FDA BSE/RUMINANT FEED TEXAS LEGEND RANCH OAI 5/10/2008

[flounder]

FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory Report Texas Legend Ranch OAI 05/10/2008

Greetings,

AS you can see from this OAI, dated 05/10/2008, the potential for banned mad cow protein still being fed to U.S. cattle is great. I did a quick search, and this was a TEXAS firm (the last two documented mad cows in the USA were atypical BSE, one being from TEXAS, and science is showing that atypical BSE is more virulent to humans). WHAT I find odd, is how difficult it is now to look up these violators of these mad cow feed ban violations. Apparently the spread sheet is still not available (full text) ;

Display Entire FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firm Inventory Report as an Excel Spreadsheet

http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/BSEInspect/bse_excel.jsp

HOWEVER, if you look hard enough, yea shall find, potential mad cow protein in commerce USA MAY 2008 ;

FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory Report

Data reported as of: 05/10/2008

Search by: State = TX, and FDA District = DAL-DO, and Firm Type = FR,HF,NL, and Last BSE Insp Date From 01/01/2007 To 05/31/2008 and BSE Program Risk = DP,HP,NP, and Last BSE District Decision = OAI, and Handles Feed for Rum. Animals = Y,N,R Sort by: Last BSE District Decision

FDA District

DAL-DO

Firm Id (FEI)

3006607060

Firm Name

Texas Legend Ranch

Street Address

2803 Highway 473

City

Kendalia

State

TX

Zip Code

78027-2016

Opr. Status

OPR

Firm Type(s)

FR, OF

Prgm Risk

NP

Last BSE Insp Date

03/25/2008

Last BSE Dist. Dcsn''

OAI

Handles Feed for Rum. Animals?

Y

Legend - Opr.Status:OPR=Operational,

SEA=Seasonal,

PRP=Pre-Production,

Firm Type:

AF=Animal Feed/Pet Food Salvager,

DR=Distributor/Retailer,

FL=Feed Mill (FDA Licensed),

FR=Feeder of Ruminants,

HF=Human Food Processor,

NL=Feed Mill (not FDA Licensed),

OF=On-farm Feed Mixer,

OT=Other,

PB=Protein Blender,

PF=Pet Food Manufacturer,

RE=Renderer,

RO=Feeder of Ruminants and Other Species,

TH=Transporter (Hauler),

Prgm RiskP=Only Distributes Prohib.Mat.(DP),

HP=Handles Prohibited Materials(HP),

NP=Does not handle Prohib.Mat.(NP),

Dist Dcsn:

OAI=Official Action Indicated (OAI),

VAI=Voluntary Action Indicated (VAI),

NAI=No Action Indicated (NAI),

RTS=Referred to State (RTS),

** District decisions listed in this report reflect the compliance status of firms when the report was generated. These district decisions may or may not represent the final Agency determination of compliance for these firms.

http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/BSEInspect/bse_results.jsp

PLEASE NOTE ;

An OAI inspection classification occurs when significant objectionable conditions or practices were found and regulatory sanctions are warranted in order to address the establishment's lack of compliance with the regulation. An example of an OAI inspection classification would be findings of manufacturing procedures insufficient to ensure that ruminant feed is not contaminated with prohibited material. Inspections classified with OAI violations will be promptly re-inspected following the regulatory sanctions to determine whether adequate corrective actions have been implemented.

http://www.fda.gov/cvm/CVM_Updates/BSE0108.htm

PLEASE SEE ;

Unacceptable risk: When the potential harm either to animal or humans from a feed product attains a level not acceptable to decision-makers. The level may vary depending on the type of harm.

http://www.fda.gov/cvm/AFSS3rdDraftFramework.html

PLEASE UNDERSTAND, with a Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy, once clinical, the disease is 100% fatal. There should be NO debate of the 'unacceptable risk factor', with any TSE. ...TSS

P04.27

Experimental BSE Infection of Non-human Primates: Efficacy of the Oral Route

Holznagel, E1; Yutzy, B1; Deslys, J-P2; Lasmézas, C2; Pocchiari, M3; Ingrosso, L3; Bierke, P4; Schulz-Schaeffer, W5; Motzkus, D6; Hunsmann, G6; Löwer, J1 1Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Germany; 2Commissariat à l´Energie Atomique, France; 3Instituto Superiore di Sanità, Italy; 4Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease control, Sweden; 5Georg August University, Germany; 6German Primate Center, Germany

Background:

In 2001, a study was initiated in primates to assess the risk for humans to contract BSE through contaminated food. For this purpose, BSE brain was titrated in cynomolgus monkeys.

Aims:

The primary objective is the determination of the minimal infectious dose (MID50) for oral exposure to BSE in a simian model, and, by in doing this, to assess the risk for humans. Secondly, we aimed at examining the course of the disease to identify possible biomarkers.

Methods:

Groups with six monkeys each were orally dosed with lowering amounts of BSE brain: 16g, 5g, 0.5g, 0.05g, and 0.005g. In a second titration study, animals were intracerebrally (i.c.) dosed (50, 5, 0.5, 0.05, and 0.005 mg).

Results:

In an ongoing study, a considerable number of high-dosed macaques already developed simian vCJD upon oral or intracerebral exposure or are at the onset of the clinical phase. However, there are differences in the clinical course between orally and intracerebrally infected animals that may influence the detection of biomarkers.

Conclusions:

Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate. The difference in the incubation period between 5 g oral and 5 mg i.c. is only 1 year (5 years versus 4 years). However, there are rapid progressors among orally dosed monkeys that develop simian v CJD as fast as intracerebrally inoculated animals.

The work referenced was performed in partial fulfillment of the study "BSE in primates" supported by the EU (QLK1-2002-01096).

http://www.prion2007.com/pdf/Prion%20Book%20of%20Abstracts.pdf

Calves were challenged by mouth with homogenised brain from confirmed cases of BSE. Some received 300g (3 doses of 100g), some 100g, 10g or 1g. They were then left to develop BSE, but were not subjected to the normal stresses that they might have encountered in a dairy herd. Animals in all four groups developed BSE. There has been a considerable spread of incubation period in some of the groups, but it appears as if those in the 1 and 10g challenge groups most closely fit the picture of incubation periods seen in the epidemic. Experiments in progress indicate that oral infection can occur in some animals with doses as low as 0.01g and 0.001g. .........

http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/science-research/pathog.html#dose

look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm) caused 7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;

Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in primates

Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog, Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe Deslys Summary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oral infection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier to transmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE to non-human primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenate from a BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological disease 60 months after exposure, whereas the other remained free of disease at 76 months. On the basis of these findings and data from other studies, we made a preliminary estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which provides additional assurance that existing public health measures can prevent transmission of BSE to man.

snip...

BSE bovine brain inoculum

100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mg

Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%)

Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%) 1/15 (7%)

RIII mice (ic ip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)

PrPres biochemical detection

The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculum used in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with a similar PrPres concentration that was

inoculated into mice and cattle.8 *Data are number of animals positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of disease in the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of

bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. ic ip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal.

Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infected orally with similar BSE brain inocula

Published online January 27, 2005

http://www.thelancet.com/journal/journal.isa

It is clear that the designing scientists must

also have shared Mr Bradley's surprise at the results because all the dose

levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s145d.pdf

6. It also appears to me that Mr Bradley's answer (that it would take less than say 100 grams) was probably given with the benefit of hindsight; particularly if one considers that later in the same answer Mr Bradley expresses his surprise that it could take as little of 1 gram of brain to cause BSE by the oral route within the same species. This information did not become available until the "attack rate" experiment had been completed in 1995/96. This was a titration experiment designed to ascertain the infective dose. A range of dosages was used to ensure that the actual result was within both a lower and an upper limit within the study and the designing scientists would not have expected all the dose levels to trigger infection. The dose ranges chosen by the most informed scientists at that time ranged from 1 gram to three times one hundred grams. It is clear that the designing scientists must have also shared Mr Bradley's surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s147f.pdf

FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds.

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2001/NEW00752.html

http://www.fda.gov/ora/about/enf_story/archive/2001/ch5/default.htm

If transmission occurs, tissue distribution comparisons will be made between cattle infected with the atypical BSE isolate and the U.S. BSE isolate. Differences in tissue distribution could require new regulations regarding specific risk material (SRM) removal.

http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/projects/projects.htm?ACCN_NO=408490

PLEASE BE ADVISED, also, such 'significant objectionable conditions or practices' such as this, allow millions and millions of pounds of banned ruminant feed into commerce, such as the one in 2007. I suppose this is why they DO NOT release such data anymore i.e. in tonnage or pounds, much too embarrassing considering .005 grams is lethal for a cow. ...TSS

In 2007, in one weekly enforcement report, the fda recalled 10,000,000+ pounds of BANNED MAD COW FEED, 'in commerce', and i can tell you that most of it was fed out ;

10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST REASON Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 42,090 lbs. DISTRIBUTION WI

REASON Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 9,997,976 lbs. DISTRIBUTION ID and NV

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html

Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA SEPT 6, 2006 1961.72 TONS IN COMMERCE AL, TN, AND WV Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST

snip... see listings and references of enormous amounts of banned mad cow protein 'in commerce' in 2006 and 2005 ;

see full text ;

Friday, April 25, 2008

Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed [Docket No. 2002N-0273] (Formerly Docket No. 02N-0273) RIN 0910-AF46

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/04/substances-prohibited-from-use-in.html

SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS

http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/2008/02/specified-risk-materials-srm.html

SRM MAD COW RECALL 406 THOUSAND POUNDS CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS KANSAS

http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/04/srm-mad-cow-recall-406-thousand-pounds.html

MAD COW DISEASE terminology UK c-BSE (typical), atypical BSE H or L, and or Italian L-BASE

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/03/mad-cow-disease-terminology-uk-c-bse.html

Please remember, the last two mad cows documented in the USA i.e. Alabama and Texas, both were of the 'atypical' BSE strain, and immediately after that, the USDA shut down the testing from 470,000 to 40,000 in the U.S. in 2007 out of about 35 million cattle slaughtered. also, science is showing that some of these atypical cases are more virulent to humans than the typical UK BSE strain ;

***Atypical forms of BSE have emerged which, although rare, appear to be more virulent than the classical BSE that causes vCJD.***

Progress Report from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center

An Update from Stephen M. Sergay, MB, BCh & Pierluigi Gambetti, MD

April 3, 2008

http://www.aan.com/news/?event=read&article_id=4397&page=72.45.45

please see full text with additional comments and links @ ;

http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/

In this context, a word is in order about the US testing program. After the discovery of the first (imported) cow in 2003, the magnitude of testing was much increased, reaching a level of >400,000 tests in 2005 (Figure 4). Neither of the 2 more recently indigenously infected older animals with nonspecific clinical features would have been detected without such testing, and neither would have been identified as atypical without confirmatory Western blots. Despite these facts, surveillance has now been decimated to 40,000 annual tests (USDA news release no. 0255.06, July 20, 2006) and invites the accusation that the United States will never know the true status of its involvement with BSE.

In short, a great deal of further work will need to be done before the phenotypic features and prevalence of atypical BSE are understood. More than a single strain may have been present from the beginning of the epidemic, but this possibility has been overlooked by virtue of the absence of widespread Western blot confirmatory testing of positive screening test results; or these new phenotypes may be found, at least in part, to result from infections at an older age by a typical BSE agent, rather than neonatal infections with new "strains" of BSE. Neither alternative has yet been investigated.

http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no12/06-0965.htm

CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006

The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.

The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.

These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.

"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."

Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.

USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.

"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end

http://www.upi.com/

CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...

http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm

PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE

Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM

"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."

http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0703&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=8125

To be published in the Proceedings of the Fourth International Scientific Congress in Fur Animal Production. Toronto, Canada, August 21-28, 1988

Evidence That Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy Results from Feeding Infected Cattle

R.F. Marsh* and G.R. Hartsough

•Department of Veterinary Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, Wisconsin 53706; and ^Emba/Creat Lakes Ranch Service, Thiensville, Wisconsin 53092

Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME. Since previous incidences of TME were associated with common or shared feeding practices, we obtained a careful history of feed ingredients used over the past 12-18 months. The rancher was a "dead stock" feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle and a few horses. Sheep had never been fed.

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf

TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY

http://transmissible-mink-encephalopathy.blogspot.com/

IF BSE is not in the USA (just not documented for many different reasons), and only atypical BSE is in the USA (plus CWD, plus, many strains of Scrapie, and Now the Nor-98 documented in 5 different states, plus TME, then why would human mad cow in the USA look like the UK nvCJD from UK BSE cows ? it was shown long ago in studies at Mission Texas that experimental transmission of USA Scrapie to USA Bovine, DID NOT LOOK LIKE UK BSE. so again, in short, why would human mad cow in the USA look like human mad cow in the UK i.e. the (nvCJD). however, I believe that BSE has been in the USA untested and undocumented for years. why on earth then does the USDA refuse to allow creekstone or anyone else test their product? simple, if you don't look/test, you don't find.

ONE only has to read how the USDA et al have legally blocked, blundered, botched, mismanaged, bungled, floundered, and flat out manipulated, the testing in the infamous June 2004 enhanced cover-up program for mad cow surveillance and testing. I mean, I am not really to hip on THE INDUSTRY, testing for mad cow disease, and what that program might consist of, but anything is better than nothing at all. ...

BSE BASE MAD COW TESTING TEXAS, USA, AND CANADA

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2008/05/agriculture-secretary-ed-schafer.html

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/

CJD RISING USA

The statistical incidence of CJD cases in the United States has been revised to reflect that there is one case per 9000 in adults age 55 and older. Eighty-five percent of the cases are sporadic, meaning there is no known cause at present.

http://www.cjdfoundation.org/fact.html

There is a growing number of human CJD cases, and they were presented last week in San Francisco by Luigi Gambatti(?) from his CJD surveillance collection.

He estimates that it may be up to 14 or 15 persons which display selectively SPRPSC and practically no detected RPRPSC proteins.

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/1006-4240t1.htm

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/2006-4240t1.pdf

A system of corruption, contamination, and slow death, i.e. FDA, USDA. $$$

Tuesday, May 27, 2008

FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory Report Texas Legend Ranch OAI 05/10/2008

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/05/fda-bseruminant-feed-inspections-firms.html

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

 

[fedup2]

First the headline: FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory Report Texas Legend Ranch OAI 05/10/2008

Then the sensationalist line: PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED
Followed by an actual violation: "labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement".

Anything for attention Terry! Why aren't you in Korea leading the protests against beef?
Just wondering what you do for fun. Study how cow f@rts are ruining the ozone?
Get a freaking life! :roll: :roll: :roll: :help:

 

[flounder]

First the headline: FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory Report Texas Legend Ranch OAI 05/10/2008

Then the sensationalist line: PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED
Followed by an actual violation: "labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement".

