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BSE & OFFSPRING CULL COMPENSATION

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PORKER

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BSE & OFFSPRING CULL COMPENSATION
EU.

Revised compensation rates applicable to the above schemes and effective for the month of NOVEMBER 2005 are as follows:-

1. BSE Compensation
Compensation payable for an animal slaughtered because it is suspected of being affected by BSE is an amount equal to the lower of either the market value of the animal or the indicative market price (IMP).

This will be up to a maximum of:

£422.00 if BSE is confirmed by post mortem

£527.50 if BSE is not confirmed

2. BSE Offspring Cull Compensation
Compensation will be made in accordance with the following table:

Table - Valuation for November 2005

Cattle type

Age (months)
Dairy
Beef breeding
Beef


Less than 1
£ 84.40
£ 84.40
£ 84.40

1 - less than 3
£ 126.60
£ 126.60
£ 126.60

3 - less than 6
£ 168.80
£ 168.80
£ 168.80

6 - less than 9
£ 211.00
£ 211.00
£ 211.00

9 - less than 12
£ 253.20
£ 253.20
£ 253.20

12 - less than 15
£ 295.40
£ 295.40
£ 295.40

15 - less than 18
£ 337.60
£ 337.60
£ 337.60

18 - less than 21
£ 379.80
£ 379.80
£ 379.80

21 - less than 24
£422.00
£ 422.00
£ 422.00

24 - less than 27
£464.20
£ 464.20
£ 464.20

27 - less than 30
£ 506.40
£506.40
£ 506.40

Over 30
£ 548.60
£ 506.40
OTMS


Compensation stated is based on the Indicative Market Price (IMP) for NOVEMBER 2005

Basic compensation rates will change monthly, by the same percentage as the IMP.

OTMS - The maximum amount payable for animals under the OTMS. Rates change monthly.




--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Notes for editors

BSE compensation and BSE Offspring Cull compensation is paid in England under the provisions of the TSE (England) Regulations 2002. In Wales compensation is paid under the provisions of the TSE (Wales) Regulations 2002.
 

Mike

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This will be up to a maximum of:

£422.00 if BSE is confirmed by post mortem

£527.50 if BSE is not confirmed

Somebody help me out here. You get paid more by the government if the animal is not confirmed? But if it's not confirmed the meat can go into the food supply, but cannot if confirmed? What's wrong with this picture?
 

Kathy

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What's wrong with this picture?? ditto!

Why compensate for something that is not supposed to be here anymore, since they banned the use of ruminant MBM in all animal food products?

What a wicked web they weave, when first they practice to deceive.

For those interested, or know someone with Alzheimer's disease, or other neurological disorders - check out this study.

J. Biol. Chem., Vol. 279, Issue 50, 51958-51964, December 10, 2004

Clioquinol Mediates Copper Uptake and Counteracts Copper Efflux Activities of the Amyloid Precursor Protein of Alzheimer's Disease*

Carina Treiber¶, Andreas Simons, Markus Strauss, Mathias Hafner¶, Roberto Cappai||**, Thomas A. Bayer, and Gerd Multhaup
From the Freie Universitaet Berlin, Institut fuer Chemie/Biochemie, Thielallee 63, D-14195 Berlin, Germany, ZMBH-Center for Molecular Biology, Im Neuenheimer Feld 282, D-69120 Heidelberg, Germany, ¶Fachhochschule Mannheim, Hochschule für Technik und Gestaltung, Windeckstrasse 110, D-68163 Mannheim, Germany, ||Department of Pathology, Centre for Neuroscience, The University of Melbourne, Victoria 3010, Australia and The Mental Health Research Institute, Parkville, Victoria 3052, Australia, and Department of Psychiatry, Division of Neurobiology, University of the Saarland Medical Center, D-66421 Homburg, Germany

Received for publication, July 2, 2004 , and in revised form, September 29, 2004

available on-line at:
http://www.jbc.org/cgi/content/full/279/50/51958
 

flounder

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>Why compensate for something that is not supposed to be here

>anymore, since they banned the use of ruminant MBM in all animal food

>products?





##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################

From: TSS ()
Subject: Hydrolyzed Feather Meal, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-109-5 "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants" USA
Date: October 27, 2005 at 7:33 pm PST


RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II
______________________________
PRODUCT
Hydrolyzed Feather Meal, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-109-5
CODE
Lot number: 11579
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Recalling Firm: Griffin Industries, Inc., Cold Springs, KY, by telephone on September 2, 2005.
Manufacturer: Griffin Industries, Inc., Henderson, KY. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Product may contain prohibited material and is not identified with the cautionary statement: "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants".
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
863/50 lb. bags
DISTRIBUTION
IN

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 28, 2005

###


http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2005/ENF00919.html



RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II
______________________________
PRODUCT
Triple Play Blocks with Rumensin, medicated feed blocks for beef animals, sheep and goats, Recall # V-106-5
CODE
No product labeling or lot coding
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
A-C Feed Ltd, Winters, TX, by telephone and by letter beginning June 2, 2005. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Distribution of a medicated free choice feed block for which there is no New Animal Drug Application on file.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
70.41 tons of Triple Play Blocks and 704.1 pounds of Rumensin 80
DISTRIBUTION
TX

______________________________
PRODUCT
a) Procaine Penicillin - 10, Type B Medicated Feed,
containing penicillin (from 10 g/lb. procaine
penicillin), 6.0 g/lb., packaged in 50-lb. bags.
Recall # V-107-5;
b) Deccox 10X, Type B Medicated Feed, containing
decoquinate, 2,271 mg/lb., packaged in 10-lb.
and 50-lb. bags. Recall # V-108-5
CODE
a) All product that is not labeled with the warning;
b) All product that does not include sheep (as well as
cows and goats) producing milk for food in the
warning statement
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
International Nutrition, Inc., Omaha, NB, by telephone on August 3, 2005 and by fax on August 4, 2005. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
a) Labels lacked required warning to not feed to
chickens or turkeys producing eggs for human consumption;
b) Labels lacked required warning to not feed to sheep
producing milk for food. Cows and goats were properly
listed on the label.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
111/50-lb. bags Procaine Penicillin -- 10;
19887/50-lb. bags and 3,710/10-lb.s Deccox 10X
DISTRIBUTION
KS, NE, MN, IA, CO, MO, and AZ

