Saturday, June 7, 2008
Export Requirements for the Republic of Korea IMPORT HEALTH REQUIREMENTS FOR
U.S. BEEF AND BEEF PRODUCTS
http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2008/06/export-requirements-for-republic-of.html
KS-73 (Apr 23, 2008)
Asterisks (*) indicate the most recent revision to these requirements. To
search, click on your browser's "Edit" menu, then click on "Find (on this
page)". Enter "*" in the "Find What" field, then click "Find" or "Find Next"
until all asterisks have been identified.
Eligible/Ineligible Products
Eligible product
Although the United States and Korea have reached general agreement on the
resumption of export of U.S. beef and beef products to Korea, FSIS officials
should not issue export certificates for beef and beef products intended for
export to Korea at this time. Additional information about the specific
conditions, including eligible product, plant approval, and certification
requirements are being developed and will be made available as soon as
possible. Establishment management may contact AMS at 540-361-7640 for
information about AMS program requirements.*
snip...end
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/regulations_&_policies/Republic_of_Korea_Requirements/index.asp
Greetings,
please see the 'meat of the issue' on import health requirements for the
U.S. beef and beef products to Korea, or the lack of, as follows ;
IMPORT HEALTH REQUIREMENTS FOR U.S. BEEF AND BEEF PRODUCTS
Import Health Requirements for U.S. Beef and Beef Products
The following import health requirements shall be applied to beef and beef
products exported from the United States of America ("United States") to the
Republic of Korea ("Korea").
Definitions
1. Definitions for the purpose of these health requirements are as follows:
(1) "Beef or beef products" includes all edible parts of cattle less than 30
months of age at the time of slaughter and products derived from all edible
parts of cattle less than 30 months of age at the time of slaughter as
described in the U.S. Federal Meat Inspection Act. However, "beef or beef
products" excludes specified risk materials (SRMs); all mechanically
recovered meat (MRM)/mechanically separated meat (MSM); and advanced meat
recovery product (AMR) from the skull and vertebral column of cattle 30
months of age and over at the time of slaughter. AMR that is free of SRMs
and central nervous system tissues (CNS) is allowed. Ground meat, processed
products and beef extracts may contain AMR but excludes specified risk
materials (SRMs) and all MRM/MSM.
(2) "BSE" means Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy.
(3) "Cattle" means domesticated bovine animals (Bos taurus and Bos indicus)
born and raised in the United States, legally imported into the United
States from a country deemed eligible by the Korean government to export
beef or beef products to Korea, or raised in the United States for at least
100 days prior to slaughter.
(4) "Food-safety hazard" means any biological, chemical, or physical
property that may cause food to be unsafe for human consumption.
(5) "Lot" means a quantity of beef or beef products identified on a single
export certificate from one meat establishment, and consists of the same
process category and product standard of identity (sub-category).
(6) "Meat establishment" includes any slaughterhouse, processing plant, and
storage facility for beef or beef products that operates under U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) inspection.
(7) "Non-compliance" means an inconsistency with this protocol that does not
constitute a food-safety hazard.
(8) "Serious non-compliance" means a food-safety hazard in a shipped product
or a food-safety hazard found during a system audit.
(9) "Specified risk materials" (SRMs) means:
(a) tonsils and distal ileum from cattle of all ages; and
(b) brain, eyes, spinal cord, skull, dorsal root ganglia (DRG) and vertebral
column (excluding vertebrae of the tail, transverse processes and spinous
processes of the cervical, thoracic and lumbar vertebrae, median crest and
wings of the sacrum) from cattle 30 months of age and over at the time of
slaughter.(10) "United States" (U.S.) means the fifty states and the
District of Columbia.
General Requirements
2. Prior to the loading of the beef or beef products:
(a) the United States has been free of foot-and-mouth disease for the past
12 months and has been free of rinderpest, contagious bovine
pleuropneumonia, lumpy skin disease and Rift Valley fever for the past 24
months; and
(b) Vaccination has not been carried out against the aforementioned
diseases.
Notwithstanding the above, in the event the Korean government recognizes
that effective stamping-out policies ar e in place for the specific disease
in the United States, including emergency vaccination if carried out, the
required period for recognizing the United States as being free of that
disease may be shortened in accordance with World Organization for Animal
Health (OlE) guidelines after Korea conducts a risk analysis.
3. In the event a disease set out in item 2 occurs in the United States, the
U.S. government shall immediately suspend the issuance of export
certificates for all beef and beef products to Korea that do not meet the
requirements of item 2.
4. The U.S. government, in accordance with U.S. regulations, continuously
maintains measures that meet or exceed OlE guidelines for controlled-risk
status to effectively detect and prevent the introduction and spread of BSE.
The U.S. government will provide notice to the World Trade Organization
(WTO) -according to its WTO commitments -and inform Korea regarding the
repeal or amendment of any BSE-related measure.
5. In the event (an) additional case(s) of BSE occur(s) in the United
States, the U.S. government shall immediately conduct a thorough
epidemiological investigation and inform the Korean government of the
results of the investigation. The U.S. government will consult with the
Korean government about the findings of the investigation. The Korean
government will suspend the importation of beef and beef products if the
additional case(s) results in the OlE recognizing an adverse change in the
classification of the U.S. BSE status.
Requirements for Meat Establishments
6. Any meat establishment in the United States that operates under USDA
inspection is eligible to produce beef or beef products for Korea. The
establishment should be notified to the Korean government in advance.
7. The U.S. government will maintain a regular monitoring and aUditing
program for meat establishments that produce beef or beef products for
export to Korea to ensure they comply with the relevant provisions of these
health requirements and U.S. regulations. In the event of a serious
non-compliance, the Food Safely and Inspection Service (FSIS) personnel
would issue a Noncompliance Record and would immediately control the
non-compliant product If the process that resulted in the non-compliant
product is on-going, FSIS would immediately stop the process until it
determines tha t appropriate corrective and preventative measures have been
taken. Only when FSIS determines that corrective actions are adequate will
production be allowed to resume. The U.S. government will inform the Korean
government if an establishment is suspended and when corrective action has
been taken.
8. The Korean government may conduct on-site aUdits of a representative
sample of the meat establishments that export beef or beef products to
Korea. When a serious non-compliance with these health requirements has been
found as a result of the on-site audit, the Korean government will inform
the results to the U.S. government, and the U.S. government shall take
appropriate measures and inform the Korean government of the measures taken.
9. The U.S. government shall verify that a suspended meat establishment has
determined and implemented appropriate corrective and preventative measures
before lifting the suspension described in item 7, item B or item 24. The
U.S. government shall inform the Korean government of the corrective action
the meat establishment has taken and of the date the meat establishmenfs
suspension is lifted.
Requirements for Beef and Beef Products
10. The beef or beef products were derived from cattle born and raised in
the United States, from cattle legally imported into the United States from
a country deemed eligible by the Korean government to export beef or beef
products to Korea, or from cattle raised in the United States for at least
100 days prior to slaughter.
11. Cattle for producing beef or beef products for export were not suspect
or confirmed BSE cases; confirmed progenies of BSE cases; or confirmed
cohorts of BSE cases, as defined in the Terrestrial Animal Health Code
adopted by the OlE.
12. Meat establishments that produce beef or beef products shall maintain a
program for the hygienic removal of SRMs.
13. For the purpose of SRM removal, the age of cattle at the time of
slaughter was verified by documentation which identifies the age or by
dentition.
14. The meat establishments maintain purchase records indicating the
facility from which the animals were purchased for slaughter. Records may be
disposed of two years after the date of purchase.
15. The beef or beef products were derived from cattle that were slaughtered
in meat establishments (slaughterhouses) certified by th e U.S. government
as eligible to export beef and beef products to Korea and that passed
ante-mortem and post-mortem inspection conducted by USDA inspection
personnel under the supervision of the resident USDA veterinarian.
16. The beef or beef products were derived from cattle that were not
subjected to a stunning process, prior to slaughter, with a device injecting
compressed air or gas into the cranial cavity, or to a pithing process.
17. The beef or beef products were produced and handled in a manner as to
prevent contamination from SRMs or from MSM from the skull and vertebral
column of cattle 30 months of age and over, in accordance with FSIS
regulations.
18. Residues (radioactivity, synthetic antibiotic sUbstances, antibiotic
substances, heavy metals, pesticides, hormones, etc.) posing a public health
hazard and pathogenic microorganisms in the beef and beef products shall not
exceed the tolerance levels established by the Korean government. The beef
and beef products may be treated with ionizing radiation, ultraviolet rays,
and tenderizers in accordance with Korean regUlations.
19. Sanitary packaging material was used to package the beef or beef
products.
20. The processing, storage and transportation of the beef an d beef
products were handled in such a manner as to prevent contamination by
communicable animal disease pathogens.
21. Refrigerated or cold storage rooms on a ship (aircraft) or container
that transports the beef and beef products were sealed by using the seal of
the U.S. government or a U.S. government-recognized seal and then certified
by a U.S. government veterinarian.
Export Certificate
22. Beef and beef products qualify for import quarantine inspection if
accompanied by the Export Certificate of Wholesomeness and the Certificate
for Export of Beef and Beef Products to the Republic of Korea (ROK) issued
by the veterinary authority of the U.S. government, which include the
following information to be submitted to the quarantine authority of the
Korean government:
(1) Information responsive to items 2,10 and 15-20 above;
(2) Name of the product (including species), number of packages and weight
(net weight) listed by each final processing plant;
(3) Names, addresses and establishment numbers of the slaughterhouse, meat
processing plant and storage facility;
(4) Slaughtering period and/or processing period (dd/mmJyy-dd/mm/yy);
(5) Names and addresses of the consignor and the consignee;
(6) Date the export certificate was issued and the name and signature of the
issuer; and
(7) Container number and seal number.
Import Quarantine Inspection and Regulatory Action
23. If the Korean government detects a food-safety hazard in a lot during
the quarantine inspection process, it may reject the lot. The Korean
government shall notify and consult with the U.S. government regarding the
matter and may request corrective action if appropriate. If an SRM is found,
FSIS will conduct an investigation to determine the cause of the problem.
Product pro duced by the pertinent me at establishment shall continue to be
eligible for import quarantine inspection. However, the Korean government
will increase the rate of inspection of subsequent beef and beef products
from the meat establishment. After the Korean government inspects five lots
of equal or greater quantity of the same product wnhout finding a
food-safety hazard, the Korean government shall apply its standard
inspection procedures and rates.