Anything for attention Terry! Why aren't you in Korea leading the protests against beef?
Just wondering what you do for fun. Study how cow f@rts are ruining the ozone?
Get a freaking life! :roll: :roll: :roll: :help:

FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory Report Texas Legend Ranch OAI 05/10/2008



PLEASE NOTE ;

An OAI inspection classification occurs when significant objectionable conditions or practices were found and regulatory sanctions are warranted in order to address the establishment's lack of compliance with the regulation. An example of an OAI inspection classification would be findings of manufacturing procedures insufficient to ensure that ruminant feed is not contaminated with prohibited material. Inspections classified with OAI violations will be promptly re-inspected following the regulatory sanctions to determine whether adequate corrective actions have been implemented.

http://www.fda.gov/cvm/CVM_Updates/BSE0108.htm

Why aren't you in Korea leading the protests against beef? :roll: :roll: :roll: :help:

fedup2, you can roll your eyes and scream for help all you want, when the only ones that can help, are the very ones that continue to flagrantly violate the BSE regulations. these are the facts, nothing sensational about them. you should be 'fedup' with them there fedup2.

and no need to go to Korea, i can tell them the truth from sunny baycliff, texas ;


----- Original Message -----
From: Younghui Kim
To: [email protected]
Sent: Thursday, May 15, 2008 8:14 PM
Subject: articles for press conference of Concerned Amerians Against Mad Cow Disease



Dear Terry,

Thank you so much for your supporting statement for Concernrd Americans Against Mad Cow Disease. In the news conference, we read your supporting statement, which we condensed from your origianl statement.

Please click the following links to see the articles for our news conference.

All Korean articles wrote about your statement.


http://kr.news.yahoo.com/ /news/shellview.htm?linkid=4&articleid=20080515030000705i9&newssetid=1352

http://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/view/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0000900198&PAGE_CD=S0200>>

http://la.indymedia.org/news/2008/05/217550.php


Please visit WWW.STOPMADCOW.ORG and sign for our statement. (I am sure you are going to try to circulate our website to your friends.)

In korean section, lots of s..korean people are visiting this website and signigng too. so far 800 people have signed already.

Respectfully.

young-hui



Concerned Americans against Mad Cow Disease STATEMENT OF SOLIDARITY with Koreans May 13, 2008

Concerned Americans against the Mad Cow

Please sign on with your name, city you live in and your email address. Or you can email it to [email protected].

STATEMENT OF SOLIDARITY

May 10, 2008

US citizens are in full support of Koreans who oppose the government's decision to import US beef that have a potential risk of the Mad Cow Disease:

l US beef poses a health threat to consumers in the US and abroad

l Complete liberalizations of beef in Korea will only benefit US beef industries

l Governments of Korea and US must re-negotiate the US beef trade agreement to safeguard public health

As citizens of the United States, we are concerned about the potential risk of Mad Cow Disease in the US beef and highly commend the conscious decisions of the Korean children, students, parents, elders, workers, teachers and people from all walks of life for participating in mass candlelight vigils to oppose the recent Korea-US trade negotiation concerning the US beef import.

US beef is not safe. Among the few countries that are identified with the actual cases of mad cow disease, United States is the only country that continues to allow animal feed and weaning of calves on mixed milk and cattle blood. To date, American medical experts of mad cow disease continue to warn the public about the lack of regulations in the US to protect public from the risk of mad cow disease. Under the current meat slaughtering and processing practices, US beef may carry the highest risk of mad cow disease, for which citizens across the US have been organizing and fighting against.

Last February, Westland-Hallmark Meat, one of the major distributor of school lunches had the biggest recall of US beef in history for a total of 64,350 tons. As consumers who deeply care about the health of our families and communities, we can verify that both the US government and beef industry have not demonstrated a strong commitment to protecting our health from unsafe practice of beef production in this country. Thus, we are equally concerned about the Korean government's recent decision to weaken the already low and unsatisfactory regulations governing the US meat industry by allowing no age limit on beef import and importing beef of all parts—including intestines and bones that are known to have the highest risk of mad cow disease. Korea is the 3rd largest importer of beef from US Tyson Food and Cargill that have experienced slow profit since the outbreak of mad cow disease in 2003. With a growing number of Americans taking high precautions against beef consumption, it is not difficult to see why a new market is necessary for beef industry to reap profit from.

From the global perspective, the Korean government's decision to import US beef under the blind assumption that it is safe for human consumption poses threat not only to people in Korea but to people around the globe who consume Korean food products. As many Americans enjoy food products imported from Korea all of us will be forced to eat food that contain US beef that we feel are unsafe to consume and only benefit beef industry. It will also set a horrible precedent for other countries to follow. The current global food system is a reminder that people around the globe must work together to protect each other's health and communities.

In solidarity with the people of Korea we demand the following: l We urge our government to protect the health of Americans and people around the globe from mad cow disease by shutting down inhumane and unsafe practices of the US beef industry instead of protecting their profits. l We urge our government to re-negotiate the beef export to other countries, including Korea. Trade negotiations must be made only after the risk of mad cow disease and the inhumane and unhealthy practice of beef industry are satisfactorily addressed and resolved. l 82% of all people in South Korea are urging its government to re-negotiate the beef import with the US. Thousands of people are flooding into the streets all throughout the country to hold mass candlelight vigils to express their concerns about food safety. South Korean government must stop its "mad cow policy" and guarantee the freedom of speech for all people engaged in peaceful candlelight vigils in Korea. l United States and Korean government must recall the agreement and uphold the will of people by entering into a re-negotiation to resolve this situation.

Concerned Americans against the Mad Cow Disease Los Angeles, New York, Washington D.C., San Francisco, Seattle, Toronto

http://www.yacomitservice.com/php/eng/board.php?board=kkkqna&command=body&no=85&

Students Protest Imports of US Beef in Candlelight Rally

http://www.yacomitservice.com/php/eng/board.php?board=kkkqna&command=body&no=79&

Re..Korea vs USDA beef (the truth)

Greetings KIWA et al and all Koreans,

A kind greetings from Bacliff, Texas.

I submit this data with great concern, sincerity, and in peace.

President Lee Myung-bak states ;

http://www.yacomitservice.com/php/eng/board.php?board=kkkqna&command=body&no=84

========================================


May 11, 2008

SUPPORTING STATEMENT

Korea and Americans STATEMENT OF SOLIDARITY Korea VS USDA Beef Dispute May 11, 2008

Dear President Young-hui, KIWA (Koreatown Immigrant Workers Alliance), and all Korea,

Over this past Mothers day weekend, the fact my mother (DOD 12-14-97 confirmed hvCJD) and many more here in the USA of young and old are dead and dying from different forms of CJD, the fact the last two cases of mad cow disease here in the USA was of the atypical BSE strain (more virulent to humans), the ongoing dispute about US beef going to Korea, the deal that President Lee Myung-bak made with the USDA, the fact the second firewall the USDA speaks of i.e. mad cow feed ban, was nothing more than ink on paper, that was never enforced, I have been trying desperately to warn people in Korea about the true story of mad cow disease in the USA, and what has really taken place over the past 8 years or so. The people of Korea have not been told the truth. I kindly wish to submit the following to you with great concern. It is with great honor, sadness, sincerity, and hope that I submit the following in good faith, so the kind Honorable people of Korea, America, and the rest of the world, can know the truth. I thank President Young-hui, KIWA (Koreatown Immigrant Workers Alliance), for allowing me to comment on this urgent matter. I hope that by this STATEMENT OF SOLIDARITY, that a movement in the USA and around the globe, of young and old, will join with those brave young Koreans protesting in the streets, and demand an end to this madness. WE are the consumers, and we demand a safe product, period. Just because the _documented_ death rate from human vCJD is minimal so far, does not make it acceptable. There are many factors that play into this long term nightmare, that are still unknown, one is of the atypical TSEs. Also, DO NOT forget about 'friendly fire' iatrogenic Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease. it's not just about 'consumption'. the medical, surgical, and dental arena will play a huge role in these long term death sentences from animal TSE via secondary transmission i.e. 'friendly fire', and with the atypical BSE being more virulent, it's anyone's guess how this will play out in the long run. you here industry groups comment 'your more likely to get hit by a car than die from CJD'. well, maybe so, but my mother and many more did not die from getting hit by a car, they died from CJD, my mothers being the hvCJD (documented). The deception by the USDA, FDA, and the Bush administration about mad cow disease, CJD, and all Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy over the past 8 years have been outrageous, to a point of being criminal. I am vested in nothing, but the truth. ...

"South Korea may demand revision of US beef import pact"

"The agreement, struck last month, has been widely criticized as making too"

"many concessions to the United States"

THE PEOPLE of Korea _should_ be mad about the importing of USA beef into their Country. can you believe these regulations? even IF a BSE case(s) are documented in the USA, the people of Korea still cannot suspend the importing of U.S. beef, NO matter how many more mad cows the USA finds, until a thorough epidemiological investigation is finished. please remember, it took over a year and literally an act of congress to confirm the atypical mad cow in Texas before they finally finish that epidemiological investigation, and even after all that, the Koreans still cannot ban USA beef, until the OIE recognizes an adverse change in the classification of the U.S. BSE status. Considering the USDA and the OIE collaborated to seal the deal of the BSE MRR policy (the legal trading of all strains of TSE globally, just for commodities and futures sake, human health was not even considered), I doubt the OIE would ever change the BSE status for the USA, no matter how many more mad cows are found. It's all about money folks.

WE are talking years now, before the Koreans could ever suspend USA beef due to a BSE case(s) ever being documented in the USA, due to these stupid regulations. This is nothing more than FORCE FEEDING KOREA USDA MAD COW BEEF, i.e. all for a dollar, to hell with human health on a disease with an incubation period of years if not a decade or more.

Please remember, the last two mad cows documented in the USA i.e. Alabama and Texas, both were of the 'atypical' BSE strain, and immediately after that, the USDA shut down the testing from 470,000 to 40,000 in the U.S. in 2007 out of about 35 million cattle slaughtered. also, science is showing that some of these atypical cases are more virulent to humans than the typical UK BSE strain ;

***Atypical forms of BSE have emerged which, although rare, appear to be more virulent than the classical BSE that causes vCJD.***

Progress Report from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center

An Update from Stephen M. Sergay, MB, BCh & Pierluigi Gambetti, MD

April 3, 2008

http://www.aan.com/news/?event=read&article_id=4397&page=72.45.45

IF BSE is not in the USA (just not documented for many different reasons), and only atypical BSE is in the USA (plus CWD, plus, many strains of Scrapie, and Now the Nor-98 documented in 5 different states, plus TME, then why would human mad cow in the USA look like the UK nvCJD from UK BSE cows ? it was shown long ago in studies at Mission Texas that experimental transmission of USA Scrapie to USA Bovine, DID NOT LOOK LIKE UK BSE. so again, in short, why would human mad cow in the USA look like human mad cow in the UK i.e. the (nvCJD). however, I believe that BSE has been in the USA untested and undocumented for years. why on earth then does the USDA refuse to allow creekstone or anyone else test their product? simple, if you don't look/test, you don't find.

ONE only has to read how the USDA et al have legally blocked, blundered, botched, mismanaged, bungled, floundered, and flat out manipulated, the testing in the infamous June 2004 enhanced cover-up program for mad cow surveillance and testing. I mean, I am not really to hip on THE INDUSTRY, testing for mad cow disease, and what that program might consist of, but anything is better than nothing at all. ...

BSE BASE MAD COW TESTING TEXAS, USA, AND CANADA

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/

MAD COW DISEASE terminology UK c-BSE (typical), atypical BSE H or L, and or Italian L-BASE

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/03/mad-cow-disease-terminology-uk-c-bse.html

In 2007, in one weekly enforcement report, the fda recalled 10,000,000+ pounds of BANNED MAD COW FEED, 'in commerce', and i can tell you that most of it was fed out ;

10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST REASON Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 42,090 lbs. DISTRIBUTION WI

REASON Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 9,997,976 lbs. DISTRIBUTION ID and NV

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html

Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA SEPT 6, 2006 1961.72 TONS IN COMMERCE AL, TN, AND WV Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST

snip... see listings and references of enormous amounts of banned mad cow protein 'in commerce' in 2006 and 2005 ;

see full text ;

Friday, April 25, 2008

Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed [Docket No. 2002N-0273] (Formerly Docket No. 02N-0273) RIN 0910-AF46

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/04/substances-prohibited-from-use-in.html

SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS

http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/2008/02/specified-risk-materials-srm.html

SRM MAD COW RECALL 406 THOUSAND POUNDS CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS KANSAS

http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/04/srm-mad-cow-recall-406-thousand-pounds.html

Sunday, April 20, 2008 Progress Report from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center April 3, 2008

Atypical forms of BSE have emerged which, although rare, appear to be more virulent than the classical BSE that causes vCJD.

see full text ;

http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2008/04/progress-report-from-national-prion.html

CJD TEXAS (cjd clusters)

http://cjdtexas.blogspot.com/

CJD USA RISING

The statistical incidence of CJD cases in the United States has been revised to reflect that there is one case per 9000 in adults age 55 and older. Eighty-five percent of the cases are sporadic, meaning there is no known cause at present.

http://www.cjdfoundation.org/fact.html

Communicated by: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. <[email protected]>

[In submitting these data, Terry S. Singeltary Sr. draws attention to the steady increase in the "type unknown" category, which, according to their definition, comprises cases in which vCJD could be excluded. The total of 26 cases for the current year (2007) is disturbing, possibly symptomatic of the circulation of novel agents. Characterization of these agents should be given a high priority. - Mod.CP]

http://pro-med.blogspot.com/2007/11/proahedr-prion-disease-update-2007-07.html

http://www.promedmail.org/

There is a growing number of human CJD cases, and they were presented last week in San Francisco by Luigi Gambatti(?) from his CJD surveillance collection.

He estimates that it may be up to 14 or 15 persons which display selectively SPRPSC and practically no detected RPRPSC proteins.

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/1006-4240t1.htm

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/2006-4240t1.pdf

JOURNAL OF NEUROLOGY

MARCH 26, 2003

RE-Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob

disease in the United States

Email Terry S. Singeltary:

[email protected]

I lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain Variant CJD). I would like to comment on the CDC's attempts to monitor the occurrence of emerging forms of CJD. Asante, Collinge et al [1] have reported that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest sporadic CJD. However, CJD and all human TSEs are not reportable nationally. CJD and all human TSEs must be made reportable in every state and internationally. I hope that the CDC does not continue to expect us to still believe that the 85%+ of all CJD cases which are sporadic are all spontaneous, without route/source. We have many TSEs in the USA in both animal and man. CWD in deer/elk is spreading rapidly and CWD does transmit to mink, ferret, cattle, and squirrel monkey b y intracerebral inoculation. With the known incubation periods in other TSEs, oral transmission studies of CWD may take much longer. Every victim/family of CJD/TSEs should be asked about route and source of this agent. To prolong this will only spread the agent and needlessly expose others. In light of the findings of Asante and Collinge et al, there should be drastic measures to safeguard the medical and surgical arena from sporadic CJDs and all human TSEs. I only ponder how many sporadic CJDs in the USA are type 2 PrPSc?

http://www.neurology.org/cgi/eletters/60/2/176#535

THE PATHOLOGICAL PROTEIN

Hardcover, 304 pages plus photos and illustrations. ISBN 0-387-95508-9

June 2003

BY Philip Yam

CHAPTER 14 LAYING ODDS

Answering critics like Terry Singeltary, who feels that the U.S. under- counts CJD, Schonberger conceded that the current surveillance system has errors but stated that most of the errors will be confined to the older population.

http://www.thepathologicalprotein.com/

Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734. Vol. 285 No. 6, February 14, 2001 JAMA

Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

To the Editor: In their Research Letter, Dr Gibbons and colleagues1 reported that the annual US death rate due to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) has been stable since 1985. These estimates, however, are based only on reported cases, and do not include misdiagnosed or preclinical cases. It seems to me that misdiagnosis alone would drastically change these figures. An unknown number of persons with a diagnosis of Alzheimer disease in fact may have CJD, although only a small number of these patients receive the postmortem examination necessary to make this diagnosis. Furthermore, only a few states have made CJD reportable. Human and animal transmissible spongiform encephalopathies should be reportable nationwide and internationally.

