Sandhusker said:
Senate Asked to Place Moratorium on Further Premise Registration Efforts, Defund NAIS
Billings, Mont. – In a letter to the Senate Agriculture Committee, R-CALF USA has requested a moratorium on any further premise registration efforts, and also has requested that the National Animal Identification System (NAIS), or any other similar systems under any other name, be defunded at once.
“There are just so many questions and issues that must be addressed before reasonable consideration could be given as to whether funding of NAIS should continue at all,” said R-CALF USA President/Region VI Director Max Thornsberry, a Missouri veterinarian who also chairs the group’s animal health committee.
“Does USDA (U.S. Department of Agriculture) truly have the authority to mandate NAIS under the Animal Health Protection Act,” Thornsberry asked. “We want a thorough study on the legitimate authority and legal ramifications of the program, as well as a complete financial audit of NAIS thus far.”
R-CALF USA believes that USDA has used improper and questionable tactics to garner NAIS premise registration numbers. It is our opinion that the methodology used is less than ethical, and that the potential ramifications of a program of this scope and complexity must be assessed and completely understood by all Members of Congress to adequately represent their constituents.
USDA published, in the July 17, 2007, Federal Register, its final rule on Animal Identification Numbers (AINs), which repeatedly refers to rolling in all disease-control programs to reach “full implementation” of NAIS. Livestock producers are being rolled into NAIS with, or without, their knowledge or consent. This “full implementation” also is referenced in several NAIS documents and means “mandatory with enforcement.”
“To increase participation in premise registration, USDA has used Cooperative Agreements to contract with various state departments of agriculture, and other parties, such as FFA, 4-H, state fairs, the National Pork Producers Council and the American Angus Association,” said Thornsberry. “Many of these tactics, we believe, have been underhanded, deceptive and unethical.”
For example:
1) Roll-ins to NAIS through existing state disease-control programs, such as scrapies, calfhood vaccinations and brand registrations, which are mandatory in many Western states. Idaho achieved a 96 percent participation level by rolling into NAIS more than 13,000 registered brands. New York achieved a 58 percent level by rolling into NAIS those who vaccinate their calves. Interestingly, in Wisconsin, which requires mandatory premise registration, USDA reported a 114 percent participation level. How so?
2) Some fairs in some states, especially Colorado, require premise registration numbers, especially from FFA and 4-H kids, before these students are allowed to participate in the fairs. These minors do not own property, but, nonetheless, are required to have a Premise Identification Number (PIN) to participate.
3) Most states give away some sort of premium or financial incentive to encourage people to register their premises. Items vary from coffee cups, to vise grips, and even cash. Producers in Tennessee were required to register their premises if they wanted to participate in the hay-share relief program there.
4) In many states, cattle producers, in particular, were told they would have to participate in NAIS to continue to engage in commerce. In Missouri during the summer of 2005, NAIS Committee Member Dr. Taylor Woods visited livestock auctions across the state and told producers they would be required to electronically identify their cattle by January 2006, or they would be unable to sell cattle in their state. Approximately 8,000 premises were registered as a result.
5) USDA also has awarded grants to many non-profit breed and farm organizations, as mentioned earlier, as well as the U.S. Animal Identification Organization (USAIO) for the tracking database. Many pork producers have been required to register their property with PINs or lose their ability to market their hogs, all while USDA continues to state that NAIS “is voluntary with a capital V”.
There are approximately 100 million head of cattle in the U.S., and the NAIS-compliant RFID (radio frequency identification) tags for these animals would cost approximately $300 million. The approved device for horses is an implantable microchip with an average cost of $25 each. In 2006, the USAIO predicted a charge of 30-cents per entry into its database. There is an awful lot of money to be made on the backs of livestock producers that obviously will have an impact on Rural America.
“Historically, the United States has had the most efficient and effective disease control programs in the world,” Thornsberry asserted. “Our programs have worked because they were disease-specific and species-specific, and also had good science behind them without being overly burdensome on farmers and ranchers.
“The U.S. has existing emergency animal disease protocols in place in each and every state, and NAIS will not change the protocols for disease control and eradication,” he emphasized. “NAIS implementation is both redundant and a waste of taxpayer money. Was it truly the intent of the Congress and Senate to require citizens engaging in the commonplace activity of owning animals to be under such onerous regulations and penalties?”
RIGHT, this is the thing to do, continue to force feed consumers mad cow disease, then refuse to tell them where it comes from. what a hoot! you folks must want to go belly up. ......
