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ND cattle feeder wants to open feedlot culled Canadian cows

flounder

Well-known member
ND cattle feeder wants to open feedot for culled Canadian cows

By SUE ROESLER, Farm & Ranch Guide Sunday, February 14, 2010 12:35 PM CST

BISMARCK, N.D. - North Dakota may soon be getting its first restricted feedlot if the State Board of Animal Health agrees to the proposal.

Korby Kost, a livestock feeder north of Carrington, wants to import 2-to-5 year old culled open cows from Canada, custom finish them for 100 to 150 days and send them straight to slaughter in St. Paul, Minn.

Kost has renovated an old feedlot at the site two miles north of Carrington, updating the feeding facility to be completely self-contained, and with its own lagoon. It is fenced on all four sides and at least 2,000 feet away from his other cattle.

“It is pretty much out there by itself (the feedlot),” Kost told board members during a meeting last week on conference call. He said the facility was designed by an engineer and has been inspected by the State Department of Health. He also worked with federal officials to bring the feedlot up to federal as well as state standards.

Kost is asking the board for a permit to exempt him from TB and brucellosis testing when the cows come into North Dakota. He is also asking for an exemption of the requirement that cows are Officially Calfhood Vaccinated (OCV) for brucellosis.

The cattle will all be branded with the CAN brand to designate them as Canadian origin, be officially tagged, and have the proper health paperwork for inspection at the border.

They will not commingle with any U.S. cattle and will be transported from their original ranches in Saskatchewan and Alberta straight to the restricted feedlot, he said.

Kost added he has been working with the same Canadian livestock producers for the past 10 years.

“They have some excellent cattle coming out of that region,” he said, adding that other producers in South Dakota have said some good things about the cattle.

Kost is not planning on feeding North Dakota cattle, so there would be no chance of mixing U.S. and Canadian cattle.

One board member was concerned that if bovine spongiform encephalitis (BSE) was found in the herd, if North Dakota would be credited with that case.

There have been some instances of feeder cattle from Mexico testing positive for TB, but states are not typically credited with those cases.

Board members decided to ask for clarification from USDA-APHIS to make sure they would not credit North Dakota with BSE if one of those feeder cattle were found with it.

“(The Canadian cattle) are all of the age where they were born after the feed ban became effective in Canada,” Kost said.

Dr. Susan Keller, North Dakota state veterinarian, said there is less likelihood that BSE would be found in cows that are 2-5 years old, since that is mainly a problem with older culled cows.

Kost said the decision to begin the enterprise was an economic one and he realized he had a good opportunity to feed cattle with his feedlot being close to the slaughter facility in Minnesota.

He is currently working on getting the water running to the facility and finishing the fencing. He hopes to have the feedlot ready by March 1, and wants to get approval to take advantage of the cattle market.

The State Board of Animal Health plans to meet with Kost at its next meeting March 3 to consider the proposal further.

In other business at the meeting:

- The Board heard an update on the recent bovine tuberculosis case found in southeastern South Dakota from Dr. Susan Reenders, South Dakota assistant state veterinarian.

She said two cows in Yankton County were found to be positive for the disease in December. The infected animals were part of a group of heifers purchased from Nebraska. They had been pastured near an infected farmed elk and fallow deer herd in Nebraska, but there was no fenceline contact.

Reenders said the remainder of the producer's herd was also tested, and all those animals were negative.

Several other herds in South Dakota, Nebraska, and Iowa have been quarantined due to potential exposure to the infected animals, or as a result of purchasing animals from the affected herd. Testing continues in some of these herds. North Dakota did not receive any exposed animals.

- The Board also heard a summary of information from the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources and the North Dakota Game and Fish Department regarding TB.

Game and Fish indicated that although most deer would be unlikely to travel more than 10 miles, it is possible that a deer could travel out of the TB zone, with some deer traveling 20 miles or more.

