United States.

“The COOL law also does not affect products destined for export as it only applies to products sold domestically at retail, so, U.S. meat exports, upon entry into another WTO members’ market, would continue to be subject to the same ‘substantial transformation’ rule applicable for determining the origin of imported products that enter the U.S. market,” Thornsberry added.

“It is unfortunate that AMI persists in misrepresenting the 2002 COOL law to Congress and consumers in its efforts to prevent the U.S. consumer from knowing the origins of their food purchases,” Thornberry emphasized. “R-CALF USA would welcome the opportunity to discuss how COOL can be immediately and efficiently implemented – using the same eight simplification steps USDA used in 2005 to implement the fish and shellfish provisions of the COOL law – at minimal cost to farmers and ranchers.”

Note: To view R-CALF USA’s and AMI’s letters, visit the ‘Country-of-Origin Labeling’ link at www.r-calfusa.com.
 

PORKER

Well-known member
Food-origin law is back from oblivion
Recent scares revive call to label imports

By Stephen J. Hedges
Washington Bureau
Published June 10, 2007


WASHINGTON -- Amid concerns about the safety of pet food ingredients and catfish from China, consumers and even a few members of Congress are wondering why there isn't a law that requires merchants to label where food comes from.

The short answer: There is. And there has been since 2002.

The more complicated answer is that what Congress passes, Congress can take away. The requirement for "country-of-origin labeling"—or COOL, as Washington knows it—for food products was postponed a year after its adoption, due to heavy lobbying from food groups saying the law was unnecessary and expensive.

Recent fears over imported foods, however, have given new momentum to reviving the law.

Though COOL's suspension is due to end in September 2008, food safety groups have called for it to end immediately. Worried opponents, meanwhile, are already working to derail the law's implementation.

Some say recent food scares have made the labeling an idea whose time has come, and bills in the House and Senate propose making it effective as early as this September.

"There will be mandatory COOL by 2008 at the latest," said Rep. Rosa DeLauro (D-Conn.). "I believe that this is the direction we're moving in. This is about consumers and their ability to make marketplace decisions."

If it takes effect, COOL would require country-of-origin labeling on beef, pork, lamb, fruit and peanuts.

It would not apply to processed foods or to meals served in restaurants. The labeling requirement has applied to fish and shellfish since 2005.

Opponents have become increasingly vocal, arguing that the law will be costly for grocers and food producers because they would have to maintain records on their products for one year.


'It's simply a bad idea'
Critics also have raised questions about the practicality of tracking cattle and hogs as they are raised, slaughtered and processed, asking how livestock owners and meatpacking companies should label meat from cattle and pigs that were born overseas but raised in the U.S.

"It's simply a bad idea," said Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.), one of the idea's chief opponents. The cost of complying with the labeling law, he said, would hurt domestic farmers and ranchers as well as beef and pork producers.

"It doesn't ensure any more food safety," Goodlatte insisted. "It's not a food safety issue. It's a marketing issue."

What makes COOL particularly contentious is that while powerful lobbies like the grocers and meatpackers are fighting it, other food producers enthusiastically support it, hoping foreign-origin labels will steer American shoppers back toward U.S. goods.

They say opponents are citing potential costs only to mask their real concern—consumer reaction. If meat producers are forced to disclose that foreign beef goes into products like hamburger, some say, that could hurt sales, especially given the public's worries about mad cow disease.

"I think that there is concern, particularly with regard to some of the Mexican cattle," said Bill Bullard, president of R-CALF, a cattlemen's organization that, unlike much of the beef industry, supports COOL. "There's a concern that the Mexican label would not be well received. The same could be true of Canada, which has had ongoing [mad cow] disease problems."

Bullard also noted that cattle ranchers, by law, already must keep extensive health records on cattle.

The fight has become a classic Washington debate over new regulation, with millions of dollars and consumers' interests hanging in the balance.


COOL gets cold reception
Country-of-origin labeling was passed in 2002 as part of the farm bill, a massive piece of legislation that comes up for renewal about every five years. It was touted as a way to protect American food producers from cheap imports, much like the "Made in the U.S.A." tags on clothing and other items.

But nearly as soon as President Bush signed the farm bill into law, COOL opponents began to work against it. The provision's effective date was delayed until September 2006, then again until 2008.

"It's been pretty clear to us who are in support of COOL that the intent in delaying it was really to give more time to kill it outright," said Patty Lovera, assistant director of the consumer group Food & Water Watch.

It is the measure's complex language describing what grocers and food producers must do to comply with the law that most troubles its critics.

"We consider it an awfully expensive way of going about doing something," said Allen Matthys, vice president for federal and state regulations at the Grocery Manufacturers Association and the Food Products Association. "Regarding the appropriateness of an ingredient coming from a country, you need to deal with that country and that ingredient. Just putting a country-of-origin stamp on it doesn't help anybody."

Matthys said the cost of implementing COOL at the 28,000 retail stores likely to be affected would stretch into "hundreds of millions of dollars."

A study by the Food Marketing Institute, which opposes COOL, found that the costs of implementing the seafood portion of COOL have been higher than the Agriculture Department predicted. USDA estimated that the first-year cost to retail stores would be $1,530 per store, the study said, but instead it has been $9,000 to $16,000.


Differentiating products
COOL's supporters are also making their case. Wild American Shrimp Inc., for instance, has just begun airing television ads that highlight the family tradition of catching wild shrimp off the Southern coast, contrasting it with the flood of farm-raised shrimp that now comes to the U.S. from Asian countries such as Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia.

"We've just had our third-largest harvest in history, but we're being dwarfed by the huge influx of shrimp from around the world, particularly Asia," said Eddie Gordon, the shrimp group's executive director. "If we have a major [health] problem with shrimp from China, if we don't have product differentiated by country, then that would take us all down. Consumers would just stop buying shrimp."

[email protected]
 

PORKER

Well-known member
It's More than just good reading. Food-origin law is back from oblivion as
Recent scares revive call to label COOL imports . COOL law will give the consumer the ability to know where his food came from.
 

flounder

Well-known member
PORKER said:
Food-origin law is back from oblivion
Recent scares revive call to label imports

By Stephen J. Hedges
Washington Bureau
Published June 10, 2007


snip...

"It's simply a bad idea," said Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.), one of the idea's chief opponents. The cost of complying with the labeling law, he said, would hurt domestic farmers and ranchers as well as beef and pork producers.

"It doesn't ensure any more food safety," Goodlatte insisted. "It's not a food safety issue. It's a marketing issue."



THIS is a total bogus answer, strictly industry fed [email protected] i.e. BSeee

TRY EXPLAINING THIS to all those consumers that potentially ate mad cow meat, but law prohibited them from knowing about it $$$


USDA VOLUNTARY MAD COW TAINTED FOOD RECALL ''DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL'' POLICY


AS ONE LEGISLATOR THAT MOU SHOULD BE TERMINATED IMMEDIATELY

IT IS A FRONT TO THE PUBLIC

THAT YOU WOULD ON YOUR OWN ACCORD, IN THAT KIND OF SECRECY, AND CALL THAT
GOVERNMENT

THAT'S NOT WHAT WERE HERE FOR, WERE HERE FOR TRANSPARENCY, WERE NOT HERE TO
DO SECRET DEALS,

''WERE NOT THE CIA'' !!!

THERE ARE OTHER WAYS TO GET TO THE GOAL OF REACHING THE CONSUMER WITHOUT
DEALING WITH USDA THAT FINDS IT UNACCEPTABLE TO SHARE INFORMATION WITH THE
PUBLIC



http://maddeer.org/video/embedded/02snip.rpm



STANLEY PRUSINER NOBEL PEACE PRIZE WINNER ON THE PRION SLAMS USDA ON BSE

US AG SEC AND LAYCRAFT

"nothing ELSE matters, except beef from canada under 30 months bones beef
product, that's ALL THAT MATTERS!"


