Feb. 21, 2008, 10:57PM
USDA inspectors: Staff shortages imperil meat supply
Government, industry defend meatpacking safety
By GILLIAN FLACCUS
Associated Press
LOS ANGELES — Sometimes, government inspectors responsible for examining
slaughterhouse cattle for mad cow disease and other ills are so
short-staffed that they find themselves peering down from catwalks at
hundreds of animals at once, looking for such telltale signs as droopy ears,
stumbling gait and facial paralysis.
The ranks of inspectors are so thin that slaughterhouse workers often figure
out when "surprise" visits are about to take place, and make sure they are
on their best behavior.
These allegations were raised by former and current U.S. Department of
Agriculture inspectors in the wake of the biggest beef recall in history —
143 million pounds from a California meatpacker accused of sending lame
"downer" cows to slaughter.
The inspectors told The Associated Press that they fear chronic staff
shortages in their ranks are allowing sick cows to get into the nation's
food supply, endangering the public. According to USDA's own figures, the
inspector ranks nationwide had vacancy rates of 10 percent or more in
2006-07.
"They're not covering all their bases. There's a possibility that something
could go through because you don't have the manpower to check everything,"
said Lester Friedlander, a former USDA veterinary inspector at a plant in
Wyalusing, Pa.
Amanda Eamich, a spokeswoman for the USDA's Food Safety and Inspection
Service, acknowledged that the department has been struggling to fill
vacancies but denied the food supply is at risk.
"Every single animal must past antemortem inspection before it's presented
for slaughter, so only healthy animals are going to pass," she said.
Similarly, Janet Riley, a spokeswoman for the American Meat Institute,
defended the meatpacking industry's safety record. "It is interesting to
keep in mind how heavily regulated we are," she said. "Nobody has this level
of inspection."
The current and former inspectors and other industry critics charged that
the staff shortages are also resulting in the mistreatment of animals on the
way to slaughter, and may have contributed to the recall announced earlier
this week.
U.S. Sen. Herb Kohl, D-Wis., said Thursday that his Senate Agriculture,
Rural Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Subcommittee will hold
a Feb. 28 hearing on the recall.
The USDA recalled the beef after the Humane Society of the United States
released undercover video that showed slaughterhouse workers at the
Chino-based Westland/Hallmark Meat Co. kicking and shoving sick and crippled
cows and forcing them to stand with electric prods, forklifts and water
hoses.
Wayne Pacelle, the Humane Society's president and chief executive, said the
video was filmed over a six-week period last fall and all the abuse happened
when USDA inspectors were not present.
Generally, downer cows — those too sickly to stand, even with coaxing — are
banned from the food supply under federal regulations. Downer cows carry a
higher risk of mad cow disease.
Thursday, February 21, 2008
TRANSCRIPT: Technical Briefing - Hallmark/Westland Meat Packing Company -
(02/21/08)
Release No. 0054.08
http://downercattle.blogspot.com/
http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2008/02/transcript-technical-briefing.html
Subject: USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half (bogus BSE
sampling FROM HEALTHY USDA CATTLE)
Date: June 21, 2007 at 2:49 pm PST
Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty
to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program
An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled
guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government
funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his
company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when
they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and
then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services.
In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle
that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors
for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be
submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy
USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently
received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled
for May 2007.
snip...
Topics that will be covered in ongoing or planned reviews under Goal 1
include:
soundness of BSE maintenance sampling (APHIS),
implementation of Performance-Based Inspection System
enhancements for specified risk material (SRM) violations and
improved inspection controls over SRMs (FSIS and APHIS),
snip...
The findings and recommendations from these efforts will be covered in
future semiannual reports as the relevant audits and
investigations are completed.
4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf
suppressed peer review of Harvard study October 31, 2002
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/oa/topics/BSE_Peer_Review.pdf
APHIS notes that for the current surveillance program, it had established
regional goals and APHIS was not trying to meet particular sampling levels
in particular States. However, we believe that it would be advantageous for
APHIS to monitor collection data and increase outreach when large
geographical areas such as the above States do not provide samples in
proportion to the numbers and types of cattle in the population.