The size of the zone was established based upon movement data, with at least 95 percent confidence, that all deer that may have originated in the area where positive cases have been identified would not travel outside the zone.

In December, Minnesota announced its 27th case of bovine TB in deer since 2005.

The deer was found within three miles of a farm where bovine tuberculosis was found in cattle. More than 7,500 deer have been tested from this area since 2005.

- Board members considered a request from Rick Millner who manages the Prairie Ridge dairy cooperative in four states, including Five Star Dairy in North Dakota. Cooperative animals are also located in Minnesota, South Dakota and Montana.

Millner is requesting a commuter herd agreement which would allow him to move animals between the facilities across state lines without testing the animals for tuberculosis (TB) each time.

North Dakota currently requires that all sexually intact dairy cattle from any state test negative for TB within 60 days prior to importation, Keller said.

In lieu of testing the animals each time, Millner is proposing to test his whole herd every three years.

The board agreed to draft an agreement, which includes several stipulations, and have it examined by veterinarians involved with the dairies in the four states and with other animal health officials in the states.

http://www.farmandranchguide.com/articles/2010/02/15/ag_news/livestock_news/live4.txt

Monday, May 12, 2008

BSE YOUNGEST AGE STATISTICS UNDER 30 MONTHS

We can confirm that of the 100 cases, 49 were under 30 months of age, of these the youngest case was 20 months old.

http://www.defra.gov.uk/vla/vla/vla_ati_020205.htm

BSE Youngest Japan 21 months, 23 months

http://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/ehpm/10/3/130/_pdf

The implications of the Swiss result for Britain, which has had the most BSE, are complex. Only cattle aged 30 months or younger are eaten in Britain, on the assumption, based on feeding trials, that cattle of that age, even if they were infected as calves, have not yet accumulated enough prions to be infectious. But the youngest cow to develop BSE on record in Britain was 20 months old, showing some are fast incubators. Models predict that 200-300 cattle under 30 months per year are infected with BSE and enter the food chain currently in Britain. Of these 3-5 could be fast incubators and carrying detectable quantities of prion.

http://www.sare.org/sanet-mg/archives/html-home/28-html/0359.html

see full text ;

http://bseyoungestage.blogspot.com/

Subject: Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION

Date: August 24, 2005 at 2:47 pm PST

August 24, 2005

Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION

Greetings APHIS ET AL,

My name is Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

I would kindly like to comment on [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 ;

PROPOSED RULES

Exportation and importation of animals and animal products:

Whole cuts of boneless beef from-

Japan,

48494-48500 [05-16422]

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=0900006480086ebc&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw6

Docket No. 03-080-1 -- USDA ISSUES PROPOSED RULE TO ALLOW LIVE ANIMAL IMPORTS FROM CANADA

https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/BSEcom.nsf/0/b78ba677e2b0c12185256dd300649f9d?OpenDocument&AutoFramed

PLEASE SEE FULL TEXT HERE ;

Docket No. 03-080-1 -- USDA ISSUES PROPOSED RULE TO ALLOW LIVE ANIMAL IMPORTS FROM CANADA

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/07/docket-no-03-080-1-usda-issues-proposed.html

Docket APHIS-2006-0026 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Animal Identification and Importation of Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0026-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions, Identification of Ruminants and Processing and Importation of Commodities Public Submission APHIS-2006-0026-0012 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801e47e1

Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary

Comment 2006-2007 USA AND OIE POISONING GLOBE WITH BSE MRR POLICY

THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted products from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone. These are the facts as I have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species.

MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???

go figure. ...