STAN THE MAN

question for stan ;

is this a demonstrated threat to public health safety ?

stan states ;

yes i think they (prions) are bad to eat, and you can die from them.


http://maddeer.org/video/embedded/08snip.ram



THE LINKs YOU JUST WATCHED WAS OF THE FOLLOWING HEARING ON THE WASHINGTON
MAD COW and what little ramifications there after, and to this day, nothing
has changed much, except more secrecy. ...TSS



022404 Senate Info-Hearing Agriculture / Water Resources / Health and Human
Services / Government Oversight: Mad Cow Disease


Entire 5 hour hearing - The California Channel

(scroll down to "022404 Senate Info-Hearing")

http://www.calchannel.com/february2004.htm



http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Frame/FrameRedirect.asp?main=http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/rdad/FRPubs/2006-0009.htm



Greetings,


I would kindly like to comment on the Availability of Lists of Retail Consignees During Meat or Poultry Product Recalls (71 FR 11326). I am in full support of this, and more, i.e. COOL. It all should have been mandatory long ago. you have consumers that are suspicious, and rightly so. just look what happened in California and Washington, with that mad cow and it's cohorts (AND THEN TO TEXAS AND ALABAMA COHORTS). i am talking total open honesty from farm to fork, mandatory traceability from the time that calf hits the ground to the time it hits the fork and all feed/drug records to go with it, recorded properly, and should be mandatory. WE have humans dying from human TSE, and we have ample animal TSE in the food production line to account for some of those human TSE. The USA has the most documented animal TSE in the world. WE must not flounder any longer. THE BSE MRR policy the Bush Administration, along with Mexico and Canada, with the grace from the OIE to go ahead, set back the eradication of BSE, set it back to the stone ages, pre-90. The BSE GBR risk assessments must be adhered to, and strengthened to include all animal TSE. WHEN the OIE chose to ignore the BSE GBR risk assessments, to go with the more industry friendly BSE MRR policy, they sold there soul to the devil as far as i am concerned, (never did much good anyway, all one has to do is look at all the documented BSE countries now that went by the OIE very weak BSE surveillance guidelines to begin with),


* GAO-05-51 October 2004 FOOD SAFETY (over 500 customers receiving
potentially BSE contaminated beef) - TSS 10/20/04


October 2004 FOOD SAFETY
USDA and FDA Need
to Better Ensure
Prompt and Complete
Recalls of Potentially
Unsafe Food

snip...

Page 38 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
To examine the voluntary recall of beef products associated with the
December 2003 discovery of an animal infected with BSE, we analyzed the
distribution lists USDA collected from companies and the verification
checks it conducted to develop a diagram illustrating the location and
volume of recalled beef that reached different levels of the distribution
chain. We compared the distribution lists and verification checks to
identify how many customers listed on the distribution lists did not
receive
the recalled beef and the number of customers not listed on distribution
lists that received the recalled beef. We interviewed USDA and FDA staff
involved with the recall to understand the timing of recall actions and the
challenges encountered during the recall.
To develop information on the 2002 recall of ground beef by a ConAgra
plant in Greeley, Colorado, we reviewed USDA s recall file and other
documents on the recall. We also met with the department s Office of
Inspector General and reviewed the Inspector General s September 2003
report.1
We conducted our review from May 2003 through August 2004 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
1U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General, Great
Plains Region Audit
Report: Food Safety and Inspection Service: Oversight of Production
Process and Recall at
ConAgra Plant (Establishment 969), Report No. 24601-2-KC (September 2003).
Page 39 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
Appendix II
Federal Actions Associated with the
Discovery of an Animal in the United States
Infected with BSE Appendix II
On December 23, 2003, USDA announced that a cow in the state of
Washington had tested positive for BSE commonly referred to as mad
cow disease. This appendix describes the actions USDA took to recall the
meat and the actions FDA took with respect to FDA-regulated products,
such as animal feed and cosmetics, made from rendered parts of the
animal.
Beef Recall Was
Triggered by a BSEPositive
Sample from
One Cow
On December 9, 2003, the recalling company slaughtered 23 cows. USDA,
in accordance with its BSE surveillance policy at the time, took a
sample of
1 cow that was unable to walk, although the condition of the tested cow is
now disputed. USDA did not process the sample in its Ames, Iowa National
Veterinary Services Laboratory in an expedited manner because the cow
did not show symptoms of neurological disorder. USDA test results
indicated a presumptive positive for BSE on December 23, 2003.
Recall Begun in
December 2003 Was
Completed in March
2004
On December 23, 2003, after learning about the positive BSE test, USDA
headquarters notified the Boulder District Office, which is the field
office
with jurisdiction over the recalling firm. The Boulder District began
gathering information about the recalling company s product distribution.
Field staff telephoned the recalling company and were on-site at 7:00 p.m.
The Boulder District initially thought 3 days of the recalling company s
production would have to be recalled, but further examination of facility
cleanup and shipping records revealed that it was only necessary to
recall 1
day of production. USDA recall staff convened at 9:15 p.m. and discussed
the science related to BSE and whether the recalling company s cleanup
practices were sufficient to limit the recall to 1 day of production.
Following USDA s determination to conduct a Class II recall that is, the
beef posed a remote possibility of adverse health consequences USDA
contacted the recalling company to discuss recall details and the press
release. The press release and Recall Notification Report were released
that evening.
On December 24, 2003, USDA s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS)
sent inspectors to the recalling company s primary customers to obtain
secondary customer distribution lists and product shipping records. USDA
conducted 100 percent verification checks for this recall it contacted
every customer that received the recalled meat. This level of verification
checks is well above the percentage of checks conducted by USDA district
offices for the Class I recalls we reviewed.
Appendix II
Federal Actions Associated with the
Discovery of an Animal in the United States
Infected with BSE
Page 40 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
On December 26, 2003, USDA began checking the primary and secondary
customers of the recalling company that it was aware of, although the
entire product distribution chain was unknown. During the checks, USDA
tried to determine if the product was further distributed, and it used
verification checks to acquire distribution lists for secondary and
tertiary
customers of the recalling company.
Verification checks continued until February 25, 2004. Three USDA
districts conducted these verification checks. The Boulder District
coordinated the checks and assigned checks to the Minneapolis District
Office for customers in Montana and to the Alameda District Office for
customers in California. USDA required that 100 percent of the primary
checks, 50 percent of the secondary checks, and 20 percent of the tertiary
checks be conducted on-site. According to USDA, more than 50 percent of
the secondary checks were actually conducted on-site. FDA officials
helped conduct verification checks. According to USDA, the recall took a
long time to complete because USDA contacted each customer at least
twice. USDA first contacted each customer to conduct the check and again
to verify product disposition.
On February 25, 2004, the Boulder District concluded that the recall was
conducted in an effective manner. On March 1, 2004, USDA s Recall
Management Division recommended that the agency terminate the recall,
and USDA sent a letter to the recalling company to document that USDA
considered the recall to be complete.
Recall Was
Complicated by
Inaccurate Distribution
Lists and Mixing of
Potentially
Contaminated and
Noncontaminated Beef
USDA used distribution lists and shipping records to piece together where
the recalled product was distributed. According to USDA, one of the
recalling company s three primary customers was slow in providing its
customer list. USDA could not begin verification activities for that
primary
customer without this list. Furthermore, some customers of the recalling
company provided USDA with imprecise lists that did not specify which
customers received the recalled product. As a consequence, USDA could
not quickly determine the scope of product distribution and had to take
time conducting extra research using shipping invoices to determine which
specific customers received the product.
Even when USDA determined the amount and location of beef, the agency
still had trouble tracking the beef in certain types of establishments,
such
as grocery store distributors. USDA could not easily track the individual
stores where those distributors sent the beef because of product mixing
Appendix II
Federal Actions Associated with the
Discovery of an Animal in the United States
Infected with BSE
Page 41 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
and the distributors record-keeping practices. Generally, distributors
purchase beef from multiple sources, mix it in their inventory, and lose
track of the source of the beef they send to the stores that they
supply. To
deal with this problem, USDA first identified the dates when recalled beef
was shipped to the distributors and then asked for a list of the stores
that
were shipped any beef after those dates. Consequently, some stores were
included in the recall that may never have received recalled beef.
The recall was also complicated by repeated mixing of recalled beef with
nonrecalled beef, thereby increasing the amount of meat involved in the
recall. The recalling company slaughtered 23 cows on December 9, 2003,
and shipped those and 20 other carcasses to a primary customer on
December 10, 2003. The recalling company s carcasses were tagged to
identify the slaughter date and the individual cow. The primary customer
removed the identification tags and mixed the 23 recalled carcasses with
the 20 nonrecalled carcasses. Because the carcasses could not be
distinguished, the recall included all 43 carcasses at the primary
customer.
After one round of processing at the primary customer, the meat from the
carcasses was shipped to two other processing facilities. Both
establishments further mixed the recalled meat from the 43 carcasses with
meat from other sources. In all, the mixing of beef from 1 BSE-positive cow
resulted in over 500 customers receiving potentially contaminated beef.
Imprecise distribution lists and the mixing of recalled beef combined to
complicate USDA s identification of where the product went. Specifically,
on December 23, 2003, USDA s initial press release stated that the
recalling
company was located in Washington State. Three days later, on December
26, 2003, USDA announced that the recalled beef was distributed within
Washington and Oregon. On December 27, 2003, USDA determined that one
of the primary customers of the recalling firm distributed beef to
facilities
in California and Nevada, in addition to Washington and Oregon, for a total
of four states. On December 28, 2003, USDA announced that some of the
secondary customers of the recalling company may also have distributed
the product to Alaska, Montana, Hawaii, Idaho, and Guam, for a total of
eight states and one territory.
On January 6, 2004, over 2 weeks from recall initiation, USDA determined
that the beef went to only six states Washington, Oregon, California,
Nevada, Idaho, and Montana and that no beef went to Alaska, Hawaii, or
Guam. To reach that conclusion, USDA used the distribution lists, shipping
records, and sales invoices that it received from companies to piece
together exactly where the recalled beef may have been sent. The lists
Appendix II
Federal Actions Associated with the
Discovery of an Animal in the United States
Infected with BSE
Page 42 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
showed that 713 customers may have received the recalled beef; 6 of those
may have received beef from more than one source. USDA determined that
176 customers on the lists did not actually receive recalled beef,
including
the customers in Guam and Hawaii. USDA s review also indicated that
recalled beef was probably not shipped to Alaska or Utah, and USDA
checked 2 retailers in Alaska and 3 retailers in Utah to confirm that
was the
case. In total, USDA conducted verification checks on 537 of the 713
customers on the lists. USDA s initial checks identified an additional 45
customers that may have received the recalled beef that were not included
on the distribution lists, for a total of 582 verification checks. Figure 4
summarizes USDA s verification efforts during the recall.
Appendix II
Federal Actions Associated with the
Discovery of an Animal in the United States
Infected with BSE
Page 43 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
Figure 4: USDA s Recall Verification Checks by Location and Customer
Type for Meat Associated with the Animal Infected with
BSE
Note: USDA checked 15 primary, 40 secondary, and 526 tertiary customers
plus the recalling
company, for a total of 582 verification checks.
USDA s press release stated that the recall involved 10,410 pounds of beef
products, and the USDA recall coordinator for this recall told us that
downstream processors mixed the recalled beef with nonrecalled beef, for
a total of more than 38,000 pounds of beef that was distributed at the
secondary customer level. According to USDA officials involved with the