24. If the Korean government observes at least two incidents of food-safety
hazards involving separate lots from the same meat establishment, the meat
establishment may be suspended until corrective action has been taken. Beef
and beef products of the meat establishment that were certified prior to the
date of suspension shall continue to be eligible for import quarantine
inspection. An establishment shall remain suspended until the U.S.
government verifies to the Korean government that corrective actions have
been completed. The U.S. government shall inform the Korean government of
the meat establishment's corrective action and of the date the meat
establishmenfs suspension is lifted. The Korean government may include an
on-site audit of the establishment during its next system audit in the
United States.
Consultations
25. The Korean government or the U.S. government may request consultations
with the other concerning any matter regarding the interpretation or
application of these import health requirements. Unless otherwise agreed,
the consultations shall be held within seven days of the request in the
territory of the government that receives the request.
Addendum
1. This notice will go into effect on the date of its notification.
2. When the United States publicly announces its enhanced feed ban, Article
1(1) shall be modified to read as follows: "beef or beef products" includes
all edible parts of cattle and products derived from all edible parts of
cattle as described in the U.S. Federal Meat Inspection Act. However, "beef
or beef products" excludes specified risk materials (SRMs); all mechanically
recovered meat (MRM) /mechanically separated meat (MSM); and advanced meat
recovery product (AMR) from the skull and vertebral column of cattle 30
months of age and over at the time of slaughter. AMR that is free of SRMs
and central nervous system tissues (CNS) is allowed. Ground meat, processed
products and beef extracts may contain AMR but excludes specified risk
materials (SRMs) and all MRM/MSM.
3. During the first 90 days following the effective date of these import
health requirements, Korea may audit and/or reject U.S. decisions regarding
the listing of new plants or re-Iisting of previously de-listed plants.
4. During the first 180 days following the effective date of these import
health requirements, exports of T-bone and Porterhouse steaks will be
accompanied by some notation on the box that confirms for Korean officials
that these cuts of beef come from cattle under 30 months of age. The Korean
government and the U.S. government agree to have consultations upon the
completion of the 180 day period with a view to addressing concerns after
reviewing the notation's effect on beef trade and its inspection.
Min Dong-Seck
Deputy Minister
MIFAFF
On behalf of Korea
A. Ellen Terpstra
Deputy Under Secretary
USDA
On behalf of the United States
http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/import_requirements_eng_both_sign.pdf
Why Americans, As Well as Koreans, Should Be Worried About Mad Cow Tainted
USA Beef
By Terry S. Singeltary Sr. May 15, 2008
Straight to the Source
Web Note: This is an important commentary by Terry S. Singeltary Sr., on a
recent Business Week story on the controversy in South Korea over their
government's lifting on the ban on conventional (non-organic) beef, despite
the fact that the USDA is still allowing slaughterhouse waste and blood and
manure to be fed to cows, and refusing to test all cows at slaughter. See
the Mad Cow section of the OCA website for in-depth information. Terry is a
regular blogger on the OCA website on Mad Cow issues.
Ronnie Cummins
One Korean official says the probability of a human being catching a mad cow
disease by eating U.S. beef is like the one of a golf player scoring a
hole-in-one and then being killed by lightning.
this is typical BSe. you here industry groups comment 'your more likely to
get hit by a car than die from CJD'. well, maybe so, but my mother and many
more did not die from getting hit by a car, they died from CJD, my mothers
being the hvCJD (confirmed), and my neighbors mother died from CJD
(confirmed). the UKBSEnvCJD _only_ theory is incorrect. there are more
strains of mad cow than the UK BSE in beef to nvCJD in humans in the UK. The
deception by the USDA, FDA, and the Bush administration about mad cow
disease, CJD, and all Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy over the past
8 years have been outrageous, to a point of being criminal. I am vested in
nothing, but the truth.
snip...see full text ;
http://www.grassrootsnetroots.org/articles/article_12387.cfm
Tuesday, May 13, 2008
Concerned Americans against Mad Cow Disease STATEMENT OF SOLIDARITY with
Koreans May 13, 2008
http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2008/05/concerned-americans-against-mad-cow.html
http://flounder068.vox.com/library/post/concerned-americans-against-mad-cow-disease-statement-of-solidarity-with-koreans-may-13-2008.html
http://www.koreantopnews.com/story.php?title=USDA_VS_KOREA_typical_or_atypical_BSe_Concerned_Americans_against_Mad_Cow_Disease_STATEMENT_OF_SOLIDARITY_with_Koreans_May_13_2008
BSE YOUNGEST AGE STATISTICS UNDER 30 MONTHS
http://bseyoungestage.blogspot.com/
http://flounder068.vox.com/library/post/bse-youngest-age-statistics-under-30-months.html
Tuesday, May 27, 2008
FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory Report Texas Legend Ranch
OAI 05/10/2008
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/05/fda-bseruminant-feed-inspections-firms.html
"South Korea may demand revision of US beef import pact"
"The agreement, struck last month, has been widely criticized as making too"
"many concessions to the United States"
THE PEOPLE of Korea _should_ be mad about the importing of USA beef into
their Country. can you believe these regulations? even IF a BSE case(s) are
documented in the USA, the people of Korea still cannot suspend the
importing of U.S. beef, NO matter how many more mad cows the USA finds,
until a thorough epidemiological investigation is finished. please remember,
it took over a year and literally an act of congress to confirm the atypical
mad cow in Texas before they finally finish that epidemiological
investigation, and even after all that, the Koreans still cannot ban USA
beef, until the OIE recognizes an adverse change in the classification of
the U.S. BSE status. Considering the USDA and the OIE collaborated to seal
the deal of the BSE MRR policy (the legal trading of all strains of TSE
globally, just for commodities and futures sake, human health was not even
considered), I doubt the OIE would ever change the BSE status for the USA,
no matter how many more mad cows are found. It's all about money folks.
WE are talking years now, before the Koreans could ever suspend USA beef due
to a BSE case(s) ever being documented in the USA, due to these stupid
regulations. This is nothing more than FORCE FEEDING KOREA USDA MAD COW
BEEF, i.e. all for a dollar, to hell with human health on a disease with an
incubation period of years if not a decade or more.
Please remember, the last two mad cows documented in the USA i.e. Alabama
and Texas, both were of the 'atypical' BSE strain, and immediately after
that, the USDA shut down the testing from 470,000 to 40,000 in the U.S. in
2007 out of about 35 million cattle slaughtered. also, science is showing
that some of these atypical cases are more virulent to humans than the
typical UK BSE strain ;
***Atypical forms of BSE have emerged which, although rare, appear to be
more virulent than the classical BSE that causes vCJD.***
Progress Report from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance
Center
An Update from Stephen M. Sergay, MB, BCh & Pierluigi Gambetti, MD
April 3, 2008
http://www.aan.com/news/?event=read&article_id=4397&page=72.45.45
IF BSE is not in the USA (just not documented for many different reasons),
and only atypical BSE is in the USA (plus CWD, plus, many strains of
Scrapie, and Now the Nor-98 documented in 5 different states, plus TME, then
why would human mad cow in the USA look like the UK nvCJD from UK BSE cows ?
it was shown long ago in studies at Mission Texas that experimental
transmission of USA Scrapie to USA Bovine, DID NOT LOOK LIKE UK BSE. so
again, in short, why would human mad cow in the USA look like human mad cow
in the UK i.e. the (nvCJD). however, I believe that BSE has been in the USA
untested and undocumented for years. why on earth then does the USDA refuse
to allow creekstone or anyone else test their product? simple, if you don't
look/test, you don't find.
ONE only has to read how the USDA et al have legally blocked, blundered,
botched, mismanaged, bungled, floundered, and flat out manipulated, the
testing in the infamous June 2004 enhanced cover-up program for mad cow
surveillance and testing. I mean, I am not really to hip on THE INDUSTRY,
testing for mad cow disease, and what that program might consist of, but
anything is better than nothing at all. ...
BSE BASE MAD COW TESTING TEXAS, USA, AND CANADA
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/
MAD COW DISEASE terminology UK c-BSE (typical), atypical BSE H or L, and or
Italian L-BASE
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/03/mad-cow-disease-terminology-uk-c-bse.html
In 2007, in one weekly enforcement report, the fda recalled 10,000,000+
pounds of BANNED MAD COW FEED, 'in commerce', and i can tell you that most
of it was fed out ;
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. MBM IN COMMERCE USA
2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST REASON Blood meal used to make cattle
feed was recalled because it was cross-contaminated with prohibited bovine
meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and
labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN
COMMERCE 42,090 lbs. DISTRIBUTION WI
REASON Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was
cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did
not bear cautionary BSE statement. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 9,997,976
lbs. DISTRIBUTION ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA SEPT 6, 2006 1961.72 TONS IN COMMERCE AL,
TN, AND WV Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST
snip... see listings and references of enormous amounts of banned mad cow
protein 'in commerce' in 2006 and 2005 ;
see full text ;
Friday, April 25, 2008
Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed [Docket No.
2002N-0273] (Formerly Docket No. 02N-0273) RIN 0910-AF46
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/04/substances-prohibited-from-use-in.html
SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS
http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/2008/02/specified-risk-materials-srm.html
SRM MAD COW RECALL 406 THOUSAND POUNDS CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS KANSAS
http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/04/srm-mad-cow-recall-406-thousand-pounds.html
Sunday, April 20, 2008 Progress Report from the National Prion Disease
Pathology Surveillance Center April 3, 2008
Atypical forms of BSE have emerged which, although rare, appear to be more
virulent than the classical BSE that causes vCJD.
see full text ;
http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2008/04/progress-report-from-national-prion.html
CJD TEXAS (cjd clusters)
http://cjdtexas.blogspot.com/
CJD USA RISING
The statistical incidence of CJD cases in the United States has been revised
to reflect that there is one case per 9000 in adults age 55 and older.
Eighty-five percent of the cases are sporadic, meaning there is no known
cause at present.
http://www.cjdfoundation.org/fact.html
Communicated by: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
[In submitting these data, Terry S. Singeltary Sr. draws attention to the
steady increase in the "type unknown" category, which, according to their
definition, comprises cases in which vCJD could be excluded. The total of 26
cases for the current year (2007) is disturbing, possibly symptomatic of the
circulation of novel agents. Characterization of these agents should be
given a high priority. - Mod.CP]
http://pro-med.blogspot.com/2007/11/proahedr-prion-disease-update-2007-07.html
http://www.promedmail.org/pls/askus/f?p=2400:1001:6833194127530602005::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1010,39963
There is a growing number of human CJD cases, and they were presented last
week in San Francisco by Luigi Gambatti(?) from his CJD surveillance
collection.
He estimates that it may be up to 14 or 15 persons which display selectively
SPRPSC and practically no detected RPRPSC proteins.