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f8151

Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028.1 Public Submission Title Attachment to Singletary comment

January 28, 2007

Greetings APHIS,

I would kindly like to submit the following to ;

BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f8152&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8

Harvard Model of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Implications of Importing Cattle Over 30 Months of Age from Canada Joshua T. Cohen, Ph.D. Center for the Evaluation of Value and Risk Institute for Clinical Research and Health Policy Studies Tufts New England Medical Center October 27, 2006

Executive Summary

The analysis described here has been conducted for USDA-APHIS, as a component of a risk assessment conducted to evaluate the impact of allowing additional cattle imports from BSE minimal-risk regions. Specifically, this analysis supports the exposure assessment component of the risk assessment and contributes to the environmental assessment.

In January 2005, USDA-APHIS published a final rule allowing some cattle imports from countries falling into a new category, designated “minimal risk regions”. The rule places Canada into the minimal risk regions category and allows that country to export cattle to the U.S., so long as the animals are slaughtered prior to the age of 30 months. In order to investigate the impact of allowing the import of older cattle from Canada into the U.S. and eliminating the requirement that they be slaughtered by a specified age, APHIS conducted a risk assessment. The risk assessment estimates the likelihood that BSE-infected cattle will be imported into the U.S. given the mitigations proposed (the release assessment), the extent to which disease might spread among U.S. cattle as a result (the exposure assessment), and characterizes the resulting impacts (consequence assessment). This document supports the environmental assessment and the exposure assessment component of the risk assessment.

The analysis uses a computer simulation model developed for USDA by the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis1. A series of modifications to the model have been implemented. The most important modifications for the purpose of this analysis include enhanced capabilities for specifying the import of infected cattle; and explicit modeling of cattle exposure to the BSE agent via administration of poultry litter in cattle feed. For the purpose of completeness, this report documents all modifications to the function of the model and to its assumptions made since the release of initial Harvard BSE risk assessment (1).

In order to characterize the impact of uncertainty, the analysis evaluates the impact of using pessimistic assumptions for the rate of mislabeling and contamination, the rate of on-farm misfeeding of prohibited feed to cattle, the prevalence of various rendering technologies used in 1 While on the research staff at the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, the author of this report was a lead developer of the Harvard BSE simulation model. He has been involved in several risk assessments conducted using that software. Dr. Cohen moved to the Tufts New England Medical Center in January, 2006.

4

the U.S., the proportion of poultry litter that is used in cattle feed, and the prevalence of BSE in Canada.

Under base case conditions, the results of this analysis indicate that the expected number of infected cattle in the U.S. over 20 years as a result of importing cattle from Canada would amount to 21 animals. Most of these infected animals (approximately 90%) would be imported directly, while the remaining 10% would represent secondary infections (i.e., native U.S. cases). Potential human exposure over this 20-year period would be expected to amount to 45 cattle oral ID50s. Of the five uncertain parameters considered in the sensitivity analyses, the model is most sensitive to the release of infectivity (as expressed by BSE prevalence in Canada). Simultaneous assignment of pessimistic values to all five of the uncertain assumptions considered here increases the predicted number of secondary BSE cases to 42 on average, with total potential human exposure increasing to 290 cattle oral ID50s over 20 years. Under all cases, the reproductive constant for BSE (R0) remains less than 1 with high probability, indicating exponential growth in the number of native U.S. cases following potential introduction from Canada is unlikely. Equivalently, the results indicate that in the absence of a continual introduction of BSE into the U.S., its prevalence will decrease over time, eventually leading to its elimination. It is important to note that this set of findings reflects the simultaneous use of pessimistic values for a range of assumptions, including the assumptions identified as being influential in earlier analyses (1), as well as the assumed prevalence of BSE in Canada.