TRY EXPLAINING THIS to all those consumers that potentially ate mad cow meat, but law prohibited them from knowing about it $$$
USDA VOLUNTARY MAD COW TAINTED FOOD RECALL ''DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL'' POLICY
AS ONE LEGISLATOR THAT MOU SHOULD BE TERMINATED IMMEDIATELY
IT IS A FRONT TO THE PUBLIC
THAT YOU WOULD ON YOUR OWN ACCORD, IN THAT KIND OF SECRECY, AND CALL THAT
GOVERNMENT
THAT'S NOT WHAT WERE HERE FOR, WERE HERE FOR TRANSPARENCY, WERE NOT HERE TO
DO SECRET DEALS,
''WERE NOT THE CIA'' !!!
THERE ARE OTHER WAYS TO GET TO THE GOAL OF REACHING THE CONSUMER WITHOUT
DEALING WITH USDA THAT FINDS IT UNACCEPTABLE TO SHARE INFORMATION WITH THE
PUBLIC
http://maddeer.org/video/embedded/02snip.rpm
STANLEY PRUSINER NOBEL PEACE PRIZE WINNER ON THE PRION SLAMS USDA ON BSE
US AG SEC AND LAYCRAFT
"nothing ELSE matters, except beef from canada under 30 months bones beef
product, that's ALL THAT MATTERS!"
STAN THE MAN
question for stan ;
is this a demonstrated threat to public health safety ?
stan states ;
yes i think they (prions) are bad to eat, and you can die from them.
http://maddeer.org/video/embedded/08snip.ram
THE LINKs YOU JUST WATCHED WAS OF THE FOLLOWING HEARING ON THE WASHINGTON
MAD COW and what little ramifications there after, and to this day, nothing
has changed much, except more secrecy. ...TSS
022404 Senate Info-Hearing Agriculture / Water Resources / Health and Human
Services / Government Oversight: Mad Cow Disease
Entire 5 hour hearing - The California Channel
(scroll down to "022404 Senate Info-Hearing")
http://www.calchannel.com/february2004.htm
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Frame/FrameRedirect.asp?main=http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/rdad/FRPubs/2006-0009.htm
Greetings,
I would kindly like to comment on the Availability of Lists of Retail Consignees During Meat or Poultry Product Recalls (71 FR 11326). I am in full support of this, and more, i.e. COOL. It all should have been mandatory long ago. you have consumers that are suspicious, and rightly so. just look what happened in California and Washington, with that mad cow and it's cohorts (AND THEN TO TEXAS AND ALABAMA COHORTS). i am talking total open honesty from farm to fork, mandatory traceability from the time that calf hits the ground to the time it hits the fork and all feed/drug records to go with it, recorded properly, and should be mandatory. WE have humans dying from human TSE, and we have ample animal TSE in the food production line to account for some of those human TSE. The USA has the most documented animal TSE in the world. WE must not flounder any longer. THE BSE MRR policy the Bush Administration, along with Mexico and Canada, with the grace from the OIE to go ahead, set back the eradication of BSE, set it back to the stone ages, pre-90. The BSE GBR risk assessments must be adhered to, and strengthened to include all animal TSE. WHEN the OIE chose to ignore the BSE GBR risk assessments, to go with the more industry friendly BSE MRR policy, they sold there soul to the devil as far as i am concerned, (never did much good anyway, all one has to do is look at all the documented BSE countries now that went by the OIE very weak BSE surveillance guidelines to begin with),
* GAO-05-51 October 2004 FOOD SAFETY (over 500 customers receiving
potentially BSE contaminated beef) - TSS 10/20/04
October 2004 FOOD SAFETY
USDA and FDA Need
to Better Ensure
Prompt and Complete
Recalls of Potentially
Unsafe Food
snip...
Page 38 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
To examine the voluntary recall of beef products associated with the
December 2003 discovery of an animal infected with BSE, we analyzed the
distribution lists USDA collected from companies and the verification
checks it conducted to develop a diagram illustrating the location and
volume of recalled beef that reached different levels of the distribution
chain. We compared the distribution lists and verification checks to
identify how many customers listed on the distribution lists did not
receive
the recalled beef and the number of customers not listed on distribution
lists that received the recalled beef. We interviewed USDA and FDA staff
involved with the recall to understand the timing of recall actions and the
challenges encountered during the recall.
To develop information on the 2002 recall of ground beef by a ConAgra
plant in Greeley, Colorado, we reviewed USDA s recall file and other
documents on the recall. We also met with the department s Office of
Inspector General and reviewed the Inspector General s September 2003
report.1
We conducted our review from May 2003 through August 2004 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
1U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General, Great
Plains Region Audit
Report: Food Safety and Inspection Service: Oversight of Production
Process and Recall at
ConAgra Plant (Establishment 969), Report No. 24601-2-KC (September 2003).