We also disagree with APHIS/FSIS’ contention that because they have tested
over 375,000 of their 446,000 estimate of high risk cattle, few in the
high-risk population are being missed, including those that might be
pre-screened before entering a slaughter facility’s property. In our prior
audit, we reported that APHIS underestimated the high-risk population; we
found that this estimate should have been closer to 1 million animals (see
Finding 1). We recognize that BSE samples are provided on a voluntary basis;
however, APHIS should consider industry practice in any further maintenance
surveillance effort. Animals unsuitable for slaughter exhibiting symptoms
not inconsistent with BSE should be sampled and their clinical signs
recorded. However, this cited industry practice results in rejected animals
not being made available to either APHIS or FSIS veterinarians for their
observation and identification of clinical signs exhibited ante mortem.
Although these animals may be sampled later at other collection sites, the
animals are provided post mortem without information as to relevant clinical
signs exhibited ante mortem. For these reasons, we believe APHIS needs to
USDA/OIG-A/50601-10-KC Page 27
observe these animals ante mortem when possible to assure the animals from
the target population are ultimately sampled and the clinical signs
evaluated.
snip...
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf
[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. MBM IN COMMERCE USA
2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling’s 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried,
Recall # V-024-2007
CODE
Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was
cross-contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been
manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE
statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
42,090 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
WI
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL
Prot-Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal,
TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY
Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST
POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI – 8# SPECIAL
DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J – PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK
CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC
MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY,
A-BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007
CODE
The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with
commodity and weights identified.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm
initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross
contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not
bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
9,997,976 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html
and that is but one of many since the infamous 8/4/97 partial
and voluntary mad cow feed ban.
2006 was a banner year for MAD COW PROTEIN IN COMMERCE ;
PLEASE SEE LAUNDRY LIST OF MAD COW PROTEIN IN COMMERCE HERE ;
SRM SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS
RUMINANT TO RUMINANT ANIMAL PROTEIN IN COMMERCE 2006-2007
http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/2008/02/specified-risk-materials-srm.html
Geographical BSE Risk (GBR) assessments covering 2000-2006
Date : 01.08.2006
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/Scientific_Document/GBR_assessments_table_Overview_assessed_countries_2002-2006.pdf
QUESTION, IS U.S.A. FOOD PRODUCTION SYSTEM POISONING US ?
What Do We Feed to Food-Production Animals? A Review of Animal Feed
Ingredients and Their Potential Impacts on Human Health
Amy R. Sapkota,1,2 Lisa Y. Lefferts,1,3 Shawn McKenzie,1 and Polly Walker1
1Johns Hopkins Center for a Livable Future, Bloomberg School of Public
Health, Baltimore, Maryland, USA; 2Maryland Institute for
Applied Environmental Health, College of Health and Human Performance,
University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, USA;
3Lisa Y. Lefferts Consulting, Nellysford, Virginia, USA
snip...
Table 1. Animal feed ingredients that are legally used in U.S. animal feeds
Animal
Rendered animal protein from Meat meal, meat meal tankage, meat and bone
meal, poultry meal, animal the slaughter of food by-product meal, dried
animal blood, blood meal, feather meal, egg-shell production animals and
other meal, hydrolyzed whole poultry, hydrolyzed hair, bone marrow, and
animal animals digest from dead, dying, diseased, or disabled animals
including deer and elk Animal waste Dried ruminant waste, dried swine waste,
dried poultry litter, and undried processed animal waste products
snip...