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/HarvardModel06-041-1.pdf

Attachment 1: Estimation of BSE Prevalence in Canada 1 Attachment 1: Estimation of BSE Prevalence in Canada

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/BSE_Prevalence.pdf

Summary of Enhanced BSE Surveillance in the United States Prepared by Centers for Epidemiology and Animal Health National Surveillance Unit April 27, 2006

Summary of Enhanced BSE Surveillance in the United States Introduction

Since 1990, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has taken aggressive measures to prevent the introduction and potential spread of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). Following the confirmation of BSE in an imported cow in December 2003, USDA designed and implemented an Enhanced BSE Surveillance Program to more accurately determine the level of disease present in the U.S. cattle population. The following report summarizes the data collected during the Enhanced BSE Surveillance Program as well as the information gathered from earlier surveillance efforts. The Enhanced BSE Surveillance Program tested as many cattle as possible in the targeted high-risk population beginning June 1, 2004. Collection at an enhanced level has continued beyond 18 months to ameliorate concerns of trading partners. Experience in the United Kingdom and Europe has shown that if present, BSE is most likely to be detected in adult cattle exhibiting clinical signs consistent with the disease.

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/SummaryEnhancedBSE-Surv4-26-06.pdf

BSE (“Mad Cow Disease”): A Brief Overview Geoffrey S. Becker Specialist in Agricultural Policy Resources, Science, and Industry Division

Summary

The appearance of BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy or “mad cow disease”) in North America in 2003 raised meat safety concerns and disrupted trade for cattle and beef producers. A major issue for Congress has been how to rebuild foreign markets for U.S. beef. Other issues include whether additional measures are needed to further protect the public and cattle herd, and concerns over the relative costs and benefits of such measures for consumers, taxpayers and industry. This report will not be updated.1

http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RS22345.pdf

Position Brief on USDA?s Justification of 30-Month Rule in Final Rule Prepared by R-CALF USA February 1, 2005

http://www.r-calfusa.com/bse/050201-PositionPaper30MonthRule.pdf

The most recent assessments (and reassessments) were published in June 2005 (Table I; 18), and included the categorisation of Canada, the USA, and Mexico as GBR III. Although only Canada and the USA have reported cases, the historically open system of trade in North America suggests that it is likely that BSE is present also in Mexico.

http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/06heim937950.pdf

Suppressed peer review of Harvard study October 31, 2002.

October 31, 2002 Review of the Evaluation of the Potential for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in the United States Conducted by the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, Harvard School of Public Health and Center for Computational Epidemiology, College of Veterinary Medicine, Tuskegee University Final Report Prepared for U.S. Department of Agriculture Food Safety and Inspection Service Office of Public Health and Science Prepared by RTI Health, Social, and Economics Research Research Triangle Park, NC 27709 RTI Project Number 07182.024

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/oa/topics/BSE_Peer_Review.pdf

[Federal Register: July 12, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 133)] [Notices] [Page 39282-39283] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr12jy06-35]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Food Safety and Inspection Service

[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011]

Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Update; Notice of Availability and Technical Meeting

AGENCY: Food Safety and Inspection Service, USDA.

ACTION: Notice of availability and announcement of technical meeting.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) is announcing the availability of an updated risk assessment model and report for BSE. The previous risk assessment, released in October 2003, was revised to incorporate information available through December 2003, including the discovery of a BSE-infected cow in Washington State. The revised risk assessment model evaluates the impact of measures implemented after the discovery of the BSE-positive cow and recommendations made by an international BSE panel. FSIS will also hold a technical meeting to discuss the updated risk assessment model and report.

DATES: The public meeting will be held on July 25, 2006, from 1 p.m. to 4 p.m. Comments on the updated Harvard Risk Assessment must be received by August 11, 2006.

http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2006/E6-10928.htm

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE + + + + + HARVARD BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) RISK ASSESSMENT TECHNICAL MEETING + + + + + July 25, 2006 1:00 p.m. Jefferson Auditorium 1400 Independence Avenue, SWWashington, D.C.

http://199.140.94.5/PDF/BSE_Transcript_072506.pdf

Owens, Julie From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [[email protected]] Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM To: FSIS RegulationsComments Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)

Page 1 of 98

8/3/2006

Greetings FSIS, I would kindly like to comment on the following ; [Federal Register: July 12, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 133)] [Notices] [Page 39282-39283] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr12jy06-35] -----------------------------------------------------------------------

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf

Harvard Response

Response to Public Comments on the Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Update, October 31, 2005

..... RESPONSE TO COMMENTS FROM TERRY S. SINGELTARY SR. ...