Page 39 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
Appendix II
Federal Actions Associated with the
Discovery of an Animal in the United States
Infected with BSE Appendix II
On December 23, 2003, USDA announced that a cow in the state of
Washington had tested positive for BSE commonly referred to as mad
cow disease. This appendix describes the actions USDA took to recall the
meat and the actions FDA took with respect to FDA-regulated products,
such as animal feed and cosmetics, made from rendered parts of the
animal.
Beef Recall Was
Triggered by a BSEPositive
Sample from
One Cow
On December 9, 2003, the recalling company slaughtered 23 cows. USDA,
in accordance with its BSE surveillance policy at the time, took a
sample of
1 cow that was unable to walk, although the condition of the tested cow is
now disputed. USDA did not process the sample in its Ames, Iowa National
Veterinary Services Laboratory in an expedited manner because the cow
did not show symptoms of neurological disorder. USDA test results
indicated a presumptive positive for BSE on December 23, 2003.
Recall Begun in
December 2003 Was
Completed in March
2004
On December 23, 2003, after learning about the positive BSE test, USDA
headquarters notified the Boulder District Office, which is the field
office
with jurisdiction over the recalling firm. The Boulder District began
gathering information about the recalling company s product distribution.
Field staff telephoned the recalling company and were on-site at 7:00 p.m.
The Boulder District initially thought 3 days of the recalling company s
production would have to be recalled, but further examination of facility
cleanup and shipping records revealed that it was only necessary to
recall 1
day of production. USDA recall staff convened at 9:15 p.m. and discussed
the science related to BSE and whether the recalling company s cleanup
practices were sufficient to limit the recall to 1 day of production.
Following USDA s determination to conduct a Class II recall that is, the
beef posed a remote possibility of adverse health consequences USDA
contacted the recalling company to discuss recall details and the press
release. The press release and Recall Notification Report were released
that evening.
On December 24, 2003, USDA s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS)
sent inspectors to the recalling company s primary customers to obtain
secondary customer distribution lists and product shipping records. USDA
conducted 100 percent verification checks for this recall it contacted
every customer that received the recalled meat. This level of verification
checks is well above the percentage of checks conducted by USDA district
offices for the Class I recalls we reviewed.
Appendix II
Federal Actions Associated with the
Discovery of an Animal in the United States
Infected with BSE
Page 40 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
On December 26, 2003, USDA began checking the primary and secondary
customers of the recalling company that it was aware of, although the
entire product distribution chain was unknown. During the checks, USDA
tried to determine if the product was further distributed, and it used
verification checks to acquire distribution lists for secondary and
tertiary
customers of the recalling company.
Verification checks continued until February 25, 2004. Three USDA
districts conducted these verification checks. The Boulder District
coordinated the checks and assigned checks to the Minneapolis District
Office for customers in Montana and to the Alameda District Office for
customers in California. USDA required that 100 percent of the primary
checks, 50 percent of the secondary checks, and 20 percent of the tertiary
checks be conducted on-site. According to USDA, more than 50 percent of
the secondary checks were actually conducted on-site. FDA officials
helped conduct verification checks. According to USDA, the recall took a
long time to complete because USDA contacted each customer at least
twice. USDA first contacted each customer to conduct the check and again
to verify product disposition.
On February 25, 2004, the Boulder District concluded that the recall was
conducted in an effective manner. On March 1, 2004, USDA s Recall
Management Division recommended that the agency terminate the recall,
and USDA sent a letter to the recalling company to document that USDA
considered the recall to be complete.
Recall Was
Complicated by
Inaccurate Distribution
Lists and Mixing of
Potentially
Contaminated and
Noncontaminated Beef
USDA used distribution lists and shipping records to piece together where
the recalled product was distributed. According to USDA, one of the
recalling company s three primary customers was slow in providing its
customer list. USDA could not begin verification activities for that
primary
customer without this list. Furthermore, some customers of the recalling
company provided USDA with imprecise lists that did not specify which
customers received the recalled product. As a consequence, USDA could
not quickly determine the scope of product distribution and had to take
time conducting extra research using shipping invoices to determine which
specific customers received the product.
Even when USDA determined the amount and location of beef, the agency
still had trouble tracking the beef in certain types of establishments,
such
as grocery store distributors. USDA could not easily track the individual
stores where those distributors sent the beef because of product mixing
Appendix II
Federal Actions Associated with the
Discovery of an Animal in the United States
Infected with BSE
Page 41 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
and the distributors record-keeping practices. Generally, distributors
purchase beef from multiple sources, mix it in their inventory, and lose
track of the source of the beef they send to the stores that they
supply. To
deal with this problem, USDA first identified the dates when recalled beef
was shipped to the distributors and then asked for a list of the stores
that
were shipped any beef after those dates. Consequently, some stores were
included in the recall that may never have received recalled beef.