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 14, 2005

###


http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2005/ENF00917.html


Greetings,



i am still concerned that the FDA et al seems to have stopped posting updates on ruminant feed ban violations??? here are the last ones posted;



BSE -- CVM Updates

June 2005 Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of BSE (June 20, 2005)

March 2005 Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of BSE (March 17, 2005)

November 2004 Update on Ruminant Feed (BSE) Enforcement Activities (November 23, 2004)

FDA Evaluates Test Kits to Detect Animal Proteins in Animal Feed (November 4, 2004)

July 2004 Update on Ruminant Feed (BSE) Enforcement Activities (July 29, 2004)

FDA and USDA Request Comments and Scientific Information on Possible New BSE Safeguards (July 9, 2004)

April 2004 Update on Ruminant Feed (BSE) Enforcement Activities (April 22, 2004)

Update on Ruminant Feed (BSE) Enforcement Activities (February 6, 2004)

Guidance for Investigators on Ruminant Feed (BSE) Inspections Available (November 10, 2003)

Information about Ruminant Feed (BSE) Inspections Available (October 10, 2003)

Update On Ruminant Feed (BSE) Enforcement Activities (September 30, 2003)

NEW VERSION OF BSE INSPECTION CHECKLIST RELEASED (April 22, 2002)

RUMINANT FEED (BSE) ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES (April 15, 2002)

RUMINANT FEED (BSE) ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES (October 30, 2001)

FDA HOLDING PUBLIC HEARING ON RUMINANT FEED (BSE) RULES (October 10, 2001 )

BSE INSPECTION CHECKLIST AVAILABLE ON THE CVM INTERNET HOME PAGE (September 25, 2001)

RUMINANT FEED (BSE) ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES (July 7, 2001 )

CVM PROVIDES INFORMATION ABOUT RUMINANT FEED (BSE) INSPECTIONS (April 19, 2001 )

RUMINANT FEED (BSE) ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES (March 23, 2001 )

UPDATE ON RUMINANT FEED (BSE) ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES (January 10, 2001 )

BSE FEED REGULATION TEAM TO RECEIVE VICE PRESIDENTIAL AWARD (May 13, 1999 )

FDA GUIDANCE ON BSE FEED REGULATION AVAILABLE (July 14, 1998 )

SATELLITE TELECONFERENCE ON FEED RULES ANNOUNCED (May 15, 1998 )

FDA GUIDANCE ON RUMINANT FEED RULES AVAILABLE (March 26, 1998)

INFORMATION FOR DAIRY AND BEEF PRODUCERS -- PROTEIN FEED RULES (January 22, 1998)

DEADLINE FOR RUMINANT FEED RULE (October 9, 1997)

REQUEST FOR COMMENT ON RUMINANT FEED DRAFT RULE -- MAMMALIAN PROTEINS PROHIBITED IN RUMINANT FEED (April 15, 1997)

FDA PROPOSES PRECAUTIONARY BAN AGAINST RUMINANT-TO-RUMINANT FEEDING (January 2, 1997)

BSE "Fact Sheet"



Web Page Updated by mdt - June 21, 2005, 9:20 AM ET



http://www.fda.gov/cvm/bse_updates.htm



TSS

#################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html ####################
 

flounder

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##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################


From: TSS ()
Subject: MAD COW FEED BAN WARNING LETTER USA June 9, 2005
Date: July 5, 2005 at 8:46 am PST

Department of Health and Human Services Public Health Service
Food and Drug Administration

Minneapolis District Office
Central Region
212 Third Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55401
Telephone: (612) 758-7119
FAX: (612) 334-4142






June 9, 2005

WARNING LETTER

CERTIFIED MAIL
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

Refer to MIN 05-15

Michael J. Langenhorst
President
Anamax Corporation
P.O. Box 10067
Green Bay, WI 54307

Dear Mr. Langenhorst:

Our inspection of your rendering plant located at 505 Hardman Avenue South, South St. Paul, Minnesota, from January 12-20, 2005, revealed significant deviations from the requirements set forth in Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations , Part 589 .2000 (21 CFR 589 .2000), Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed. This regulation is intended to prevent the establishment and amplification of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). Because you failed to follow the requirements of this regulation, products being manufactured and distributed by your facility are adulterated within the meaning of Section 402(a)(4) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act) [21 U.S.C. 342(a)(4)], and misbranded within the meaning of Section 403(a)(1) of the Act [21 U.S.C. 343(a)(1)].

Our investigation found that you failed to provide for measures to prevent commingling or cross-contamination and to maintain sufficient written procedures [21 CFR 589.2000(e)] in that:

1. You failed to use clean-out procedures or other means adequate to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues into feeds that may be used for ruminants.

2. You failed to maintain written procedures specifying the clean-out procedures or other means to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues into feeds that may be used for ruminants.

Our investigation also found that you failed to label products that may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues with the statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." For example, your Feather Meal and Stabilized Poultry By-Product Meal lack this statement, even though the absence of sufficient measures to avoid commingling or cross-contamination may result in these products containing protein derived from mammalian tissues. Because your products do not bear this caution statement, they are misbranded under Section 403(a)(1) of the Act [21 U.S .C. 343(a)(1)).

The above is not intended as an all-inclusive list of violations. As a manufacturer of materials intended for animal feed use, you are responsible for ensuring that your overall operation and the products you manufacture and distribute are in compliance with the law.

You should acknowledge this letter within 15 working days of receiving and include any additional corrective actions concerning your facility. We have received your letter dated January 31, 2005, which replies to the Form FDA-483 issued on January 20, 2005, and your letter dated February 25, 2005, that states all corrections have been implemented. The corrections you have reported appear to be adequate but will be evaluated further during our follow-up inspection.

Your response should be directed to Compliance Officer Jane E . Nelson at the address on the letterhead. If you have any questions regarding this letter, you may phone Ms. Nelson at (612) 758-7119.