Terry S. Singeltary, Sr Bacliff, Tex

1. Gibbons RV, Holman RC, Belay ED, Schonberger LB. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States: 1979-1998. JAMA. 2000;284:2322-2323. FREE FULL TEXT

http://jama.ama-assn.org/

2 January 2000 British Medical Journal U.S. Scientist should be concerned with a CJD epidemic in the U.S., as well

http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/320/7226/8/b#6117

15 November 1999 British Medical Journal vCJD in the USA * BSE in U.S.

http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/319/7220/1312/b#5406

Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME. Since previous incidences of TME were associated with common or shared feeding practices, we obtained a careful history of feed ingredients used over the past 12-18 months. The rancher was a "dead stock" feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle and a few horses. Sheep had never been fed.

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf

USDA CERTIFIED DEAD STOCK DOWNER COW SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM for children

please note, dead stock downer cattle i.e. non-ambulatory, are the most likely to have mad cow disease.

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2008/02/transcript-technical-briefing.html

GAO REPORT ON HUMANE METHODS OF HANDLING AND SLAUGHTER I.E. DOWNER COW SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM

What GAO Found

April 17, 2008

HUMANE METHODS OF HANDLING AND SLAUGHTER

Public Reporting on Violations Can Identify Enforcement Challenges and Enhance Transparency

In January 2004, GAO reported that incomplete and inconsistent inspection records made it difficult to determine the frequency and scope of HMSA violations, inspectors did not always document violations of the act, and they did not consistently document the scope and severity of each incident. GAO also reported that enforcement actions to address noncompliance with the act were inconsistent, and that USDA was not using consistent criteria to determine when to suspend plant operations in cases of serious or repeated violations. The Congress has urged USDA to report annually on trends in compliance with humane slaughter methods. Such public reporting can enhance transparency, but USDA's most recent report was in March 2003 and relied on incomplete data. For example, that report said very few infractions were for inhumane treatment, but GAO found that at least one-fourth of the infractions were for ineffective stunning which fails to meet humane standards. USDA has taken actions to address the recommendations GAO made in 2004 about oversight of HMSA. However, GAO has not evaluated the effectiveness of these actions. USDA faces resource challenges that may make it difficult for it to enforce HMSA and ensure the safety of the food supply. Although USDA's budget for food safety-related activities has increased since 1988, staffing for these activities has declined from its highest level in 1995. Agency officials noted the overall decline is due, in part, to consolidation in the meat industry, resulting in fewer facilities. In 2004, GAO found that USDA lacked detailed information on how much time its inspectors spend on humane handling and slaughter activities, making it difficult to determine if the number of inspectors is adequate. USDA has taken actions to address most of GAO's recommendationsfor assessing its resource needs for HMSA, but GAO has not evaluated these actions. Although not directly related to HMSA activities, the quantity of meat and poultry inspected and passed by USDA has grown, and the quantity of meat and poultry recalled has increased. USDA has oversight responsibility for ensuring the safety of meat, poultry, and processed eggs. For example, federal regulations prohibit companies from processing and selling meat from disabled cows—which have a higher probability of being infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy—without explicit USDA inspector approval. However, USDA is only 1 of 15 agencies that collectively administer at least 30 laws related to food safety. This fragmentation is the key reason GAO added the federal oversight of food safety to its High-Risk Series in 2007 and called for a governmentwide reexamination of the food safety system. GAO has reported on problems with this system—including inconsistent oversight, ineffective coordination, and inefficient use of resources. Going forward, as GAO has recommended, a governmentwide, results-oriented performance plan and a reconvened President's Council on Food Safety could build a sustained focus on the safety of the nation's food supply.

Note: Data for 2008 are estimated. Although the number of recalls has declined in recent years, the quantity of meat and poultry recalled has increased sharply. Meat and poultry product recalls declined from 125 in 2002 to 58 in 2007. However, 2 of the 6 biggest meat recalls in U.S. history have occurred in the past 6 months. In October 2007, Topps Meat Company LLC announced the recall of 22 million pounds of ground beef used for frozen hamburgers due to E. coli contamination. At the time, the Topps recall was the fifth largest in U.S. history. The E. coli-contaminated meat sickened at least 32 people in eight states. On February 17, 2008, Westland/Hallmark Meat Company announced the recall of more than 143 million pounds of beef, the largest recall in U.S. history. The quantity of meat and poultry recalled has increased from 5 million pounds in 1994, the first year for which data were readily available, to 145 million in just the first quarter of March 2008.

see full text 18 pages ;

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08686t.pdf

Thu Dec 6, 2007 11:38

FDA IN CRISIS MODE, AMERICAN LIVES AT RISK

http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/fs/food-disease/news/dec0407fda.html

FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/07/briefing/2007-4329b_02_01_FDA%20Repor t%20on%20Science%20and%20Technology.pdf

[Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food and Requirement for the Disposition of Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle 9/13/2005

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf

3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach was to accord it a _very low profile indeed_. Dr. A Thiermann showed the picture in the ''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and thought this was a fanatical incident to be _avoided_ in the US _at all costs_ $

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11b/tab01.pdf

Attachment to Singeltary comment

January 28, 2007

Greetings APHIS,

I would kindly like to submit the following to ;

BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01

[Federal Register: January 9, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 5)] [Proposed Rules] [Page 1101-1129] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr09ja07-21]

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f8152

BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01 Date: January 9, 2007 at 9:08 am PST

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f3412

[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf

APHIS-2006-0041-0006 TSE advisory committee for the meeting December 15, 2006

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f3413&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8

NOR-98 ATYPICAL SCRAPIE 5 cases documented in USA in 5 different states USA 007

http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2008/04/seac-spongiform-encephalopathy-advisory.html

http://nor-98.blogspot.com/

SCRAPIE USA

http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/

CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE

http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/

Thursday, April 03, 2008

A prion disease of cervids: Chronic wasting disease 2008

http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2008/04/prion-disease-of-cervids-chronic.html

Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy TME

http://transmissible-mink-encephalopathy.blogspot.com/

Tuesday, April 29, 2008

Interference at the EPA - Science and Politics at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

please see full text ;

http://sciencebushwhacked.blogspot.com/

Greetings again Honorable President Young-hui, KIWA (Koreatown Immigrant Workers Alliance), and all Korea,

You might want to communicate these factors of iCJD to your fellow Koreans in the USA who are having medical, surgical and or dental work done. With the many different animal TSEs in the USA of typical and atypical phenotype, the consumption thereof of these TSE infected animals, and the following medical, surgical, and or dental work done on any individual consuming such tainted product, the fact that Koreans are more susceptible to contracting a TSE, one must ponder all these factors ;

Polymorphisms of the prion protein gene (PRNP) in a Korean population Journal Journal of Human Genetics Publisher Springer Japan ISSN 1434-5161 (Print) 1435-232X (Online) Issue Volume 49, Number 6 / June, 2004 Category Short Communication DOI 10.1007/s10038-004-0150-7 Pages 319-324 Subject Collection Biomedical and Life Sciences SpringerLink Date Monday, May 17, 2004

Byung-Hoon Jeong1, Jae-Hwan Nam2, Yun-Jung Lee1, Kyung-Hee Lee1, Myoung-Kuk Jang1, Richard I. Carp3, Ho-Dong Lee2, Young-Ran Ju2, Sangmee Ahn Jo2, Keun-Yong Park2 and Yong-Sun Kim1, 4

(1) Ilsong Institute of Life Science, Hallym University, Ilsong Building, 1605-4, Gwanyang-dong, Dongan-gu, Anyang, Kyounggi-do, 431-060, South Korea (2) Department of Virology, Korea National Institute of Health, Eunpyung-gu, Seoul, 122-701, South Korea (3) New York State Institute for Basic Research in Developmental Disabilities, Staten Island, NY 10314, USA (4) Department of Microbiology, College of Medicine, Hallym University, 1605-4, Gwanyang-dong, Dongan-gu, Anyang, Kyounggi-do, 431-060, South Korea

Received: 7 January 2004 Accepted: 5 March 2004 Published online: 18 May 2004

Abstract Human prion protein gene (PRNP) has been considered to be involved in the susceptibility of humans to prion diseases. Polymorphisms of methionine (Met)/valine (Val) at codon 129 and of glutamic acid (Glu)/lysine (Lys) at codon 219 are thought to play an important role in susceptibility to sporadic, iatrogenic and variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease (CJD). Although the genotype distribution of polymorphisms in PRNP open reading frame (ORF) has been reported in many European populations, among Asian groups, it has been reported only in the Japanese population. We examined the PRNP polymorphisms in 529 healthy Koreans. We observed that genotype frequencies at codon 129 was 94.33% Met/Met, 5.48% Met/Val, and 0.19% Val/Val with an allele frequency of 0.971:0.029 Met:Val, and that genotype frequencies at codon 219 was 92.06% Glu/Glu, 7.94% Glu/Lys, and 0% Lys/Lys with an allele frequency of 0.96:0.04 Glu:Lys. The frequencies of the Glu/Glu genotype (2=10.075, P=0.0015) and of the Glu allele (2=9.486, P=0.0021) at codon 219 were significantly higher in the Korean population than the Japanese population. In addition, the genotype frequency of heterozygotes (12.7%) at codons 129 or/and 219 was significantly lower in Koreans than in people from Great Britain (2=89.52, P<0.0001). The deletion rate of one octarepeat (R2 deletion) was 0.38%, with 99.62% undeleted homozygotes and 0% deleted homozygote. To our knowledge, the R2 octarepeat deletion has never been found in people from countries other than Korea. The data of PRNP polymorphism at codon 219 suggest that Koreans may be more sensitive to sporadic CJD than the Japanese population. Keywords Prion protein gene - Polymorphism - Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease - Single nucleotide polymorphism - Deletion - Korean

http://www.springerlink.com/content/51h1j81h80hjrdtf/

European Journal of Human Genetics (2005) 13, 1094–1097. doi:10.1038/sj.ejhg.5201460; published online 29 June 2005

Polymorphism at 3' UTR +28 of the prion-like protein gene is associated with sporadic Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease Byung-Hoon Jeong1, Nam-Ho Kim1, Eun-Kyoung Choi1, Chaeyoung Lee1, Young-Han Song1, Jae-Il Kim2, Richard I Carp2 and Yong-Sun Kim1,3

1Ilsong Institute of Life Science, Hallym University, 1605-4 Gwanyang-dong

snip...

Our results are the first genetic association study of the PRND noncoding region with sporadic CJD. Recently, we reported that the distributions of codons 129 and 219 genotypes of PRNP in a Korean population differ significantly from those reported for other ethnic groups.24 Thus, further investigations in different ethnic groups including Europeans will be necessary to assess association between sporadic CJD and the PRND 3' UTR +28 polymorphism. Furthermore, since it is unknown whether this polymorphism affects mRNA stability or gene expression of PRND, further experiments should be conducted to clarify the role of this polymorphism in PRND function.

http://www.nature.com/ejhg/journal/v13/n9/full/5201460a.html

iatrogenic Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease

Reports of incidents of potential iatrogenic exposure to CJD via surgery: 01 January 2000 to 31 Dec 2007

There were a total of 329 incidents reported during this period (table 1). Eleven surgical incidents were reported between 1 July and 31 December 2007 (since the previous update report). A surgical incident occurs when a patient undergoes surgery but is only identified as having CJD or being at risk of CJD at a later date. This means that the Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP) transmissible spongiform encephalopathy working group infection control guidelines would not have been followed. The surgery carried out on an index patient with, or at risk of, CJD may result in contamination of the instruments with abnormal prion protein. Table 1 shows the number of CJD surgical incidents reported to the CJD Incidents Panel from January 2000 to December 2007 by the diagnosis of the index patient.

Table 1 CJD Surgical Incidents (n=329) reported to the CJD Incidents Panel, by diagnosis of index patient: January 2000 to Dec 2007

snip... see full text ;

http://www.hpa.org.uk/hpr/infections/ei_cjd.htm#cjd

Wednesday, January 02, 2008 Risk factors for sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease Wednesday, January 02, 2008 Risk factors for sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease

FURTHER INTO THIS STUDY ;

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2008/01/risk-factors-for-sporadic-creutzfeldt.html

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2007/12/risk-factors-for-sporadic-creutzfeldt.html

Monday, December 31, 2007 Risk Assessment of Transmission of Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease in Endodontic Practice in Absence of Adequate Prion Inactivation

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2007/12/risk-assessment-of-transmission-of.html

with kindest regards, I am sincerely,

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

===============================END2008TSS============================

SUPPORTING STATEMENT 5-8-08

Our recent investigations of the U.S. cattle industry have shown that cows too sick, crippled, or diseased to even stand up are being beaten, shocked, and dragged with chains in an attempt to move them to slaughter for human consumption. Out of the 16 cases of mad cow disease found so far in North America, 13 cases have been in these downer cows. Upwards of a half million U.S. cattle go down every year due to illness or injury and a 2006 government report suggests over one hundred slaughter plants in the U.S. process these downer cows for human consumption.

The United States is the only country with this disease that allows downer cows to be slaughtered for human consumption, allows the continued feeding of slaughterhouse waste and manure to cows, and even allows the weaning of calves on milk replacers containing spray-dried cattle blood. Because the United States has the most lax regulations of any affected country, U.S. beef is likely the riskiest meat in the world when it comes to mad cow disease.

Because the incubation period for the human form of mad cow disease may be a decade or longer, it may take years between eating infected beef and coming down with symptoms before one dies with this invariably fatal neurodegenerative disease. So by the time many people are dying it is too late. And no form of cooking can eliminate infection from meat—the infectious agent has been shown to survive even incineration at temperatures hot enough to melt lead (600°C).

There is a bill before the U.S. Congress and Senate, the Downed Animal and Food Safety Protection Act. Until in the very least this bill passes into law and cows too sick to even walk to slaughter are not allowed in the human food supply, domestic consumers and our international trading partners have a right to be concerned about the safety of American beef. We strongly support the Korean people's demand that the United States eliminate these risky and inhumane practices.

Michael Greger, M.D. Director, Public Health and Animal Agriculture The Humane Society of the United States 2100 L St., N.W. Washington, DC 20037 direct line: (202) 676-2361 fax: (202) 676-2372 http://www.birdflubook.org

About Michael Greger, MD: Michael Greger, MD, is the Mad Cow Coordinator for the Organic Consumers Association and the Chief BSE Investigator for Farm Sanctuary. Dr. Greger has been speaking publicly about mad cow disease since 1993. He has debated the National Cattlemen's Beef Association before the FDA and was invited as an expert witness at the Oprah Winfrey infamous "meat defamation" trial. He has contributed to many books and articles on the subject and continues to lecture extensively. Dr. Greger is a graduate of the Cornell University School of Agriculture and the Tufts University School of Medicine.