The recall was also complicated by repeated mixing of recalled beef with
nonrecalled beef, thereby increasing the amount of meat involved in the
recall. The recalling company slaughtered 23 cows on December 9, 2003,
and shipped those and 20 other carcasses to a primary customer on
December 10, 2003. The recalling company s carcasses were tagged to
identify the slaughter date and the individual cow. The primary customer
removed the identification tags and mixed the 23 recalled carcasses with
the 20 nonrecalled carcasses. Because the carcasses could not be
distinguished, the recall included all 43 carcasses at the primary
customer.
After one round of processing at the primary customer, the meat from the
carcasses was shipped to two other processing facilities. Both
establishments further mixed the recalled meat from the 43 carcasses with
meat from other sources. In all, the mixing of beef from 1 BSE-positive cow
resulted in over 500 customers receiving potentially contaminated beef.
Imprecise distribution lists and the mixing of recalled beef combined to
complicate USDA s identification of where the product went. Specifically,
on December 23, 2003, USDA s initial press release stated that the
recalling
company was located in Washington State. Three days later, on December
26, 2003, USDA announced that the recalled beef was distributed within
Washington and Oregon. On December 27, 2003, USDA determined that one
of the primary customers of the recalling firm distributed beef to
facilities
in California and Nevada, in addition to Washington and Oregon, for a total
of four states. On December 28, 2003, USDA announced that some of the
secondary customers of the recalling company may also have distributed
the product to Alaska, Montana, Hawaii, Idaho, and Guam, for a total of
eight states and one territory.
On January 6, 2004, over 2 weeks from recall initiation, USDA determined
that the beef went to only six states Washington, Oregon, California,
Nevada, Idaho, and Montana and that no beef went to Alaska, Hawaii, or
Guam. To reach that conclusion, USDA used the distribution lists, shipping
records, and sales invoices that it received from companies to piece
together exactly where the recalled beef may have been sent. The lists
Appendix II
Federal Actions Associated with the
Discovery of an Animal in the United States
Infected with BSE
Page 42 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
showed that 713 customers may have received the recalled beef; 6 of those
may have received beef from more than one source. USDA determined that
176 customers on the lists did not actually receive recalled beef,
including
the customers in Guam and Hawaii. USDA s review also indicated that
recalled beef was probably not shipped to Alaska or Utah, and USDA
checked 2 retailers in Alaska and 3 retailers in Utah to confirm that
was the
case. In total, USDA conducted verification checks on 537 of the 713
customers on the lists. USDA s initial checks identified an additional 45
customers that may have received the recalled beef that were not included
on the distribution lists, for a total of 582 verification checks. Figure 4
summarizes USDA s verification efforts during the recall.
Appendix II
Federal Actions Associated with the
Discovery of an Animal in the United States
Infected with BSE
Page 43 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
Figure 4: USDA s Recall Verification Checks by Location and Customer
Type for Meat Associated with the Animal Infected with
BSE
Note: USDA checked 15 primary, 40 secondary, and 526 tertiary customers
plus the recalling
company, for a total of 582 verification checks.
USDA s press release stated that the recall involved 10,410 pounds of beef
products, and the USDA recall coordinator for this recall told us that
downstream processors mixed the recalled beef with nonrecalled beef, for
a total of more than 38,000 pounds of beef that was distributed at the
secondary customer level. According to USDA officials involved with the
snip...see chart
( ) Acronyms in parentheses are postal abbreviations for each state.
Source: GAO analysis of USDA verification check documents.
Appendix II
Federal Actions Associated with the
Discovery of an Animal in the United States
Infected with BSE
Page 44 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
recall, the precise amount of meat that was sold at the retail level is
unknown because retailers at the tertiary level further mixed nonrecalled
meat with potentially contaminated meat. USDA told us that more than
64,000 pounds of beef was ultimately returned or destroyed by customers,
and that, because of the mixing, it was not able to determine how much of
the original 10,410 pounds of recalled beef was contained in the 64,000
pounds that were recovered.
FDA s Role in USDA s
Recall
Parts of the BSE-infected animal slaughtered on December 9, 2003, were
not used for food, but they were sent to renderers to be separated into raw
materials, such as proteins and blood. Rendered materials are used for
many purposes, including cosmetics and vaccines. FDA has jurisdiction
over renderers.