Sincerely,

/S/

W. Charles Becoat
Director
Minneapolis District


http://www.fda.gov/foi/warning_letters/g5373d.pdf


TSS

#################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html ####################



----- Original Message -----
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <[email protected]>
To: <[email protected]>
Sent: Sunday, June 26, 2005 6:55 PM
Subject: June 2005 Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread
of BSE and TSE surveillance update in the USA


##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
#####################

From: TSS ()
Subject: June 2005 Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread
of BSE and TSE surveillance update in the USA
Date: June 26, 2005 at 4:49 pm PST

June 20, 2005


June 2005 Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of BSE

To help prevent the establishment and amplification of BSE through feed in
the United States, FDA implemented a final rule that prohibits the use of
most mammalian protein in feeds for ruminant animals. This rule, Title 21
Part 589.2000 of the Code of Federal Regulations, here called the Ruminant
Feed Ban , became effective on August 4, 1997.

This is an update on FDA enforcement activities regarding the ruminant feed
regulation. FDA's CVM has assembled data from the inspections that have been
conducted AND whose final inspection report has been recorded in the FDA's
inspection database as of June 11, 2005. As of June 11, 2005, FDA had
received over 37,000 inspection reports. The majority of these inspections
(around 68%) were conducted by State officials under contract to FDA, with
the remainder conducted by FDA officials.

Inspections conducted by FDA or State investigators are classified to
reflect the compliance status at the time of the inspection based upon the
objectionable conditions documented. These inspection conclusions are
reported as Official Action Indicated (OAI), Voluntary Action Indicated
(VAI), or No Action Indicated (NAI).

An OAI inspection classification occurs when significant objectionable
conditions or practices were found and regulatory sanctions are warranted in
order to address the establishment's lack of compliance with the regulation.
An example of an OAI inspection classification would be findings of
manufacturing procedures insufficient to ensure that ruminant feed is not
contaminated with prohibited material. Inspections classified with OAI
violations will be promptly re-inspected following the regulatory sanctions
to determine whether adequate corrective actions have been implemented.

A VAI inspection classification occurs when objectionable conditions or
practices were found that do not meet the threshold of regulatory
significance, but do warrant advisory actions to inform the establishment of
findings that should be voluntarily corrected. Inspections classified with
VAI violations are more technical violations of the Ruminant Feed Ban. These
include provisions such as minor recordkeeping lapses and conditions
involving non-ruminant feeds.

An NAI inspection classification occurs when no objectionable conditions or
practices were found during the inspection or the significance of the
documented objectionable conditions found does not justify further actions.

The results to date are reported here both by “segment of industry” and “in
total”. NOTE – A single firm can operate as more than one firm type. As a
result, the categories of the different industry segments are not mutually
exclusive.

RENDERERS

These firms are the first to handle and process (i.e., render) animal
proteins and to send these processed materials to feed mills and/or protein
blenders for use as a feed ingredient.

Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA –
263

Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant
feed – 176 (67% of those active firms inspected)

Of the 176 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent
inspection revealed that:

2 firms (1.1%) were classified as OAI

8 firms (4.5%) were classified as VAI

LICENSED FEED MILLS

FDA licenses these feed mills to produce medicated feed products. The
license is required to manufacture and distribute feed using certain potent
drug products, usually those requiring some pre-slaughter withdrawal time.
This licensing has nothing to do with handling prohibited materials under
the feed ban regulation. A medicated feed license from FDA is not required
to handle materials prohibited under the Ruminant Feed Ban.

Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA –
1,069

Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant
feed – 411 (38% of those active firms inspected)

Of the 411 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent
inspection revealed that:

1 firm (0.2%) was classified as OAI

7 firms (1.7%) were classified as VAI

FEED MILLS NOT LICENSED BY FDA

These feed mills are not licensed by the FDA to produce medicated feeds.

Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA –
5,145

Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant
feed – 1,920 (37% of those active firms inspected)

Of the 1,920 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent
inspection revealed that:

2 firms (0.1%) were classified as OAI

27 firms (1.4%) were classified as VAI

PROTEIN BLENDERS

These firms blend rendered animal protein for the purpose of producing
quality feed ingredients that will be used by feed mills.

Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA --
329

Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant
feed – 117 (36% of those active firms inspected)

Of the 117 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent
inspection revealed that:

0 firms (0%) were classified as OAI

3 firms (2.6%) were classified as VAI

RENDERERS, FEED MILLS, AND PROTEIN BLENDERS

This category includes only those firms that actually use prohibited
material to manufacture, process, or blend animal feed or feed ingredients.

Number of active renderers, feed mills, and protein blenders whose initial
inspection has been reported to FDA – 6,550

Number of active renderers, feed mills, and protein blenders processing with
prohibited materials – 553 (8.4% of those active firms inspected)

Of the 553 of active renderers, feed mills, and protein blenders processing
with prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:

5 firms (0.9%) were classified as OAI

20 firms (3.6%) were classified as VAI

OTHER FIRMS INSPECTED

Examples of such firms include ruminant feeders, on-farm mixers, pet food
manufacturers, animal feed salvagers, distributors, retailers, and animal
feed transporters.

Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA –
12,575

Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant
feed – 3,288 (26% of those active firms inspected)

Of the 3,288 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent
inspection revealed that:

8 firms (0.2%) were classified as OAI

90 firms (2.7%) were classified as VAI

TOTAL FIRMS

Note that a single firm can be reported under more than one firm category;
therefore, the summation of the individual OAI/VAI firm categories will be
more than the actual total number of OAI/VAI firms, as presented below.

Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA –
15,676

Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant
feed – 4,093 (26% of those active firms inspected)

Of the 4,093 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent
inspection revealed that:

10 firms (0.2%) were classified as OAI

98 firms (2.4%) were classified as VAI


----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----

Issued by:
FDA, Center for Veterinary Medicine,
Communications Staff, HFV-12
7519 Standish Place, Rockville, MD 20855
Telephone: (240) 276-9300 FAX: (240) 276-9115
Internet Web Site: http://www.fda.gov/cvm


http://www.fda.gov/cvm/bse0605.htm


THOSE TRIPLE BSE MAD COW FIREWALLS are still leaking in June 2005. The
8/4/97 ruminant to ruminant feed ban was nothing more than ink on paper.
Lets look at one year ago;


Of the 3,444 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent
inspection revealed that:

16 firms (0.5%) were classified as OAI

89 firms (2.6%) were classified as VAI


http://www.fda.gov/cvm/bseup112304.htm


TSS
 

flounder

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>>> USDA assembled a team of technical experts that arrived in Canada on
Jan. 24 to gather all relevant information to do an in-depth assessment on
Canada's ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban and their feed ban inspection
program. USDA took this additional step to ensure compliance with Canada's
feed ban control measures. The feed ban has been determined to be an
important BSE risk mitigation measure to protect animal health.

The inspection team's report states that "Canada has a robust inspection
program, that overall compliance with the feed ban is good and that the feed
ban is reducing the risk of transmission of bovine spongiform encephalopathy
in the Canadian cattle population." <<<


http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB?contentidonly=true&con
tentid=2005/02/0066.xml


HOLY MAD COW, this is like the blind leading the blind. the total lack of
BSE protocol here again shows that the USDA/APHIS et al should NOT be giving
any expert BSE advise to anyone. ...TSS



Questions and Answers on BSE
(Items 14-22 added on May 18, 2005)


[Overall BSE measures/firewalls]


Are all cattle inspected prior to slaughter?
Why isn't USDA testing all cattle slaughtered in the United States?
Do you think you will find more cases of BSE? (APHIS)
[SRM]

Are all SRMs properly removed? What is the procedure? How is SRM-removal and
prevention of cross-contamination ensured?
Isn't Advanced Meat Recovery (AMR) still being used?
[Feed Ban]

Feed ban: The United States claims that it has been implementing a ban on
feeding mammalian proteins to ruminants since 1997, but it still is
primarily a ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban. How can you prevent
bovine-derived poultry feed, for example, from commingling with cattle feed?
[Compliance]

What was the rate of compliance of the U.S. feed ban in the initial stages
of its implementation?
Please provide an update on the investigation into the recent labor union
allegation of problems with the implementation/compliance of the SRM
regulation.
[About A40]

What is A Maturity?
How can A40 assure that animals are younger than 21 months old?
How can you verify that each inspector correctly and consistently performs
the maturity grading? Do you have any monitoring system in place to assure
the accuracy of the inspector?
[Other]

What is vCJD? How many vCJD cases have been found in the United States? What
about the alleged cases in New Jersey?
With respect to trade between the United States and Canada, now that Canada
has found 3 BSE cases (4 including the one found in Washington state), how
will the United States ensure that no BSE-infected animals will enter the
United States when the U.S.-Canadian border opens?
[Added May 18, 2005]


snip...


Q6. The United States claims that it has been implementing a ban on feeding
mammalian proteins to ruminants since 1997, but it still is primarily a
ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban. How can you prevent bovine-derived poultry
feed, for example, from commingling with cattle feed?

A6. There is a scientific consensus that BSE cannot be transmitted through
the use of mammalian origin meat-and-bone meal (MBM) tp swine, poultry, or
other non-ruminant species. However, firms that handle or produce feed for
ruminants and non-ruminants are required to have separate equipment or
facilities or have an adequate cleanout process in order to prevent
cross-contamination.

The feed ban's restrictions on the use of mammalian protein apply only to
its use in ruminant feed and not to feed for other species. Therefore,
mammalian origin meat-and-bone meal (MBM) may be used in feed for swine,
poultry, and other non-ruminant species. However, firms that handle material
prohibited for ruminants (but allowed for non-ruminants) and also produce
ruminant feed are required to have separate equipment or facilities or else
have cleanout procedures adequate to prevent cross-contamination. This
requirement applies to firms at all levels, from rendering to on-farm
mixing. They also are required to clearly label prohibited material as not
to be fed to ruminants. Guidance on preventing cross-contamination is
available through FDA's Center for Veterinary Medicine.


Q7. What was the rate of compliance of the U.S. feed ban in the initial
stages of its implementation?

A7. FDA initiated a feed ban in August 1997. Compliance rates for the first
year showed higher than anticipated for a new program with 50-85 percent of
the renderers and feed manufacturers in compliance with all aspects of the
regulation. The majority of problems were minor, relating to noncompliance
of simple documentation requirements as opposed to serious concerns such as
the presence of prohibited material. As of July 2004, conditions or
practices warranting regulatory sanctions had been found in less than one
percent of inspected facilities. Inspection results are posted in a
searchable online database. In August, 2005, the U.S. will have had an
effective feed ban in place for 8 years, the time period recommended by OIE
to effectively mitigate the spread or introduction of BSE within a domestic
herd.


Q14. A recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that 19
percent of the feed industry has not been re-inspected in the past five
years. How can the FDA ensure the Japanese people that U.S. cattle are not
consuming meat-and-bone meal?

A14. To maximize enforcement of the ruminant feed ban, FDA inspects firms
(renderers, feed mills, etc.) considered to be of highest risk more
frequently than low risk firms. High-risk firms are those which manufacture,
or process feeds or feed ingredients containing prohibited meat-and-bone
meal (which is allowed for non-ruminants). High-risk firms are inspected at
least once every year to ensure their compliance with FDA requirements
preventing cross contamination.

Low risk firms are those that purchase feed or feed ingredients from
high-risk firms, but do not further process or re-manufacture the feed or
feed ingredients. For most of these firms there is no commercial handling of
meat-and-bone meal since they are handling only packaged products like pet
food. As a result, it would be highly unlikely that cattle would have access
to any of these products.

Once FDA has established through inspection that these firms do not
manufacture or process feeds containing meat-and-bone meal, the frequency of
re-inspection is reduced so that greater enforcement activities can be
focused on the high-risk firms. The 19 percent of the feed industry cited in
the GAO report consist entirely of low risk firms.


snip...


Q22. What is the U.S. response to the EU's classification of the U.S. as
having a risk level III in its geographical bovine encephalopathy risk
assessment (GBR)?