==============================END2008GREGER========================

Friday, May 9, 2008 USDA VS KOREA typical or atypical BSe Honorable people of Korea,

a kind and warm greetings from Texas.

snip...

"South Korea may demand revision of US beef import pact"

"The agreement, struck last month, has been widely criticized as making too"

"many concessions to the United States"

THE PEOPLE of Korea _should_ be mad about the importing of USA beef into their Country. can you believe these regulations? even IF a BSE case(s) are documented in the USA, the people of Korea still cannot suspend the importing of U.S. beef, NO matter how many more mad cows the USA finds, until a thorough epidemiological investigation is finished. please remember, it took over a year and literally an act of congress to confirm the atypical mad cow in Texas before they finally finish that epidemiological investigation, and even after all that, the Koreans still cannot ban USA beef, until the OIE recognizes an adverse change in the classification of the U.S. BSE status. Considering the USDA and the OIE collaborated to seal the deal of the BSE MRR policy (the legal trading of all strains of TSE globally, just for commodities and futures sake, human health was not even considered), I doubt the OIE would ever change the BSE status for the USA, no matter how many more mad cows are found. It's all about money folks.

WE are talking years now, before the Koreans could ever suspend USA beef due to a BSE case(s) ever being documented in the USA, due to these stupid regulations. This is nothing more than FORCE FEEDING KOREA USDA MAD COW BEEF, i.e. all for a dollar, to hell with human health on a disease with an incubation period of years if not a decade or more. ...

snip... see full text ;

http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/

Monday, May 5, 2008

STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD RAYMOND USDA UNDERSECRETARY FOR FOOD SAFETY May 4, 2008 (statements on Korea beef dispute)

http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2008/05/statement-of-dr-richard-raymond-usda.html

Friday, April 18, 2008

Statement by Agriculture Secretary Ed Schafer on South Korea Reopening Market to U.S. Beef and Beef Products in Line with International Standards

http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2008/04/statement-by-agriculture-secretary-ed.html

Thursday, January 17, 2008

Seoul must end curbs on US beef for FTA, but WHY $

http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2008/01/seoul-must-end-curbs-on-us-beef-for-fta.html

Thursday, November 1, 2007

Transcript of Questions and Answers: Acting Agriculture Secretary Chuck Conner with Media After U.S. Meat Export Federation Remarks

http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2007/11/transcript-of-questions-and-answers.html

Monday, May 12, 2008

BSE YOUNGEST AGE STATISTICS UNDER 30 MONTHS

http://bseyoungestage.blogspot.com/

Tuesday, May 13, 2008

Concerned Americans against Mad Cow Disease STATEMENT OF SOLIDARITY with Koreans May 13, 2008

http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2008/05/concerned-americans-against-mad-cow.html

http://flounder068.vox.com/library/post/concerned-americans-against-mad-cow-disease-statement-of-solidarity-with-koreans-may-13-2008.html

http://www.koreantopnews.com/


Monday, May 12, 2008

BSE YOUNGEST AGE STATISTICS UNDER 30 MONTHS

http://bseyoungestage.blogspot.com/

http://flounder068.vox.com/library/post/bse-youngest-age-statistics-under-30-months.html


Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

 

[fedup2]

You write crap like this to the Koreans ["US beef is not safe."]
And then try to give credibility to your dumb @ss statements by quoting your own hysteric ramblings! You could save pages of rambling and quotes by just saying "it is my opinion" because that is all you have ever brought to this forum is your own biased opinion backed by nothing but more of your opinions!

 

[RobertMac]

You write crap like this to the Koreans ["US beef is not safe."]
And then try to give credibility to your dumb @ss statements by quoting your own hysteric ramblings! You could save pages of rambling and quotes by just saying "it is my opinion" because that is all you have ever brought to this forum is your own biased opinion backed by nothing but more of your opinions!

:agree:

 

[flounder]

You write crap like this to the Koreans ["US beef is not safe."]
And then try to give credibility to your dumb @ss statements by quoting your own hysteric ramblings! You could save pages of rambling and quotes by just saying "it is my opinion" because that is all you have ever brought to this forum is your own biased opinion backed by nothing but more of your opinions!

oh heck fedup2, your just not paying attention again. lets try this once more. these are not my opinions ;

Thu Dec 6, 2007 11:38

FDA IN CRISIS MODE, AMERICAN LIVES AT RISK

http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/fs/food-disease/news/dec0407fda.html

FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/07/briefing/2007-4329b_02_01_FDA%20Report%20on%20Science%20and%20Technology.pdf

Audit Report

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program - Phase II

and

Food Safety and Inspection Service

Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III

Report No. 50601-10-KC January 2006

Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle Still Remain

Our prior report identified a number of inherent problems in identifying and testing high-risk cattle. We reported that the challenges in identifying the universe of high-risk cattle, as well as the need to design procedures to obtain an appropriate representation of samples, was critical to the success of the BSE surveillance program. The surveillance program was designed to target nonambulatory cattle, cattle showing signs of CNS disease (including cattle testing negative for rabies), cattle showing signs not inconsistent with BSE, and dead cattle. Although APHIS designed procedures to ensure FSIS condemned cattle were sampled and made a concerted effort for outreach to obtain targeted samples, industry practices not considered in the design of the surveillance program reduced assurance that targeted animals were tested for BSE.

USDA/OIG-A/50601-10-KC Page 27

observe these animals ante mortem when possible to assure the animals from the target population are ultimately sampled and the clinical signs evaluated.

snip...

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf

In this context, a word is in order about the US testing program. After the discovery of the first (imported) cow in 2003, the magnitude of testing was much increased, reaching a level of >400,000 tests in 2005 (Figure 4). Neither of the 2 more recently indigenously infected older animals with nonspecific clinical features would have been detected without such testing, and neither would have been identified as atypical without confirmatory Western blots. Despite these facts, surveillance has now been decimated to 40,000 annual tests (USDA news release no. 0255.06, July 20, 2006) and invites the accusation that the United States will never know the true status of its involvement with BSE.

In short, a great deal of further work will need to be done before the phenotypic features and prevalence of atypical BSE are understood. More than a single strain may have been present from the beginning of the epidemic, but this possibility has been overlooked by virtue of the absence of widespread Western blot confirmatory testing of positive screening test results; or these new phenotypes may be found, at least in part, to result from infections at an older age by a typical BSE agent, rather than neonatal infections with new "strains" of BSE. Neither alternative has yet been investigated.

http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no12/06-0965.htm

CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006

The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.

The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.

These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.

"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."

Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.

USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.

"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end

http://www.upi.com/

CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...

http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm

PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE

Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM

"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."

http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0703&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=8125

Progress Report from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center

An Update from Stephen M. Sergay, MB, BCh & Pierluigi Gambetti, MD

April 3, 2008

The importance to public health in the U.S. of timely diagnosis and monitoring of human prion diseases is unquestionable. Here are some compelling reasons for this:

Prion surveillance in cattle has been reduced by 90% (from about 470,000 to 40,000 in the U.S. in 2007 out of about 35 million cattle slaughtered). Termination of human prion surveillance would therefore remove the second line of surveillance, thereby eliminating prion surveillance in the U.S. entirely. This development would be extremely worrisome in view of recent reports that precautions to limit the spread of the prion infectious agent may not have been followed in some slaughter houses in the U.S. Cattle affected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) continue to be discovered in Canada, which has more rigorous BSE surveillance than the U.S. At the same time, Canada imposes few limitations in the trade of potentially prion-infectious cattle with the U.S.

Atypical forms of BSE have emerged which, although rare, appear to be more virulent than the classical BSE that causes vCJD.

http://www.aan.com/news/?event=read&article_id=4397&page=72.45.45

National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL) Immunohistochemistry (IHC) Testing Summary

The BSE enhanced surveillance program involves the use of a rapid screening test, followed by confirmatory testing for any samples that come back "inconclusive." The weekly summary below captures all rapid tests conducted as part of the enhanced surveillance effort. It should be noted that since the enhanced surveillance program began, USDA has also conducted approximately 9,200 routine IHC tests on samples that did not first undergo rapid testing. This was done to ensure that samples inappropriate for the rapid screen test were still tested, and also to monitor and improve upon IHC testing protocols. ...

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse_testing/test_results.html

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Statement May 4, 2004 Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA

Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.

FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse.

FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/NEW01061.html

Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program

An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.

snip...

Topics that will be covered in ongoing or planned reviews under Goal 1 include:

soundness of BSE maintenance sampling (APHIS),

implementation of Performance-Based Inspection System enhancements for specified risk material (SRM) violations and improved inspection controls over SRMs (FSIS and APHIS),

snip...

The findings and recommendations from these efforts will be covered in future semiannual reports as the relevant audits and investigations are completed.

4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf

-------- Original Message --------

Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???

Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2004 11:38:21 -0600

From: Carla Everett

To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."References: <[log in to unmask]>

The USDA has made a statement, and we are referring all callers to the USDA web site. We have no information about the animal being in Texas.

Carla

At 09:44 AM ***11/19/2004***, you wrote:

Greetings Carla,

i am getting unsubstantiated claims of this BSE 'inconclusive' cow is from

TEXAS. can you comment on this either way please?

thank you,

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.>>

***Aug. 30, 2005***

Investigation Results of Texas Cow That Tested Positive for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)

Release No. 0336.05 Contact: USDA Jim Rogers 202-690-4755 FDA Rae Jones 301-827- 6242

Printable version Email this page

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Food and Drug Administration (FDA)

Investigation Results of Texas Cow That Tested Positive for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Aug. 30, 2005

The U.S. Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' Food and Drug Administration (FDA) have completed their investigations regarding a cow that tested positive for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in June 2005. The agencies conducted these investigations in collaboration with the Texas Animal Health Commission and the Texas Feed and Fertilizer Control Service.

Our results indicate that the positive animal, called the index animal, was born and raised on a ranch (termed the "index farm") in Texas. It was a cream colored Brahma cross approximately 12 years old at the time of its death. It was born prior to the implementation of the 1997 feed ban instituted by FDA to help minimize the risk that a cow might consume feed contaminated with the agent thought to cause BSE. The animal was sold through a livestock sale in November of 2004 and transported to a packing plant. The animal was dead upon arrival at the packing plant and was then shipped to a pet food plant where it was sampled for BSE. The plant did not use the animal in its product, and the carcass was destroyed in November 2004.

snip... see full text ;

http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usdahome?contentidonly=true&contentid=2005/08/0336.xml

DeLauro is ranking member of the House Appropriations Agriculture subcommittee, which has jurisdiction and oversight responsibilities of USDA and FDA.

"I am concerned that the APHIS officials that reviewed these results seemed to make decisions based not on science, but on the economic ramifications a positive BSE finding in a domestic born animal could have on the U.S. economy," said DeLauro. "When consumer safety is in question, APHIS should not be forced into additional testing of an inconclusive sample by its inspector general.

"While we are glad that this cow did not enter the human food supply, APHIS officials had a responsibility to further examine this sample that even our "gold standard" test proved inconclusive. By refusing to send samples for further testing, APHIS could have jeopardized consumer health and safety and put the industry at a disadvantage, drawing into question the safety of our beef.

"Today I am requesting that APHIS disclose which officials made this decision and further explain their reasoning for not voluntarily testing this inconclusive sample further."

###

www.house.gov/delauro

http://www.house.gov/delauro/press/2006/February/APHIS_retesting_2_3_06.html


7/20/05 USDA, APHIS, Veterinary Services, National Center for Import and Export: Protocol for The Importation of Farm Raised Cervids from Canada PDF USDA, APHIS, Veterinary Services, National Center for Import and Export: Protocol for The Importation of Camelids from Canada PDF

7/15/05 Importation of Bovines (Cattle or Bison) from Canada for Feeding PDF BSE Minimal-Risk Regions and the Importation of Live Animals Importers, Brokers, and Other Interested Parties PDF BSE Minimal-Risk Regions and the Importation of Live Animals Accredited Veterinarians or Other Interested Parties PDF USDA, APHIS, Veterinary Services, National Center for Import and Export: Protocol for The Importation of Cattle or Bison for Feeding from Canada PDF USDA, APHIS, Veterinary Services, National Center for Import and Export: Protocol for the Importation of Cattle, Bison, Sheep and Goats for Immediate Slaughter from Canada PDF USDA, APHIS, Veterinary Services, National Center for Import and Export: Protocol for the Importation of Sheep and Goats for Feeding from Canada PDF Animal Products Implementation: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions and Importation of Commodities from Canada PDF Johanns Announces Next Steps for Importing Canadian Cattle Transcript of Tele-News Conference with Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions and Importation of Commodities— FINAL RULE— 9 CFR Parts 93, 94, 95, and 96 [Docket No. 03-080-3] Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions and Importation of Commodities; Partial Delay of Applicability [Docket No. 03-080-6] — Final rule; partial delay of applicability — 9 CFR Parts 94 and 95Published March 11, 2005 — 70 FR 12112-12113 Text PDF • Risk Document PDF • Economic Analysis PDF • Appendices to economic analysis PDF • Final environmental assessment PDF • Final Rule on BSE and Minimal-Risk Regions (Factsheet) • Questions and Answers for Minimal Risk/Canada Rule • Port of Entry for Eligible Ruminants 7/14/05 Secretary Johanns Statement on Ninth Circuit Court Ruling

04/01/05 Canada, Mexico And United States Release Harmonized North American BSE Strategy Harmonization of a BSE Strategy (PDF)

03/17/05 U.S. Government Requests Appeal In Minimal-Risk Rule Case

03/04/05 BSE Minimal-Risk Regions and Importation of Live Animals and Commodities From Canada Delay of Effective Date (Memo)

TEXAS FEED STANDARDS

Report on Food & Drug Administration Dallas District Investigation of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Event in Texas 2005

Executive Summary:

On June 24, 2005, USDA informed FDA that a cow in Texas tested positive for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). Information provided by APHIS was that the BSE positive cow was born and raised in a herd in Texas and was approximately 12 years old. The animal was sampled for BSE at a pet food plant in Texas on November 15, 2004, as part of USDA's enhanced surveillance program. The animal was disposed of by incineration and did not enter the human food or animal feed chains. Although the positive animal posed no risk to the animal feed supply, FDA, APHIS, the Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC), and the Texas Feed and Fertilizer Control Service (TFFCS) conducted a feed investigation with two main objectives. The first objective was to identify all protein sources in the animal's feed history that could potentially have been the source of the BSE agent. The second objective was to verify that cattle leaving the herd after 1997 that were identified by USDA/APHIS as animals of concern (e.g. progeny and feed cohorts), were rendered at facilities in compliance with the regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) that prohibits most mammalian protein in feed for ruminants that became effective August 4, 1997 (herein called BSE/Ruminant Feed rule).

snip...

The feed history investigation identified 21 feed products that had been used on the farm since 1990. These feed products were purchased from three retail feed stores and had been manufactured at nine different feed mills. The investigators visited these establishments to collect information on formulations, shipping invoices, and use of ruminant meat and bone meal (MBM) on the premises both pre-1997 feed ban and post-1997 feed ban. This investigation found no feed products used on the farm since 1997 that had been formulated to contain prohibited mammalian protein.