snip...see chart

( ) Acronyms in parentheses are postal abbreviations for each state.
Source: GAO analysis of USDA verification check documents.
Appendix II
Federal Actions Associated with the
Discovery of an Animal in the United States
Infected with BSE
Page 44 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs

recall, the precise amount of meat that was sold at the retail level is
unknown because retailers at the tertiary level further mixed nonrecalled
meat with potentially contaminated meat. USDA told us that more than
64,000 pounds of beef was ultimately returned or destroyed by customers,
and that, because of the mixing, it was not able to determine how much of
the original 10,410 pounds of recalled beef was contained in the 64,000
pounds that were recovered.
FDA s Role in USDA s
Recall
Parts of the BSE-infected animal slaughtered on December 9, 2003, were
not used for food, but they were sent to renderers to be separated into raw
materials, such as proteins and blood. Rendered materials are used for
many purposes, including cosmetics and vaccines. FDA has jurisdiction
over renderers.
When USDA learned of the BSE-infected cow on December 23, 2003, the
agency immediately notified FDA. On December 24, 2003, FDA sent an
inspection team to a renderer that handled materials from the BSE cow.
Inspectors confirmed that the parts of the slaughtered BSE positive cow
were on the premises. FDA later identified a second company that
potentially rendered material from the slaughtered BSE cow. Both
renderers agreed to voluntarily hold all product processed from the
diseased cow and dispose of the product as directed by FDA and local
authorities.
On January 7, 2004, 15 containers of potentially contaminated, rendered
material (meat and bone meal) were inadvertently loaded on a ship, and on
January 8, 2004, the ship left Seattle, Washington, for Asia. The renderer
initiated steps to recover the shipped material, so it could be disposed
of as
directed by FDA and local authorities. The ship carrying the material
returned to the United States on February 24, 2004, and the material was
disposed of in a landfill on March 2, 2004.
On January 12, 2004, FDA asked both renderers to expand their voluntary
holds to rendered materials processed from December 23, 2003, through
January 9, 2004, because they may have rendered some recalled meat or
trim that was recovered from retail establishments. Both renderers agreed
to the expanded product hold. In total, FDA requested that renderers
voluntarily hold approximately 2,000 tons of rendered material. FDA
confirmed that none of the potentially contaminated, rendered material
entered commerce, because FDA accounted for all rendered material. FDA
Appendix II
Federal Actions Associated with the
Discovery of an Animal in the United States
Infected with BSE
Page 45 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
reported that no recall was necessary because no product was distributed
commercially by the rendering companies.
USDA and FDA
Worked Together on
the Recall
USDA and FDA worked together in two ways. First, both agencies notified
each other if their investigations yielded any information about products
within the jurisdiction of the other agency. For instance, when conducting
the second round of verification checks, USDA tracked the disposition of
the product to renderers and landfills and notified FDA when the product
went to renderers. Second, FDA officials helped conduct verification
checks. FDA conducted 32 of the 582 verification checks (approximately 5
percent) for the USDA recall. Officials from both agencies indicated they
regularly interacted and shared information. Table 3 outlines the agencies
actions.
Table 3: Detailed Timeline of USDA, FDA, and Company Actions Related to
the Discovery of an Animal Infected with BSE
Date USDA recall actions FDA actions Company actions
12/9/03 " USDA samples cow for BSE. " BSE cow is slaughtered.
12/11/03 " Sample is sent to Ames, Iowa, for BSE
testing.
" Recalling company sends
carcasses to primary customer for
processing.
12/12/03 " Primary customer sends meat
products to two other primary
customers for further processing.
12/12 -
12/23/03
" Other primary customers distribute
recalled product to secondary
customers.
" Secondary customers distribute
recalled product to tertiary
customers.
12/23/03 " BSE test results are presumptively
positive.
" Recall meeting.
" Initiation of voluntary recall.
" Press release.
" FDA notified of BSE test results.
" FDA dispatches investigation teams.
12/24/03 " FDA inspects Renderer 1.
" FDA determines some rendered
material from Renderer 1 is intended
for Indonesia.
" FDA discovers some material may
have been sent to Renderer 2.
" Renderer 1 agrees to hold remaining
rendered material.
" Recalling company contacts
primary customers.
" Primary customers contact their
customers.
Appendix II
Federal Actions Associated with the
Discovery of an Animal in the United States
Infected with BSE
Page 46 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
12/25/03 " USDA receives confirmation from
reference lab in England that cow in
question is BSE positive.
12/26/03 " Verification checks begin
" USDA announces recalled product in
Washington State and Oregon.
" FDA begins process of comparing
records to ensure all products from
Renderers 1 and 2 are accounted for.
" Renderer 2 agrees to hold all material
that may have been derived from
BSE cow. None of the rendered
material has been distributed.
12/27/03 " USDA announces recalled product was
distributed in Washington State,
Oregon, California, and Nevada.
" FDA issues statement confirming that
the rendering plants that processed
all of the nonedible material from the
BSE cow have placed a voluntary
hold on all of the potentially infectious
product, none of which had left the
control of the companies and entered
commercial distribution.
12/28/03 " USDA announces recalled product was
distributed in Washington State,
Oregon, California, Nevada, Montana,
Idaho, Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam.
12/29/03 " Food Safety and Inspection Service
determines that the recalled meat
products were distributed to 42
locations, with 80 percent of the
products distributed to stores in
Oregon and Washington State.
12/31/03 " FDA offers assistance to USDA to
complete recall verification checks.
1/6/04 " USDA determines recalled product
was only distributed in Washington
State, Oregon, California, Nevada,
Montana, and Idaho.
1/8/04 " FDA is notified by the renderer that
some of the rendered material on
hold from Renderer 1 was
inadvertently shipped to Asia.
Renderer 1 commits to isolate and
return the rendered material.
" Rendering company notifies FDA of
shipment of product on hold.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Date USDA recall actions FDA actions Company actions
Appendix II
Federal Actions Associated with the
Discovery of an Animal in the United States
Infected with BSE
Page 47 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
Source: GAO analysis of USDA and FDA information.
1/12/04 " FDA advises Renderers 1 and 2 that
they may have rendered meat or trim
subject to recall from retail stores.
" FDA requests Renderers 1 and 2 to
place all rendered material from
December 23 to January 9 on hold.
" FDA determines neither renderer had
shipped rendered material
manufactured after December 23,
2003.
2/9/04 " All rendered material was disposed of
in landfill, except material shipped to
Asia.
2/24/04 " Ship carrying rendered material
returns to U.S. port.
2/25/04 " Verification checks complete.
" USDA Boulder District Office
concludes recall is effective.
3/1/04 " Recall is closed.
3/2/04 " FDA observes disposal in landfill of
remaining rendered material...