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/1006-4240t1.htm
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/2006-4240t1.pdf
JOURNAL OF NEUROLOGY
MARCH 26, 2003
RE-Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease in the United States
Email Terry S. Singeltary:
f[email protected]
I lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain Variant CJD). I would like to comment
on the CDC's attempts to monitor the occurrence of emerging forms of CJD.
Asante, Collinge et al [1] have reported that BSE transmission to the
129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is
indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest sporadic CJD. However,
CJD and all human TSEs are not reportable nationally. CJD and all human TSEs
must be made reportable in every state and internationally. I hope that the
CDC does not continue to expect us to still believe that the 85%+ of all CJD
cases which are sporadic are all spontaneous, without route/source. We have
many TSEs in the USA in both animal and man. CWD in deer/elk is spreading
rapidly and CWD does transmit to mink, ferret, cattle, and squirrel monkey
by intracerebral inoculation. With the known incubation periods in other
TSEs, oral transmission studies of CWD may take much longer. Every
victim/family of CJD/TSEs should be asked about route and source of this
agent. To prolong this will only spread the agent and needlessly expose
others. In light of the findings of Asante and Collinge et al, there should
be drastic measures to safeguard the medical and surgical arena from
sporadic CJDs and all human TSEs. I only ponder how many sporadic CJDs in
the USA are type 2 PrPSc?
http://www.neurology.org/cgi/eletters/60/2/176#535
THE PATHOLOGICAL PROTEIN
Hardcover, 304 pages plus photos and illustrations. ISBN 0-387-95508-9
June 2003
BY Philip Yam
CHAPTER 14 LAYING ODDS
Answering critics like Terry Singeltary, who feels that the U.S. under-
counts CJD, Schonberger conceded that the current surveillance system has
errors but stated that most of the errors will be confined to the older
population.
http://www.thepathologicalprotein.com/
Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Singeltary, Sr et al.
JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734. Vol. 285 No. 6, February 14, 2001 JAMA
Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
To the Editor: In their Research Letter, Dr Gibbons and colleagues1 reported
that the annual US death rate due to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) has
been stable since 1985. These estimates, however, are based only on reported
cases, and do not include misdiagnosed or preclinical cases. It seems to me
that misdiagnosis alone would drastically change these figures. An unknown
number of persons with a diagnosis of Alzheimer disease in fact may have
CJD, although only a small number of these patients receive the postmortem
examination necessary to make this diagnosis. Furthermore, only a few states
have made CJD reportable. Human and animal transmissible spongiform
encephalopathies should be reportable nationwide and internationally.
Terry S. Singeltary, Sr Bacliff, Tex
1. Gibbons RV, Holman RC, Belay ED, Schonberger LB. Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease in the United States: 1979-1998. JAMA. 2000;284:2322-2323. FREE FULL
TEXT
http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/extract/285/6/733?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=singeltary&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT
http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/285/6/733?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=singeltary&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT
2 January 2000 British Medical Journal U.S. Scientist should be concerned
with a CJD epidemic in the U.S., as well
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/320/7226/8/b#6117
15 November 1999 British Medical Journal vCJD in the USA * BSE in U.S.
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/319/7220/1312/b#5406
Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the
farm died from TME. Since previous incidences of TME were associated with
common or shared feeding practices, we obtained a careful history of feed
ingredients used over the past 12-18 months. The rancher was a "dead stock"
feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle and a few horses.
Sheep had never been fed.
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf
USDA CERTIFIED DEAD STOCK DOWNER COW SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM for children
please note, dead stock downer cattle i.e. non-ambulatory, are the most
likely to have mad cow disease.
http://downercattle.blogspot.com/
http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2008/02/transcript-technical-briefing.html
see full text 18 pages ;
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08686t.pdf
Thu Dec 6, 2007 11:38
FDA IN CRISIS MODE, AMERICAN LIVES AT RISK
http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/fs/food-disease/news/dec0407fda.html
FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/07/briefing/2007-4329b_02_01_FDA%20Report%20on%20Science%20and%20Technology.pdf
[Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk
Materials for Human Food and Requirement for the Disposition of
Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle 9/13/2005
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf
3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach was to
accord it a _very low profile indeed_. Dr. A Thiermann showed the picture in
the ''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and thought this was a
fanatical incident to be _avoided_ in the US _at all costs_ $
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11b/tab01.pdf
Attachment to Singeltary comment
January 28, 2007
Greetings APHIS,
I would kindly like to submit the following to ;
BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES
[Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01
[Federal Register: January 9, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 5)] [Proposed Rules]
[Page 1101-1129] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access
[wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr09ja07-21]
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f8152
BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES
[Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01 Date: January 9, 2007 at 9:08 am
PST
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f3412
[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf
APHIS-2006-0041-0006 TSE advisory committee for the meeting December 15,
2006
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f3413&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8
Tuesday, June 3, 2008 SCRAPIE USA UPDATE JUNE 2008 NOR-98 REPORTED PA
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2008/06/scrapie-usa-update-june-2008-nor-98.html
NOR-98 ATYPICAL SCRAPIE 5 cases documented in USA in 5 different states USA
007
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2008/04/seac-spongiform-encephalopathy-advisory.html
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/
SCRAPIE USA
http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/
CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE
http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/
8. Human susceptibility to CWD
Millions of North Americans hunt deer and elk (U.S. Department of the
Interior, Census Bureau), and there is no doubt that people have been
exposed to CWD through venison consumption, particularly in light of recent
data showing CWD prions in muscle [2]. Human susceptibility to CWD or to
other newly emerging animal TSE [9, 14] is still unclear, although we can be
somewhat reassured in that there have been no large scale outbreaks of human
TSE cases in Colorado and Wyoming, where CWD has existed for decades [51].
Up until approximately 10 years ago, autopsies were not performed on suspect
human TSE cases in many states due to biosafety concerns, therefore the
diagnosis of potential new TSE strains has been hampered. This indicates
that clinical TSE diagnoses in humans were not confirmed, nor was any strain
typing done to look for the appearance of potentially subtle or unusual
pathological or biochemical phenotypes of a new TSE strain. Fortunately, the
autopsy rate for suspect cases is improving. At the National Prion Disease
Pathology Surveillance Center at Case Western Reserve University (Cleveland,
Ohio), Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) suspect cases are studied and
classified by CJD subtype. Thus far,
*** twenty-seven CJD patients who regularly consumed venison were reported
to the Surveillance Center***,
however there have been no unusual or novel prion subtypes that might
indicate the appearance of a new prion strain [7, 41]. Other indirect
studies of human susceptibility to CWD also suggest that the risk is low. In
biochemical conversion studies, Raymond et al. [68] showed that the
efficiency of CWD to convert recombinant human PrP into amyloid fibrils was
low, but similar to that of both BSE and scrapie fibrils to do the same.
These results suggest that there is a molecular incompatibility in the
conversion of human PrPC by CWD, sheep scrapie, or BSE, and that cross
species infections in humans may be rare events. To determine whether common
PrPSc strain features may link CWD and CJD, histopathology and the PrPSc
biochemical characteristics from deer and elk were compared with that of
humans with sporadic CJD (sCJD) cases that are methionine homozygous at
codon 129 of the Prnp gene by Xie et al. [96], although strain features
including histologic profile, target organs, and glycoform patterns will not
necessarily remain the same upon crossing species barriers [6, 5, 8, 57].
The PrPSc form is cleaved by proteinase-K (PK) at different sites depending
on the conformation of the protein and may aid determination of whether the
PrPSc conformation is similar. By western blot (SDS-PAGE) of elk CWD, the
unglycosylated PK-resistant PrPSc migrated at 21 kDa, similar to sCJD (MM1
subtype) and the PK cleavage site was the same, occurring at residues 78 and
82 as assessed by N-terminal sequencing. Conformational stability was
evaluated by measuring the PrPSc stability under partially denaturing
conditions and also showed no significant difference between elk CWD and
sCJD MM1 PrPSc. However, elk CWD and human sCJD MM1 strains exhibited
distinct glycoform patterns by two dimensional gel electrophoresis,
suggesting that the strains differed. Future studies may utilize luminescent
conjugated polymers, which were recently shown to distinguish naturally- and
experimentally-derived prion strains [79]. To study elk-human prion species
barriers, Kong et al. inoculated elk CWD into transgenic mice expressing
either human PrP or elk PrP. Whereas the elk PrP expressing mice developed
disease after only 118-142 days post-inoculation, human PrP expressing mice
(129M) did not develop any features of TSE after more than 657 or more than
756 days [41]. In accordance with these results, Tamgüney et al. also
reported that human PrP overexpressing mice were not susceptible to 9 CWD
isolates from mule deer, white-tailed deer, and elk [84]. However, mice have
a limited lifespan and further passages may be necessary to detect low
levels of prion infectivity that may be present subclinically. Although
indirect evidence is accumulating that there may be a robust species barrier
for CWD transmission to humans, one report indicates nonhuman primate
susceptibility to CWD. Intracerebral inoculation of squirrel monkeys
(Saimiri sciureus) demonstrated a positive CWD transmission [49]. Among
non-human primates, however, the Prnp sequence of the new world monkeys are
the most distant from humans [72], and therefore may not indicate that human
prion conversion would occur by CWD.
snip...
11. Disease control challenges posed by CWD
Evidence is building that indicates efficient horizontal transmission occurs
in CWD, indeed a complicating aspect in disease control [91]. Potential
transmission mechanisms range from spread via direct contact among animals
to environmental exposure through grazing in areas contaminated by
prion-infected secretions, excretions (saliva, urine, feces), tissues
(placenta), or decomposed carcasses. Recently, in a breakthrough finding,
saliva from CWD infected deer was shown to transmit prion disease [50]. An
additional experiment by Miller and colleagues showed that CWD-infected
carcasses allowed to decay naturally in confined pastures can lead to CWD
infections in captive deer, demonstrating the potential for environmental
contamination to spread infection [55]. Modelling studies have provided
further
support that environmental contamination is likely playing a significant
role in transmitting CWD [56, 53]. Additionally, infectious prions have been
demonstrated to bind soil particles and remain infectious to animals by both
intracerebral and oral exposure routes [38, 37]. Prion infectivity has been
recovered from soil more than two years after experimental exposure to
prions, suggesting the soil may serve as a reservoir for CWD prions [75].
Taken together, these results indicate that there may even be multiple
sources for CWD exposure, perhaps through direct contact and environmental
routes. Significant challenges to CWD eradication exist in free-ranging
cervids. Infected deer and elk range over a broad geographic region, and
even previously surmised geographic barriers such as the Continental Divide
have proven passable by infected animals. Ridding the environment of
CWD-contaminated soil or even CWD-infected carcasses is not possible.