Conclusions
Food-animal production in the United States has changed markedly in the past
century, and these changes have paralleled major changes in animal feed
formulations. While this industrialized system of food-animal production may
result in increased production efficiencies, some of the changes in animal
feeding practices may result in unintended adverse health consequences for
consumers of animal-based food products. Currently, the use of animal feed
ingredients,
including rendered animal products, animal waste, antibiotics, metals, and
fats, could result in higher levels of bacteria, antibioticresistant
bacteria, prions, arsenic, and dioxinlike compounds in animals and resulting
animal-based food products intended for human consumption. Subsequent human
health effects among consumers could include increases in bacterial
infections (antibioticresistant and nonresistant) and increases in the risk
of developing chronic (often fatal) diseases
such as vCJD. Nevertheless, in spite of the wide range of potential human
health impacts that could result from animal feeding practices, there are
little data collected at the federal or state level concerning the amounts
of specific ingredients that are intentionally included in U.S. animal feed.
In addition, almost no biological or chemical testing is conducted on
complete U.S. animal feeds; insufficient testing is performed on retail meat
products; and human health effects data are not appropriately linked to this
information. These surveillance inadequacies make it difficult to conduct
rigorous epidemiologic studies and risk assessments
that could identify the extent to which specific human health risks are
ultimately associated with animal feeding practices. For example, as noted
above, there are insufficient data to determine whether other human
foodborne bacterial illnesses besides those caused by S. enterica serotype
Agona are associated with animal feeding practices. Likewise, there are
insufficient data to determine the percentage of antibiotic-resistant human
bacterial infections that are attributed to the nontherapeutic use of
antibiotics in animal feed. Moreover, little research has been conducted to
determine whether the use of organoarsenicals in animal feed, which can lead
to elevated levels of arsenic in meat products (Lasky et al. 2004),
contributes to increases in cancer risk. In order to address these research
gaps, the following principal actions are necessary within the United
States: a) implementation of a nationwide reporting system of the specific
amounts and types of feed ingredients of concern to public health that are
incorporated into animal feed, including antibiotics, arsenicals, rendered
animal products, fats, and animal waste; b) funding and development of
robust surveillance systems that monitor biological, chemical, and other
etiologic agents throughout the animal-based food-production chain “from
farm to fork” to human health outcomes; and c) increased communication and
collaboration among feed professionals, food-animal producers, and
veterinary and public health officials.
REFERENCES...snip...end
Sapkota et al.
668 VOLUME 115 | NUMBER 5 | May 2007 • Environmental Health Perspectives
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/picrender.fcgi?artid=1867957&blobtype=pdf
P04.27
Experimental BSE Infection of Non-human Primates: Efficacy of the Oral Route
Holznagel, E1; Yutzy, B1; Deslys, J-P2; Lasmézas, C2; Pocchiari, M3;
Ingrosso, L3;
Bierke, P4; Schulz-Schaeffer, W5; Motzkus, D6; Hunsmann, G6; Löwer, J1
1Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Germany; 2Commissariat à l´Energie Atomique, France;
3Instituto Superiore di Sanità, Italy; 4Swedish Institute for Infectious
Disease
control, Sweden; 5Georg August University, Germany; 6German Primate Center,
Germany
Background:
In 2001, a study was initiated in primates to assess the risk for humans
to contract BSE through contaminated food. For this purpose, BSE brain was
titrated in cynomolgus monkeys.
Aims:
The primary objective is the determination of the minimal infectious dose
(MID50)
for oral exposure to BSE in a simian model, and, by in doing this, to assess
the risk for
humans. Secondly, we aimed at examining the course of the disease to
identify
possible biomarkers.
Methods:
Groups with six monkeys each were orally dosed with lowering amounts of
BSE brain: 16g, 5g, 0.5g, 0.05g, and 0.005g. In a second titration study,
animals were intracerebrally (i.c.) dosed (50, 5, 0.5, 0.05, and 0.005 mg).
Results:
In an ongoing study, a considerable number of high-dosed macaques already
developed simian vCJD upon oral or intracerebral exposure or are at the
onset of the clinical phase. However, there are differences in the clinical
course
between orally and intracerebrally infected animals that may influence the
detection of
biomarkers.
