I took the liberty of copy and pasting a portion of this interview I don't want old dis to miss. What do you have to say about this dis?
FP: Do we have any idea what is in the Iraqi Intelligence documents regarding Saddam's ties to al Qaeda and global terrorism?
Joscelyn: Yes, we do. But first, a caveat. Since so few of the documents have been reviewed, it is difficult to say what the complete picture of Saddam’s activities will look like. We also know that a large number of documents and other pieces of media were destroyed as U.S. forces entered the country. Furthermore, the majority of the documents have not been authenticated. Great care should be exercised in analyzing these documents and we should always be wary of forgeries.
However, the Iraqi intelligence documents that have been authenticated by the U.S. intelligence community offer a startling view of Saddam’s ties to global terrorism, including al Qaeda.
One IIS document, in particular, has received significant attention. The document was apparently authored in early 1997 and summarizes a number of contacts between Iraqi Intelligence and Saudi oppositionist groups, including al Qaeda, during the mid 1990’s. The document says that in early 1995 bin Laden requested Iraqi assistance in two ways. First, bin Laden wanted Iraqi television to carry al Qaeda’s anti-Saudi propaganda. Saddam agreed. Second, bin Laden requested Iraqi assistance in performing “joint operations against the foreign forces in the land of Hijaz.” That is, bin Laden wanted Iraq’s assistance in attacking U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia.
We do not know what, exactly, came of bin Laden’s second request. But the document indicates that Saddam’s operatives “were left to develop the relationship and the cooperation between the two sides to see what other doors of cooperation and agreement open up.” Thus, it appears that both sides saw value in working with each other. It is also worth noting that in the months following bin Laden’s request, al Qaeda was tied to a series of bombings in Saudi Arabia.
The same document also indicates that Iraq was in contact with Dr. Muhammad al-Massari, the head of the Committee for Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR). The CDLR is a known al Qaeda propaganda organ based in London. The document indicates that the IIS was seeking to “establish a nucleus of Saudi opposition in Iraq” and to “use our relationship with [al-Massari] to serve our intelligence goals.” The document also notes that Iraq was attempting to arrange a visit for the al Qaeda ideologue to Baghdad. Again, we can’t be certain what came of these contacts.
Just recently, however, al-Massari confirmed that Saddam had joined forces with al Qaeda prior to the war. Al-Massari says that Saddam established contact with the “Arab Afghans” who fled Afghanistan to northern Iraq in 2001 and that he funded their relocation to Iraq under the condition that they would not seek to undermine his regime. Upon their arrival, these al Qaeda terrorists were put in contact with Iraqi army personnel, who armed and funded them.
Obviously, this paints a very different picture of prewar Iraq than many would like to see.
Interestingly enough, the existence of this document was first reported by The New York Times in the summer of 2004, several weeks after the 9-11 Commission proclaimed that there was no operational relationship between Saddam’s Iraq and al Qaeda. For some reason, the Times decided to sit on the document while splashing the 9-11 Commission’s conclusion on the front page.
But that conclusion is now more tenuous than ever. Bob Kerrey, a former Democratic senator who served as a 9/11 commissioner, told Eli Lake of The New York Sun that the document is a “very significant set of facts.” While cautioning that it does not tie Saddam to the September 11 attack, Kerrey said that the document “does tie him into a circle that meant to damage the United States.”
That circle includes al Qaeda’s affiliate in the Philippines, Abu Sayyaf, which was funded by bin Laden’s brother-in-law. One document, which has not yet been released to the public, indicates that Iraqi Intelligence also funded Abu Sayyaf. Steve Hayes first reported the existence of this document last month. The document includes a series of IIS memos from 2001 in which Saddam’s henchmen discuss funding the group, but consider withdrawing support after a string of high-profile kidnappings of westerners brought unwanted attention. But whatever concerns Iraqi Intelligence had appear to be short-lived. In 2003, one Abu Sayyaf leader openly admitted to the press that the Iraqis had been funding his group.
Still another document provides interesting insight into the workings of Saddam’s ultra-loyal Fedayeen martyrs. Uday Hussein, leader of the Fedayeen, authorized a wave of terror attacks in London, Iran, and “self-ruled” areas of Iraq (meaning Kurdish-controlled territory) in May 1999. The Fedayeen were ordered “to start planning from now on to perform special operations (assassinations/bombings).” One such operation was called “Blessed July.”
The document recounts explicit instructions for recruiting Fedayeen capable of carrying out these attacks. Martyrs are even reminded to use "death capsules" if "captured at the European fields"--an apparent order to commit suicide if caught. What ever came of the “Blessed July” operation or similar operations, if anything? We don’t know.
We do know, however, that the Fedayeen Saddam were trained alongside terrorists from throughout the Middle East. There are a number of unreleased documents that demonstrate that Saddam was training terrorists by the thousand. For example, a team of analysts working for the Joint Forces Command reviewed hundreds of Iraqi Intelligence documents and reported their findings in a report called the “Iraqi Perspectives Project, A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam’s Senior Leadership.” Here is what they found in the documents:
Beginning in 1994, the Fedayeen Saddam opened its own paramilitary training camps for volunteers, graduating more than 7,200 "good men racing full with courage and enthusiasm" in the first year. Beginning in 1998, these camps began hosting "Arab volunteers from Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, 'the Gulf,' and Syria." It is not clear from available evidence where all of these non-Iraqi volunteers who were "sacrificing for the cause" went to ply their newfound skills. Before the summer of 2002, most volunteers went home upon the completion of training. But these training camps were humming with frenzied activity in the months immediately prior to the war. As late as January 2003, the volunteers participated in a special training event called the "Heroes Attack." This training event was designed in part to prepare regional Fedayeen Saddam commands to "obstruct the enemy from achieving his goal and to support keeping peace and stability in the province."
Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor describe similar documents in their new book Cobra II. They say that in March 2003 Saddam called back many of the terrorists his forces had trained. Some of the documents, they write, “show that the Iraqi Ministry of Defense coordinated border crossings with Syria and provided billeting, pay, and allowances and armaments for the influx of Syrians, Palestinians, and other fighters.” Paul Bremer writes in his book, My Year in Iraq, that he too saw Iraqi Intelligence documents that showed Saddam was planning on coordinating an insurgency with various jihadists.
All of this should make anyone who wants to argue that Saddam had nothing to do with terrorism or al Qaeda pause. Instead, many current and former members of the U.S. intelligence community still contend that Saddam was disconnected from the global terrorist network.