Moreover, the available ante-mortem diagnostic tests for surveillance are
laborious and impractical for large numbers of free-ranging animals [74, 88,
95]. Therefore for a wildlife manager, this disease is costly to survey and
difficult to control.
12. Conclusion
CWD in cervids is efficiently transmitted, likely more than any other TSE in
animals or humans. Therefore, it is unlikely that this TSE can be
eradicated, but perhaps through an improved understanding of transmission
routes, biological factors influencing pathogenesis, and the molecular basis
of CWD prion conversion, a targeted strategy for interrupting disease spread
may be developed.
Acknowledgements
I thank Drs. Michael Miller, Jason Bartz and Mathias Heikenwalder for
critical review of the manuscript.
snip...see full text 19 pages ;
http://www.vetres.org/index.php?option=article&access=standard&Itemid=129&url=/articles/vetres/pdf/2008/04/v08092.pdf
SEE FULL TEXT CWD ;
http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2008/04/prion-disease-of-cervids-chronic.html
Thursday, April 03, 2008
A prion disease of cervids: Chronic wasting disease 2008
http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2008/04/prion-disease-of-cervids-chronic.html
Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy TME
http://transmissible-mink-encephalopathy.blogspot.com/
Tuesday, April 29, 2008
Interference at the EPA - Science and Politics at the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
please see full text ;
http://sciencebushwhacked.blogspot.com/
Greetings again Honorable President Young-hui, KIWA (Koreatown Immigrant
Workers Alliance), and all Korea,
You might want to communicate these factors of iCJD to your fellow Koreans
in the USA who are having medical, surgical and or dental work done. With
the many different animal TSEs in the USA of typical and atypical phenotype,
the consumption thereof of these TSE infected animals, and the following
medical, surgical, and or dental work done on any individual consuming such
tainted product, the fact that Koreans are more susceptible to contracting a
TSE, one must ponder all these factors ;
Polymorphisms of the prion protein gene (PRNP) in a Korean population
Journal Journal of Human Genetics Publisher Springer Japan ISSN 1434-5161
(Print) 1435-232X (Online) Issue Volume 49, Number 6 / June, 2004 Category
Short Communication DOI 10.1007/s10038-004-0150-7 Pages 319-324 Subject
Collection Biomedical and Life Sciences SpringerLink Date Monday, May 17,
2004
Byung-Hoon Jeong1, Jae-Hwan Nam2, Yun-Jung Lee1, Kyung-Hee Lee1, Myoung-Kuk
Jang1, Richard I. Carp3, Ho-Dong Lee2, Young-Ran Ju2, Sangmee Ahn Jo2,
Keun-Yong Park2 and Yong-Sun Kim1, 4
(1) Ilsong Institute of Life Science, Hallym University, Ilsong Building,
1605-4, Gwanyang-dong, Dongan-gu, Anyang, Kyounggi-do, 431-060, South Korea
(2) Department of Virology, Korea National Institute of Health, Eunpyung-gu,
Seoul, 122-701, South Korea (3) New York State Institute for Basic Research
in Developmental Disabilities, Staten Island, NY 10314, USA (4) Department
of Microbiology, College of Medicine, Hallym University, 1605-4,
Gwanyang-dong, Dongan-gu, Anyang, Kyounggi-do, 431-060, South Korea
Received: 7 January 2004 Accepted: 5 March 2004 Published online: 18 May
2004
Abstract Human prion protein gene (PRNP) has been considered to be involved
in the susceptibility of humans to prion diseases. Polymorphisms of
methionine (Met)/valine (Val) at codon 129 and of glutamic acid (Glu)/lysine
(Lys) at codon 219 are thought to play an important role in susceptibility
to sporadic, iatrogenic and variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease (CJD).
Although the genotype distribution of polymorphisms in PRNP open reading
frame (ORF) has been reported in many European populations, among Asian
groups, it has been reported only in the Japanese population. We examined
the PRNP polymorphisms in 529 healthy Koreans. We observed that genotype
frequencies at codon 129 was 94.33% Met/Met, 5.48% Met/Val, and 0.19%
Val/Val with an allele frequency of 0.971:0.029 Met:Val, and that genotype
frequencies at codon 219 was 92.06% Glu/Glu, 7.94% Glu/Lys, and 0% Lys/Lys
with an allele frequency of 0.96:0.04 Glu:Lys. The frequencies of the
Glu/Glu genotype (2=10.075, P=0.0015) and of the Glu allele (2=9.486,
P=0.0021) at codon 219 were significantly higher in the Korean population
than the Japanese population. In addition, the genotype frequency of
heterozygotes (12.7%) at codons 129 or/and 219 was significantly lower in
Koreans than in people from Great Britain (2=89.52, P<0.0001). The deletion
rate of one octarepeat (R2 deletion) was 0.38%, with 99.62% undeleted
homozygotes and 0% deleted homozygote. To our knowledge, the R2 octarepeat
deletion has never been found in people from countries other than Korea. The
data of PRNP polymorphism at codon 219 suggest that Koreans may be more
sensitive to sporadic CJD than the Japanese population. Keywords Prion
protein gene - Polymorphism - Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease - Single nucleotide
polymorphism - Deletion - Korean
http://www.springerlink.com/content/51h1j81h80hjrdtf/
European Journal of Human Genetics (2005) 13, 1094–1097.
doi:10.1038/sj.ejhg.5201460; published online 29 June 2005
Polymorphism at 3' UTR +28 of the prion-like protein gene is associated with
sporadic Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease Byung-Hoon Jeong1, Nam-Ho Kim1,
Eun-Kyoung Choi1, Chaeyoung Lee1, Young-Han Song1, Jae-Il Kim2, Richard I
Carp2 and Yong-Sun Kim1,3
1Ilsong Institute of Life Science, Hallym University, 1605-4 Gwanyang-dong
snip...
Our results are the first genetic association study of the PRND noncoding
region with sporadic CJD. Recently, we reported that the distributions of
codons 129 and 219 genotypes of PRNP in a Korean population differ
significantly from those reported for other ethnic groups.24 Thus, further
investigations in different ethnic groups including Europeans will be
necessary to assess association between sporadic CJD and the PRND 3' UTR +28
polymorphism. Furthermore, since it is unknown whether this polymorphism
affects mRNA stability or gene expression of PRND, further experiments
should be conducted to clarify the role of this polymorphism in PRND
function.
http://www.nature.com/ejhg/journal/v13/n9/full/5201460a.html
iatrogenic Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease
Reports of incidents of potential iatrogenic exposure to CJD via surgery: 01
January 2000 to 31 Dec 2007
There were a total of 329 incidents reported during this period (table 1).
Eleven surgical incidents were reported between 1 July and 31 December 2007
(since the previous update report). A surgical incident occurs when a
patient undergoes surgery but is only identified as having CJD or being at
risk of CJD at a later date. This means that the Advisory Committee on
Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP) transmissible spongiform encephalopathy working
group infection control guidelines would not have been followed. The surgery
carried out on an index patient with, or at risk of, CJD may result in
contamination of the instruments with abnormal prion protein. Table 1 shows
the number of CJD surgical incidents reported to the CJD Incidents Panel
from January 2000 to December 2007 by the diagnosis of the index patient.
Table 1 CJD Surgical Incidents (n=329) reported to the CJD Incidents Panel,
by diagnosis of index patient: January 2000 to Dec 2007
snip... see full text ;
http://www.hpa.org.uk/hpr/infections/ei_cjd.htm#cjd
Wednesday, January 02, 2008 Risk factors for sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease Wednesday, January 02, 2008 Risk factors for sporadic
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
FURTHER INTO THIS STUDY ;
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2008/01/risk-factors-for-sporadic-creutzfeldt.html
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2007/12/risk-factors-for-sporadic-creutzfeldt.html
Monday, December 31, 2007 Risk Assessment of Transmission of Sporadic
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease in Endodontic Practice in Absence of Adequate
Prion Inactivation
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2007/12/risk-assessment-of-transmission-of.html
Wednesday, June 4, 2008
SEAC 2008 ONE HUNDREDTH MEETING OF THE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY ADVISORY
COMMITTEE
http://seac992007.blogspot.com/2008/06/seac-2008-one-hundredth-meeting-of.html
summary
In summary, although this young woman clearly died of a prion disease, we
could not conclude she had vCJD, but also we could not be sure this was
sporadic CJD either. Although we were not able to make definite conclusions
on the basis of a single patient, we felt it important to report this tragic
death and these findings in the medical literature so as to bring this to
the attention of other doctors who might see similar patients in the future.
This unusual finding reminds us of the importance of keeping alert to the
possibility that BSE prions will cause disease in individuals with different
genetic types, who may develop a disease that may resemble sporadic CJD, or
vCJD, or have a new pattern of disease. This work emphasises the importance
of continuing to study the rogue prion protein type in patients and we thank
all patients and families who have kindly consented to use their, or their
loved one’s, tissues for this medical research.
Reference: Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease, Prion Protein Gene Codon 129VV, and a
Novel PrPSc Type in a Young British Woman Simon Mead; Susan Joiner; Melanie
Desbruslais; Jonathan A. Beck; Michael O’ Donoghue; Peter Lantos; Jonathan
D. F. Wadsworth; John Collinge Arch Neurol. 2007;64(12):1780-1784.
www.cjdsupport.net Newsletter issue 17 april 2008
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease, Prion Protein Gene Codon 129VV, and a Novel PrPSc
ype in a Young British Woman
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2008/01/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-prion-protein.html
And last but not least, similarities of PrPres between Htype BSE and human
prion diseases like CJD or GSS have been put forward [10], as well as
between L-type BSE and CJD [17]. These findings raise questions about the
origin and inter species transmission of these prion diseases that were
discovered through the BSE active surveillance.
full text 18 pages ;
http://www.vetres.org/index.php?option=article&access=standard&Itemid=129&url=/articles/vetres/pdf/2008/04/v07232.pdf
Thursday, June 05, 2008
Review on the epidemiology and dynamics of BSE epidemics
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/06/review-on-epidemiology-and-dynamics-of.html
The statistical incidence of CJD cases in the United States has been ***
revised *** to reflect that there is one case per 9000 in adults age 55 and
older. Eighty-five percent of the cases are sporadic, meaning there is no
known cause at present.
http://www.cjdfoundation.org/fact.html
SIGN THE PETITION TODAY, it may be the only recourse for the USA consumer to
finally get USA beef tested for BSE. We must stand together and demand a
safer BSE free beef product
http://www.stopmadcow.org
Saturday, June 7, 2008
Export Requirements for the Republic of Korea IMPORT HEALTH REQUIREMENTS FOR
U.S. BEEF AND BEEF PRODUCTS
http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2008/06/export-requirements-for-republic-of.html
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
Export Requirements for the Republic of Korea IMPORT HEALTH REQUIREMENTS FOR
U.S. BEEF AND BEEF PRODUCTS
http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2008/06/export-requirements-for-republic-of.html
KS-73 (Apr 23, 2008)
Asterisks (*) indicate the most recent revision to these requirements. To
search, click on your browser's "Edit" menu, then click on "Find (on this
page)". Enter "*" in the "Find What" field, then click "Find" or "Find Next"
until all asterisks have been identified.