The investigation identified one feed which contained an animal protein source that could not be identified. The investigation also found one feed mill that supplied feed to the farm that had used ruminant MBM in feed formulations for non-ruminant species after the BSE/Ruminant Feed rule went into effect, which is permitted under the rule, and that several feed mills had used ruminant MBM in feeds prior to the feed ban. Although the investigation did not identify a specific feed source as the likely cause of this animal's infection, it is probable that the most likely route of exposure for this animal was consumption of an animal feed containing mammalian protein prior to the implementation of the BSE/Ruminant Feed rule in 1997.

snip... see full text ;

http://www.fda.gov/cvm/texasfeedrpt.htm

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE P01-05 January 30, 2001 Print Media: 301-827-6242 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA

---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----

Note: On Dec. 23, 2003, the U.S. Department of Agriculture reported that a cow in Washington state had tested positive for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or mad cow disease). As a result, information on this Web page stating that no BSE cases had been found in the United States is now incorrect. However, because other information on this page continues to have value, the page will remain available for viewing.

FDA ANNOUNCES TEST RESULTS FROM TEXAS FEED LOT

Today the Food and Drug Administration announced the results of tests taken on feed used at a Texas feedlot that was suspected of containing meat and bone meal from other domestic cattle -- a violation of FDA's 1997 prohibition on using ruminant material in feed for other ruminants. Results indicate that a very low level of prohibited material was found in the feed fed to cattle.

FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds.

It is important to note that the prohibited material was domestic in origin (therefore not likely to contain infected material because there is no evidence of BSE in U.S. cattle), fed at a very low level, and fed only once. The potential risk of BSE to such cattle is therefore exceedingly low, even if the feed were contaminated.

According to Dr. Bernard Schwetz, FDA's Acting Principal Deputy Commissioner, "The challenge to regulators and industry is to keep this disease out of the United States. One important defense is to prohibit the use of any ruminant animal materials in feed for other ruminant animals. Combined with other steps, like U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) ban on the importation of live ruminant animals from affected countries, these steps represent a series of protections, to keep American cattle free of BSE."

Despite this negligible risk, Purina Mills, Inc., is nonetheless announcing that it is voluntarily purchasing all 1,222 of the animals held in Texas and mistakenly fed the animal feed containing the prohibited material. Therefore, meat from those animals will not enter the human food supply. FDA believes any cattle that did not consume feed containing the prohibited material are unaffected by this incident, and should be handled in the beef supply clearance process as usual.

FDA believes that Purina Mills has behaved responsibly by first reporting the human error that resulted in the misformulation of the animal feed supplement and then by working closely with State and Federal authorities.

This episode indicates that the multi-layered safeguard system put into place is essential for protecting the food supply and that continued vigilance needs to be taken, by all concerned, to ensure these rules are followed routinely.

FDA will continue working with USDA as well as State and local officials to ensure that companies and individuals comply with all laws and regulations designed to protect the U.S. food supply.

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2001/NEW00752.html


BESIDES the Texas mad cow that sat on the shelf for 7+ months before the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG finally did the end around Johanns et al and finally had Weybridge bring that negative cow back from the dead to finally being a confirmed mad cow (hint, hint, getting MRR implemented first), was this simply another bumbling of BSE protocol, or just same old same old;

Jim Rogers (202) 690-4755

USDA Press Office (202) 720-4623

Statement by Chief Veterinary Medical Officer John Clifford Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Regarding Non-Definitive BSE Test Results
July 27, 2005

snip...

Our laboratory ran the IHC test on the sample and received non-definitive results that suggest the need for further testing. As we have previously experienced, it is possible for an IHC test to yield differing results depending on the "slice" of tissue that is tested. Therefore, scientists at our laboratory and at Weybridge will run the IHC test on additional "slices" of tissue from this animal to determine whether or not it was infected with BSE. We will announce results as soon as they are compiled, which we expect to occur by next week.

I would note that the sample was taken in April, at which time the protocols allowed for a preservative to be used (protocols changed in June 2005). The sample was not submitted to us until last week, because the veterinarian set aside the sample after preserving it and simply forgot to send it in. On that point, I would like to emphasize that while that time lag is not optimal, it has no implications in terms of the risk to human health. The carcass of this animal was destroyed, therefore there is absolutely no risk to human or animal health from this animal.

snip...

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/news/2005/07/bsestatement_vs.html

UPDATE ;

The statistical incidence of CJD cases in the United States has been revised to reflect that there is one case per 9000 in adults age 55 and older. Eighty-five percent of the cases are sporadic, meaning there is no known cause at present.

http://www.cjdfoundation.org/fact.html

There is a growing number of human CJD cases, and they were presented last week in San Francisco by Luigi Gambatti(?) from his CJD surveillance collection.

He estimates that it may be up to 14 or 15 persons which display selectively SPRPSC and practically no detected RPRPSC proteins.

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/1006-4240t1.htm

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/2006-4240t1.pdf

QUESTION, IS U.S.A. FOOD PRODUCTION SYSTEM POISONING US ?

What Do We Feed to Food-Production Animals? A Review of Animal Feed Ingredients and Their Potential Impacts on Human Health

Amy R. Sapkota,1,2 Lisa Y. Lefferts,1,3 Shawn McKenzie,1 and Polly Walker1 1Johns Hopkins Center for a Livable Future, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, Maryland, USA; 2Maryland Institute for Applied Environmental Health, College of Health and Human Performance, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, USA; 3Lisa Y. Lefferts Consulting, Nellysford, Virginia, USA

snip...

Table 1. Animal feed ingredients that are legally used in U.S. animal feeds

Animal

Rendered animal protein from Meat meal, meat meal tankage, meat and bone meal, poultry meal, animal the slaughter of food by-product meal, dried animal blood, blood meal, feather meal, egg-shell production animals and other meal, hydrolyzed whole poultry, hydrolyzed hair, bone marrow, and animal animals digest from dead, dying, diseased, or disabled animals including deer and elk Animal waste Dried ruminant waste, dried swine waste, dried poultry litter, and undried processed animal waste products

snip...

Conclusions

Food-animal production in the United States has changed markedly in the past century, and these changes have paralleled major changes in animal feed formulations. While this industrialized system of food-animal production may result in increased production efficiencies, some of the changes in animal feeding practices may result in unintended adverse health consequences for consumers of animal-based food products. Currently, the use of animal feed ingredients, including rendered animal products, animal waste, antibiotics, metals, and fats, could result in higher levels of bacteria, antibioticresistant bacteria, prions, arsenic, and dioxinlike compounds in animals and resulting animal-based food products intended for human consumption. Subsequent human health effects among consumers could include increases in bacterial infections (antibioticresistant and nonresistant) and increases in the risk of developing chronic (often fatal) diseases such as vCJD. Nevertheless, in spite of the wide range of potential human health impacts that could result from animal feeding practices, there are little data collected at the federal or state level concerning the amounts of specific ingredients that are intentionally included in U.S. animal feed. In addition, almost no biological or chemical testing is conducted on complete U.S. animal feeds; insufficient testing is performed on retail meat products; and human health effects data are not appropriately linked to this information. These surveillance inadequacies make it difficult to conduct rigorous epidemiologic studies and risk assessments that could identify the extent to which specific human health risks are ultimately associated with animal feeding practices. For example, as noted above, there are insufficient data to determine whether other human foodborne bacterial illnesses besides those caused by S. enterica serotype Agona are associated with animal feeding practices. Likewise, there are insufficient data to determine the percentage of antibiotic-resistant human bacterial infections that are attributed to the nontherapeutic use of antibiotics in animal feed. Moreover, little research has been conducted to determine whether the use of organoarsenicals in animal feed, which can lead to elevated levels of arsenic in meat products (Lasky et al. 2004), contributes to increases in cancer risk. In order to address these research gaps, the following principal actions are necessary within the United States: a) implementation of a nationwide reporting system of the specific amounts and types of feed ingredients of concern to public health that are incorporated into animal feed, including antibiotics, arsenicals, rendered animal products, fats, and animal waste; b) funding and development of robust surveillance systems that monitor biological, chemical, and other etiologic agents throughout the animal-based food-production chain "from farm to fork" to human health outcomes; and c) increased communication and collaboration among feed professionals, food-animal producers, and veterinary and public health officials.

REFERENCES...snip...end

Sapkota et al. 668 VOLUME 115 | NUMBER 5 | May 2007 • Environmental Health Perspectives

http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/picrender.fcgi?artid=1867957&blobtype=pdf

STANLEY PRUSINER NOBEL PEACE PRIZE WINNER ON THE PRION

US AG SEC AND LAYCRAFT

"nothing matters, except beef from Canada under 30 months bone in beef product, that's ALL THAT MATTERS!" US SENATOR AND STAN THE MAN SLAM USDA "DAMNING TESTIMONY"

Senator Michael Machado from California

"USDA does not know what's going on". "USDA is protecting the industry". " SHOULD the state of California step in"

Stanley Prusiner

"nobody has ever ask us to comment"

"they don't want us to comment"

"they never ask"

i tried to see Venemon, after Canadian cow was discovered with BSE. went to see lyle. after talking with him.

absolute ignorance.

then thought i should see Venemon.

it was clear his entire policy was to get cattle boneless beef prods across the border.

nothing else mattered.

his aids confirmed this.

5 times i tried to see Venemon, never worked.

eventually met with carl rove the political.

he is the one that arranged meeting with Venemon.

just trying to give you a sense of the distance.

threat to health public safety.

was never contacted.

yes i believe that prions are bad to eat and you can die from them.END

Dr. Stan bashing Ann Veneman - 3 minutes - Damning testimony http://maddeer.org/video/embedded/08snip.ram

File Name: USDA DON'T ASK DON'T TELL POLICY 02snip.rpm DAMNING testimony of consumer consumption of Washington mad cow in California

http://www.maddeer.org/video/embedded/02snip.rm

GAO ON USA BSE 2002

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02183.pdf

GAO 2003

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04259t.pdf

http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-588T

* GAO-05-51 October 2004 FOOD SAFETY (over 500 customers receiving potentially BSE contaminated beef) - TSS 10/20/04

October 2004 FOOD SAFETY USDA and FDA Need to Better Ensure Prompt and Complete Recalls of Potentially Unsafe Food

snip...