Conclusions:
Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral
route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate. The difference in the
incubation period between 5 g oral and 5 mg i.c. is only 1 year (5 years
versus 4
years). However, there are rapid progressors among orally dosed monkeys that
develop simian vCJD as fast as intracerebrally inoculated animals.
The work referenced was performed in partial fulfilment of the study “BSE in
primates“ supported by the EU (QLK1-2002-01096).
http://www.prion2007.com/pdf/Prion%20Book%20of%20Abstracts.pdf
look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm) caused
7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;
Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in
primates
Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog,
Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie
Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe
Deslys Summary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
(vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oral
infection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier to
transmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE to
non-human primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenate
from a BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological
disease 60 months after exposure, whereas the other remained free of disease
at 76 months. On the basis of these findings and data from other studies, we
made a preliminary estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which
provides additional assurance that existing public health measures can
prevent transmission of BSE to man.
snip...
BSE bovine brain inoculum
100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mg
Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%)
Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%)
1/15 (7%)
RIII mice (ic ip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)
PrPres biochemical detection
The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculum
used in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with a
similar PrPres concentration that was
inoculated into mice and cattle.8 *Data are number of animals
positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of
disease in the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of
bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. ic
ip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal.
Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infected
orally with similar BSE brain inocula
Published online January 27, 2005
http://www.thelancet.com/journal/journal.isa
It is clear that the designing scientists must
also have shared Mr Bradley’s surprise at the results because all the dose
levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s145d.pdf
The dose ranges chosen by the most informed scientists at that time
ranged from 1 gram to three times one hundred grams. It is clear that the
designing scientists must have also shared Mr Bradley’s surprise at the
results
because all the dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s147f.pdf
USDA CERTIFIED H-BASE MAD COW SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM
http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/02/usda-certified-h-base-mad-cow-school.html
TSS
2/22/2008 8:55 AM CST
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/headline/nation/5560836.html
USDA inspectors: Staff shortages imperil meat supply
Government, industry defend meatpacking safety
By GILLIAN FLACCUS
Associated Press
LOS ANGELES — Sometimes, government inspectors responsible for examining
slaughterhouse cattle for mad cow disease and other ills are so
short-staffed that they find themselves peering down from catwalks at
hundreds of animals at once, looking for such telltale signs as droopy ears,
stumbling gait and facial paralysis.
The ranks of inspectors are so thin that slaughterhouse workers often figure
out when "surprise" visits are about to take place, and make sure they are
on their best behavior.
These allegations were raised by former and current U.S. Department of
Agriculture inspectors in the wake of the biggest beef recall in history —
143 million pounds from a California meatpacker accused of sending lame
"downer" cows to slaughter.
The inspectors told The Associated Press that they fear chronic staff
shortages in their ranks are allowing sick cows to get into the nation's
food supply, endangering the public. According to USDA's own figures, the
inspector ranks nationwide had vacancy rates of 10 percent or more in
2006-07.
"They're not covering all their bases. There's a possibility that something
could go through because you don't have the manpower to check everything,"
said Lester Friedlander, a former USDA veterinary inspector at a plant in
Wyalusing, Pa.
Amanda Eamich, a spokeswoman for the USDA's Food Safety and Inspection
Service, acknowledged that the department has been struggling to fill
vacancies but denied the food supply is at risk.
"Every single animal must past antemortem inspection before it's presented
for slaughter, so only healthy animals are going to pass," she said.
Similarly, Janet Riley, a spokeswoman for the American Meat Institute,
defended the meatpacking industry's safety record. "It is interesting to
keep in mind how heavily regulated we are," she said. "Nobody has this level
of inspection."
The current and former inspectors and other industry critics charged that
the staff shortages are also resulting in the mistreatment of animals on the
way to slaughter, and may have contributed to the recall announced earlier
this week.