Eligible/Ineligible Products
Eligible product
Although the United States and Korea have reached general agreement on the
resumption of export of U.S. beef and beef products to Korea, FSIS officials
should not issue export certificates for beef and beef products intended for
export to Korea at this time. Additional information about the specific
conditions, including eligible product, plant approval, and certification
requirements are being developed and will be made available as soon as
possible. Establishment management may contact AMS at 540-361-7640 for
information about AMS program requirements.*
snip...end
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/regulations_&_policies/Republic_of_Korea_Requirements/index.asp
Greetings,
please see the 'meat of the issue' on import health requirements for the
U.S. beef and beef products to Korea, or the lack of, as follows ;
IMPORT HEALTH REQUIREMENTS FOR U.S. BEEF AND BEEF PRODUCTS
Import Health Requirements for U.S. Beef and Beef Products
The following import health requirements shall be applied to beef and beef
products exported from the United States of America ("United States") to the
Republic of Korea ("Korea").
Definitions
1. Definitions for the purpose of these health requirements are as follows:
(1) "Beef or beef products" includes all edible parts of cattle less than 30
months of age at the time of slaughter and products derived from all edible
parts of cattle less than 30 months of age at the time of slaughter as
described in the U.S. Federal Meat Inspection Act. However, "beef or beef
products" excludes specified risk materials (SRMs); all mechanically
recovered meat (MRM)/mechanically separated meat (MSM); and advanced meat
recovery product (AMR) from the skull and vertebral column of cattle 30
months of age and over at the time of slaughter. AMR that is free of SRMs
and central nervous system tissues (CNS) is allowed. Ground meat, processed
products and beef extracts may contain AMR but excludes specified risk
materials (SRMs) and all MRM/MSM.
(2) "BSE" means Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy.
(3) "Cattle" means domesticated bovine animals (Bos taurus and Bos indicus)
born and raised in the United States, legally imported into the United
States from a country deemed eligible by the Korean government to export
beef or beef products to Korea, or raised in the United States for at least
100 days prior to slaughter.
(4) "Food-safety hazard" means any biological, chemical, or physical
property that may cause food to be unsafe for human consumption.
(5) "Lot" means a quantity of beef or beef products identified on a single
export certificate from one meat establishment, and consists of the same
process category and product standard of identity (sub-category).
(6) "Meat establishment" includes any slaughterhouse, processing plant, and
storage facility for beef or beef products that operates under U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) inspection.
(7) "Non-compliance" means an inconsistency with this protocol that does not
constitute a food-safety hazard.
(8) "Serious non-compliance" means a food-safety hazard in a shipped product
or a food-safety hazard found during a system audit.
(9) "Specified risk materials" (SRMs) means:
(a) tonsils and distal ileum from cattle of all ages; and
(b) brain, eyes, spinal cord, skull, dorsal root ganglia (DRG) and vertebral
column (excluding vertebrae of the tail, transverse processes and spinous
processes of the cervical, thoracic and lumbar vertebrae, median crest and
wings of the sacrum) from cattle 30 months of age and over at the time of
slaughter.(10) "United States" (U.S.) means the fifty states and the
District of Columbia.
General Requirements
2. Prior to the loading of the beef or beef products:
(a) the United States has been free of foot-and-mouth disease for the past
12 months and has been free of rinderpest, contagious bovine
pleuropneumonia, lumpy skin disease and Rift Valley fever for the past 24
months; and
(b) Vaccination has not been carried out against the aforementioned
diseases.
Notwithstanding the above, in the event the Korean government recognizes
that effective stamping-out policies ar e in place for the specific disease
in the United States, including emergency vaccination if carried out, the
required period for recognizing the United States as being free of that
disease may be shortened in accordance with World Organization for Animal
Health (OlE) guidelines after Korea conducts a risk analysis.
3. In the event a disease set out in item 2 occurs in the United States, the
U.S. government shall immediately suspend the issuance of export
certificates for all beef and beef products to Korea that do not meet the
requirements of item 2.
4. The U.S. government, in accordance with U.S. regulations, continuously
maintains measures that meet or exceed OlE guidelines for controlled-risk
status to effectively detect and prevent the introduction and spread of BSE.
The U.S. government will provide notice to the World Trade Organization
(WTO) -according to its WTO commitments -and inform Korea regarding the
repeal or amendment of any BSE-related measure.
5. In the event (an) additional case(s) of BSE occur(s) in the United
States, the U.S. government shall immediately conduct a thorough
epidemiological investigation and inform the Korean government of the
results of the investigation. The U.S. government will consult with the
Korean government about the findings of the investigation. The Korean
government will suspend the importation of beef and beef products if the
additional case(s) results in the OlE recognizing an adverse change in the
classification of the U.S. BSE status.
Requirements for Meat Establishments
6. Any meat establishment in the United States that operates under USDA
inspection is eligible to produce beef or beef products for Korea. The
establishment should be notified to the Korean government in advance.
7. The U.S. government will maintain a regular monitoring and aUditing
program for meat establishments that produce beef or beef products for
export to Korea to ensure they comply with the relevant provisions of these
health requirements and U.S. regulations. In the event of a serious
non-compliance, the Food Safely and Inspection Service (FSIS) personnel
would issue a Noncompliance Record and would immediately control the
non-compliant product If the process that resulted in the non-compliant
product is on-going, FSIS would immediately stop the process until it
determines tha t appropriate corrective and preventative measures have been
taken. Only when FSIS determines that corrective actions are adequate will
production be allowed to resume. The U.S. government will inform the Korean
government if an establishment is suspended and when corrective action has
been taken.
8. The Korean government may conduct on-site aUdits of a representative
sample of the meat establishments that export beef or beef products to
Korea. When a serious non-compliance with these health requirements has been
found as a result of the on-site audit, the Korean government will inform
the results to the U.S. government, and the U.S. government shall take
appropriate measures and inform the Korean government of the measures taken.
9. The U.S. government shall verify that a suspended meat establishment has
determined and implemented appropriate corrective and preventative measures
before lifting the suspension described in item 7, item B or item 24. The
U.S. government shall inform the Korean government of the corrective action
the meat establishment has taken and of the date the meat establishmenfs
suspension is lifted.
Requirements for Beef and Beef Products
10. The beef or beef products were derived from cattle born and raised in
the United States, from cattle legally imported into the United States from
a country deemed eligible by the Korean government to export beef or beef
products to Korea, or from cattle raised in the United States for at least
100 days prior to slaughter.
11. Cattle for producing beef or beef products for export were not suspect
or confirmed BSE cases; confirmed progenies of BSE cases; or confirmed
cohorts of BSE cases, as defined in the Terrestrial Animal Health Code
adopted by the OlE.
12. Meat establishments that produce beef or beef products shall maintain a
program for the hygienic removal of SRMs.
13. For the purpose of SRM removal, the age of cattle at the time of
slaughter was verified by documentation which identifies the age or by
dentition.
14. The meat establishments maintain purchase records indicating the
facility from which the animals were purchased for slaughter. Records may be
disposed of two years after the date of purchase.
15. The beef or beef products were derived from cattle that were slaughtered
in meat establishments (slaughterhouses) certified by th e U.S. government
as eligible to export beef and beef products to Korea and that passed
ante-mortem and post-mortem inspection conducted by USDA inspection
personnel under the supervision of the resident USDA veterinarian.
16. The beef or beef products were derived from cattle that were not
subjected to a stunning process, prior to slaughter, with a device injecting
compressed air or gas into the cranial cavity, or to a pithing process.
17. The beef or beef products were produced and handled in a manner as to
prevent contamination from SRMs or from MSM from the skull and vertebral
column of cattle 30 months of age and over, in accordance with FSIS
regulations.
18. Residues (radioactivity, synthetic antibiotic sUbstances, antibiotic
substances, heavy metals, pesticides, hormones, etc.) posing a public health
hazard and pathogenic microorganisms in the beef and beef products shall not
exceed the tolerance levels established by the Korean government. The beef
and beef products may be treated with ionizing radiation, ultraviolet rays,
and tenderizers in accordance with Korean regUlations.
19. Sanitary packaging material was used to package the beef or beef
products.
20. The processing, storage and transportation of the beef an d beef
products were handled in such a manner as to prevent contamination by
communicable animal disease pathogens.
21. Refrigerated or cold storage rooms on a ship (aircraft) or container
that transports the beef and beef products were sealed by using the seal of
the U.S. government or a U.S. government-recognized seal and then certified
by a U.S. government veterinarian.
Export Certificate
22. Beef and beef products qualify for import quarantine inspection if
accompanied by the Export Certificate of Wholesomeness and the Certificate
for Export of Beef and Beef Products to the Republic of Korea (ROK) issued
by the veterinary authority of the U.S. government, which include the
following information to be submitted to the quarantine authority of the
Korean government:
(1) Information responsive to items 2,10 and 15-20 above;
(2) Name of the product (including species), number of packages and weight
(net weight) listed by each final processing plant;
(3) Names, addresses and establishment numbers of the slaughterhouse, meat
processing plant and storage facility;
(4) Slaughtering period and/or processing period (dd/mmJyy-dd/mm/yy);
(5) Names and addresses of the consignor and the consignee;
(6) Date the export certificate was issued and the name and signature of the
issuer; and
(7) Container number and seal number.
Import Quarantine Inspection and Regulatory Action
23. If the Korean government detects a food-safety hazard in a lot during
the quarantine inspection process, it may reject the lot. The Korean
government shall notify and consult with the U.S. government regarding the
matter and may request corrective action if appropriate. If an SRM is found,
FSIS will conduct an investigation to determine the cause of the problem.
Product pro duced by the pertinent me at establishment shall continue to be
eligible for import quarantine inspection. However, the Korean government
will increase the rate of inspection of subsequent beef and beef products
from the meat establishment. After the Korean government inspects five lots
of equal or greater quantity of the same product wnhout finding a
food-safety hazard, the Korean government shall apply its standard
inspection procedures and rates.