A22. The U.S. has expressed its disappointment to the EU over this
determination, which was based on unsubstantiated assumptions and uses
worst-case scenarios without proper justification. In fact, we feel that the
U.S. has learned many lessons over the past 15 years from GBR III countries
with demonstrated risks (as in Europe). We used this information to develop
a strong BSE control program that ensures that the risk to consumers in the
U.S. is negligible.

More specifically, we implemented BSE control measures such as an import ban
and a feed ban long before the 1st case of BSE was discovered in Canada. As
a result, despite extensive surveillance, BSE has never been disclosed in an
animal born in the United States. Also the U.S. and Canada both implemented
multiple BSE controls to prevent the spread of BSE in North America. That is
why the U.S. has had no domestic cases of BSE except for one Canadian cow,
and why Canada has had only 4 cases confined to a small geographical area.
...


http://tokyo.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20050304-71.html#14


National Renderers Association Public Response to USDA-APHIS
ANPR “Risk Reduction Strategies for Potential BSE Pathways Involving Downer
Cattle and Dead Sock of Cattle and Other Species”


Docket No. 01-68-1, Federal Register, Vol.68, No.13: 2703 – 2711, 01/21/2003


http://www.rendermagazine.com/news/USDA-ANPRDownersApendices.doc



Infected and Source Flocks

As of August 31, 2005, there were 115 scrapie infected and source flocks (figure 3). There were 3 new infected and source flocks reported in August (Figure 4) with a total of 148 flocks reported for FY 2005 (Figure 5). The total infected and source flocks that have been released in FY 2005 are 102 (Figure 6), with 5 flocks released in August. The ratio of infected and source flocks released to newly infected and source flocks for FY 2005 = 0.69 :
1. In addition, as of August 31, 2005, 574 scrapie cases have been confirmed and reported by the National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL), of which 122 were RSSS cases (Figure 7). This includes 55 newly confirmed cases in August 2005 (Figure 8). Fifteen cases of scrapie in goats have been reported since 1990 (Figure 9). The last goat case was reported in May 2005.

snip...

full text ;

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/nahps/scrapie/monthly_report/monthly-report.html


SCRAPIE USA JULY 2005 UPDATE

AS of July 31, 2005, there were 120 scrapie infected soure flocks (figure 3). There were 16 new infected and source flocks reorted in July (Figure 4) with a total of 143 flocks reported for FY 2005 (Figure 5). The total infected and source flocks that have been released in FY 2005 are 89 (Figure 6), with 8 flocks released in July. The ratio of infected and source flocks released to newly infected and source flocks for FY = 0.62 : 1. IN addition, as of July 31, 2005, 524 scrapie cases have been confirmed and reported by the National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL), of which 116 were RSSS cases (Figure 7). This includes 76 newly confirmed cases in July 2005 (Figure 8). Fifteen cases of scrapie in goats have been reported since 1990 (Figure 9). The last goat case was reported in May 2005. ...........

snip...

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/nahps/scrapie/monthly_report/monthly-report.html


SCRAPIE USA JUNE 2005 UPDATE


AS of June 30, 2005, there were 114 scrapie infected and source flocks
(Figure 3). There were 14 new infected and source flocks reported in June
(Figure 4) with a total of 123 flocks reported for FY 2005 (Figure 5).


snip...


In addition, as of June 30, 2005, 448 scrapie cases have been confirmed and
reported by the National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL), of which
106 were RSSS cases (Figure 7). This includes 81 newly confirmed cases in
June 2005 (Figure 8). Fifteen cases of scrapie in goats have been reported
since 1990 (Figure 9). The last goat case was reported in May 2005.


snip...end


http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/nahps/scrapie/monthly_report/monthly-report.html


From: TSS ()
Subject: SCRAPIE USA UPDATE MARCH - JUNE 2005
Date: August 24, 2005 at 7:03 pm PST

SCRAPIE USA MONTHLY REPORT 2005

AS of March 31, 2005, there were 70 scrapie infected source flocks (Figure
3). There were 11 new infected and source flocks reported in March (Figure
4) with a total of 51 flocks reported for FY 2005 (Figure 5). The total
infected and source flocks that have been released in FY 2005 are 39 (Figure
6), with 1 flock released in March. The ratio of infected and source flocks
released to newly infected and source flocks for FY 2005 = 0.76 : 1. IN
addition, as of March 31, 2005, 225 scrapie cases have been confirmed and
reported by the National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL), of which
53 were RSSS cases (Figure 7). This includes 57 newly confirmed cases in
March 2005 (Figure 8). Fourteen cases of scrapie in goats have been reported
since 1990 (Figure 9). The last goat cases was reported in January 2005. New
infected flocks, source flocks, and flocks released or put on clean-up plans
for FY 2005 are depicted in Figure 10. ...

FULL TEXT ;

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/nahps/scrapie/monthly_report/monthly-report.html


Published online before print October 20, 2005

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 10.1073/pnas.0502296102
Medical Sciences

A newly identified type of scrapie agent can naturally infect sheep with resistant PrP genotypes

( sheep prion | transgenic mice )

Annick Le Dur *, Vincent Béringue *, Olivier Andréoletti , Fabienne Reine *, Thanh Lan Laï *, Thierry Baron , Bjørn Bratberg ¶, Jean-Luc Vilotte ||, Pierre Sarradin **, Sylvie L. Benestad ¶, and Hubert Laude *
*Virologie Immunologie Moléculaires and ||Génétique Biochimique et Cytogénétique, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, 78350 Jouy-en-Josas, France; Unité Mixte de Recherche, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique-Ecole Nationale Vétérinaire de Toulouse, Interactions Hôte Agent Pathogène, 31066 Toulouse, France; Agence Française de Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments, Unité Agents Transmissibles Non Conventionnels, 69364 Lyon, France; **Pathologie Infectieuse et Immunologie, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, 37380 Nouzilly, France; and ¶Department of Pathology, National Veterinary Institute, 0033 Oslo, Norway


Edited by Stanley B. Prusiner, University of California, San Francisco, CA, and approved September 12, 2005 (received for review March 21, 2005)