When USDA learned of the BSE-infected cow on December 23, 2003, the
agency immediately notified FDA. On December 24, 2003, FDA sent an
inspection team to a renderer that handled materials from the BSE cow.
Inspectors confirmed that the parts of the slaughtered BSE positive cow
were on the premises. FDA later identified a second company that
potentially rendered material from the slaughtered BSE cow. Both
renderers agreed to voluntarily hold all product processed from the
diseased cow and dispose of the product as directed by FDA and local
authorities.
On January 7, 2004, 15 containers of potentially contaminated, rendered
material (meat and bone meal) were inadvertently loaded on a ship, and on
January 8, 2004, the ship left Seattle, Washington, for Asia. The renderer
initiated steps to recover the shipped material, so it could be disposed
of as
directed by FDA and local authorities. The ship carrying the material
returned to the United States on February 24, 2004, and the material was
disposed of in a landfill on March 2, 2004.
On January 12, 2004, FDA asked both renderers to expand their voluntary
holds to rendered materials processed from December 23, 2003, through
January 9, 2004, because they may have rendered some recalled meat or
trim that was recovered from retail establishments. Both renderers agreed
to the expanded product hold. In total, FDA requested that renderers
voluntarily hold approximately 2,000 tons of rendered material. FDA
confirmed that none of the potentially contaminated, rendered material
entered commerce, because FDA accounted for all rendered material. FDA
Appendix II
Federal Actions Associated with the
Discovery of an Animal in the United States
Infected with BSE
Page 45 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
reported that no recall was necessary because no product was distributed
commercially by the rendering companies.
USDA and FDA
Worked Together on
the Recall
USDA and FDA worked together in two ways. First, both agencies notified
each other if their investigations yielded any information about products
within the jurisdiction of the other agency. For instance, when conducting
the second round of verification checks, USDA tracked the disposition of
the product to renderers and landfills and notified FDA when the product
went to renderers. Second, FDA officials helped conduct verification
checks. FDA conducted 32 of the 582 verification checks (approximately 5
percent) for the USDA recall. Officials from both agencies indicated they
regularly interacted and shared information. Table 3 outlines the agencies
actions.
Table 3: Detailed Timeline of USDA, FDA, and Company Actions Related to
the Discovery of an Animal Infected with BSE
Date USDA recall actions FDA actions Company actions
12/9/03 " USDA samples cow for BSE. " BSE cow is slaughtered.
12/11/03 " Sample is sent to Ames, Iowa, for BSE
testing.
" Recalling company sends
carcasses to primary customer for
processing.
12/12/03 " Primary customer sends meat
products to two other primary
customers for further processing.
12/12 -
12/23/03
" Other primary customers distribute
recalled product to secondary
customers.
" Secondary customers distribute
recalled product to tertiary
customers.
12/23/03 " BSE test results are presumptively
positive.
" Recall meeting.
" Initiation of voluntary recall.
" Press release.
" FDA notified of BSE test results.
" FDA dispatches investigation teams.
12/24/03 " FDA inspects Renderer 1.
" FDA determines some rendered
material from Renderer 1 is intended
for Indonesia.
" FDA discovers some material may
have been sent to Renderer 2.
" Renderer 1 agrees to hold remaining
rendered material.
" Recalling company contacts
primary customers.
" Primary customers contact their
customers.
Appendix II
Federal Actions Associated with the
Discovery of an Animal in the United States
Infected with BSE
Page 46 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
12/25/03 " USDA receives confirmation from
reference lab in England that cow in
question is BSE positive.
12/26/03 " Verification checks begin
" USDA announces recalled product in
Washington State and Oregon.
" FDA begins process of comparing
records to ensure all products from
Renderers 1 and 2 are accounted for.
" Renderer 2 agrees to hold all material
that may have been derived from
BSE cow. None of the rendered
material has been distributed.
12/27/03 " USDA announces recalled product was
distributed in Washington State,
Oregon, California, and Nevada.
" FDA issues statement confirming that
the rendering plants that processed
all of the nonedible material from the
BSE cow have placed a voluntary
hold on all of the potentially infectious
product, none of which had left the
control of the companies and entered
commercial distribution.
12/28/03 " USDA announces recalled product was
distributed in Washington State,
Oregon, California, Nevada, Montana,
Idaho, Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam.
12/29/03 " Food Safety and Inspection Service
determines that the recalled meat
products were distributed to 42
locations, with 80 percent of the
products distributed to stores in
Oregon and Washington State.
12/31/03 " FDA offers assistance to USDA to
complete recall verification checks.
1/6/04 " USDA determines recalled product
was only distributed in Washington
State, Oregon, California, Nevada,
Montana, and Idaho.