24. If the Korean government observes at least two incidents of food-safety
hazards involving separate lots from the same meat establishment, the meat
establishment may be suspended until corrective action has been taken. Beef
and beef products of the meat establishment that were certified prior to the
date of suspension shall continue to be eligible for import quarantine
inspection. An establishment shall remain suspended until the U.S.
government verifies to the Korean government that corrective actions have
been completed. The U.S. government shall inform the Korean government of
the meat establishment's corrective action and of the date the meat
establishmenfs suspension is lifted. The Korean government may include an
on-site audit of the establishment during its next system audit in the
United States.
Consultations
25. The Korean government or the U.S. government may request consultations
with the other concerning any matter regarding the interpretation or
application of these import health requirements. Unless otherwise agreed,
the consultations shall be held within seven days of the request in the
territory of the government that receives the request.
Addendum
1. This notice will go into effect on the date of its notification.
2. When the United States publicly announces its enhanced feed ban, Article
1(1) shall be modified to read as follows: "beef or beef products" includes
all edible parts of cattle and products derived from all edible parts of
cattle as described in the U.S. Federal Meat Inspection Act. However, "beef
or beef products" excludes specified risk materials (SRMs); all mechanically
recovered meat (MRM) /mechanically separated meat (MSM); and advanced meat
recovery product (AMR) from the skull and vertebral column of cattle 30
months of age and over at the time of slaughter. AMR that is free of SRMs
and central nervous system tissues (CNS) is allowed. Ground meat, processed
products and beef extracts may contain AMR but excludes specified risk
materials (SRMs) and all MRM/MSM.
3. During the first 90 days following the effective date of these import
health requirements, Korea may audit and/or reject U.S. decisions regarding
the listing of new plants or re-Iisting of previously de-listed plants.
4. During the first 180 days following the effective date of these import
health requirements, exports of T-bone and Porterhouse steaks will be
accompanied by some notation on the box that confirms for Korean officials
that these cuts of beef come from cattle under 30 months of age. The Korean
government and the U.S. government agree to have consultations upon the
completion of the 180 day period with a view to addressing concerns after
reviewing the notation's effect on beef trade and its inspection.
Min Dong-Seck
Deputy Minister
MIFAFF
On behalf of Korea
A. Ellen Terpstra
Deputy Under Secretary
USDA
On behalf of the United States
http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/import_requirements_eng_both_sign.pdf
Why Americans, As Well as Koreans, Should Be Worried About Mad Cow Tainted
USA Beef
By Terry S. Singeltary Sr. May 15, 2008
Straight to the Source
Web Note: This is an important commentary by Terry S. Singeltary Sr., on a
recent Business Week story on the controversy in South Korea over their
government's lifting on the ban on conventional (non-organic) beef, despite
the fact that the USDA is still allowing slaughterhouse waste and blood and
manure to be fed to cows, and refusing to test all cows at slaughter. See
the Mad Cow section of the OCA website for in-depth information. Terry is a
regular blogger on the OCA website on Mad Cow issues.
Ronnie Cummins
One Korean official says the probability of a human being catching a mad cow
disease by eating U.S. beef is like the one of a golf player scoring a
hole-in-one and then being killed by lightning.
this is typical BSe. you here industry groups comment 'your more likely to
get hit by a car than die from CJD'. well, maybe so, but my mother and many
more did not die from getting hit by a car, they died from CJD, my mothers
being the hvCJD (confirmed), and my neighbors mother died from CJD
(confirmed). the UKBSEnvCJD _only_ theory is incorrect. there are more
strains of mad cow than the UK BSE in beef to nvCJD in humans in the UK. The
deception by the USDA, FDA, and the Bush administration about mad cow
disease, CJD, and all Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy over the past
8 years have been outrageous, to a point of being criminal. I am vested in
nothing, but the truth.
snip...see full text ;
http://www.grassrootsnetroots.org/articles/article_12387.cfm
Tuesday, May 13, 2008
Concerned Americans against Mad Cow Disease STATEMENT OF SOLIDARITY with
Koreans May 13, 2008
http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2008/05/concerned-americans-against-mad-cow.html
http://flounder068.vox.com/library/post/concerned-americans-against-mad-cow-disease-statement-of-solidarity-with-koreans-may-13-2008.html
http://www.koreantopnews.com/story.php?title=USDA_VS_KOREA_typical_or_atypical_BSe_Concerned_Americans_against_Mad_Cow_Disease_STATEMENT_OF_SOLIDARITY_with_Koreans_May_13_2008
BSE YOUNGEST AGE STATISTICS UNDER 30 MONTHS
http://bseyoungestage.blogspot.com/
http://flounder068.vox.com/library/post/bse-youngest-age-statistics-under-30-months.html
Tuesday, May 27, 2008
FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory Report Texas Legend Ranch
OAI 05/10/2008
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/05/fda-bseruminant-feed-inspections-firms.html
"South Korea may demand revision of US beef import pact"
"The agreement, struck last month, has been widely criticized as making too"
"many concessions to the United States"
THE PEOPLE of Korea _should_ be mad about the importing of USA beef into
their Country. can you believe these regulations? even IF a BSE case(s) are
documented in the USA, the people of Korea still cannot suspend the
importing of U.S. beef, NO matter how many more mad cows the USA finds,
until a thorough epidemiological investigation is finished. please remember,
it took over a year and literally an act of congress to confirm the atypical
mad cow in Texas before they finally finish that epidemiological
investigation, and even after all that, the Koreans still cannot ban USA
beef, until the OIE recognizes an adverse change in the classification of
the U.S. BSE status. Considering the USDA and the OIE collaborated to seal
the deal of the BSE MRR policy (the legal trading of all strains of TSE
globally, just for commodities and futures sake, human health was not even
considered), I doubt the OIE would ever change the BSE status for the USA,
no matter how many more mad cows are found. It's all about money folks.
WE are talking years now, before the Koreans could ever suspend USA beef due
to a BSE case(s) ever being documented in the USA, due to these stupid
regulations. This is nothing more than FORCE FEEDING KOREA USDA MAD COW
BEEF, i.e. all for a dollar, to hell with human health on a disease with an
incubation period of years if not a decade or more.
Please remember, the last two mad cows documented in the USA i.e. Alabama
and Texas, both were of the 'atypical' BSE strain, and immediately after
that, the USDA shut down the testing from 470,000 to 40,000 in the U.S. in
2007 out of about 35 million cattle slaughtered. also, science is showing
that some of these atypical cases are more virulent to humans than the
typical UK BSE strain ;
***Atypical forms of BSE have emerged which, although rare, appear to be
more virulent than the classical BSE that causes vCJD.***
Progress Report from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance
Center
An Update from Stephen M. Sergay, MB, BCh & Pierluigi Gambetti, MD
April 3, 2008
http://www.aan.com/news/?event=read&article_id=4397&page=72.45.45
IF BSE is not in the USA (just not documented for many different reasons),
and only atypical BSE is in the USA (plus CWD, plus, many strains of
Scrapie, and Now the Nor-98 documented in 5 different states, plus TME, then
why would human mad cow in the USA look like the UK nvCJD from UK BSE cows ?
it was shown long ago in studies at Mission Texas that experimental
transmission of USA Scrapie to USA Bovine, DID NOT LOOK LIKE UK BSE. so
again, in short, why would human mad cow in the USA look like human mad cow
in the UK i.e. the (nvCJD). however, I believe that BSE has been in the USA
untested and undocumented for years. why on earth then does the USDA refuse
to allow creekstone or anyone else test their product? simple, if you don't
look/test, you don't find.
ONE only has to read how the USDA et al have legally blocked, blundered,
botched, mismanaged, bungled, floundered, and flat out manipulated, the
testing in the infamous June 2004 enhanced cover-up program for mad cow
surveillance and testing. I mean, I am not really to hip on THE INDUSTRY,
testing for mad cow disease, and what that program might consist of, but
anything is better than nothing at all. ...
BSE BASE MAD COW TESTING TEXAS, USA, AND CANADA
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/
MAD COW DISEASE terminology UK c-BSE (typical), atypical BSE H or L, and or
Italian L-BASE
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/03/mad-cow-disease-terminology-uk-c-bse.html
In 2007, in one weekly enforcement report, the fda recalled 10,000,000+
pounds of BANNED MAD COW FEED, 'in commerce', and i can tell you that most
of it was fed out ;
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. MBM IN COMMERCE USA
2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST REASON Blood meal used to make cattle
feed was recalled because it was cross-contaminated with prohibited bovine
meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and
labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN
COMMERCE 42,090 lbs. DISTRIBUTION WI
REASON Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was
cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did
not bear cautionary BSE statement. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 9,997,976
lbs. DISTRIBUTION ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA SEPT 6, 2006 1961.72 TONS IN COMMERCE AL,
TN, AND WV Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST
snip... see listings and references of enormous amounts of banned mad cow
protein 'in commerce' in 2006 and 2005 ;
see full text ;
Friday, April 25, 2008
Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed [Docket No.
2002N-0273] (Formerly Docket No. 02N-0273) RIN 0910-AF46
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/04/substances-prohibited-from-use-in.html
SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS
http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/2008/02/specified-risk-materials-srm.html
SRM MAD COW RECALL 406 THOUSAND POUNDS CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS KANSAS
http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/04/srm-mad-cow-recall-406-thousand-pounds.html
Sunday, April 20, 2008 Progress Report from the National Prion Disease
Pathology Surveillance Center April 3, 2008
Atypical forms of BSE have emerged which, although rare, appear to be more
virulent than the classical BSE that causes vCJD.
see full text ;
http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2008/04/progress-report-from-national-prion.html
CJD TEXAS (cjd clusters)
http://cjdtexas.blogspot.com/
CJD USA RISING
The statistical incidence of CJD cases in the United States has been revised
to reflect that there is one case per 9000 in adults age 55 and older.
Eighty-five percent of the cases are sporadic, meaning there is no known
cause at present.
http://www.cjdfoundation.org/fact.html
Communicated by: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
[In submitting these data, Terry S. Singeltary Sr. draws attention to the
steady increase in the "type unknown" category, which, according to their
definition, comprises cases in which vCJD could be excluded. The total of 26
cases for the current year (2007) is disturbing, possibly symptomatic of the
circulation of novel agents. Characterization of these agents should be
given a high priority. - Mod.CP]
http://pro-med.blogspot.com/2007/11/proahedr-prion-disease-update-2007-07.html
http://www.promedmail.org/pls/askus/f?p=2400:1001:6833194127530602005::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1010,39963
There is a growing number of human CJD cases, and they were presented last
week in San Francisco by Luigi Gambatti(?) from his CJD surveillance
collection.
He estimates that it may be up to 14 or 15 persons which display selectively
SPRPSC and practically no detected RPRPSC proteins.