Scrapie in small ruminants belongs to transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), or prion diseases, a family of fatal neurodegenerative disorders that affect humans and animals and can transmit within and between species by ingestion or inoculation. Conversion of the host-encoded prion protein (PrP), normal cellular PrP (PrPc), into a misfolded form, abnormal PrP (PrPSc), plays a key role in TSE transmission and pathogenesis. The intensified surveillance of scrapie in the European Union, together with the improvement of PrPSc detection techniques, has led to the discovery of a growing number of so-called atypical scrapie cases. These include clinical Nor98 cases first identified in Norwegian sheep on the basis of unusual pathological and PrPSc molecular features and "cases" that produced discordant responses in the rapid tests currently applied to the large-scale random screening of slaughtered or fallen animals. Worryingly, a substantial proportion of such cases involved sheep with PrP genotypes known until now to confer natural resistance to conventional scrapie. Here we report that both Nor98 and discordant cases, including three sheep homozygous for the resistant PrPARR allele (A136R154R171), efficiently transmitted the disease to transgenic mice expressing ovine PrP, and that they shared unique biological and biochemical features upon propagation in mice. These observations support the view that a truly infectious TSE agent, unrecognized until recently, infects sheep and goat flocks and may have important implications in terms of scrapie control and public health.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Author contributions: H.L. designed research; A.L.D., V.B., O.A., F.R., T.L.L., J.-L.V., and H.L. performed research; T.B., B.B., P.S., and S.L.B. contributed new reagents/analytic tools; V.B., O.A., and H.L. analyzed data; and H.L. wrote the paper.

A.L.D. and V.B. contributed equally to this work.

To whom correspondence should be addressed.

Hubert Laude, E-mail: [email protected]

www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0502296102


http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/0502296102v1


TSS

#################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html ####################
 

Kathy

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The price listing for compensation was from the UK. The UK does not allow any animal protein in livestock feed. How is BSE occurring in the UK if animals are not being fed these animal protein products?


Are we going to blame stupid farmers for feeding illegal products, forever? Or, are we going to actually acknowledge the causal agent?

Don't forget to look at:

J. Biol. Chem., Vol. 279, Issue 50, 51958-51964, December 10, 2004

Clioquinol Mediates Copper Uptake and Counteracts Copper Efflux Activities of the Amyloid Precursor Protein of Alzheimer's Disease*

Carina Treiber¶, Andreas Simons, Markus Strauss, Mathias Hafner¶, Roberto Cappai||**, Thomas A. Bayer, and Gerd Multhaup
From the Freie Universitaet Berlin, Institut fuer Chemie/Biochemie, Thielallee 63, D-14195 Berlin, Germany, ZMBH-Center for Molecular Biology, Im Neuenheimer Feld 282, D-69120 Heidelberg, Germany, ¶Fachhochschule Mannheim, Hochschule für Technik und Gestaltung, Windeckstrasse 110, D-68163 Mannheim, Germany, ||Department of Pathology, Centre for Neuroscience, The University of Melbourne, Victoria 3010, Australia and The Mental Health Research Institute, Parkville, Victoria 3052, Australia, and Department of Psychiatry, Division of Neurobiology, University of the Saarland Medical Center, D-66421 Homburg, Germany

Received for publication, July 2, 2004 , and in revised form, September 29, 2004

available on-line at:
http://www.jbc.org/cgi/content/full/279/50/51958
 

Econ101

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Kathy,

I do not discount ANY of your claims to causuality. Feed banning is only ONE of the known preventative measures of CJD. Feed banning can be traced directly to those packing plants that sold infected BSE products to be used as feed and is one aknowledged source of CJD. In this case increased "efficiency" had consequences where the liablility was conveniently skirted by those making a profit on an unfit product.

That was the packers.
 

flounder

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kathy,

i cannot help it if you cannot understand common sense. this is not my problem. this is NOT rocket science. common sense will tell and show you that the ruminant to ruminant feed ban that has been in place has drastically reduced the number of infected cattle in the UK and EU. we know that the feed ban was not fully enforced, so tainted ruminant protein did and is entering the animal food chain still. also, cross contamination. face it kathy, your theory on OPs causing all this BSE does not hold water, and never has. again, transmission studies do not lie, simple as that.


12



BSE cases born after the reinforced

feed ban of 1996 (BARBs)

The reinforced feed ban of April 1996 was

followed by a recall of feed in the supply chain.

The ban was therefore considered to be

effective from 1 August 1996. BSE has been

confirmed in cattle born after that date and

these cases (BARBs) have been investigated in

some detail. In the 12 months from 1 January

to 31 December 2004, a total of 25 such cases

were confirmed in the UK, 22 in Great Britain

and 3 in Northern Ireland. This is a significant

reduction on the 45 confirmed for 2003 (38

in GB and 7 in NI). At present there is no

indication of any likely source of infection

other than feed. Possible origins include

vegetable feed ingredients contaminated by

infected mammalian meat and bone meal since

an EU wide ban was imposed only at the start

of 2001.



http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/publications/progress/dec04/order.pdf





Feed borne infection (31-34)

a) Recent unpublished experiments at the VLA have shown that feeding exceptionally

low doses (0.001g) of infected neural tissue can cause BSE.

b) The working hypothesis of Defra that the major cause of BSE in BARBs cases has

been through the ingestion of contaminated feed, most likely by young animals, is

strongly supported. Thus control of the disease requires, as it has always required,

completely eliminating the agent from the cattle feed chain.

c) Understanding causes of variation in infectivity are important in terms of

understanding the disease, but do not particularly impinge on the control of BSE,

where risks have to be avoided.

R: Defra continues to operate on the basis that BSE transmission via feed is the major

route involved in BARB cases.

Control measures on feed (35-37)

The problem, if there is one, is not with the principle of the feed control regulations,

but whether they have been and are being broken knowingly or unknowingly, through

use of banned material or for example of feed that has remained in plants or on farms,

e.g. in corners of feed bins.