snip...

REPORTS

1. Food Safety: USDA and FDA Need to Better Ensure Prompt and Complete
Recalls of Potentially Unsafe Food. GAO-05-51, October 7.tss
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-51
Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d0551high.pdf


Appendix C. Agents that require specific government approval for scientific investigations within the USA.a


Select agents, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services onlyb
High consequence pathogens and agents, U.S. Department of Agriculture onlyc
HIgh consequence livestock pathogens and toxins, overlap agents and toxinsd


(NO HUMAN TSE LISTED ???...tss) BSE agent


http://www.nwhc.usgs.gov/publications/disease_emergence/AppendixC.pdf


QFC sued over mad cow case

Grocer negligently exposed them to beef, family claims

Friday, March 5, 2004

By LEWIS KAMB
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER REPORTER

An Eastside family who says they ate beef linked to the nation's only
known case of mad cow disease yesterday filed a class-action lawsuit
against QFC, claiming the grocery store chain negligently exposed them
and others to "highly hazardous" meat and did not properly notify them
that they had bought it.

Attorneys for Jill Crowson, a 52-year-old interior designer from Clyde
Hill, filed the lawsuit in King County Superior Court on behalf of her
family and possibly hundreds of other customers who unwittingly bought
and consumed beef potentially exposed to mad cow disease.

"I was pretty upset about it," Crowson said. "I've spent all of my kids'
lives trying to be a responsible parent for them to keep them safe. I
felt badly that the food I served could be harmful to their health."

The lawsuit is believed to be the first stemming from this country's
only confirmed case of mad cow disease, or bovine spongiform
encephalopathy, which was detected in a slaughtered Holstein from a
Yakima Valley ranch on Dec. 23.

Neither officials at Quality Food Centers' Bellevue headquarters, or
Kroger -- the company's Ohio-based corporate parent -- could be reached
for comment about the lawsuit yesterday.

The suit contends the family bought and later ate ground beef from their
local QFC that was part of a batch processed at Vern's Moses Lake Meats
on Dec. 9 and included meat from the diseased Holstein.

The beef was later shipped to wholesalers and retailers in Washington,
Oregon, California, Idaho, Montana and Nevada.

On Dec. 23 -- after government scientists confirmed the Holstein was
infected with BSE -- businesses began pulling potentially affected beef
from store shelves under a voluntary recall.

But the family's suit claims that, although QFC was aware of the recall
on Dec. 23, the store did not begin pulling the recalled beef from about
40 of its stores that carried it until Dec. 24.

The company also did not try to warn customers about the recalled beef
until Dec. 27 -- and only then with small, inconspicuous signs inside
the stores, the suit claims.

Steve Berman, the family's attorney, said the company had "a duty to
warn" consumers who bought the beef under terms of the Washington
Product Liability Act.

QFC could've easily notified customers by taking out TV, radio or
newspaper ads, or by tracking and notifying those who bought the beef
through customers' QFC Advantage Cards, Berman said.

At Berman's downtown Seattle firm yesterday, Crowson described how on
Dec. 22 and Dec. 23 -- the day of the recall -- she bought single
packages of "9 percent leanest ground beef" from her local QFC store at
Bellevue Village.

Crowson took the beef home, cooked it and made tacos one night and
spaghetti the next -- serving the dinners to herself; her daughter,
Laura, 22; son, Nicholas, 19; and her niece, Claire De Winter, 23.
Members of the family also ate leftovers from those meals for the next
several days, Crowson said.

"When the news about mad cow came out, I instantly became concerned,"
Crowson said. "But the initial stories didn't mention anything about
QFC, so I thought we were OK."

While shopping at the grocery store a few days later, Crowson said she
asked a store butcher whether QFC stores had sold any of the recalled
beef. The butcher assured her they had not, she said.

The family only learned QFC had sold any of the beef in question after
reading a news story Jan. 10 about a Mercer Island man who discovered
his family had eaten affected beef that he bought at a local QFC store,
Crowson said.

Crowson later called QFC and faxed the company a signed letter asking
that it track purchases made on her QFC Advantage Card -- a store
discount card issued to customers. On Jan. 12, the company notified
Crowson that the beef she bought and served to her family was, in fact,
part of the recalled batch, she said.

Scientists believe people who eat beef from infected cows can contract a
fatal form of the disease.

The family is "now burdened with the possibility that they presently
carry (the disease) that may have an incubation period of up to 30
years," the lawsuit says.

Lawyers for the family say they believe hundreds, if not thousands, of
QFC customers, and those of other stores, likely ate beef from the
recalled batch -- the reason why Berman filed their legal claim as a
class-action lawsuit. A USDA official this week said that up to 17,000
pounds of meat affected by the recall likely was eaten or thrown out by
customers.

Berman added that an investigator from his firm learned that QFC buys
beef for its "9 percent leanest ground beef" products in large tubs that
can weigh several hundred pounds, and then regrinds and packages the
meat for sale.

Because QFC stores regrind the beef before selling it, Berman contends
that makes the store a manufacturer responsible under the Washington
Product Liability Act for not selling any unsafe product.

Scientists believe people who eat beef from cows infected with BSE can
contract variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob, a fatal brain-wasting disease that
has been detected in about 150 people worldwide.

However, officials with the U.S. Agriculture Department have repeatedly
said the risk from eating muscle cuts from an infected cow -- the likely
cut of meat processed and sold for hamburger in the recalled batch -- is
extremely low.

Although Crowson said she tries not to "obsess over it," she is fearful
that her family could one day become sick.

"It's pretty scary," she said.

Because no medical test is available to determine whether a living
person is infected with the disease, the couple's "stress and fear
cannot be allayed," the lawsuit said.

The family seeks unspecified damages for emotional distress and medical
monitoring costs.

Crowson said her reason for bringing the lawsuit isn't about money. "The
more I've thought about this, the angrier I've gotten," she said.


snip...

http://home.hetnet.nl/~mad.cow/archief/2004/mar04/sued.htm

QFC s Delayed Mad Cow Response Draws Lawsuit
Family claims QFC should have used customer database to warn those at
risk sooner

March 05, 2004

SEATTLE A Bellevue, Wash. family today filed a proposed class-action
lawsuit against Quality Food Centers (QFC), a subsidiary of Kroger
(NYSE: KR), claiming the grocery store chain should have used
information gathered through its customer loyalty program to warn those
who purchased beef potentially tainted with mad cow disease.