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/BSE_Risk_Assess_Response_Public_Comments.pdf

03-025IFA 03-025IFA-2 Terry S. Singeltary

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [[email protected]] Sent: Thursday, September 08, 2005 6:17 PM To: [email protected] Subject: [Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food and Requirements for the Disposition of Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf

THE SEVEN SCIENTIST REPORT ***

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0273/02n-0273-EC244-Attach-1.pdf

USDA/OIG-A/50601-10-KC

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf

http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/contentStreamer?objectId=09000064801f3413&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8

http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/contentStreamer?objectId=0900006480086ebc&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw6

http://stanford.wellsphere.com/cjd-article/docket-aphis-2007-0033-docket-title-agricultural-bioterrorism-protection-act-of-2002-toxin-list-docket-type-rulemaking-aphis/641253

Docket No. 03-080-1 -- USDA ISSUES PROPOSED RULE TO ALLOW LIVE ANIMAL IMPORTS FROM CANADA

https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/BSEcom.nsf/0/b78ba677e2b0c12185256dd300649f9d?OpenDocument&AutoFramed

PLEASE SEE FULL TEXT HERE ;

Docket No. 03-080-1 -- USDA ISSUES PROPOSED RULE TO ALLOW LIVE ANIMAL IMPORTS FROM CANADA

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/07/docket-no-03-080-1-usda-issues-proposed.html

Docket APHIS-2006-0026 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Animal Identification and Importation of Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0026-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions, Identification of Ruminants and Processing and Importation of Commodities Public Submission APHIS-2006-0026-0012 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801e47e1

Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary

Comment 2006-2007 USA AND OIE POISONING GLOBE WITH BSE MRR POLICY

THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted products from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone. These are the facts as I have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species.

MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???

go figure. ...

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f8151

Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028.1 Public Submission Title Attachment to Singletary comment

January 28, 2007

Greetings APHIS,

I would kindly like to submit the following to ;

BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f8152&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8

Friday, January 29, 2010 14th International Congress on Infectious Diseases H-type and L-type Atypical BSE January 2010 (special pre-congress edition)

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/01/14th-international-congress-on.html

*This case study accompanies the IRGC report “Risk Governance Deficits: An analysis and illustration of the most common deficits in risk governance”.

The Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Epidemic in the United Kingdom

By Belinda Cleeland1

The emergence of Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in the UK and the handling of the epidemic in British cattle in the late 1980s-early 1990s, especially as regards the risks posed by BSE to humans, is an example of inadequate risk governance. The epidemic resulted in the infection of 170,000 cattle, the killing of 4.4 million cattle as a precaution and the deaths of 164 people to date in Britain from New Variant Creutzfeld-Jacob disease (vCJD), the human form of BSE. It was also disastrous for the UK beef trade.

snip...

Risk Governance Deficits implicated in the BSE outbreak in the UK

A2 Factual knowledge about risks

When BSE was first diagnosed in cattle in 1986 it was a novel disease and risk assessors did not possess adequate scientific knowledge about its epidemiology or pathology to confidently evaluate what sort of risk it posed to animal or human health.

A4 Stakeholder involvement

The committees (Southwood working party, Tyrell committee, SEAC) that were set up to advise the government on various aspects of BSE played an important role in guiding its reaction to the outbreak. However, as evidenced by the outcomes of the BSE crisis, these committees did not effectively fulfil their task of providing advice on risk communication and risk management options. Following the BSE outbreak, fundamental questions have been posed as to the shortcomings of the advisory process in the UK, especially with regards to the composition and remit of such advisory committees. The process via which committees were put together – including requirements that members should not represent extremes of opinion, not produce dissenting opinions and be able to agree with each other – led to the exclusion of many diverse views and interests [Lofstedt & Fairman, 2006:26-7]. The BSE Inquiry later noted that lay persons can play “a valuable role on an expert committee” and also that “potential conflicts of interest should not preclude selection of those members otherwise best qualified, but conflicts of interest should be declared and registered.” [BSE Inquiry, 2000a].