1/8/04 " FDA is notified by the renderer that
some of the rendered material on
hold from Renderer 1 was
inadvertently shipped to Asia.
Renderer 1 commits to isolate and
return the rendered material.
" Rendering company notifies FDA of
shipment of product on hold.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Date USDA recall actions FDA actions Company actions
Appendix II
Federal Actions Associated with the
Discovery of an Animal in the United States
Infected with BSE
Page 47 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
Source: GAO analysis of USDA and FDA information.
1/12/04 " FDA advises Renderers 1 and 2 that
they may have rendered meat or trim
subject to recall from retail stores.
" FDA requests Renderers 1 and 2 to
place all rendered material from
December 23 to January 9 on hold.
" FDA determines neither renderer had
shipped rendered material
manufactured after December 23,
2003.
2/9/04 " All rendered material was disposed of
in landfill, except material shipped to
Asia.
2/24/04 " Ship carrying rendered material
returns to U.S. port.
2/25/04 " Verification checks complete.
" USDA Boulder District Office
concludes recall is effective.
3/1/04 " Recall is closed.
3/2/04 " FDA observes disposal in landfill of
remaining rendered material...
snip...
REPORTS
1. Food Safety: USDA and FDA Need to Better Ensure Prompt and Complete
Recalls of Potentially Unsafe Food. GAO-05-51, October 7.tss
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-51
Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d0551high.pdf
Appendix C. Agents that require specific government approval for scientific investigations within the USA.a
Select agents, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services onlyb
High consequence pathogens and agents, U.S. Department of Agriculture onlyc
HIgh consequence livestock pathogens and toxins, overlap agents and toxinsd
(NO HUMAN TSE LISTED ???...tss) BSE agent
http://www.nwhc.usgs.gov/publications/disease_emergence/AppendixC.pdf
QFC sued over mad cow case
Grocer negligently exposed them to beef, family claims
Friday, March 5, 2004
By LEWIS KAMB
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER REPORTER
An Eastside family who says they ate beef linked to the nation's only
known case of mad cow disease yesterday filed a class-action lawsuit
against QFC, claiming the grocery store chain negligently exposed them
and others to "highly hazardous" meat and did not properly notify them
that they had bought it.
Attorneys for Jill Crowson, a 52-year-old interior designer from Clyde
Hill, filed the lawsuit in King County Superior Court on behalf of her
family and possibly hundreds of other customers who unwittingly bought
and consumed beef potentially exposed to mad cow disease.
"I was pretty upset about it," Crowson said. "I've spent all of my kids'
lives trying to be a responsible parent for them to keep them safe. I
felt badly that the food I served could be harmful to their health."
The lawsuit is believed to be the first stemming from this country's
only confirmed case of mad cow disease, or bovine spongiform
encephalopathy, which was detected in a slaughtered Holstein from a
Yakima Valley ranch on Dec. 23.
Neither officials at Quality Food Centers' Bellevue headquarters, or
Kroger -- the company's Ohio-based corporate parent -- could be reached
for comment about the lawsuit yesterday.
The suit contends the family bought and later ate ground beef from their
local QFC that was part of a batch processed at Vern's Moses Lake Meats
on Dec. 9 and included meat from the diseased Holstein.
The beef was later shipped to wholesalers and retailers in Washington,
Oregon, California, Idaho, Montana and Nevada.
On Dec. 23 -- after government scientists confirmed the Holstein was
infected with BSE -- businesses began pulling potentially affected beef
from store shelves under a voluntary recall.
But the family's suit claims that, although QFC was aware of the recall
on Dec. 23, the store did not begin pulling the recalled beef from about
40 of its stores that carried it until Dec. 24.
The company also did not try to warn customers about the recalled beef
until Dec. 27 -- and only then with small, inconspicuous signs inside
the stores, the suit claims.
Steve Berman, the family's attorney, said the company had "a duty to
warn" consumers who bought the beef under terms of the Washington
Product Liability Act.
QFC could've easily notified customers by taking out TV, radio or
newspaper ads, or by tracking and notifying those who bought the beef
through customers' QFC Advantage Cards, Berman said.
At Berman's downtown Seattle firm yesterday, Crowson described how on
Dec. 22 and Dec. 23 -- the day of the recall -- she bought single
packages of "9 percent leanest ground beef" from her local QFC store at
Bellevue Village.
Crowson took the beef home, cooked it and made tacos one night and
spaghetti the next -- serving the dinners to herself; her daughter,
Laura, 22; son, Nicholas, 19; and her niece, Claire De Winter, 23.