The suit, filed in King County Superior Court, seeks to represent all
Washington residents who purchased the potentially tainted meat, and
asks the court to establish a medical monitoring fund.

Jill Crowson purchased the potentially tainted beef from a Bellevue QFC
on Dec. 22 and 23, and used her Advantage Card, QFC s customer loyalty
program. She served the meat to her husband over Dec. 25 and 26, and
later heard of the recall in the newspaper.

Steve Berman, the attorney representing the Crowsons, asserts that since
the company tracks purchases, it should have warned the Crowsons and
many other customers who purchased the beef at approximately 40 stores
across Washington.

If you lose your keys with an Advantage Card attached, QFC will return
them to you free of charge, said Berman. If they can contact you over
a lost set of car keys, why couldn t they contact you and tell you that
the beef you purchased could kill you?

QFC is among the large number of grocers that track customer purchases
through loyalty cards like the Advantage Card. Once a customer shares
contact information including name, address and phone number they
are given discounts on certain items.

Regardless of any discounts offered, the loyalty card tracks customers
every purchase and stores them in a central database, the complaint states.

We contend that QFC knew which Advantage Card customers purchased the
suspect meat, and could have easily called to warn them, said Berman.
Instead, QFC used a series of spurious excuses to hide their failure to
act.

On Dec. 23, the U.S. Department of Agriculture ordered the recall of
approximately 10,410 pounds of raw beef that may have been infected with
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), which if consumed by humans can
lead to the always-fatal Cruetzfeldt-Jakobs Disease (vCJD).

According to the complaint, QFC at first mistakenly believed it did not
have any of the affected beef and took no action to remove the product
from its shelves. The store later removed the beef on Dec. 24, but then
did little to warn those who earlier purchased the meat, the suit claims.

It wasn t until Dec. 27 that the grocery chain posted small signs with
information about the recall, the complaint alleges.

The Crowsons contacted QFC when they suspected they had purchased the
potentially tainted meat, but QFC would not confirm their suspicions for
two more weeks, the suit states. According to Berman, the family had to
file a written request before QFC would confirm their fears.

According to health experts, Cruetzfeldt-Jakobs Disease can have an
incubation period of as long as 30 years. There is no test to determine
if infection took place after possible exposure, nor is there any
treatment once one is infected. The condition is always fatal.

If the court grants the suit class-action status, QFC would likely be
compelled to turn over the names of those who purchased the potentially
tainted beef.

The proposed class-action claims QFC violated provisions of the
Washington Product Liability Act by failing to give adequate warning to
consumers about the potentially dangerous meat.

The suit seeks unspecified damages for the plaintiffs, as well as the
establishment of a medical monitoring fund.

http://www.hagens-berman.com/frontend?command=PressRelease&task=viewPressReleaseDetail&iPressReleaseId=654

QFC's Delayed Mad Cow Response Draws Lawsuit

... subsidiary of Kroger , claiming the grocery store chain should ...
beef potentially tainted with "mad cow disease ... beef at approximately
40 stores across Washington. ...
www.forrelease.com/D20040305/ sff005.P2.03042004214558.03634.html - 9k -

040307 Woman Sues QFC Over Mad-Cow Recall
... Jakob disease, the
human form of mad-cow, from eating ... QFC is subject to the Washington
Product Liability ... been found in a slaughtered Yakima County dairy
cow. ...
www.spcnetwork.com/mii/2004/040307.htm - 6k

Subject: GOVERNOR SCHWARZENEGGER PREFERS CALIFORNIANS TO EAT MAD COW
BEEF IN SECRECY, VETOED BILL SB 1585
Date: October 1, 2004 at 2:22 pm PST

GOVERNOR SCHWARZENEGGER PREFERS CALIFORNIANS TO EAT MAD COW BEEF IN
SECRECY, VETOED BILL SB 1585

Schwarzenegger Vetoes Meat Recall Disclosure Bill

Legislation Would Have Identified Stores that Received Contaminated Meat
and Poultry

Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger (R-CA) vetoed a bill yesterday that would
have let Californians know whether they ve purchased contaminated meat
or poultry. The bill, SB 1585, would have ended a secrecy agreement
between the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and California that
prevents the state from disclosing the names and locations of stores
that receive shipments of recalled meat.

Consumers have a right to know if they purchased recalled meat or
poultry, said Ken Kelly, Staff Attorney at the Center for Science in
the Public Interest (CSPI). Why force families to roll the dice when
they put food on the table? Governor Schwarzenegger prefers a
get-sick-first, ask-questions-later policy.

Earlier this year, California was one of several states that received
meat from the Washington State cow that tested positive for mad cow
disease. But because California is one of 12 states that have signed a
secrecy agreement with USDA, state health officials were prohibited from
identifying stores or restaurants that may have received beef from the
infected cow. Even recalled meat tainted with deadly E. coli 0157:H7
bacteria would be subject to the secrecy agreement, leaving consumers
uncertain as to whether the ground beef in their refrigerator were safe
to eat.

In his veto message, Governor Schwarzenegger indicated he would instruct
the state s health department to renegotiate an agreement that would
allow USDA to share recall information with local public health
officials. But according to CSPI, even if USDA agreed to share recall
information with local officials, the local officials would be similarly
prohibited from disclosing names of retail outlets with consumers. In
August, CSPI urged USDA not to force states to sign any such secrecy
agreements.
Federal and state government should be more concerned with protecting
consumers from unnecessary hospitalizations and deaths associated with
food-borne illness, and less concerned with protecting grocers and meat
producers from bad publicity, Kelly said.

http://cspinet.org/new/200410011.html


SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNTY

JILL CROWSON, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS

VS

QUALITY FOOD CENTERS, INC., an Ohio corporation Defendent

NO. 04-2-05608-0 SEA

snip...

The Court hereby GRANTS the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's
claims based on a manufacturer's strict liability (Counts I and II) and
DENIES the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claim of negligence
by a product seller (Count III).

DATED this 14th day of June, 2004

snip...


http://www.hagens-berman.com/files/Mad%20Cow%20Order%20Denying%20Motion%20to%20Dismiss1088546283878.pdf


Date Filed: March 5, 2004
Court: King County Superior Court (Washington)
Location: Seattle
Ticker Symbol: NYSE:KR

Join This Suit
Tell a Friend


Consumers filed a proposed class-action lawsuit against Quality Food Centers
(QFC), a subsidiary of Kroger (NYSE: KR), claiming the grocery store chain
should have used information gathered through its customer loyalty program
to warn those who purchased beef potentially tainted with �mad cow disease.�
The USDA issued a recall notice for the meat on December 23, 2003. QFC sold
the meat through its approximately 40 stores across Washington.

The suit claims that even though QFC had the ability to quickly warn every
customer who purchased the potentially deadly meat if they used the QFC
Advantage Card at the time of purchase, the grocery store neglected to do
so.

The suit seeks to represent every consumer in Washington state who purchased
the recalled meat from QFC.

Recent Updates

June 14, 2004 - the King County Superior Court gave the green light to a
suit claiming QFC didn't do enough to warn customers about beef potentially
tainted with 'mad cow disease,' finding enough questions about the beef and
QFC's responsibility to explore in the courtroom.

Read the court order.


http://www.hagens-berman.com/frontend?command=Lawsuit&task=viewLawsuitDetail&iLawsuitId=653


QFC - 'Mad Cow' Frequently Asked Questions


The Suit

What is the key issue in this suit?
On December 23, 2003, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
recalled more than 10,000 pounds of raw beef that could have been exposed to
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). Humans consuming BSE-tainted meat
can contract Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), an always-fatal condition.

QFC sold this meat throughout its stores in Washington. Even though QFC had
the ability to quickly warn every customer who purchased the potentially
deadly meat if they used the QFC advantage card at the time of purchase, the
grocery store neglected to do so, the suit alleges.

Who does the suit seek to represent?
The suit seeks to represent all persons who purchased recalled meat from any
QFC store in the state of Washington.