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/1006-4240t1.htm
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/2006-4240t1.pdf
JOURNAL OF NEUROLOGY
MARCH 26, 2003
RE-Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease in the United States
Email Terry S. Singeltary:
f[email protected]
I lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain Variant CJD). I would like to comment
on the CDC's attempts to monitor the occurrence of emerging forms of CJD.
Asante, Collinge et al [1] have reported that BSE transmission to the
129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is
indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest sporadic CJD. However,
CJD and all human TSEs are not reportable nationally. CJD and all human TSEs
must be made reportable in every state and internationally. I hope that the
CDC does not continue to expect us to still believe that the 85%+ of all CJD
cases which are sporadic are all spontaneous, without route/source. We have
many TSEs in the USA in both animal and man. CWD in deer/elk is spreading
rapidly and CWD does transmit to mink, ferret, cattle, and squirrel monkey
by intracerebral inoculation. With the known incubation periods in other
TSEs, oral transmission studies of CWD may take much longer. Every
victim/family of CJD/TSEs should be asked about route and source of this
agent. To prolong this will only spread the agent and needlessly expose
others. In light of the findings of Asante and Collinge et al, there should
be drastic measures to safeguard the medical and surgical arena from
sporadic CJDs and all human TSEs. I only ponder how many sporadic CJDs in
the USA are type 2 PrPSc?
http://www.neurology.org/cgi/eletters/60/2/176#535
THE PATHOLOGICAL PROTEIN
Hardcover, 304 pages plus photos and illustrations. ISBN 0-387-95508-9
June 2003
BY Philip Yam
CHAPTER 14 LAYING ODDS
Answering critics like Terry Singeltary, who feels that the U.S. under-
counts CJD, Schonberger conceded that the current surveillance system has
errors but stated that most of the errors will be confined to the older
population.
http://www.thepathologicalprotein.com/
Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Singeltary, Sr et al.
JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734. Vol. 285 No. 6, February 14, 2001 JAMA
Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
To the Editor: In their Research Letter, Dr Gibbons and colleagues1 reported
that the annual US death rate due to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) has
been stable since 1985. These estimates, however, are based only on reported
cases, and do not include misdiagnosed or preclinical cases. It seems to me
that misdiagnosis alone would drastically change these figures. An unknown
number of persons with a diagnosis of Alzheimer disease in fact may have
CJD, although only a small number of these patients receive the postmortem
examination necessary to make this diagnosis. Furthermore, only a few states
have made CJD reportable. Human and animal transmissible spongiform
encephalopathies should be reportable nationwide and internationally.
Terry S. Singeltary, Sr Bacliff, Tex
1. Gibbons RV, Holman RC, Belay ED, Schonberger LB. Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease in the United States: 1979-1998. JAMA. 2000;284:2322-2323. FREE FULL
TEXT
http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/extract/285/6/733?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=singeltary&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT
http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/285/6/733?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=singeltary&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT
2 January 2000 British Medical Journal U.S. Scientist should be concerned
with a CJD epidemic in the U.S., as well
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/320/7226/8/b#6117
15 November 1999 British Medical Journal vCJD in the USA * BSE in U.S.
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/319/7220/1312/b#5406
Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the
farm died from TME. Since previous incidences of TME were associated with
common or shared feeding practices, we obtained a careful history of feed
ingredients used over the past 12-18 months. The rancher was a "dead stock"
feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle and a few horses.
Sheep had never been fed.
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf
USDA CERTIFIED DEAD STOCK DOWNER COW SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM for children
please note, dead stock downer cattle i.e. non-ambulatory, are the most
likely to have mad cow disease.
http://downercattle.blogspot.com/
http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2008/02/transcript-technical-briefing.html
see full text 18 pages ;
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08686t.pdf
Thu Dec 6, 2007 11:38
FDA IN CRISIS MODE, AMERICAN LIVES AT RISK
http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/fs/food-disease/news/dec0407fda.html
FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/07/briefing/2007-4329b_02_01_FDA%20Report%20on%20Science%20and%20Technology.pdf
[Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk
Materials for Human Food and Requirement for the Disposition of
Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle 9/13/2005
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf
3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach was to
accord it a _very low profile indeed_. Dr. A Thiermann showed the picture in
the ''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and thought this was a
fanatical incident to be _avoided_ in the US _at all costs_ $
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11b/tab01.pdf
Attachment to Singeltary comment
January 28, 2007
Greetings APHIS,
I would kindly like to submit the following to ;
BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES
[Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01
[Federal Register: January 9, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 5)] [Proposed Rules]
[Page 1101-1129] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access
[wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr09ja07-21]
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f8152
BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES
[Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01 Date: January 9, 2007 at 9:08 am
PST
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f3412
[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf
APHIS-2006-0041-0006 TSE advisory committee for the meeting December 15,
2006
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f3413&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8
Tuesday, June 3, 2008 SCRAPIE USA UPDATE JUNE 2008 NOR-98 REPORTED PA
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2008/06/scrapie-usa-update-june-2008-nor-98.html
NOR-98 ATYPICAL SCRAPIE 5 cases documented in USA in 5 different states USA
007
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2008/04/seac-spongiform-encephalopathy-advisory.html
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/
SCRAPIE USA
http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/
CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE
http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/
8. Human susceptibility to CWD
Millions of North Americans hunt deer and elk (U.S. Department of the
Interior, Census Bureau), and there is no doubt that people have been
exposed to CWD through venison consumption, particularly in light of recent
data showing CWD prions in muscle [2]. Human susceptibility to CWD or to
other newly emerging animal TSE [9, 14] is still unclear, although we can be
somewhat reassured in that there have been no large scale outbreaks of human
TSE cases in Colorado and Wyoming, where CWD has existed for decades [51].
Up until approximately 10 years ago, autopsies were not performed on suspect
human TSE cases in many states due to biosafety concerns, therefore the
diagnosis of potential new TSE strains has been hampered. This indicates
that clinical TSE diagnoses in humans were not confirmed, nor was any strain
typing done to look for the appearance of potentially subtle or unusual
pathological or biochemical phenotypes of a new TSE strain. Fortunately, the
autopsy rate for suspect cases is improving. At the National Prion Disease
Pathology Surveillance Center at Case Western Reserve University (Cleveland,
Ohio), Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) suspect cases are studied and
classified by CJD subtype. Thus far,
*** twenty-seven CJD patients who regularly consumed venison were reported
to the Surveillance Center***,
however there have been no unusual or novel prion subtypes that might
indicate the appearance of a new prion strain [7, 41]. Other indirect
studies of human susceptibility to CWD also suggest that the risk is low. In
biochemical conversion studies, Raymond et al. [68] showed that the
efficiency of CWD to convert recombinant human PrP into amyloid fibrils was
low, but similar to that of both BSE and scrapie fibrils to do the same.
These results suggest that there is a molecular incompatibility in the
conversion of human PrPC by CWD, sheep scrapie, or BSE, and that cross
species infections in humans may be rare events. To determine whether common
PrPSc strain features may link CWD and CJD, histopathology and the PrPSc
biochemical characteristics from deer and elk were compared with that of
humans with sporadic CJD (sCJD) cases that are methionine homozygous at
codon 129 of the Prnp gene by Xie et al. [96], although strain features
including histologic profile, target organs, and glycoform patterns will not
necessarily remain the same upon crossing species barriers [6, 5, 8, 57].
The PrPSc form is cleaved by proteinase-K (PK) at different sites depending
on the conformation of the protein and may aid determination of whether the
PrPSc conformation is similar. By western blot (SDS-PAGE) of elk CWD, the
unglycosylated PK-resistant PrPSc migrated at 21 kDa, similar to sCJD (MM1
subtype) and the PK cleavage site was the same, occurring at residues 78 and
82 as assessed by N-terminal sequencing. Conformational stability was
evaluated by measuring the PrPSc stability under partially denaturing
conditions and also showed no significant difference between elk CWD and
sCJD MM1 PrPSc. However, elk CWD and human sCJD MM1 strains exhibited
distinct glycoform patterns by two dimensional gel electrophoresis,
suggesting that the strains differed. Future studies may utilize luminescent
conjugated polymers, which were recently shown to distinguish naturally- and
experimentally-derived prion strains [79]. To study elk-human prion species
barriers, Kong et al. inoculated elk CWD into transgenic mice expressing
either human PrP or elk PrP. Whereas the elk PrP expressing mice developed
disease after only 118-142 days post-inoculation, human PrP expressing mice
(129M) did not develop any features of TSE after more than 657 or more than
756 days [41]. In accordance with these results, Tamgüney et al. also
reported that human PrP overexpressing mice were not susceptible to 9 CWD
isolates from mule deer, white-tailed deer, and elk [84]. However, mice have
a limited lifespan and further passages may be necessary to detect low
levels of prion infectivity that may be present subclinically. Although
indirect evidence is accumulating that there may be a robust species barrier
for CWD transmission to humans, one report indicates nonhuman primate
susceptibility to CWD. Intracerebral inoculation of squirrel monkeys
(Saimiri sciureus) demonstrated a positive CWD transmission [49]. Among
non-human primates, however, the Prnp sequence of the new world monkeys are
the most distant from humans [72], and therefore may not indicate that human
prion conversion would occur by CWD.
snip...
11. Disease control challenges posed by CWD
Evidence is building that indicates efficient horizontal transmission occurs
in CWD, indeed a complicating aspect in disease control [91]. Potential
transmission mechanisms range from spread via direct contact among animals
to environmental exposure through grazing in areas contaminated by
prion-infected secretions, excretions (saliva, urine, feces), tissues
(placenta), or decomposed carcasses. Recently, in a breakthrough finding,
saliva from CWD infected deer was shown to transmit prion disease [50]. An
additional experiment by Miller and colleagues showed that CWD-infected
carcasses allowed to decay naturally in confined pastures can lead to CWD
infections in captive deer, demonstrating the potential for environmental
contamination to spread infection [55]. Modelling studies have provided
further
support that environmental contamination is likely playing a significant
role in transmitting CWD [56, 53]. Additionally, infectious prions have been
demonstrated to bind soil particles and remain infectious to animals by both
intracerebral and oral exposure routes [38, 37]. Prion infectivity has been
recovered from soil more than two years after experimental exposure to
prions, suggesting the soil may serve as a reservoir for CWD prions [75].
Taken together, these results indicate that there may even be multiple
sources for CWD exposure, perhaps through direct contact and environmental
routes. Significant challenges to CWD eradication exist in free-ranging
cervids. Infected deer and elk range over a broad geographic region, and
even previously surmised geographic barriers such as the Continental Divide
have proven passable by infected animals. Ridding the environment of
CWD-contaminated soil or even CWD-infected carcasses is not possible.