R: a) The feed controls currently in place seem adequate but require vigilant

enforcement. Defra should continue to review appropriate controls.

b) Efforts to obtain consistent quality of feed testing for animal derived material in all

EU member states should be made.

c) In view of the likelihood that breaches of regulations have occurred and enabled

BSE contaminated material to enter the cattle feed chain, Defra should help facilitate

the recent recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Animal Feedingstuffs to

ensure a more coordinated and risk-based programme of over-all animal feed law

enforcement.

Potential feed borne sources of BARBs cases (38-43)

a) It may not be possible to attribute BARBs cases to any single source of feed

contamination. Some feed may not have been fully cleared out on farms in 1996 in

GB in 1996 and in other countries later. Imported feed seems a likely cause, certainly

until controls were tightened up throughout Europe, but does not readily explain the

random country-wide distribution in GB.

b) Firm conclusions cannot be drawn from the recent case-control study of BARBs.

R: a) No source of feed contamination should be ruled out and detailed investigations

should be continued.

b) Some improvements in the design of the case-control study can be effected fairly

straightforwardly and should be undertaken. A major effort to obtain feed records on

control animals does not seem justified, if indeed it is feasible.

Inferences from changes in incidence (44-46)

a) There has been a fall in the underlying incidence of BSE by birth cohort 1996/97 to

99/00 in GB, but the 2001/2 case leaves doubt subsequently. There has also been a fall

in other countries except where feed controls were introduced later.

b) Consequently risks of infection are in general falling and should progressively

reduce the risks of contamination and cross contamination.

c) As cohorts of affected animals are tested, numbers of index cases rather than total

numbers may give a better indication of progress of the epidemic.

General conclusions

Elimination of feed borne sources seems to be now, as before, the key to elimination

of BSE. The incidence of the disease can be greatly reduced but not readily eliminated

in any country by adequate imposition of controls, particularly on animal feed. As the

level of incidence falls both in the UK and internationally, the risks of contamination

through cattle feed, pet food, or indeed through any other source, fall whether or not

controls in the UK and abroad are further tightened. With the current expertise in

Defra and the VLA, GB is well placed to keep on top of and promote developments.

R: It is essential that appropriate, risk based, controls and monitoring should be

maintained on animals and feed until no cases of BSE are found, and controls

tightened up where feasible, both in the UK and elsewhere that the UK can influence.

In view of the very long incubation period of BSE in some animals, long-continued

vigilance is necessary. It is not evident, however, that specific new measures are

needed. Basically it is necessary to ‘keep taking the medicine’. Nevertheless, in view

of new discoveries on the nature of the disease and the possibilities of new or changed

TSEs arising, relevant research capacity in GB should be maintained.



snip...



Nature of the disease

10. BSE is a transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE), with characteristic

lesions in the brain and clinical symptoms. Affected brain tissue is infective to cattle

when fed orally (Wells et al., 1994), and the disease can be transmitted to mice via

injection into the brain (Fraser et al., 1992). Characteristic of other TSEs such as

scrapie, there is accumulation of an abnormal protein (denoted PrPSc or PrPres),

derived from and different in structure from a protein (PrPC) coded by the PRNP gene

in the host genome (Basler et al., 1986). Transmission can be effected apparently

without the presence of DNA or RNA. The putative transmissible agent is termed a

prion and, in the most commonly accepted model, is assumed to be solely the protein

accumulated in the infected tissue (Prusiner, 1982; reviewed, e.g. Weissmann, 2004).

The PrPSc protein is believed to act as a template for the conversion of PrPC protein to

the non-degradable form, leading to further deposit of the abnormal protein (Prusiner,

1982), and the consequent physical and clinical changes. Transgenic mice lacking the

PRNP gene cannot develop TSEs (Büeler et al., 1993; Manson et al., 1994). Recent

work has added weight to the hypothesis: Legname et al. (2004) reported infection

and transmission of a TSE in mice initiated solely from a protein source, and Castilla

et al. (2005) have mimicked PrPc to PrPSc conversion in vitro by cyclic amplification

to produce indefinite amplification of PrPSc. Although various alternative hypotheses

have been proposed, there is no recent evidence of which I am aware from laboratory

experiments or field studies that robustly refutes the protein only prion model.

Nevertheless it is not uniformly accepted, one important question being how

differences between agents, e.g. strains of scrapie, are determined; in the prion model

it is solely the conformation of the PrPSc protein template.

11. The prion hypothesis for BSE was reviewed in the BSE Inquiry (1988) led by

Lord Justice Phillips with Prof. M. Ferguson-Smith as scientific assessor and by the

subsequent committee chaired by Sir Gabriel Horn (2001) on the origins of the BSE

epidemic. Both concluded that the prion played a central role in the transmission of

BSE. Based also on the epidemiological evidence, they agreed with the Southwood

Committee (1998) that transmission of BSE largely occurred through feed

contaminated with BSE affected material derived from animal sources. In view of the

homogeneity of BSE, in terms of the brain lesions and biochemical signature of

abnormal PrP and as shown by strain typing experiments in mice (Bruce, 2003), these

committees concluded that a single point origin was most likely, and I am aware of no

more recent evidence to suggest otherwise.

12. Many other hypotheses have been put forward over the years as to the causes of

BSE, including organophosphates (Purdey, 1994), bacterial and fungal toxins from

ergot in Italian ryegrass (Stockdale, 2001), an autoimmune disease in response to

Acinetobacter (Ebringer et al., 1997), and trace element deficiency or excess (e.g.