Who are the defendants?
Quality Food Centers, or QFC. Once a local, Northwest company, QFC is now a
wholly owned subsidiary of the grocery chain giant, Kroger.

What does the suit seek?
The suit asks the court to order QFC to establish a medical monitoring fund
which would allow those who purchased and consumed the meat to seek medical
care, checking for � and if necessary, treating --- the infection of vCJD.
The suit also seeks the creation of a medical notification system, allowing
those who may have been exposed to the disease to receive periodic updates
on research and treatment of vCJD. The suit also seeks unspecified damages
for the plaintiffs.

Does the suit claim QFC violated specific laws?
Yes. The lawsuit claims QFC violated the Washington Product Liability Act.
In addition, the suit claims QFC was negligent by not warning consumers of
the dangers associated with the affected meat.

Where was the lawsuit filed?
The suit was filed in King County Superior Court on March 4, 2004.

How do I determine if I qualify to join the lawsuit?
If you have a QFC Advantage card and believe that you bought recalled meat
from a QFC store, you may be eligible to join the lawsuit. Click here to
fill out the sign-up request form, or you can contact Hagens Berman
attorneys.

QFC


What is the QFC Advantage Card?
The Advantage Card is known in the grocery industry as a Customer Loyalty
Card. Customers who sign up for QFC�s Advantage Card receive special
discounts on selected items, but gives the grocery store chain the ability
to track consumers� purchases in order to enhance their marketing efforts.
In addition, grocery chains which offer affinity card programs often use the
database and shopping pattern data to send users coupons and other marketing
material. According to the complaint, QFC tracks every purchase made by
consumers presenting the Advantage Card, including product description, date
of purchase, store of purchase and the price, and saves that data with
customer contact information.

What was QFC�s response to the meat recall?
On Dec. 23, 2003, QFC received notice from the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) of a recall of approximately 10,410 lbs. of raw meat that
may have been contaminated with the infectious agent that causes �mad cow�
disease. QFC did not act immediately on the recall notice but initially
responded by denying that it had any of the tainted meat. On December 24 QFC
pulled the meat from its shelves, but the company took no steps to directly
warn consumers. It was not until Dec. 27 that QFC posted small signs in its
stores recalling the tainted beef, according to the complaint. During that
four day period when QFC was silent hundreds of consumers may have eaten the
meat.

Can QFC determine if an Advantage Card holder purchased the potentially
dangerous meat?
Yes. In fact, consumers can now contact QFC directly and the company will
provide information about meat purchases � but only if you ask. Hundreds of
other consumers who purchased the meat and are unaware of the situation have
not heard from QFC, the complaint states.

Why was QFC sued even though they pulled the meat?
Under Washington law since QFC ground the meat it is deemed a manufacturer
and is strictly liable for any unsafe product. In addition QFC possessed
specific and easily obtainable information on which customers purchased the
recalled meat, but did not act to inform customers, the suit states.
Considering the potential danger and risk of worry for consumers, and the
ease of contacting consumers using database information, simply pulling the
meat from the shelves and belatedly posting small signs was not an adequate
response, according to the complaint.

What information on customer purchases does QFC track with the Advantage
Card?
QFC tracks every purchase that a customer with an Advantage Card makes,
regardless of whether discounts are offered or not, according to the
complaint.

Does the recently announced larger-than-expected recall of beef affect the
lawsuit?
No. Regardless of the size of the beef recall, attorneys believe the facts
in the case remain the same.

How can I find out if I bought recalled meat from QFC?
If you believe that you may have purchased recalled meat from a QFC store,
and you have an Advantage Card, you can contact QFC and ask if your record
shows you purchased recalled beef. You can contact QFC at 866-221-4141.

Isn�t QFC prohibited by privacy laws from contacting consumers with warnings
like this?
No � the suit notes that the company will return car keys returned to the
store if the keys have an Advantage Card attached. According the complaint,
If QFC can return car keys by mail, why can�t they send a notice saying the
meat a customer purchased in their store could cause an incurable, fatal
disease? Further privacy laws would prevent QFC from disclosing information
to third parties, disclosing the information to the customer whose card it
is does not violate privacy laws. For example, if a trade group wanted to
know the names of consumers who purchased a given drug sold at QFC,
disclosure of that private information might be a privacy concern. However,
disclosure to a consumer of his own records is not.

�Mad Cow� Disease

What is Mad Cow disease?
In cows, mad cow disease is defined as bovine spongiform encephalopathy
(BSE), and is a progressive neurological disease. The human disease variant
is know as Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), which is a rare brain disorder
that causes a rapid, progressive dementia and is always fatal, according to
the complaint.

Where can I get more information on Mad Cow disease?
The USDA provides information on the disease at www.usda.gov/.

What should I do if I believe that I�ve eaten recalled meat?
According to the complaint, no screening tests or treatments have been found
for Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. Those who suspect they�ve eaten recalled meat
should contact their physician for more information.


http://www.hagens-berman.com/files/madcowfaq1-13-051105661006369.html


Do Stores That Offer Loyalty Cards Have a Duty to Notify Customers of
Product Safety Recalls?
A Recent Suit Raises This Novel Question
By ANITA RAMASASTRY
----

Thursday, Aug. 05, 2004

An interesting new Washington state court suit raises an important question:
If a retailer benefits from collecting personally identifiable information
about its customers, does it have a corresponding duty to use such data to
alert its customers that products they've bought have been recalled for
health or safety reasons? And if so, could turning over private data to
companies actually create benefits, as well as privacy risks, for the
consumer?

In the suit, consumer Jill Crowson is suing her grocery store -- Quality
Food Center (QFC), a subsidiary of Kroger -- for negligent infliction of
emotional distress and disregard of a "duty to warn" under the Washington
Product Liability Act. Crowson alleges in her complaint that QFC failed to
alert her family that ground beef it had sold them had been recalled in
December's mad-cow scare.

Yet, Crowson says, QFC easily could have done so through information it
maintained connected with her Advantage card - a "loyalty card" that meant
QFC had Crowson's name, address and purchasing information. According to her
complaint, QFC tracks every purchase made by consumers presenting the
Advantage Card, including product description, date of purchase, store of
purchase and the price, and saves that data alongside customer contact
information.

Now, Crowson says, her family members "feel like walking time bombs" knowing
they may be infected with the human form of mad-cow disease which the
complaint states may have an up-to-30-year incubation period. And they are
not the only ones: Crowson is seeking class action status for herself and
what she believes are "hundreds" of similarly-situated Washington customers
at QFC's approximately 40 stores in the state.

Some lawyers think Crowson's suit is a stretch. Federal law does not impose
on companies a specific duty to notify consumers when tainted meat is
recalled under the direction of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA),
as was the case here. Also, Crowson and her family, and the class she seeks
to represent, are suing based on fear (and possible future harm), not
current illness. Moreover, the chance they will actually get Mad Cow Disease
some time in the future are apparently remote.

Nevertheless, the lawsuit has strong intuitive appeal: QFC could have saved
the Crowsons and others like them a lot of worry, and perhaps sleepless
nights, with what appears would have been minimal effort, using information
at its digital fingertips. And the court has already once refused to dismiss
it - finding that there were sufficient factual questions about the beef and
about QFC's responsibility to the Crowsons, to merit further exploration of
the evidence, through discovery and in the courtroom.

Regardless of the outcome of Crowson's suit, it underscores the need for
retailers and policymakers to examine what sort of responsibilities come
with private data gathering under loyalty card schemes.

The Lawsuit: The Chronology of Facts Alleged, and the Loyalty Card at Issue

On December 22 and 23, 2003, Crowson bought ground beef from a QFC store.
Also on December 23, 2003, the USDA recalled Washington beef after it
confirmed that a cow slaughtered in Washington had been infected with Mad
Cow Disease. But Crowson says QFC did not pull the affected meat from its
shelves until December 24, and did not post signs in its stores announcing
the recall until December 27. By then, the Crowson family had eaten the
meat.

Crowson states that she only learned of the recall by reading an article in
her local newspaper. She said she subsequently called the supermarket chain,
then faxed QFC a letter asking that her purchase be traced through her QFC
Advantage card. On January 10, she was notified that her ground beef
purchase was indeed from the recalled batch.