U.S. Sen. Herb Kohl, D-Wis., said Thursday that his Senate Agriculture,
Rural Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Subcommittee will hold
a Feb. 28 hearing on the recall.
The USDA recalled the beef after the Humane Society of the United States
released undercover video that showed slaughterhouse workers at the
Chino-based Westland/Hallmark Meat Co. kicking and shoving sick and crippled
cows and forcing them to stand with electric prods, forklifts and water
hoses.
Wayne Pacelle, the Humane Society's president and chief executive, said the
video was filmed over a six-week period last fall and all the abuse happened
when USDA inspectors were not present.
Generally, downer cows — those too sickly to stand, even with coaxing — are
banned from the food supply under federal regulations. Downer cows carry a
higher risk of mad cow disease.
Thursday, February 21, 2008
TRANSCRIPT: Technical Briefing - Hallmark/Westland Meat Packing Company -
(02/21/08)
Release No. 0054.08
http://downercattle.blogspot.com/
http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2008/02/transcript-technical-briefing.html
Subject: USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half (bogus BSE
sampling FROM HEALTHY USDA CATTLE)
Date: June 21, 2007 at 2:49 pm PST
Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty
to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program
An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled
guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government
funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his
company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when
they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and
then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services.
In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle
that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors
for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be
submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy
USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently
received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled
for May 2007.
snip...
Topics that will be covered in ongoing or planned reviews under Goal 1
include:
soundness of BSE maintenance sampling (APHIS),
implementation of Performance-Based Inspection System
enhancements for specified risk material (SRM) violations and
improved inspection controls over SRMs (FSIS and APHIS),
snip...
The findings and recommendations from these efforts will be covered in
future semiannual reports as the relevant audits and
investigations are completed.
4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf
suppressed peer review of Harvard study October 31, 2002
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/oa/topics/BSE_Peer_Review.pdf
APHIS notes that for the current surveillance program, it had established
regional goals and APHIS was not trying to meet particular sampling levels
in particular States. However, we believe that it would be advantageous for
APHIS to monitor collection data and increase outreach when large
geographical areas such as the above States do not provide samples in
proportion to the numbers and types of cattle in the population.
We also disagree with APHIS/FSIS’ contention that because they have tested
over 375,000 of their 446,000 estimate of high risk cattle, few in the
high-risk population are being missed, including those that might be
pre-screened before entering a slaughter facility’s property. In our prior
audit, we reported that APHIS underestimated the high-risk population; we
found that this estimate should have been closer to 1 million animals (see
Finding 1). We recognize that BSE samples are provided on a voluntary basis;
however, APHIS should consider industry practice in any further maintenance
surveillance effort. Animals unsuitable for slaughter exhibiting symptoms
not inconsistent with BSE should be sampled and their clinical signs
recorded. However, this cited industry practice results in rejected animals
not being made available to either APHIS or FSIS veterinarians for their
observation and identification of clinical signs exhibited ante mortem.
Although these animals may be sampled later at other collection sites, the
animals are provided post mortem without information as to relevant clinical
signs exhibited ante mortem. For these reasons, we believe APHIS needs to
USDA/OIG-A/50601-10-KC Page 27
observe these animals ante mortem when possible to assure the animals from
the target population are ultimately sampled and the clinical signs
evaluated.
snip...
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf
[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. MBM IN COMMERCE USA
2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling’s 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried,
Recall # V-024-2007
CODE
Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was
cross-contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been
manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE
statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
42,090 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
WI
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL
Prot-Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal,
TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY
Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST
POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI – 8# SPECIAL
DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J – PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK
CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC
MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY,
A-BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007
CODE
The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with
commodity and weights identified.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm
initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross
contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not
bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
9,997,976 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html
and that is but one of many since the infamous 8/4/97 partial
and voluntary mad cow feed ban.