Page 38 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs To examine the voluntary recall of beef products associated with the December 2003 discovery of an animal infected with BSE, we analyzed the distribution lists USDA collected from companies and the verification checks it conducted to develop a diagram illustrating the location and volume of recalled beef that reached different levels of the distribution chain. We compared the distribution lists and verification checks to identify how many customers listed on the distribution lists did not receive the recalled beef and the number of customers not listed on distribution lists that received the recalled beef. We interviewed USDA and FDA staff involved with the recall to understand the timing of recall actions and the challenges encountered during the recall. To develop information on the 2002 recall of ground beef by a ConAgra plant in Greeley, Colorado, we reviewed USDAs recall file and other documents on the recall. We also met with the departments Office of Inspector General and reviewed the Inspector Generals September 2003 report.1 We conducted our review from May 2003 through August 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 1U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General, Great Plains Region Audit Report: Food Safety and Inspection Service: Oversight of Production Process and Recall at ConAgra Plant (Establishment 969), Report No. 24601-2-KC (September 2003). Page 39 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs Appendix II Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE Appendix II On December 23, 2003, USDA announced that a cow in the state of Washington had tested positive for BSEcommonly referred to as mad cow disease. This appendix describes the actions USDA took to recall the meat and the actions FDA took with respect to FDA-regulated products, such as animal feed and cosmetics, made from rendered parts of the animal. Beef Recall Was Triggered by a BSEPositive Sample from One Cow On December 9, 2003, the recalling company slaughtered 23 cows. USDA, in accordance with its BSE surveillance policy at the time, took a sample of 1 cow that was unable to walk, although the condition of the tested cow is now disputed. USDA did not process the sample in its Ames, Iowa National Veterinary Services Laboratory in an expedited manner because the cow did not show symptoms of neurological disorder. USDA test results indicated a presumptive positive for BSE on December 23, 2003. Recall Begun in December 2003 Was Completed in March 2004 On December 23, 2003, after learning about the positive BSE test, USDA headquarters notified the Boulder District Office, which is the field office with jurisdiction over the recalling firm. The Boulder District began gathering information about the recalling companys product distribution. Field staff telephoned the recalling company and were on-site at 7:00 p.m. The Boulder District initially thought 3 days of the recalling companys production would have to be recalled, but further examination of facility cleanup and shipping records revealed that it was only necessary to recall 1 day of production. USDA recall staff convened at 9:15 p.m. and discussed the science related to BSE and whether the recalling companys cleanup practices were sufficient to limit the recall to 1 day of production. Following USDAs determination to conduct a Class II recallthat is, the beef posed a remote possibility of adverse health consequencesUSDA contacted the recalling company to discuss recall details and the press release. The press release and Recall Notification Report were released that evening. On December 24, 2003, USDAs Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) sent inspectors to the recalling companys primary customers to obtain secondary customer distribution lists and product shipping records. USDA conducted 100 percent verification checks for this recallit contacted every customer that received the recalled meat. This level of verification checks is well above the percentag of checks conducted by USDA district offices for the Class I recalls we reviewed. Appendix II Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE Page 40 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs On December 26, 2003, USDA began checking the primary and secondary customers of the recalling company that it was aware of, although the entire product distribution chain was unknown. During the checks, USDA tried to determine if the product was further distributed, and it used verification checks to acquire distribution lists for secondary and tertiary customers of the recalling company. Verification checks continued until February 25, 2004. Three USDA districts conducted these verification checks. The Boulder District coordinated the checks and assigned checks to the Minneapolis District Office for customers in Montana and to the Alameda District Office for customers in California. USDA required that 100 percent of the primary checks, 50 percent of the secondary checks, and 20 percent of the tertiary checks be conducted on-site. According to USDA, more than 50 percent of the secondary checks were actually conducted on-site. FDA officials helped conduct verification checks. According to USDA, the recall took a long time to complete because USDA contacted each customer at least twice. USDA first contacted each customer to conduct the check and again to verify product disposition. On February 25, 2004, the Boulder District concluded that the recall was conducted in an effective manner. On March 1, 2004, USDAs Recall Management Division recommended that the agency terminate the recall, and USDA sent a letter to the recalling company to document that USDA considered the recall to be complete. Recall Was Complicated by Inaccurate Distribution Lists and Mixing of Potentially Contaminated and Noncontaminated Beef USDA used distribution lists and shipping records to piece together where the recalled product was distributed. According to USDA, one of the recalling companys three primary customers was slow in providing its customer list. USDA could not begin verification activities for that primary customer without this list. Furthermore, some customers of the recalling company provided USDA with imprecise lists that did not specify which customers received the recalled product. As a consequence, USDA could not quickly determine the scope of product distribution and had to take time conducting extra research using shipping invoices to determine which specific customers received the product. Even when USDA determined the amount and location of beef, the agency still had trouble tracking the beef in certain types of establishments, such as grocery store distributors. USDA could not easily track the individual stores where those distributors sent the beef because of product mixing Appendix II Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE Page 41 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs and the distributors record-keeping practices. Generally, distributors purchase beef from multiple sources, mix it in their inventory, and lose track of the source of the beef they send to the stores that they supply. To deal with this problem, USDA first identified the dates when recalled beef was shipped to the distributors and then asked for a list of the stores that were shipped any beef after those dates. Consequently, some stores were included in the recall that may never have received recalled beef. The recall was also complicated by repeated mixing of recalled beef with nonrecalled beef, thereby increasing the amount of meat involved in the recall. The recalling company slaughtered 23 cows on December 9, 2003, and shipped those and 20 other carcasses to a primary customer on December 10, 2003. The recalling companys carcasses were tagged to identify the slaughter date and the individual cow. The primary customer removed the identification tags and mixed the 23 recalled carcasses with the 20 nonrecalled carcasses. Because the carcasses could not be distinguished, the rec ll included all 43 carcasses at the primary customer. After one round of processing at the primary customer, the meat from the carcasses was shipped to two other processing facilities. Both establishments further mixed the recalled meat from the 43 carcasses with meat from other sources. In all, the mixing of beef from 1 BSE-positive cow resulted in over 500 customers receiving potentially contaminated beef. Imprecise distribution lists and the mixing of recalled beef combined to complicate USDAs identification of where the product went. Specifically, on December 23, 2003, USDAs initial press release stated that the recalling company was located in Washington State. Three days later, on December 26, 2003, USDA announced that the recalled beef was distributed within Washington and Oregon. On December 27, 2003, USDA determined that one of the primary customers of the recalling firm distributed beef to facilities in California and Nevada, in addition to Washington and Oregon, for a total of four states. On December 28, 2003, USDA announced that some of the secondary customers of the recalling company may also have distributed the product to Alaska, Montana, Hawaii, Idaho, and Guam, for a total of eight states and one territory. On January 6, 2004, over 2 weeks from recall initiation, USDA determined that the beef went to only six statesWashington, Oregon, California, Nevada, Idaho, and Montanaand that no beef went to Alaska, Hawaii, or Guam. To reach that conclusion, USDA used the distribution lists, shipping records, and sales invoices that it received from companies to piece together exactly where the recalled beef may have been sent. The lists Appendix II Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE Page 42 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs showed that 713 customers may have received the recalled beef; 6 of those may have received beef from more than one source. USDA determined that 176 customers on the lists did not actually receive recalled beef, including the customers in Guam and Hawaii. USDAs review also indicated that recalled beef was probably not shipped to Alaska or Utah, and USDA checked 2 retailers in Alaska and 3 retailers in Utah to confirm that was the case. In total, USDA conducted verification checks on 537 of the 713 customers on the lists. USDAs initial checks identified an additional 45 customers that may have received the recalled beef that were not included on the distribution lists, for a total of 582 verification checks. Figure 4 summarizes USDAs verification efforts during the recall. Appendix II Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE Page 43 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs Figure 4: USDAs Recall Verification Checks by Location and Customer Type for Meat Associated with the Animal Infected with BSE Note: USDA checked 15 primary, 40 secondary, and 526 tertiary customers plus the recalling company, for a total of 582 verification checks. USDAs press release stated that the recall involved 10,410 pounds of beef products, and the USDA recall coordinator for this recall told us that downstream processors mixed the recalled beef with nonrecalled beef, for a total of more than 38,000 pounds of beef that was distributed at the secondary customer level. According to USDA officials involved with the D = Distributor R = Retailer SF = Storage facility P = Processor Primary customers (15 total) Recalling slaughterhouse (WA) 1 R (OR) 1 P (WA) 1 P (OR) 1 P (OR) 11 R (WA) Secondary customers (40 total) Tertiary customers (526 total) 1 R (OR) 1 SF (OR) 3 D (OR) 3 D (WA) 2 dual D (OR) 59 R (OR) 79 R (WA) 5 R (ID) 3 R (UT) 4 R (MT) 161 R (WA) 8 R (ID) 15 R (OR) 2 R (AK) 31 R (OR) 8 R (WA) 10 R (NV) 5 R (ID) 10 R (CA) 2 R (CA) 17 R (OR) 5 R (WA) 1 D (NV) 11 R (CA) 85 R (NV) 3 D (OR) 11 R (OR) 2 D (CA) 26 R (CA) 2 R (WA) ( ) Acronyms in parentheses are postal abbreviations for each state. Source: GAO analysis of USDA verification check documents. Appendix II Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE Page 44 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs recall, the precise amount of meat that was sold at the retail level is unknown because retailers at the tertiary level further mixed nonrecalled meat with potentially contaminated meat. USDA told us that more than 64,000 pounds of beef was ultimately returned or destroyed by customers, and that, because of the mixing, it was not able to determine how much of the original 10,410 pounds of recalled beef was contained in the 64,000 pounds that were recovered. FDAs Role in USDAs Recall Parts of the BSE-infected animal slaughtered on December 9, 2003, were not used for food, but they were sent to renderers to be separated into raw materials, such as proteins and blood. Rendered materials are used for many purposes, including cosmetics and vaccines. FDA has jurisdiction over renderers. When USDA learned of the BSE-infected cow on December 23, 2003, the agency immediately notified FDA. On December 24, 2003, FDA sent an inspection team to a renderer that handled materials from the BSE cow. Inspectors confirmed that the parts of the slaughtered BSE positive cow were on the premises. FDA later identified a second company that potentially rendered material from the slaughtered BSE cow. Both renderers agreed to voluntarily hold all product processed from the diseased cow and dispose of the product as directed by FDA and local authorities. On January 7, 2004, 15 containers of potentially contaminated, rendered material (meat and bone meal) were inadvertently loaded on a ship, and on January 8, 2004, the ship left Seattle, Washington, for Asia. The renderer initiated steps to recover the shipped material, so it could be disposed of as directed by FDA and local authorities. The ship carrying the material returned to the United States on February 24, 2004, and the material was disposed of in a landfill on March 2, 2004. On January 12, 2004, FDA asked both renderers to expand their voluntary holds to rendered materials processed from December 23, 2003, through January 9, 2004, because they may have rendered some recalled meat or trim that was recovered from retail establishments. Both renderers agreed to the expanded product hold. In total, FDA requested that renderers voluntarily hold approximately 2,000 tons of rendered material. FDA confirmed that none of the potentially contaminated, rendered material entered commerce, because FDA accounted for all rendered material. FDA Appendix II Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE Page 45 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs reported that no recall was necessary because no product was distributed commercially by the rendering companies. USDA and FDA Worked Together on the Recall USDA and FDA worked together in two ways. First, both agencies notified each other if their investigations yielded any information about products within the jurisdiction of the other agency. For instance, when conducting the second round of verification checks, USDA tracked the disposition of the product to renderers and landfills and notified FDA when the product went to renderers. Second, FDA officials helped conduct verification checks. FDA conducted 32 of the 582 verification checks (approximately 5 percent) for the USDA recall. Officials from both agencies indicated they regularly interacted and shared information. Table 3 outlines the agencies actions. Table 3: Detailed Timeline of USDA, FDA, and Company Actions Related to the Discovery of an Animal Infected with BSE Date USDA recall actions FDA actions Company actions 12/9/03 " USDA samples cow for BSE. " BSE cow is slaughtered. 12/11/03 " Sample is sent to Ames, Iowa, for BSE testing. " Recalling company sends carcasses to primary customer for processing. 12/12/03 " Primary customer sends meat products to two other primary customers for further processing. 12/12 - 12/23/03 " Other primary customers distribute recalled product to secondary customers. " Secondary customers distribute recalled product to tertiary custo ers. 12/23/03 " BSE test results are presumptively positive. " Recall meeting. " Initiation of voluntary recall. " Press release. " FDA notified of BSE test results. " FDA dispatches investigation teams. 12/24/03 " FDA inspects Renderer 1. " FDA determines some rendered material from Renderer 1 is intended for Indonesia. " FDA discovers some material may have been sent to Renderer 2. " Renderer 1 agrees to hold remaining rendered material. " Recalling company contacts primary customers. " Primary customers contact their customers. Appendix II Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE Page 46 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs 12/25/03 " USDA receives confirmation from reference lab in England that cow in question is BSE positive. 12/26/03 " Verification checks begin " USDA announces recalled product in Washington State and Oregon. " FDA begins process of comparing records to ensure all products from Renderers 1 and 2 are accounted for. " Renderer 2 agrees to hold all material that may have been derived from BSE cow. None of the rendered material has been distributed. 12/27/03 " USDA announces recalled product was distributed in Washington State, Oregon, California, and Nevada. " FDA issues statement confirming that the rendering plants that processed all of the nonedible material from the BSE cow have placed a voluntary hold on all of the potentially infectious product, none of which had left the control of the companies and entered commercial distribution. 12/28/03 " USDA announces recalled product was distributed in Washington State, Oregon, California, Nevada, Montana, Idaho, Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam. 12/29/03 " Food Safety and Inspection Service determines that the recalled meat products were distributed to 42 locations, with 80 percent of the products distributed to stores in Oregon and Washington State. 12/31/03 " FDA offers assistance to USDA to complete recall verification checks. 1/6/04 " USDA determines recalled product was only distributed in Washington State, Oregon, California, Nevada, Montana, and Idaho. 1/8/04 " FDA is notified by the renderer that some of the rendered material on hold from Renderer 1 was inadvertently shipped to Asia. Renderer 1 commits to isolate and return the rendered material. " Rendering company notifies FDA of shipment of product on hold. (Continued From Previous Page) Date USDA recall actions FDA actions Company actions Appendix II Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE Page 47 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs Source: GAO analysis of USDA and FDA information. 1/12/04 " FDA advises Renderers 1 and 2 that they may have rendered meat or trim subject to recall from retail stores. " FDA requests Renderers 1 and 2 to place all rendered material from December 23 to January 9 on hold. " FDA determines neither renderer had shipped rendered material manufactured after December 23, 2003. 2/9/04 " All rendered material was disposed of in landfill, except material shipped to Asia. 2/24/04 " Ship carrying rendered material returns to U.S. port. 2/25/04 " Verification checks complete. " USDA Boulder District Office concludes recall is effective. 3/1/04 " Recall is closed. 3/2/04 " FDA observes disposal in landfill of remaining rendered material...

snip...

REPORTS

1. Food Safety: USDA and FDA Need to Better Ensure Prompt and Complete Recalls of Potentially Unsafe Food. GAO-05-51, October 7.tss

http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-51

Highlights -

http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d0551high.pdf

2004

U.S. Department of Agriculture

Office of Inspector General

Great Plains Region

Audit Report

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

and

Food Safety and Inspection Service

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)

Surveillance Program - Phase I

Executive Summary

Report No. 50601-9-KC

August 2004

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and Food Safety and Inspection Service

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program - Phase I

Results in Brief Since 1990, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Animal and Plant

Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has led an interagency effort to monitor

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), widely known as "mad cow

disease." Central to this effort was the testing of cattle in a high-risk

category—those that exhibited a disorder in their central nervous systems

(CNS), such as difficulty standing, walking, etc., and cattle that died on the

farm from unclear causes. With the discovery of a BSE-infected animal in

December 2003, APHIS determined to expand its surveillance program to

test a larger number of high-risk animals. The goal of the program before

2004 had been to test 12,500 animals per year; under the expanded program,

the goal extends to over 200,000 animals to be tested in a 12 to 18 month

period.

The objectives of our audit were to determine whether the surveillance

program in place at the time of the December 2003 discovery of BSE was

adequately implemented and whether the expanded program will accomplish

its stated goal—to determine if "…BSE is actually present in the population

and if so, at what level."

This is the first in a series of reports we are planning to issue on our

evaluation of USDA's BSE surveillance activities. We could not fully

evaluate the first objective due to the absence of adequate documentation (see

General Comments Section) to support the basis for USDA's BSE

surveillance plan prior to the discovery of the BSE-infected cow. Our

evaluation of the second objective was limited because the design and

implementation of the BSE surveillance program is still in a state of flux.

However, where possible, we assessed documents provided to us and

interviewed USDA personnel so that we could provide USDA with

recommendations on potential concerns and issues as it moves forward with

implementation.

USDA's expanded surveillance program is based largely on a broadened plan

of sampling. This sampling plan has been announced as scientifically based

and representative of the population of U.S. cattle as a whole. However, we

concluded that several limitations inherent in the sampling plan need to be

clarified so that industry, the public, and U.S. trading partners understand

what the results of the testing actually imply.

• Sampling is not truly random because participation in the program is

voluntary. The BSE sampling plan, as designed, assumes each animal

USDA/OIG-A/50601-9-KC Page ii

has the same chance of being selected for BSE testing, which will not be

true if testing is voluntary. APHIS has the authority to collect samples,

but it has chosen not to exercise this authority, except at

federally-inspected slaughter facilities.

• Discovery of BSE cases will result in a statistical projection with either a

significantly lower confidence level or a significantly higher maximum

BSE prevalence level. By not discussing this, the plan's statistical

statements may inadvertently overemphasize the implied "best-case

scenario."

• As the plan is currently designed, APHIS cannot obtain a statistically

appropriate geographical representation of the U.S. cattle population.

Because the program is voluntary and the universe of high-risk cattle is

difficult to identify, obtain, and test, the surveillance plan needs to be

clarified and its conclusions relating to the prevalence of BSE may need

to be qualified.

• APHIS' sampling plan assumes BSE is confined to the high-risk cattle

population; other studies show that healthy-looking animals may also

have BSE.

• APHIS' plan to test 20,000 clinically normal cattle may give the incorrect

impression that these few tests will suggest a level of assurance higher

than warranted about the 45 million adult cattle in the United States.1

• APHIS cannot easily identify, obtain, or test cattle in its high-risk

population; therefore, the chances of detecting BSE, if it exists, may be

reduced and the projected maximum BSE prevalence rate may be

unreliable.

APHIS needs to fully disclose the assumptions that it made in designing its

sampling plan, and it needs to clarify the limitations that exist in the data it

will collect. Beyond its sampling design, however, lie significant challenges

for APHIS in its goal to determine if BSE exists in the United States at a

prevalence of at least one case per 10 million adult cattle. These

challenges—in identifying and testing the high-risk population of cattle—

were inherent in the operations of the surveillance program as it had been

conducted prior to June 2004, and still exist under the expanded program.

Cattle condemned at slaughter plants for CNS symptoms were not

always tested for BSE. This occurred because of confusion in testing

requirements and lack of coordination between APHIS and the agency

1 National Agricultural Statistics Service, Agricultural Statistics 2003, per Table 7-2 for 2002, 44,474,000

(equals 33,118,000 beef cows plus 9,112,000 milk cows plus 2,244,000 bulls).

USDA/OIG-A/50601-9-KC Page iii

that condemns cattle at slaughtering plants, the Food Safety and

Inspection Service (FSIS). Of the 680 cattle FSIS condemned for CNS

symptoms between fiscal years (FY) 2002 and 2004 (through

February 2004), we could validate that only 162 were tested for BSE.

USDA needs to increase testing of rabies-negative brain samples.

Rabies cases exhibit clinical signs not inconsistent with BSE, and a

negative rabies test means the cause of the cow's disorder has not been

diagnosed. Nevertheless, this high priority population has not been

adequately pursued for BSE testing. Public health and State veterinary

diagnostic laboratories did not always submit rabies-negative samples for

BSE testing because there was no formal mechanism in place to ensure

the submissions.