Crowson says that what QFC allegedly did in response to the recall - pulling
the beef from shelves the next day, and posting signs three days after
that -- was far from enough. She says it should have immediately warned
customers who had bought possibly tainted meat through newspaper, radio and
television advertising -- and by contacting individually those who, like
her, had Advantage cards. Its failure to do so, she says, is what makes the
company liable to her and other shoppers.

The Advantage Card is known in the retail industry as a customer "loyalty
card" - providing discounts on specific items, in exchange for consumer
information that will aid in better tailoring the company's marketing
efforts. Combining the data from one's loyalty card application with data
from other commercial databases or public records (for examples, mortgage
records, or court filings) can often allow a very specific profile of each
consumer.

Some states limit the types of information that a grocery store can collect
from you when you register for a loyalty card. For example, California state
law prohibits a grocery store from requiring that you turn over your social
security or your driver's license number.

Companies, of course, stress the potential savings that might result from
use of a loyalty card. Consider, for instance, the sales pitch on the QFC
website it reads: "If you don't have a QFC Advantage Card, you're missing
out! The Advantage Card is a powerful new way to save on the groceries you
buy every day. It gives you the best of all possible worlds: premium
quality, superb service and lower prices. That's something no other grocery
store can match. So make sure you take advantage of the big savings."

Privacy advocates complain that loyalty cards result in the improper use -
and, often, sale to third parties - of customers' private information. QFC
apparently doesn't sell customers' data to third parties, however. Its
website promises that "QFC will not release your name to any list service or
manufacturer, and that such information will be held in the strictest of
confidence-even within our company."

Privacy advocates also warn, however, that even if third-party sales of data
are not allowed, the data compiled can always be accessed with a subpoena or
warrant and used against the customer in court proceedings. Meanwhile,
consumer advocates claim that certain loyalty cards don't really offer the
savings they promise. Nevertheless, numerous stores employ loyalty cards.

Turning the Privacy Debate on Its Head: With Great Information, Comes Great
Responsibility?

The Crowson lawsuit turns the privacy debate on its head. Typically, privacy
advocates ask retailers to safeguard the personal information they collect
about their shoppers. In this case, in contrast, plaintiff is asking that
QFC delve into its database to notify her about a meat recall.

QFC does this very thing if a consumer loses his or her keys with an
Advantage Card attached to them - returning the keys free of charge. So
Crowson's attorney, Steve Berman, asks: "If they can contact you over a lost
set of car keys, why couldn't they contact you and tell you that the beef
you purchased could kill you?"

According to some news reports, QFC was reluctant to call customers
regarding the recall based on privacy concerns. But in this case, the
concerns seem misplaced. No privacy law is violated when a consumer
communicates with the customer herself regarding private information -
indeed, every offer the customer receives is, in a sense, this kind of
communication. When the customer is receiving personalized discounts based
on her purchase history, why can't she receive personalized health and
safety warnings based on that history, too?

Was There a Duty to Warn Here?

From the law's perspective, the question will be not whether QFC ideally
should have warned the Crowsons - of course it should have. The question
will be if it had a legal duty to do so. Such a duty would come from either
the common law of torts, which allows claims where there is a duty to behave
reasonably to prevent foreseeable harm to others. . Or it might come from
the Washington product liability statute - which, as noted above, creates a
"duty to warn" in certain situations.

And of course, if there is no current duty, the legislature may see fit to
pass a statute creating such a duty. :It may seem more prudent, however, for
retailers to voluntarily assume such a responsibility. When companies
benefit from collecting customer information, shouldn't they also assume a
duty to protect customers from known risks associated with that very
information? Some risks, of course, may be a matter of opinion. But this one
was not: The fact of the risk was acknowledged by the USDA recall of the
meat. With this kind of clear notice of the risk, it seems that QFC either
does - or ought to - have a duty to protect customers from this risk.

Of course, should a retailer not wish to take on this responsibility, it can
also change its loyalty program. QFC and other retailers could still track
consumer purchases without asking them for personally identifiable
information.


http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20040805.html


FindLaw's Writ - Ramasastry: Mad Cow in the USA

http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20031230.html



Family to sue grocery chain

A Seattle family that ate beef linked to the US's only known case of BSE has filed a classaction

lawsuit against the grocery chain QFC, claiming the company negligently exposed

them and others to "highly hazardous" meat and did not properly notify them that they had

bought it.34 The suit contends that Jill Crowson and her family bought and later ate ground

beef from their local QFC that was part of a batch processed at Vern's Moses Lake Meats on

9 December 2003 and included meat from the diseased Holstein. The beef was later shipped

to wholesalers and retailers in Washington, Oregon, California, Idaho, Montana and Nevada.

After government scientists confirmed on 23 December that the Holstein was infected with

BSE, businesses began pulling potentially affected beef from store shelves under a voluntary

recall. But, the family's suit claims, although QFC was aware of the recall, the store did not

begin pulling the beef from about 40 of its stores until 24 December. The company also did

not try to warn customers about the recalled beef until 27 December – and only then with

small, inconspicuous signs inside the stores, the suit claims. The family only learned QFC had

9

sold any of the beef in question after reading a news story on 10 January about a man who

discovered his family had eaten affected beef that he bought at a local QFC store, Crowson

said. She later called QFC and faxed the company a signed letter asking that it track

purchases made on her QFC Advantage Card, and on 12 January the company notified

Crowson that the beef she bought and served to her family was, in fact, part of the recalled

batch, she said.

The family seeks unspecified damages for emotional distress and medical monitoring costs.

Crowson said her reason for bringing the lawsuit is not about money. "The more I've thought

about this, the angrier I've gotten," she said. Neither the company nor its parent corporation,

Kroger, have commented.


http://www.which.net/campaigns/food/safety/bse_reports/bserep0304.pdf


-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Pennsylvania Firm Recalls Ground Beef Patties Due To Mislabeling
Date: Fri, 30 Jul 2004 16:01:19 -0500
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
To: [email protected]


Pennsylvania Firm Recalls Ground Beef Patties Due To Mislabeling

Recall Release CLASS III RECALL
FSIS-RC-028-2004 HEALTH RISK: NONE

Congressional and Public Affairs
(202) 720-9113; FAX: (202) 690-0460
Steven Cohen

WASHINGTON, DC - July 28, 2004 - Quaker Maid Meats, Inc., a Reading,
Penn., firm, is voluntarily recalling approximately 170,000 pounds of
ground beef patties due to mislabeling. The beef patties were partially
made from Canadian product that was mislabeled and ineligible for import
to the U.S.

Products subject to recall include:

* 5-pound boxes of "PHILLY-GOURMET, 100% PURE BEEF, HOMESTYLE
PATTIES" with a packaging code of 1974 or 2024.
* 3-pound boxes of "PHILLY-GOURMET, 100% PURE BEEF, HOMESTYLE
PATTIES" with a packaging code of 1974 or 2024.
* 3-pound boxes of "The Philly Homestyle Beef Patty" with a
packaging code of 1984 or 2014.


The products also bear the "Est. 2748" inside the USDA mark of
inspection. The patties were produced on July 15, 16, 19 and 20 and were
shipped to distribution centers and retail stores in Pennsylvania, New
Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, Wisconsin and
Maine.

Consumers and media with questions about the recall may contact company
General Manager Todd Bray at 610-376-1500, ext. 114.

Consumers with food safety questions can phone the toll-free USDA Meat
and Poultry Hotline at 1-888-MPHotline (l-888-674-6854). The hotline is
available in English and Spanish and can be reached from l0 a.m. to 4
p.m. (Eastern Time) Monday through Friday. Recorded food safety messages
are available 24 hours a day.
Product label photos:
Label of 5-pound boxes of PHILLY-GOURMET, 100% PURE BEEF, HOMESTYLE PATTIES
Label of 3-pound boxes of The Philly Homestyle Beef Patty
Label of 3-pound boxes of PHILLY-GOURMET, 100% PURE BEEF, HOMESTYLE PATTIES
#


http://www.fsis.usda.gov/News_&_Events/Recall_028_2004_Release/index.asp


> Recall Release CLASS III RECALL
> FSIS-RC-028-2004 HEALTH RISK: NONE
>

IF there is NO risk, why the recall? why the ban?