Members of the family also ate leftovers from those meals for the next
several days, Crowson said.
"When the news about mad cow came out, I instantly became concerned,"
Crowson said. "But the initial stories didn't mention anything about
QFC, so I thought we were OK."
While shopping at the grocery store a few days later, Crowson said she
asked a store butcher whether QFC stores had sold any of the recalled
beef. The butcher assured her they had not, she said.
The family only learned QFC had sold any of the beef in question after
reading a news story Jan. 10 about a Mercer Island man who discovered
his family had eaten affected beef that he bought at a local QFC store,
Crowson said.
Crowson later called QFC and faxed the company a signed letter asking
that it track purchases made on her QFC Advantage Card -- a store
discount card issued to customers. On Jan. 12, the company notified
Crowson that the beef she bought and served to her family was, in fact,
part of the recalled batch, she said.
Scientists believe people who eat beef from infected cows can contract a
fatal form of the disease.
The family is "now burdened with the possibility that they presently
carry (the disease) that may have an incubation period of up to 30
years," the lawsuit says.
Lawyers for the family say they believe hundreds, if not thousands, of
QFC customers, and those of other stores, likely ate beef from the
recalled batch -- the reason why Berman filed their legal claim as a
class-action lawsuit. A USDA official this week said that up to 17,000
pounds of meat affected by the recall likely was eaten or thrown out by
customers.
Berman added that an investigator from his firm learned that QFC buys
beef for its "9 percent leanest ground beef" products in large tubs that
can weigh several hundred pounds, and then regrinds and packages the
meat for sale.
Because QFC stores regrind the beef before selling it, Berman contends
that makes the store a manufacturer responsible under the Washington
Product Liability Act for not selling any unsafe product.
Scientists believe people who eat beef from cows infected with BSE can
contract variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob, a fatal brain-wasting disease that
has been detected in about 150 people worldwide.
However, officials with the U.S. Agriculture Department have repeatedly
said the risk from eating muscle cuts from an infected cow -- the likely
cut of meat processed and sold for hamburger in the recalled batch -- is
extremely low.
Although Crowson said she tries not to "obsess over it," she is fearful
that her family could one day become sick.
"It's pretty scary," she said.
Because no medical test is available to determine whether a living
person is infected with the disease, the couple's "stress and fear
cannot be allayed," the lawsuit said.
The family seeks unspecified damages for emotional distress and medical
monitoring costs.
Crowson said her reason for bringing the lawsuit isn't about money. "The
more I've thought about this, the angrier I've gotten," she said.
snip...
http://home.hetnet.nl/~mad.cow/archief/2004/mar04/sued.htm
QFC s Delayed Mad Cow Response Draws Lawsuit
Family claims QFC should have used customer database to warn those at
risk sooner
March 05, 2004
SEATTLE A Bellevue, Wash. family today filed a proposed class-action
lawsuit against Quality Food Centers (QFC), a subsidiary of Kroger
(NYSE: KR), claiming the grocery store chain should have used
information gathered through its customer loyalty program to warn those
who purchased beef potentially tainted with mad cow disease.
The suit, filed in King County Superior Court, seeks to represent all
Washington residents who purchased the potentially tainted meat, and
asks the court to establish a medical monitoring fund.
Jill Crowson purchased the potentially tainted beef from a Bellevue QFC
on Dec. 22 and 23, and used her Advantage Card, QFC s customer loyalty
program. She served the meat to her husband over Dec. 25 and 26, and
later heard of the recall in the newspaper.
Steve Berman, the attorney representing the Crowsons, asserts that since
the company tracks purchases, it should have warned the Crowsons and
many other customers who purchased the beef at approximately 40 stores
across Washington.
If you lose your keys with an Advantage Card attached, QFC will return
them to you free of charge, said Berman. If they can contact you over
a lost set of car keys, why couldn t they contact you and tell you that
the beef you purchased could kill you?
QFC is among the large number of grocers that track customer purchases
through loyalty cards like the Advantage Card. Once a customer shares
contact information including name, address and phone number they
are given discounts on certain items.
Regardless of any discounts offered, the loyalty card tracks customers
every purchase and stores them in a central database, the complaint states.
We contend that QFC knew which Advantage Card customers purchased the
suspect meat, and could have easily called to warn them, said Berman.
Instead, QFC used a series of spurious excuses to hide their failure to
act.
On Dec. 23, the U.S. Department of Agriculture ordered the recall of
approximately 10,410 pounds of raw beef that may have been infected with
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), which if consumed by humans can
lead to the always-fatal Cruetzfeldt-Jakobs Disease (vCJD).