A process for obtaining samples from animals that "died on the

farm" has not been developed. These samples are important because the

high-risk animals that die on the farm comprise the largest component of

the targeted high-risk population and the most difficult to identify,

obtain, and test. Identifying truly high-risk cattle that die on the farm

may be complicated by the reluctance of producers to submit them for

testing and the motivation to mischaracterize low-risk carcasses as "high

risk" since only the latter may qualify for reimbursement.

The age requirement for BSE testing should be standardized to prevent

confusion. Current testing guidance contains inconsistent age criteria for

testing cattle for BSE. Some documents emphasize testing of livestock

at 20 months of age, some at 24 months of age, and at least one—the

APHIS Surveillance Plan of March 2004—over 30 months of age. This

confusion has created and will continue to create a potential that some

cattle may not be subject to BSE testing.

We are recommending that APHIS implement management controls to

ensure that all high-risk animals, including those that test negative for rabies,

those condemned for CNS symptoms, and those that die on the farm from

unknown causes are sampled and tested in accordance with USDA policy and

the 2004 Surveillance Plan.

In reviewing APHIS' management of the BSE surveillance program, we also

noted some areas of concern in program administration. Most critically, we

found that stronger controls were needed over the collection of test samples

and the recording of test information. We found cases in which test samplers

submitted nonviable samples and provided inaccurate or incomplete

information on their submission forms. We found other cases in which some

animals that had been tested for such non-high-risk symptoms as diarrhea and

inner ear infection were included in APHIS' count of samples for the purpose

of meeting surveillance goals. Some information maintained in the

USDA/OIG-A/50601-9-KC Page iv

surveillance program's database was the result of misentries. This database

was the source of APHIS' reports on surveillance achievements.

We are recommending that APHIS expedite its development of a new

management information system to track and report its accomplishments

under the expanded surveillance program. We are also recommending that

APHIS implement performance measures and a continuous risk assessment to

enhance its management of the surveillance program and better assess the

program's effectiveness.

Finally, we noted that, prior to June 1, 2004, APHIS did not have standard

written agreements in place to ensure consistent performance from

non-Federal laboratories and reasonable arrangements and charges from meat

plants and contractors who provide sampling services. Use of these entities

will increase as the 2004 surveillance program expands. Past arrangements

with meat plants and sampling contractors were made on a regional basis,

were sometimes informal, and resulted in costs ranging from $0 to $100 per

sample taken. We concluded that APHIS should impose a standardized

contract specifying the quality of work required and the costs the

Government is willing to incur for it.

The problems disclosed during our review, if not corrected, may negatively

impact the effectiveness of USDA's overall BSE surveillance program,

impair its ability to perform risk assessments and program evaluations, and

reduce the credibility of any assertion regarding the prevalence of BSE in the

United States. These are complex challenges USDA needs to address as it

moves forward with implementation of its expanded BSE surveillance

program.

This audit was coordinated with the Office of Inspector General's (OIG)

Investigations Division. OIG conducted two investigations to determine

whether employees of USDA and/or of the slaughter establishment misled or

provided false information concerning the identification of the BSE-positive

cow. In addition, OIG verified the procedures used by USDA and the

slaughter establishment to maintain the integrity of the brain tissue sample

from the slaughter establishment through delivery to the National Veterinary

Services Laboratories (NVSL) in Ames, Iowa. OIG also investigated the

circumstances surrounding the animal displaying possible CNS symptoms

that had not been tested in Texas. The results of these investigations will be

reported under separate cover.

Recommendations

In Brief We are recommending that APHIS fully disclose the assumptions that it

made in designing its sampling plan, and that it clarify the limitations that

exist in the data it will collect. We are also recommending that APHIS

implement management controls to ensure that all high-risk animals,

USDA/OIG-A/50601-9-KC Page v

snip...full text

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-9-final.pdf

Audit Report

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Oversight of the Importation

of Beef Products from Canada

Report No. 33601-01-Hy February 2005 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Washington D.C. 20250

DATE: February 14, 2005

REPLY TO

ATTN OF: 33601-01-Hy

SUBJECT: Oversight of the Importation of Beef Products from Canada

TO: W. Ron DeHaven

Administrator

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Barbara J. Masters

Acting Administrator

Food Safety and Inspection Service

ATTN: William J. Hudnall

Deputy Administrator

Marketing and Regulatory Programs – Business Services

Ronald F. Hicks

Assistant Administrator

Office of Program Evaluation, Enforcement and Review

This report presents the results of our audit of oversight of the importation of beef products from Canada. Your response to the draft, dated February 9, 2005, is included as exhibit A. Excerpts of your response and the Office of Inspector General's (OIG) position are incorporated into the Findings and Recommendations section of the report. Based on your response, management decision has been reached on all recommendations except No. 3. Please follow your agency's internal procedures in forwarding documentation for final action to the Office of the Chief Financial Officer. Management decisions for the remaining recommendation can be reached once you have provided the additional information outlined in the report section OIG Position.

In accordance with Departmental Regulatio

 

[burnt]

You write crap like this to the Koreans ["US beef is not safe."]
And then try to give credibility to your dumb @ss statements by quoting your own hysteric ramblings! You could save pages of rambling and quotes by just saying "it is my opinion" because that is all you have ever brought to this forum is your own biased opinion backed by nothing but more of your opinions!

fedup2, are we to understand from the above quote that you would hold up the American testing record as being exemplary and able to guarantee safe beef?

 

[flounder]

You write crap like this to the Koreans ["US beef is not safe."]
And then try to give credibility to your dumb @ss statements by quoting your own hysteric ramblings! You could save pages of rambling and quotes by just saying "it is my opinion" because that is all you have ever brought to this forum is your own biased opinion backed by nothing but more of your opinions!

oh heck fedup2, your just not paying attention again. lets try this once more. these are not my opinions ;

snip...

continued from my first post ;


Audit Report

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Oversight of the Importation

of Beef Products from Canada

Report No. 33601-01-Hy February 2005 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Washington D.C. 20250

DATE: February 14, 2005

REPLY TO

ATTN OF: 33601-01-Hy

SUBJECT: Oversight of the Importation of Beef Products from Canada

TO: W. Ron DeHaven

Administrator

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Barbara J. Masters

Acting Administrator

Food Safety and Inspection Service

ATTN: William J. Hudnall

Deputy Administrator

Marketing and Regulatory Programs – Business Services

Ronald F. Hicks

Assistant Administrator

Office of Program Evaluation, Enforcement and Review

This report presents the results of our audit of oversight of the importation of beef products from Canada. Your response to the draft, dated February 9, 2005, is included as exhibit A. Excerpts of your response and the Office of Inspector General's (OIG) position are incorporated into the Findings and Recommendations section of the report. Based on your response, management decision has been reached on all recommendations except No. 3. Please follow your agency's internal procedures in forwarding documentation for final action to the Office of the Chief Financial Officer. Management decisions for the remaining recommendation can be reached once you have provided the additional information outlined in the report section OIG Position.

In accordance with Departmental Regulation 1720-1, please furnish a reply within 60 days describing the corrective actions taken or planned, and the timeframes for implementation of the remaining recommendation. Please note that the regulation requires management decision to be reached on all recommendations within 6 months of report issuance

/s/

ROBERT W. YOUNG

Assistant Inspector General

for Audit

USDA/OIG-A/33601-01-Hy Page i

Executive Summary

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service's Oversight of the Importation of Beef Products from Canada (Audit Report No. 33601-01-Hy)

Results in Brief This report presents the results of the Office of Inspector General's (OIG) audit of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service's (APHIS) oversight of the importation of beef products from Canada following the detection of a Canadian cow with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in May 2003. In June 2004, we initiated several actions in response to concerns raised by four U.S. Senators that the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) did not follow appropriate safety measures, beginning sometime in the fall of 2003, in allowing expanded Canadian beef imports into the United States. We reviewed USDA's actions pertaining to the importation of Canadian products, including the use of risk mitigation1 measures.

On May 20, 2003, the Secretary halted imports of live cattle, other live ruminants, beef, and other ruminant products from Canada after a cow in Alberta was found to have BSE. Prior to this time, there was a free flow of trade between the United States and Canada for live cattle and beef. Due to the serious impact on trade, USDA officials sought a method to allow limited imports from Canada and determined to use the APHIS permit process as a vehicle to facilitate trade. At that time, APHIS did not have a history of issuing permits for the importation of edible meat and meat products. Veterinary import permits were generally issued for items derived from animals, such as blood, cells or cell lines, hormones, and microorganisms including bacteria, viruses, protozoa, and fungi.

On August 8, 2003, the Secretary of Agriculture (Secretary) announced a list of low-risk products, including boneless beef from cattle less than 30 months of age and veal meat from calves less than 36 weeks of age, which would be allowed into the United States from Canada, under certain predetermined conditions. In November 2003, USDA published a proposed rule in the Federal Register to create a low-risk category for countries with BSE, to place Canada on that list, and to allow imports of, among other things, low-risk beef products and live cattle under 30 months of age to resume. This rule for live animals and processed meat products was issued January 4, 2005.

The Secretary's announcement on August 8, 2003, regarding low-risk products followed USDA's review of the results of Canada's epidemiological investigation into the detection of BSE in that country. Based on the results

1 Risk mitigations include such actions as certificates indicating the product is pure liver, Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) verification that calves were 36 weeks of age or less when slaughtered, and CFIA verification that animals are not known to have been fed prohibited products during their lifetime.

USDA/OIG-A/33601-01-Hy Page ii

of the investigation, as well as international guidelines2 that indicated that products derived from young animals do not pose a risk to human health, USDA issued permits to allow these low-risk products into the United States.

Subsequent to the Secretary's announcement, APHIS issued 1,155 permits3 allowing the import of a variety of products from Canada, to include many items that had been included in the Secretary's announcement as well as other items that were not initially identified as allowable low-risk products. In April 2004, a lawsuit was filed in U.S. District Court in Montana, which resulted in a temporary restraining order that identified the specific low-risk Canadian products that were eligible for import into the United States. The list of low-risk products was the same as the list posted on August 15, 2003, by APHIS on its website as a clarification of the Secretary's August 8, 2003, announcement. On May 5, 2004, the District Court converted the temporary restraining order into a preliminary injunction. Among other things, the preliminary injunction included an exhibit listing the specific Canadian products that would be considered low-risk and details of required risk mitigations.

To accomplish our review of USDA's actions pertaining to the importation of Canadian products, we interviewed officials from APHIS, the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), and the Office of the General Counsel (OGC). We analyzed APHIS records relating to the oversight of imported Canadian product, to include a review of the 1,155 import permits and associated documentation. We met with personnel from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in Detroit, Michigan and Sweetgrass, Montana to understand their actions to enforce restrictions on the importation of ruminant products from Canada. We also visited FSIS import reinspection facilities located in Buffalo, New York; Detroit, Michigan; and Sweetgrass, Montana. At these facilities, we analyzed documentation on file for 12,427 shipments of ruminant products to determine whether the product imported from Canada met APHIS requirements. These facilities reinspected more than 646 million of the 802 million pounds of Canadian product presented for entry into the United States between September 2003 and September 2004.

From August 2003 to April 2004, APHIS officials allowed a gradual expansion in the types of Canadian beef products approved for import into the United States. The expansions in product type included processed products, bone-in product, and edible bovine tongues, hearts, kidneys, and lips. In October 2003, APHIS allowed bovine tongues despite the APHIS Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (TSE) Working Group4

2 The International Office of Epizootics, the international standard-setting organization for animal health, established these guidelines.

3 As of September 16, 2004.

4 Created by APHIS to analyze risks of BSE to the United States, disseminate accurate information about TSEs, and act as a reference source for responding to questions about TSEs.

USDA/OIG-A/33601-01-Hy Page iii

conclusion in June 2003 that fresh or frozen bovine tongues were "moderate risk" products,5 even when the required risk mitigations were in place. Thus, bovine tongues, one of the items for which APHIS approved import permits, were deemed as posing a "moderate risk," and not a "low risk" by the APHIS TSE Working Group.

The Chairperson of the TSE Working Group explained that the risk status for bovine tongues changed from moderate to low some time between June and November 2003, although the change was not documented prior to the November 2003 issuance of APHIS' "Risk Analysis: BSE Risk from Importation of Designated Ruminants and Ruminant Products from Canada into the United States." The risk analysis categorized bovine tongues as eligible product when Canadian inspection officials verify the risk mitigation, which is that tonsils are removed.

Additionally, APHIS allowed an expansion in the type of Canadian facilities that would be allowed to produce items for export to the United States. The gradual expansion occurred because the agency employees tasked with administering the permit process did not consider the initial announcement made by the Secretary to exclude products similar to those on the published list of low-risk products, if APHIS had concluded that the products posed similar risk levels. However, APHIS did not develop documentation to support the agency's conclusions that the additional products were low-risk products. APHIS also did not have a review structure or other monitoring process in place to identify discrepancies between publicly stated policy and agency practice. According to APHIS officials, they considered the initial announcement made by the Secretary to be part of an effort to demonstrate to the world that such trade with Canada was safe and appropriate. Accordingly, they allowed the import of products they considered low risk in an attempt to further that greater effort. However, APHIS did not document the process it used to determine the additional products were low risk.

As a result of the "permit creep" that occurred between August 2003 and April 2004, APHIS issued permits for the import of beef tongue as well as other permits for products with questionable eligibility. Further, the agency allowed the import of products from Canadian facilities that produced both eligible and ineligible products, thus increasing the possibility that higher-risk product could be inadvertently exported to the United States. This practice contrasted with APHIS' publicly stated policy that only Canadian facilities that limited production to eligible products would be allowed to ship to the United States. In addition, APHIS did not

5 "Recommendations of APHIS TSE Working Group for allowing certain commodities from Canada to be imported into the United States," dated June 16, 2003. When required risk mitigation measures are in place, to include various CFIA verifications, removal of tonsils, and random sample analysis by USDA of any suspicious tissue to confirm absence of specified risk materials, fresh and frozen bovine tongues have a "moderate" risk.

USDA/OIG-A/33601-01-Hy Page iv

communicate its decisions to all interested parties and USDA was criticized by segments of the public, the cattle industry, and the U.S. Congress.

APHIS issued permits to allow the import of beef cheek meat with questionable eligibility because the agency did not establish a clear working definition for the general term "boneless beef." Instead of coordinating with FSIS, APHIS reviewers relied upon their own understanding of the term. Some APHIS reviewers considered the term "boneless beef" broadly, to mean any bovine meat that did not contain a bone. Thus, some applicants who requested permits to import beef cheek meat and other products received permits allowing the import of "boneless beef or boneless beef trim." As a result, over 63,000 pounds of beef cheek meat with questionable eligibility entered U.S. commerce from Canada.