Of all the species exposed naturally to the bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE) agent, the greater kudu (Tragelaphus
strepsiceros), a nondomesticated bovine from Africa, appears to be
the most susceptible to the disease. We present the results of mouse
bioassay studies to show that, contrary to findings in cattle with
BSE in which the tissue distribution of infectivity is the most
limited recorded for any of the transmissible spongiform
encephalopathies (TSE), infectivity in greater kudu with BSE is
distributed in as wide a range of tissues as occurs in any TSE. BSE
agent was also detected in skin, conjunctiva, and salivary gland,
tissues in which infectivity has not previously been reported in any
naturally occurring TSE. The distribution of infectivity in greater
kudu with BSE suggests possible routes for transmission of the
disease and highlights the need for further research into the
distribution of TSE infectious agents in other host species.

snip...

FULL TEXT;

http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol10no6/pdfs/03-0615.pdf



sadly, this bad joke was on them with the infamous ukbsenvCJD only myth ;



USA MAD COW STRAIN MORE VIRULENT TO HUMANS THAN UK STRAIN

18 January 2007 - Draft minutes of the SEAC 95 meeting (426 KB) held on 7
December 2006 are now available.


snip...



64. A member noted that at the recent Neuroprion meeting, a study was
presented showing that in transgenic mice BSE passaged in sheep may be more
virulent and infectious to a wider range of species than bovine derived BSE.

Other work presented suggested that BSE and bovine amyloidotic spongiform
encephalopathy (BASE) MAY BE RELATED. A mutation had been identified in the
prion protein gene in an AMERICAN BASE CASE THAT WAS SIMILAR IN NATURE TO A
MUTATION FOUND IN CASES OF SPORADIC CJD.


snip...



http://www.seac.gov.uk/minutes/95.pdf


TSS


[/quote]What makes COOL particularly contentious is that while powerful lobbies like the grocers and meatpackers are fighting it, other food producers enthusiastically support it, hoping foreign-origin labels will steer American shoppers back toward U.S. goods.

They say opponents are citing potential costs only to mask their real concern—consumer reaction. If meat producers are forced to disclose that foreign beef goes into products like hamburger, some say, that could hurt sales, especially given the public's worries about mad cow disease.[/quote]


ANOTHER FINE EXAMPLE OF INDUSTRY COMPLETE DISREGARD FOR SCIENCE AND PUBLIC HEALTH, just for a dollar or two, maybe billions$ body count still low, incubation period still on our side, no big hurry to find out more about BASE and it's relations to the sCJD's$ AND FOR GODS SAKE DON'T LET CREEKSTONE TEST FOR MAD COW, cause the USDA knows that they will find. all in all, it's still a go, sell more beef no matter what, we have the 4th of July coming around the corner. $$$...TSS



[/quote]"I think that there is concern, particularly with regard to some of the Mexican cattle," said Bill Bullard, president of R-CALF, a cattlemen's organ
 

flounder

Well-known member
> Recall Release CLASS III RECALL
> FSIS-RC-028-2004 HEALTH RISK: NONE
>

IF there is NO risk, why the recall? why the ban?

Of all the species exposed naturally to the bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE) agent, the greater kudu (Tragelaphus
strepsiceros), a nondomesticated bovine from Africa, appears to be
the most susceptible to the disease. We present the results of mouse
bioassay studies to show that, contrary to findings in cattle with
BSE in which the tissue distribution of infectivity is the most
limited recorded for any of the transmissible spongiform
encephalopathies (TSE), infectivity in greater kudu with BSE is
distributed in as wide a range of tissues as occurs in any TSE. BSE
agent was also detected in skin, conjunctiva, and salivary gland,
tissues in which infectivity has not previously been reported in any
naturally occurring TSE. The distribution of infectivity in greater
kudu with BSE suggests possible routes for transmission of the
disease and highlights the need for further research into the
distribution of TSE infectious agents in other host species.

snip...

FULL TEXT;

http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol10no6/pdfs/03-0615.pdf



sadly, this bad joke was on them with the infamous ukbsenvCJD only myth ;



USA MAD COW STRAIN MORE VIRULENT TO HUMANS THAN UK STRAIN

18 January 2007 - Draft minutes of the SEAC 95 meeting (426 KB) held on 7
December 2006 are now available.


snip...



64. A member noted that at the recent Neuroprion meeting, a study was
presented showing that in transgenic mice BSE passaged in sheep may be more
virulent and infectious to a wider range of species than bovine derived BSE.

Other work presented suggested that BSE and bovine amyloidotic spongiform
encephalopathy (BASE) MAY BE RELATED. A mutation had been identified in the
prion protein gene in an AMERICAN BASE CASE THAT WAS SIMILAR IN NATURE TO A
MUTATION FOUND IN CASES OF SPORADIC CJD.


snip...



http://www.seac.gov.uk/minutes/95.pdf


TSS


[/quote]What makes COOL particularly contentious is that while powerful lobbies like the grocers and meatpackers are fighting it, other food producers enthusiastically support it, hoping foreign-origin labels will steer American shoppers back toward U.S. goods.

They say opponents are citing potential costs only to mask their real concern—consumer reaction. If meat producers are forced to disclose that foreign beef goes into products like hamburger, some say, that could hurt sales, especially given the public's worries about mad cow disease.[/quote]


ANOTHER FINE EXAMPLE OF INDUSTRY COMPLETE DISREGARD FOR SCIENCE AND PUBLIC HEALTH, just for a dollar or two, maybe billions$ body count still low, incubation period still on our side, no big hurry to find out more about BASE and it's relations to the sCJD's$ AND FOR GODS SAKE DON'T LET CREEKSTONE TEST FOR MAD COW, cause the USDA knows that they will find. all in all, it's still a go, sell more beef no matter what, we have the 4th of July coming around the corner. $$$...TSS



[/quote]"I think that there is concern, particularly with regard to some of the Mexican cattle," said Bill Bullard, president of R-CALF, a cattlemen's organization that, unlike much of the beef industry, supports COOL. "There's a concern that the Mexican label would not be well received. The same could be true of Canada, which has had ongoing [mad cow] disease problems."

Bullard also noted that cattle ranchers, by law, already must keep extensive health records on cattle.[/quote]


i dont know what world that guy lives in, but he is still in complete USA MAD COW DENIAL $$$...TSS



COMMENT FROM TERRY S. SINGELTARY SR. 1/09/2007


snip...



MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the
USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for
exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is
available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are
doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they
exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE
MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did,
thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for
poisoning ???

go figure....


Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518


see full text ;


http://www.regulations.gov/



ATTACHMENT TO SINGELTARY COMMENT 1/09/2007


http://www.regulations.gov/



EFSA Scientific Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of the United States of America (USA)


Summary of the Scientific Report

The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.

The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge in the early nineties.

A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.

EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.


http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/science/tse_assessments/gbr_assessments/573.html

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/etc/medialib/efsa/science/tse_assessments/gbr_assessments/573.Par.0004.File.dat/sr03_biohaz02_usa_report_v2_en1.pdf



EFSA Scientific Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of Canada



Summary of the Scientific Report

The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in Canada, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in Canada. This scientific report addresses the GBR of Canada as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.

The BSE agent was probably imported into the country middle of the eighties and could have reached domestic cattle in the early nineties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early 90s. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into Canada reached domestic cattle and led to an internal challenge in the early 90s.

A certain risk that BSE-infected cattle entered processing in Canada, and were at least partly rendered for feed, occurred in the early 1990s when cattle imported from UK in the mid 80s could have been slaughtered. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.

EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of Canada is III, i.e. it is confirmed at a lower level that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as the system remains unstable, it is expected that the GBR continues to grow, even if no additional external challenges occur.



http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/science/tse_assessments/gbr_assessments/564.html

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/etc/medialib/efsa/science/tse_assessments/gbr_assessments/564.Par.0001.File.dat/sr02_biohaz02_canada_report_v2_en1.pdf


TSS
 
Top