According to the complaint, QFC at first mistakenly believed it did not
have any of the affected beef and took no action to remove the product
from its shelves. The store later removed the beef on Dec. 24, but then
did little to warn those who earlier purchased the meat, the suit claims.
It wasn t until Dec. 27 that the grocery chain posted small signs with
information about the recall, the complaint alleges.
The Crowsons contacted QFC when they suspected they had purchased the
potentially tainted meat, but QFC would not confirm their suspicions for
two more weeks, the suit states. According to Berman, the family had to
file a written request before QFC would confirm their fears.
According to health experts, Cruetzfeldt-Jakobs Disease can have an
incubation period of as long as 30 years. There is no test to determine
if infection took place after possible exposure, nor is there any
treatment once one is infected. The condition is always fatal.
If the court grants the suit class-action status, QFC would likely be
compelled to turn over the names of those who purchased the potentially
tainted beef.
The proposed class-action claims QFC violated provisions of the
Washington Product Liability Act by failing to give adequate warning to
consumers about the potentially dangerous meat.
The suit seeks unspecified damages for the plaintiffs, as well as the
establishment of a medical monitoring fund.
http://www.hagens-berman.com/frontend?command=PressRelease&task=viewPressReleaseDetail&iPressReleaseId=654
QFC's Delayed Mad Cow Response Draws Lawsuit
... subsidiary of Kroger , claiming the grocery store chain should ...
beef potentially tainted with "mad cow disease ... beef at approximately
40 stores across Washington. ...
www.forrelease.com/D20040305/ sff005.P2.03042004214558.03634.html - 9k -
040307 Woman Sues QFC Over Mad-Cow Recall
... Jakob disease, the
human form of mad-cow, from eating ... QFC is subject to the Washington
Product Liability ... been found in a slaughtered Yakima County dairy
cow. ...
www.spcnetwork.com/mii/2004/040307.htm - 6k
Subject: GOVERNOR SCHWARZENEGGER PREFERS CALIFORNIANS TO EAT MAD COW
BEEF IN SECRECY, VETOED BILL SB 1585
Date: October 1, 2004 at 2:22 pm PST
GOVERNOR SCHWARZENEGGER PREFERS CALIFORNIANS TO EAT MAD COW BEEF IN
SECRECY, VETOED BILL SB 1585
Schwarzenegger Vetoes Meat Recall Disclosure Bill
Legislation Would Have Identified Stores that Received Contaminated Meat
and Poultry
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger (R-CA) vetoed a bill yesterday that would
have let Californians know whether they ve purchased contaminated meat
or poultry. The bill, SB 1585, would have ended a secrecy agreement
between the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and California that
prevents the state from disclosing the names and locations of stores
that receive shipments of recalled meat.
Consumers have a right to know if they purchased recalled meat or
poultry, said Ken Kelly, Staff Attorney at the Center for Science in
the Public Interest (CSPI). Why force families to roll the dice when
they put food on the table? Governor Schwarzenegger prefers a
get-sick-first, ask-questions-later policy.
Earlier this year, California was one of several states that received
meat from the Washington State cow that tested positive for mad cow
disease. But because California is one of 12 states that have signed a
secrecy agreement with USDA, state health officials were prohibited from
identifying stores or restaurants that may have received beef from the
infected cow. Even recalled meat tainted with deadly E. coli 0157:H7
bacteria would be subject to the secrecy agreement, leaving consumers
uncertain as to whether the ground beef in their refrigerator were safe
to eat.
In his veto message, Governor Schwarzenegger indicated he would instruct
the state s health department to renegotiate an agreement that would
allow USDA to share recall information with local public health
officials. But according to CSPI, even if USDA agreed to share recall
information with local officials, the local officials would be similarly
prohibited from disclosing names of retail outlets with consumers. In
August, CSPI urged USDA not to force states to sign any such secrecy
agreements.
Federal and state government should be more concerned with protecting
consumers from unnecessary hospitalizations and deaths associated with
food-borne illness, and less concerned with protecting grocers and meat
producers from bad publicity, Kelly said.
http://cspinet.org/new/200410011.html
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNTY
JILL CROWSON, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS
VS
QUALITY FOOD CENTERS, INC., an Ohio corporation Defendent
NO. 04-2-05608-0 SEA
snip...
The Court hereby GRANTS the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's
claims based on a manufacturer's strict liability (Counts I and II) and
DENIES the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claim of negligence
by a product seller (Count III).
DATED this 14th day of June, 2004
snip...
http://www.hagens-berman.com/files/Mad%20Cow%20Order%20Denying%20Motion%20to%20Dismiss1088546283878.pdf
TSS