2006 was a banner year for MAD COW PROTEIN IN COMMERCE ;
PLEASE SEE LAUNDRY LIST OF MAD COW PROTEIN IN COMMERCE HERE ;
SRM SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS
RUMINANT TO RUMINANT ANIMAL PROTEIN IN COMMERCE 2006-2007
http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/2008/02/specified-risk-materials-srm.html
Geographical BSE Risk (GBR) assessments covering 2000-2006
Date : 01.08.2006
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/Scientific_Document/GBR_assessments_table_Overview_assessed_countries_2002-2006.pdf
QUESTION, IS U.S.A. FOOD PRODUCTION SYSTEM POISONING US ?
What Do We Feed to Food-Production Animals? A Review of Animal Feed
Ingredients and Their Potential Impacts on Human Health
Amy R. Sapkota,1,2 Lisa Y. Lefferts,1,3 Shawn McKenzie,1 and Polly Walker1
1Johns Hopkins Center for a Livable Future, Bloomberg School of Public
Health, Baltimore, Maryland, USA; 2Maryland Institute for
Applied Environmental Health, College of Health and Human Performance,
University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, USA;
3Lisa Y. Lefferts Consulting, Nellysford, Virginia, USA
snip...
Table 1. Animal feed ingredients that are legally used in U.S. animal feeds
Animal
Rendered animal protein from Meat meal, meat meal tankage, meat and bone
meal, poultry meal, animal the slaughter of food by-product meal, dried
animal blood, blood meal, feather meal, egg-shell production animals and
other meal, hydrolyzed whole poultry, hydrolyzed hair, bone marrow, and
animal animals digest from dead, dying, diseased, or disabled animals
including deer and elk Animal waste Dried ruminant waste, dried swine waste,
dried poultry litter, and undried processed animal waste products
snip...
Conclusions
Food-animal production in the United States has changed markedly in the past
century, and these changes have paralleled major changes in animal feed
formulations. While this industrialized system of food-animal production may
result in increased production efficiencies, some of the changes in animal
feeding practices may result in unintended adverse health consequences for
consumers of animal-based food products. Currently, the use of animal feed
ingredients,
including rendered animal products, animal waste, antibiotics, metals, and
fats, could result in higher levels of bacteria, antibioticresistant
bacteria, prions, arsenic, and dioxinlike compounds in animals and resulting
animal-based food products intended for human consumption. Subsequent human
health effects among consumers could include increases in bacterial
infections (antibioticresistant and nonresistant) and increases in the risk
of developing chronic (often fatal) diseases
such as vCJD. Nevertheless, in spite of the wide range of potential human
health impacts that could result from animal feeding practices, there are
little data collected at the federal or state level concerning the amounts
of specific ingredients that are intentionally included in U.S. animal feed.
In addition, almost no biological or chemical testing is conducted on
complete U.S. animal feeds; insufficient testing is performed on retail meat
products; and human health effects data are not appropriately linked to this
information. These surveillance inadequacies make it difficult to conduct
rigorous epidemiologic studies and risk assessments
that could identify the extent to which specific human health risks are
ultimately associated with animal feeding practices. For example, as noted
above, there are insufficient data to determine whether other human
foodborne bacterial illnesses besides those caused by S. enterica serotype
Agona are associated with animal feeding practices. Likewise, there are
insufficient data to determine the percentage of antibiotic-resistant human
bacterial infections that are attributed to the nontherapeutic use of
antibiotics in animal feed. Moreover, little research has been conducted to
determine whether the use of organoarsenicals in animal feed, which can lead
to elevated levels of arsenic in meat products (Lasky et al. 2004),
contributes to increases in cancer risk. In order to address these research
gaps, the following principal actions are necessary within the United
States: a) implementation of a nationwide reporting system of the specific
amounts and types of feed ingredients of concern to public health that are
incorporated into animal feed, including antibiotics, arsenicals, rendered
animal products, fats, and animal waste; b) funding and development of
robust surveillance systems that monitor biological, chemical, and other
etiologic agents throughout the animal-based food-production chain “from
farm to fork” to human health outcomes; and c) increased communication and
collaboration among feed professionals, food-animal producers, and
veterinary and public health officials.