Purdey, 2000; Nishida, 2003). This is not the place for a review of all these, but in

most cases evidence is circumstantial and does not explain, for example, either the

transmissibility of the disease to mice or by feeding of neural tissue to cattle, or the

demography of BSE including the highly, albeit not totally, effective feed bans in the

UK and elsewhere. Further the brain lesions, protracted incubation period of infection

and evidence of transmissibility to mice, for example, all indicate that BSE is a

classical TSE such as scrapie or Kuru. Thus I find no other hypotheses on the nature

and transmissibility of the disease convincing; nor do these hypotheses relate

specifically to BARBs cases, and I do not consider any are strengthened by their

existence. Factors such as the genotype and health of the animal, or environmental

factors such as soil trace elements may, however, influence susceptibility to an

infective source or the probability of spontaneous disease through transformation of

normal PrPc protein.



http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/pdf/hillreport.pdf





Kathy wrote in another thread, but yet never documented;

> didn't say that OPs caused prion disease, but that they contributed greatly
> to the UK experience,

and again, could your please reference this materials with scientific data, instead
of hearsay please ???


you can argue the origin of TSE until all the mad cows on earth come home to roost.


i.e. ;


Phosmet induces up-regulation of surface levels of the cellular prion protein.
Neuroreport. 9(7):1391-1395, May 11, 1998.
Gordon, Irit 1; Abdulla, Elizabeth M. 1; Campbell, Iain C. 1; Whatley, Stephen A. 1,2
Abstract:
CHRONIC (2 day) exposure of human neuroblastoma cells to the organophosphate pesticide phosmet induced a marked concentration-dependent increase in the levels of PrP present on the cell surface as assessed by biotin labelling and immunoprecipitation. Levels of both phospholipase C (PIPLC)-releasable and non-releasable forms of PrP were increased on the plasma membrane. These increases appear to be due to post-transcriptional mechanisms, since PrP mRNA levels as assessed by Northern blotting were unaffected by phosmet treatment. These data raise the possibility that phosmet exposure could increase the susceptibility to the prion agent by altering the levels of accessible PrP.

(C) Lippincott-Raven Publishers.



http://www.neuroreport.com/pt/re/neuroreport/abstract.00001756-199805110-00026.htm;jsessionid=DOEcw0d3vPau1LEbPM42DrGrWVZnF06cF115hTGLe07ro2BZx8d3586698740!-949856144!9001!-1


kathy,

you have still failed to show us your data that;

Kathy wrote in another thread, but yet never documented;



> didn't say that OPs caused prion disease, but that they contributed greatly
> to the UK experience,



and again, could your please reference this materials with scientific data, instead
of hearsay please ???


you can argue the origin of TSE until all the mad cows on earth come home to roost.


i.e. ;



BUT, amplification and transmission is the most important factor in stopping the

spread of the TSE agent. WE have known for decades what factors involve the amplification

and transmission, yet the industries involved CHOSE to ignore this science until the incubation

period in humans and animals started to catch up with society.



would it not have been more easy and very much less expensive for MAFF/USDA et al to jump on the OP
bandwagon and save the industry, if OP theory had any credence to it at all? and why did they not?


transmission studies DO NOT LIE !

show me the data that ops are in all the primate/mouse transmission studies?



http://ranchers.net/forum/about4978-0.html



show us the data kathy ???


KATHY, maybe you should read;

Dying for a Hamburger
How Modern Meat-Packing Led to an Epidemic of Alzheimer's Disease


http://www.randomhouse.com/catalog/display.pperl?isbn=9780771087653


TSS
 

Kathy

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We will have to agree to disagree. I do not see how a species specific disease jumped the species barrier. I do concede that metal contamination could be transmitted via consumption; but, once the template is set for a PNC - metal nanocluster to scavenge an individual species proteins, the only proteins scavenged would be that species'. If the bare metal clusters are exposed to any species, they can be helpful or disasterous, according to findings by Dr. Vitaly Vodyanoy (who examined the healthy PNCs found in blood).

Tranmission is always assumed. When in fact, it could be that these cases are original and not related to spreading infection via prions, but by spreading contaminants being rogue metals and metalloids. ie: mercury in fish.

I was sent this tidbit today, regarding Israel's use of sonic booms to terrorize Palestinians in Gaza. I would say this could present the Gaza citizens with more problems then just rattling their nerves. It would be an ideal location for an "epidemic" of vCJD. All the criteria are present.

Wed Nov 2,11:48 AM ET

JERUSALEM (AFP) - Israeli and Palestinian medics filed a joint petition to

Israel's high court demanding the air force halt its sonic booms over Gaza because they were terrorising the local population.


The petition by Palestinian mental health professionals and Physicians for Human Rights-Israel (PHR) said the repeated ear-splitting blasts, caused by an aircraft breaking the sound barrier, terrorise Gazans and cause intense stress.

The psychological damage caused by the sonic booms amounts to collective punishment and must be stopped, the petition said.

Since a suicide bombing in northern Israel last Wednesday, the Israeli air force has carried out multiple bombing raids over the

Gaza Strip targeting Palestinian militants.

The warplanes have also broken the sound barrier as a show of force to the local population.

The air force no longer flies at speeds exceeding the speed of sound over Israeli civilian areas due to the stress they cause to the population, PHR said.

But efforts to intimidate Gaza residents backfired last week, with the enormous booms causing thousands of Israelis to panic all the way up the Mediterranean coast, as far north as Haifa -- 150 kilometres (90 miles) away.

So powerful were the shockwaves that police switchboards were jammed with concerned callers wanting to report hearing an explosion, the Maariv daily reported.

The military said the sonic booms were only intended for Gazan airspace.
 

flounder

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kathy writes;

We will have to agree to disagree. I do not see how a species specific disease jumped the species barrier. I do concede that metal contamination could be transmitted via consumption; but, once the template is set for a PNC - metal nanocluster to scavenge an individual species proteins, the only proteins scavenged would be that species'. If the bare metal clusters are exposed to any species, they can be helpful or disasterous, according to findings by Dr. Vitaly Vodyanoy (who examined the healthy PNCs found in blood).

Tranmission is always assumed. When in fact, it could be that these cases are original and not related to spreading infection via prions, but by spreading contaminants being rogue metals and metalloids. ie: mercury in fish.


I was sent this tidbit today, regarding Israel's use of sonic booms to terrorize Palestinians in Gaza. I would say this could present the Gaza citizens with more problems then just rattling their nerves. It would be an ideal location for an "epidemic" of vCJD. All the criteria are present.

=========================


kathy, please send me whatever you are smoking ;-)

im through with this nonsense...


TSS
 

PORKER

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Factors such as the genotype and health of the animal, or environmental

factors such as soil trace elements may, however, influence susceptibility to an

infective source or the probability of spontaneous disease through transformation of

normal PrPc protein.

HUM!!!! What conditions do you have Kathy?
 

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