A6 Misrepresenting information about risk

From the very beginning of the BSE outbreak, not only was knowledge misrepresented by the British government, but in some cases it was even withheld. For example, after the initial diagnosis of BSE by the SVS in late 1986, there was an embargo placed on the sharing, or making public, of any BSE-related information that ran until mid-1987. Also, up until at least 1990, outside scientists that requested access to BSE data to conduct further studies were denied, despite the fact the improved scientific understanding of the disease had the greatest potential to minimise the impact of the epidemic. Even government scientists within the CVL have acknowledged that there was a culture of suppressing information, to the point that studies revealing damaging evidence (e.g. that there was a causal link between BSE and the new encephalopathy found in cats) were denied publication permission [Ashraf, 2000]. The withholding of such information allowed the government to publicly assert that BSE was just like another version of scrapie – not transmissible to humans – and that there was “clear scientific evidence that British beef is perfectly safe” [UK House of Commons, 1990].2 This was certainly a misrepresentation of the knowledge held at the time, and one that was only possible due to the suppression of some scientific findings and recommendations. Of course, the main reason for this misrepresentation of knowledge was the protection of agricultural and industrial interests – the specific stakeholder favoured in this case was the British beef industry, which stood to lose billions of pounds if a large number of its animals had to be slaughtered, if export bans were put in place, or if costly regulations were implemented. To protect the interests of the beef industry, the government would assert on many occasions that British beef was safe to eat and that regulatory controls already implemented would prevent any 2 This comment was made by the Agriculture Minister to the House of Commons. 5 contaminated material from entering the food chain. This was also a misrepresentation of knowledge, as the government was fully aware that their measures were not designed to eliminate exposure, but only to diminish the risk [van Zwanenberg & Millstone, 2002:161].

What’s more, many uncertainties relating to the transmissibility of the disease were either down-played or ignored, resulting in an overstatement of certainty that British beef was completely safe to eat and that BSE was not transmissible to humans. The way uncertainty was dealt with in this case was the result of a number of factors, including the desire to protect specific stakeholder interests. One crucial factor was the underlying element of risk political culture in the UK that linked the identity of the actor to the consistency of his policy positions. This led to consistency of position being prioritised over accuracy [Dressel, 2000], and resulted in the government insisting on the absence of risk to the population, maintaining this public position despite mounting evidence to the contrary. Although aware of them, policy-makers chose not to overtly acknowledge the levels of uncertainty and the complexity of the risks involved with BSE and its spread because the ramifications of these were too great for the interests they were trying to safeguard.

http://www.irgc.org/IMG/pdf/BSE_full_case_study_web.pdf

Richard Horton Waffles on Lancet's Wakefield Retraction

Sally Beck Posted: February 12, 2010 03:00 PM

The Lancet has officially retracted a study which sparked a health scare over the MMR vaccine. The leading British medical journal said that it accepts that claims made by Dr. Andrew Wakefield and two fellow researchers were 'false.'

SNIP...

The paper was peer reviewed and duly published back in early 1998. The researchers included a line stating that eight of the parents felt the MMR vaccine had played a part in their children's decline. Horton knew this was controversial but published anyway. He said: "We felt it was important not to censor the information. We had censored information regarding BSE (Bovine spongiform encephalopathy, known as mad cow disease) and CJD( Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, the human form of BSE). We knew there was a risk that BSE could be transferred from cows to humans, but at the time we thought the risk was small so we didn't include the information. It was a big mistake and we should have published it."

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sally-beck/richard-horton-waffles-on_b_460550.html



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