REFERENCES...snip...end
Sapkota et al.
668 VOLUME 115 | NUMBER 5 | May 2007 • Environmental Health Perspectives
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/picrender.fcgi?artid=1867957&blobtype=pdf
P04.27
Experimental BSE Infection of Non-human Primates: Efficacy of the Oral Route
Holznagel, E1; Yutzy, B1; Deslys, J-P2; Lasmézas, C2; Pocchiari, M3;
Ingrosso, L3;
Bierke, P4; Schulz-Schaeffer, W5; Motzkus, D6; Hunsmann, G6; Löwer, J1
1Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Germany; 2Commissariat à l´Energie Atomique, France;
3Instituto Superiore di Sanità, Italy; 4Swedish Institute for Infectious
Disease
control, Sweden; 5Georg August University, Germany; 6German Primate Center,
Germany
Background:
In 2001, a study was initiated in primates to assess the risk for humans
to contract BSE through contaminated food. For this purpose, BSE brain was
titrated in cynomolgus monkeys.
Aims:
The primary objective is the determination of the minimal infectious dose
(MID50)
for oral exposure to BSE in a simian model, and, by in doing this, to assess
the risk for
humans. Secondly, we aimed at examining the course of the disease to
identify
possible biomarkers.
Methods:
Groups with six monkeys each were orally dosed with lowering amounts of
BSE brain: 16g, 5g, 0.5g, 0.05g, and 0.005g. In a second titration study,
animals were intracerebrally (i.c.) dosed (50, 5, 0.5, 0.05, and 0.005 mg).
Results:
In an ongoing study, a considerable number of high-dosed macaques already
developed simian vCJD upon oral or intracerebral exposure or are at the
onset of the clinical phase. However, there are differences in the clinical
course
between orally and intracerebrally infected animals that may influence the
detection of
biomarkers.
Conclusions:
Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral
route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate. The difference in the
incubation period between 5 g oral and 5 mg i.c. is only 1 year (5 years
versus 4
years). However, there are rapid progressors among orally dosed monkeys that
develop simian vCJD as fast as intracerebrally inoculated animals.
The work referenced was performed in partial fulfilment of the study “BSE in
primates“ supported by the EU (QLK1-2002-01096).
http://www.prion2007.com/pdf/Prion%20Book%20of%20Abstracts.pdf
look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm) caused
7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;
Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in
primates
Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog,
Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie
Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe
Deslys Summary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
(vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oral
infection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier to
transmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE to
non-human primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenate
from a BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological
disease 60 months after exposure, whereas the other remained free of disease
at 76 months. On the basis of these findings and data from other studies, we
made a preliminary estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which
provides additional assurance that existing public health measures can
prevent transmission of BSE to man.
snip...
BSE bovine brain inoculum
100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mg
Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%)
Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%)
1/15 (7%)
RIII mice (ic ip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)
PrPres biochemical detection
The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculum
used in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with a
similar PrPres concentration that was
inoculated into mice and cattle.8 *Data are number of animals
positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of
disease in the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of
bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. ic
ip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal.
Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infected
orally with similar BSE brain inocula
Published online January 27, 2005
http://www.thelancet.com/journal/journal.isa
It is clear that the designing scientists must
also have shared Mr Bradley’s surprise at the results because all the dose
levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s145d.pdf
The dose ranges chosen by the most informed scientists at that time
ranged from 1 gram to three times one hundred grams. It is clear that the
designing scientists must have also shared Mr Bradley’s surprise at the
results
because all the dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s147f.pdf
USDA CERTIFIED H-BASE MAD COW SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM
http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/02/usda-certified-h-base-mad-cow-school.html
TSS
2/22/2008 8:55 AM CST
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/headline/nation/5560836.html