Moreover, the available ante-mortem diagnostic tests for surveillance are
laborious and impractical for large numbers of free-ranging animals [74, 88,
95]. Therefore for a wildlife manager, this disease is costly to survey and
difficult to control.
12. Conclusion
CWD in cervids is efficiently transmitted, likely more than any other TSE in
animals or humans. Therefore, it is unlikely that this TSE can be
eradicated, but perhaps through an improved understanding of transmission
routes, biological factors influencing pathogenesis, and the molecular basis
of CWD prion conversion, a targeted strategy for interrupting disease spread
may be developed.
Acknowledgements
I thank Drs. Michael Miller, Jason Bartz and Mathias Heikenwalder for
critical review of the manuscript.
snip...see full text 19 pages ;
http://www.vetres.org/index.php?option=article&access=standard&Itemid=129&url=/articles/vetres/pdf/2008/04/v08092.pdf
SEE FULL TEXT CWD ;
http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2008/04/prion-disease-of-cervids-chronic.html
Thursday, April 03, 2008
A prion disease of cervids: Chronic wasting disease 2008
http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2008/04/prion-disease-of-cervids-chronic.html
Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy TME
http://transmissible-mink-encephalopathy.blogspot.com/
Tuesday, April 29, 2008
Interference at the EPA - Science and Politics at the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
please see full text ;
http://sciencebushwhacked.blogspot.com/
Greetings again Honorable President Young-hui, KIWA (Koreatown Immigrant
Workers Alliance), and all Korea,
You might want to communicate these factors of iCJD to your fellow Koreans
in the USA who are having medical, surgical and or dental work done. With
the many different animal TSEs in the USA of typical and atypical phenotype,
the consumption thereof of these TSE infected animals, and the following
medical, surgical, and or dental work done on any individual consuming such
tainted product, the fact that Koreans are more susceptible to contracting a
TSE, one must ponder all these factors ;
Polymorphisms of the prion protein gene (PRNP) in a Korean population
Journal Journal of Human Genetics Publisher Springer Japan ISSN 1434-5161
(Print) 1435-232X (Online) Issue Volume 49, Number 6 / June, 2004 Category
Short Communication DOI 10.1007/s10038-004-0150-7 Pages 319-324 Subject
Collection Biomedical and Life Sciences SpringerLink Date Monday, May 17,
2004
Byung-Hoon Jeong1, Jae-Hwan Nam2, Yun-Jung Lee1, Kyung-Hee Lee1, Myoung-Kuk
Jang1, Richard I. Carp3, Ho-Dong Lee2, Young-Ran Ju2, Sangmee Ahn Jo2,
Keun-Yong Park2 and Yong-Sun Kim1, 4
(1) Ilsong Institute of Life Science, Hallym University, Ilsong Building,
1605-4, Gwanyang-dong, Dongan-gu, Anyang, Kyounggi-do, 431-060, South Korea
(2) Department of Virology, Korea National Institute of Health, Eunpyung-gu,
Seoul, 122-701, South Korea (3) New York State Institute for Basic Research
in Developmental Disabilities, Staten Island, NY 10314, USA (4) Department
of Microbiology, College of Medicine, Hallym University, 1605-4,
Gwanyang-dong, Dongan-gu, Anyang, Kyounggi-do, 431-060, South Korea
Received: 7 January 2004 Accepted: 5 March 2004 Published online: 18 May
2004
Abstract Human prion protein gene (PRNP) has been considered to be involved
in the susceptibility of humans to prion diseases. Polymorphisms of
methionine (Met)/valine (Val) at codon 129 and of glutamic acid (Glu)/lysine
(Lys) at codon 219 are thought to play an important role in susceptibility
to sporadic, iatrogenic and variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease (CJD).
Although the genotype distribution of polymorphisms in PRNP open reading
frame (ORF) has been reported in many European populations, among Asian
groups, it has been reported only in the Japanese population. We examined
the PRNP polymorphisms in 529 healthy Koreans. We observed that genotype
frequencies at codon 129 was 94.33% Met/Met, 5.48% Met/Val, and 0.19%
Val/Val with an allele frequency of 0.971:0.029 Met:Val, and that genotype
frequencies at codon 219 was 92.06% Glu/Glu, 7.94% Glu/Lys, and 0% Lys/Lys
with an allele frequency of 0.96:0.04 Glu:Lys. The frequencies of the
Glu/Glu genotype (2=10.075, P=0.0015) and of the Glu allele (2=9.486,
P=0.0021) at codon 219 were significantly higher in the Korean population
than the Japanese population. In addition, the genotype frequency of
heterozygotes (12.7%) at codons 129 or/and 219 was significantly lower in
Koreans than in people from Great Britain (2=89.52, P<0.0001). The deletion
rate of one octarepeat (R2 deletion) was 0.38%, with 99.62% undeleted
homozygotes and 0% deleted homozygote. To our knowledge, the R2 octarepeat
deletion has never been found in people from countries other than Korea. The
data of PRNP polymorphism at codon 219 suggest that Koreans may be more
sensitive to sporadic CJD than the Japanese population. Keywords Prion
protein gene - Polymorphism - Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease - Single nucleotide
polymorphism - Deletion - Korean
http://www.springerlink.com/content/51h1j81h80hjrdtf/
European Journal of Human Genetics (2005) 13, 1094–1097.
doi:10.1038/sj.ejhg.5201460; published online 29 June 2005
Polymorphism at 3' UTR +28 of the prion-like protein gene is associated with
sporadic Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease Byung-Hoon Jeong1, Nam-Ho Kim1,
Eun-Kyoung Choi1, Chaeyoung Lee1, Young-Han Song1, Jae-Il Kim2, Richard I
Carp2 and Yong-Sun Kim1,3
1Ilsong Institute of Life Science, Hallym University, 1605-4 Gwanyang-dong
snip...
Our results are the first genetic association study of the PRND noncoding
region with sporadic CJD. Recently, we reported that the distributions of
codons 129 and 219 genotypes of PRNP in a Korean population differ
significantly from those reported for other ethnic groups.24 Thus, further
investigations in different ethnic groups including Europeans will be
necessary to assess association between sporadic CJD and the PRND 3' UTR +28
polymorphism. Furthermore, since it is unknown whether this polymorphism
affects mRNA stability or gene expression of PRND, further experiments
should be conducted to clarify the role of this polymorphism in PRND
function.
http://www.nature.com/ejhg/journal/v13/n9/full/5201460a.html
iatrogenic Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease
Reports of incidents of potential iatrogenic exposure to CJD via surgery: 01
January 2000 to 31 Dec 2007
There were a total of 329 incidents reported during this period (table 1).
Eleven surgical incidents were reported between 1 July and 31 December 2007
(since the previous update report). A surgical incident occurs when a
patient undergoes surgery but is only identified as having CJD or being at
risk of CJD at a later date. This means that the Advisory Committee on
Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP) transmissible spongiform encephalopathy working
group infection control guidelines would not have been followed. The surgery
carried out on an index patient with, or at risk of, CJD may result in
contamination of the instruments with abnormal prion protein. Table 1 shows
the number of CJD surgical incidents reported to the CJD Incidents Panel
from January 2000 to December 2007 by the diagnosis of the index patient.
Table 1 CJD Surgical Incidents (n=329) reported to the CJD Incidents Panel,
by diagnosis of index patient: January 2000 to Dec 2007
snip... see full text ;
http://www.hpa.org.uk/hpr/infections/ei_cjd.htm#cjd
Wednesday, January 02, 2008 Risk factors for sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease Wednesday, January 02, 2008 Risk factors for sporadic
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
FURTHER INTO THIS STUDY ;
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2008/01/risk-factors-for-sporadic-creutzfeldt.html
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2007/12/risk-factors-for-sporadic-creutzfeldt.html
Monday, December 31, 2007 Risk Assessment of Transmission of Sporadic
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease in Endodontic Practice in Absence of Adequate
Prion Inactivation
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2007/12/risk-assessment-of-transmission-of.html
Wednesday, June 4, 2008
SEAC 2008 ONE HUNDREDTH MEETING OF THE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY ADVISORY
COMMITTEE
http://seac992007.blogspot.com/2008/06/seac-2008-one-hundredth-meeting-of.html
summary
In summary, although this young woman clearly died of a prion disease, we
could not conclude she had vCJD, but also we could not be sure this was
sporadic CJD either. Although we were not able to make definite conclusions
on the basis of a single patient, we felt it important to report this tragic
death and these findings in the medical literature so as to bring this to
the attention of other doctors who might see similar patients in the future.
This unusual finding reminds us of the importance of keeping alert to the
possibility that BSE prions will cause disease in individuals with different
genetic types, who may develop a disease that may resemble sporadic CJD, or
vCJD, or have a new pattern of disease. This work emphasises the importance
of continuing to study the rogue prion protein type in patients and we thank
all patients and families who have kindly consented to use their, or their
loved one’s, tissues for this medical research.
Reference: Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease, Prion Protein Gene Codon 129VV, and a
Novel PrPSc Type in a Young British Woman Simon Mead; Susan Joiner; Melanie
Desbruslais; Jonathan A. Beck; Michael O’ Donoghue; Peter Lantos; Jonathan
D. F. Wadsworth; John Collinge Arch Neurol. 2007;64(12):1780-1784.
www.cjdsupport.net Newsletter issue 17 april 2008
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease, Prion Protein Gene Codon 129VV, and a Novel PrPSc
ype in a Young British Woman
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2008/01/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-prion-protein.html
And last but not least, similarities of PrPres between Htype BSE and human
prion diseases like CJD or GSS have been put forward [10], as well as
between L-type BSE and CJD [17]. These findings raise questions about the
origin and inter species transmission of these prion diseases that were
discovered through the BSE active surveillance.
full text 18 pages ;
http://www.vetres.org/index.php?option=article&access=standard&Itemid=129&url=/articles/vetres/pdf/2008/04/v07232.pdf
Thursday, June 05, 2008
Review on the epidemiology and dynamics of BSE epidemics
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/06/review-on-epidemiology-and-dynamics-of.html
The statistical incidence of CJD cases in the United States has been ***
revised *** to reflect that there is one case per 9000 in adults age 55 and
older. Eighty-five percent of the cases are sporadic, meaning there is no
known cause at present.
http://www.cjdfoundation.org/fact.html
SIGN THE PETITION TODAY, it may be the only recourse for the USA consumer to
finally get USA beef tested for BSE. We must stand together and demand a
safer BSE free beef product
http://www.stopmadcow.org
Saturday, June 7, 2008
Export Requirements for the Republic of Korea IMPORT HEALTH REQUIREMENTS FOR
U.S. BEEF AND BEEF PRODUCTS
http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2008/06/export-requirements-for-republic-of.html
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518