Further, we found that FSIS did not always communicate effectively about the eligibility status of beef cheek meat. FSIS distributed information to its import inspectors by way of a series of numbered memoranda, titled Part 4, Canada, BSE Restrictions, Revision 2 through Revision 11. Some of the issuances were supplemented by additional guidance, in the form of supplemental memoranda. However, in our opinion, FSIS managers did not ensure consistent interpretation of the provisions of the various memoranda, a factor that contributed to the entry of the previously mentioned 63,000 pounds of beef cheek meat with questionable eligibility. Because APHIS changed its instructions to FSIS frequently and did not document the direction provided to FSIS,6 it was even more difficult for FSIS to keep its field staff fully apprised of the status of product eligibility.

FSIS officials did not agree that the import inspectors misinterpreted the instructions in the numbered memoranda. Furthermore, FSIS officials asserted that the 63,000 pounds of beef cheek meat was eligible for import when it was imported from April to June 2004. However, they agreed that controls should be strengthened to better communicate the eligibility of product that frequently changed as beef cheeks did from August 2003 to July 2004. Two FSIS import inspectors we interviewed advised us that beef cheeks had been "going back and forth" regarding eligibility. APHIS notified FSIS that effective July 20, 2004, beef cheek meat was not an eligible product for import into the United States. According to APHIS direction, beef cheek meat has not been eligible for import since July 20, 2004. As of the date of this report, it is still not eligible for import. Some FSIS officials assert that the beef cheek meat was eligible product. In contrast, the APHIS National Incident Commander for BSE Enhanced Surveillance stated in an August 18, 2004 interview, that further discussion was still required with respect to the import of cheek meat and that no new

6 We found that APHIS did not document its direction to FSIS prior to April 2004 when the Ranchers-Cattlemen Action Legal Fund (R-CALF) filed a lawsuit against USDA in U.S. District Court in Montana.

scientific information on this topic had been considered by APHIS. Given the importance of the issues, ongoing litigation, and differences in scientific opinion, it would have been prudent for APHIS to write down its decisions about the eligibility status of beef cheek meat at points in time. However, the agency did not do so; or did not retain such documentation for our review.

In January 2005, FSIS assessed the shipments of beef check meat and concluded, "FSIS has no reason to believe that these four shipments7 of beef cheek meat are injurious to health." In its assessment, FSIS explained that in January 2004, the agency implemented interim final rules that prohibited the use of specified risk materials for human food. On the matter of beef cheek meat, the FSIS rule maintained that beef cheeks are not part of the skull, which is a specified risk material. The FSIS rule continued to allow the use of beef cheek meat for human food, provided that the meat is not contaminated with specified risk materials. FSIS further supported its conclusion on the basis that Canada had a pre-existing equivalent specified risk material system in place. However, as previously noted, beef cheek meat is not a product that is currently eligible to be imported into the United States.

APHIS issued 1,155 permits for the importation of ruminant products from Canada without ensuring that the agency had an appropriate system of internal controls to manage the process. The APHIS permit system was originally designed to allow for the import of research quantities (generally small amounts) of material into the United States. According to APHIS officials, this permit system handled approximately 400 permit requests annually. The procedures that APHIS had developed for handling permit requests for small amounts of product were not adequate to deal with the high volume of requests for large quantities of commercial use beef. The agency did not implement or finalize standard operating procedures for processing the large volume of permits. For example, APHIS did not establish controls to ensure that risk mitigation measures were consistently applied. We found that 8 of the 83 permits issued for bovine liver did not include the risk mitigation measure that the livers be from animals slaughtered after August 8, 2003.8 We also found that APHIS did not implement requirements to perform onsite monitoring of permit holders, Canadian facilities, or inspection personnel9 at U.S. ports of entry. As a result, there was reduced assurance that Canadian beef entering the United States was low-risk. Some product with questionable eligibility, as described above, entered U.S. commerce. ...snip...full text;

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/33601-01-HY.pdf

February 2005

MAD COW DISEASE

FDA's Management of the Feed Ban Has

Improved, but Oversight Weaknesses

Continue to Limit Program Effectiveness

FDA has made needed improvements to its management and oversight of the

feed-ban rule in response to GAO's 2002 report, but program weaknesses

continue to limit the effectiveness of the ban and place U.S. cattle at risk of

spreading BSE. Improvements made include FDA establishing a uniform

method of conducting compliance inspections and training FDA inspectors,

as well as state inspectors who carry out inspections under agreements with

FDA, on the new method. FDA also implemented new data-entry procedures

that are designed to more reliably track feed-ban inspection results.

Consequently, FDA has a better management tool for overseeing compliance

with the feed-ban rule and a data system that better conforms to standard

database management practices. However, various program weaknesses

continue to undermine the nation's firewall against BSE. For example:

• FDA acknowledges that there are more feed manufacturers and

transporters, on-farm mixers, and other feed industry businesses that are

subject to the feed ban than the approximately 14,800 firms inspected to

date; however, it has no uniform approach for identifying additional

firms.

• FDA has not reinspected approximately 2,800, or about 19 percent, of

those businesses, in 5 or more years; several hundred are potentially

high risk. FDA does not know whether those businesses now use

prohibited material in their feed.

• FDA's feed-ban inspection guidance does not include instructions to

routinely sample cattle feed to test for potentially prohibited material as

part of the compliance inspection. Instead, it includes guidance for

inspectors to visually examine facilities and equipment and review

invoices and other documents.

• Feed intended for export is not required to carry a caution label "Do not

feed to cattle or other ruminants," when the label would be required if

the feed were sold domestically. Without that statement, feed containing

prohibited material could be inadvertently or intentionally diverted back

to U.S. cattle or given to foreign cattle.

• FDA has not always alerted USDA and states when it learned that cattle

may have been given feed that contained prohibited material. This lapse

has been occurring even though FDA's guidance calls for such

communication.

• Although research suggests that cattle can get BSE from ingesting even a

small amount of infected material, inspectors do not routinely inspect or

review cleanout procedures for vehicles used to haul cattle feed.

http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d05101high.pdf

FULL TEXT;

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05101.pdf

BSE – An Emerging Issue: With the discovery of a BSE-infected cow in Washington State in

December 2003, the Department faces another challenge in food safety, as well as the related

impact on the health of the U.S. cattle population. OIG recently completed audit and

investigative reviews focusing on the BSE surveillance program's purposes, objectives, policies,

procedures, and related management controls. During the audit we found the following

challenges in identifying, obtaining, and testing cattle in the high-risk population: cattle

condemned at slaughter were not always tested for BSE; there was no formal process for testing

rabies-negative samples for BSE; a process for obtaining samples from animals that "died on the

farm" has not been developed; and confusion may arise regarding non-standardized age

requirements for BSE.

Our investigation of the BSE-positive cow in Washington State did reveal procedural errors and

inconsistent descriptions that gave rise to some of the public concerns that the identification of

the BSE-positive cow may have been mishandled. We also investigated the cow identified as

having Central Nervous System (CNS) symptoms by an FSIS veterinarian in Texas that was not

tested for BSE after it had been slaughtered. Evidence shows that at the time of this incident,

communication problems occurred between the APHIS and FSIS employees involved. Taken

together, the statements of both APHIS and FSIS personnel and other evidence indicate

inconsistencies in their understanding of procedures for BSE tissue sampling of CNS suspect

cattle in certain circumstances, and the handling of the carcass pending test results.

Page 6

ACTION NEEDED TO ADDRESS THE CHALLENGE: FSIS needs to identify

management controls for all levels of the organization in monitoring HACCP, improving recall

activities, and completing an in-depth assessment of the organizational and control structure over

the imported meat and poultry process. FSIS has issued new or updated directives, which will

provide enhancements; however, the directives have not always been responsive to specific OIG

recommendations or provided enough detail for OIG to determine what will actually be

implemented.

For BSE, the Department needs to have a supportable methodology for assessing the

effectiveness of its overall surveillance program. A supportable methodology is essential to

provide credibility for any USDA assertion regarding the prevalence of BSE in the United States.

Also, performance measures and continuous risk analyses are needed to better target limited

resources and assess whether all program participants are fulfilling their respective roles and

responsibilities.

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/Management%20Challenges%20Final%20083004.pdf

[GAO-05-101 ] Mad Cow Disease: FDA's Management of the Feed Ban Has Improved, but Oversight Weaknesses Continue to Limit Program Effectiveness Size: 104986 , Score: 1000 , TEXT , PDF , SUMMARY

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.88&filename=d05101.txt&directory=/diskb/wais/data/gao

[2]

[GAO-05-101 ] Mad Cow Disease: FDA's Management of the Feed Ban Has Improved, but Oversight Weaknesses Continue to Limit Program Effectiveness Size: 104986 , Score: 1000 , TEXT , PDF , SUMMARY

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.88&filename=d05101.txt&directory=/diskb/wais/data/gao

Defense opens case Cattlemen vs. Oprah Winfrey

By CHIP CHANDLER Globe-News Staff Writer

snip...

Van Smith, a reporter with City Paper in Baltimore, testified about an article he wrote on rendering plants. Smith said he saw sheep taken to a plant despite a voluntary ban on using processed sheep in protein-enhanced feed, backing up a statement Lyman made on Winfrey's show.

Under cross-examination, Smith said he was not sure whether the sheep were used for feed or other animal-derived products.

snip...

Van Smith, a reporter with City Paper in Baltimore, testified about an article he wrote on rendering plants. Smith said he saw sheep taken to a plant despite a voluntary ban on using processed sheep in protein-enhanced feed, backing up a statement Lyman made on Winfrey's show.

Under cross-examination, Smith said he was not sure whether the sheep were used for feed or other animal-derived products.

http://www.amarillonet.com/ns-search/stories/021998/036-3052.001.shtml?NS-search-set=/3704d/aaaa2813004db0d&NS-doc-offset=5&

Web posted Wednesday, February 18, 1998 2:02 p.m. CT

Graphic pictures greet Winfrey jury

By KAY LEDBETTER Globe-News Farm and Ranch Editor

Pictures of sheep heads, euthanized pets and roadkill greeted jurors this morning as they returned to the continuation of the cattlemen vs. Oprah Winfrey lawsuit.

The lawsuit continues today in U.S. District Mary Lou Robinson's court, but in a much diminished state.

snip...

Defense lawyer Charles Babcock called Van Smith, a City Paper reporter from Baltimore who had written an article on rendering plants in September 1995.

Smith and Babcock went through more than 50 pictures taken as the reporter toured the Valley Proteins plant in Baltimore and followed a rendering truck to the local animal shelter, a sausage plant and a slaughterhouse.

The pictures showed offal being emptied from the slaughterhouses. They showed animal shelter workers in the euthanasia room; barrels of dead animals in a refrigerated room at the animal shelter; waste meat from the sausage plant; and dead sheep from the slaughterhouse.

http://www.amarillonet.com/stories/021898/graphic.shtml

Web posted Friday, January 23, 1998 5:49 a.m. CT

Witness testifies some ill cattle sent to rendering plant

By CHIP CHANDLER Globe-News Staff Writer

snip...

Mike Engler -- son of Paul Engler, the original plaintiff and owner of Cactus Feeders Inc. -- agreed that more than 10 cows with some sort of central nervous system disorder were sent to Hereford By-Products.

The younger Engler, who has a doctorate in biochemistry from Johns Hopkins University, was the only witness jurors heard Thursday in the Oprah Winfrey defamation trial. His testimony will resume this morning.

According to a U.S. Department of Agriculture report from which Winfrey attorney Charles Babcock quoted, encephalitis caused by unknown reasons could be a warning sign for bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or mad cow disease.

Encephalitis was indicated on the death certificates -- or ``dead slips'' -- of three Cactus Feeders cows discussed in court. The slips then were stamped, ``Picked up by your local used cattle dealer'' before the carcasses were taken to the rendering plant.

snip...

http://www.amarillonet.com/ns-search/stories/012398/cattle.shtml?NS-search-set=/3704d/aaaa2813004db0d&NS-doc-offset=93&


these are just a few of a long laundry list, that are NOT my opinions. ...


TSS

 

[fedup2]

If you want to cut to the 'meat' of one of flounders posts, copy it all to Microsoft works. Then cut out all of the snip- snip BS. Now you have reduced it from 4 pages to 1. Take that page and delete all personal opinions and garbage like the following:

"it appears"
"compounded by incomplete knowledge"
"we made a preliminary estimate"
"it also appears to me"
" I suppose"
"invites the accusation"
"fairly clearly implied"

Now you are ready to read the facts. What! :shock: The page is empty! You will find this true of most everything he posts here!
:roll: :roll: :roll:
----------------------------

Burnt, you swing a pretty wide loop. Be careful of your "rope a dope" type questions. You might find yourself tangled up in that loop!
:lol:
I will tell you this. When I grill at home, I grill hamburger or steak. When I eat out, it is usually burger or steak. When I visit friends and relatives in Canada or go to one of your casino's, I eat burger or steak! I feel beef is one of the safest foods to eat! Is that simple or plain enough for you?
As far as testing, if a customer like Japan or Korea wants their beef tested, why the hell not? Test them and sell them! Is that simple enough for you?

 

[burnt]

For your testing comments - I am in complete agreement with you. Let's sit down and have a steak together. I like T-bone or prime rib, medium rare. How do you like yours?

But on the roping issue - I need to appeal to the cowboys on here for an answer. At this point, do you recommend that I tie off or dally?

 

[flounder]

snip fedup2 BSe out to...tss
As far as testing, if a customer like Japan or Korea wants their beef tested, why the hell not? Test them and sell them! Is that simple enough for you?

fedup2, you failed to mention American consumer ???

what about consumers in America, what about bse testing for them ???




tss

 

[fedup2]

The only tests that I care about are for e-coli. If the meat was handled properly, that to would be a non issue for me. The majority of people keeping bse in the spot light are peta, vegi-heads, & people like you crying wolf every chance they get. How much beef do you thing the above mentioned consume? Again, non-issue!

Burnt, sorry, you must be younger than I thought. The "rope a dope" was coined by Mohammad Ali. He would lay against the ropes and cover up his head with his gloves and his belly with his elbows. Then his opponents would think he was in trouble and punch with everything they had. He would let them do this for a few rounds until they punched themselves out. Then when they had nothing left, he would come off the ropes and kick their butts.

 

[flounder]

The only tests that I care about are for e-coli. If the meat was handled properly, that to would be a non issue for me. The majority of people keeping bse in the spot light are peta, vegi-heads, & people like you crying wolf every chance they get. How much beef do you thing the above mentioned consume? Again, non-issue! ...snip more BSe from fedup2...tss

again, and as usual, your blowing a lot of hot air there fedup2.

your dancing like a girl with a skirt on, or like GW does the Texas two step.

you spout off about bse mad cow testing for Japan and Korea consumers, and then call all consumers in the USA, and i quote ;


''The majority of people keeping bse in the spot light are peta, vegi-heads, & people like you crying wolf every chance they get. How much beef do you thing the above mentioned consume? Again, non-issue! ''


what are you saying there fedup2, that anyone in the USA, that is a consumer that wants their beef tested for BSE mad cow all vegiheads and people that cry wolf, but for the Korea and Japan consumer, they are just consumers wanting a safe mad cow free product ???

so it's an issue for the consumer of Japan, for a consumer in Korea, but it's a non-issue for the consumer in the USA. you beat all there fedup2, you are as about as full of BSe, as one could be, and you just proved it.


USA consumers are not as good a customer as the Koreans and Japan.
feed the USA consumer slop and make them like it, must be fedup2's motto.


why is this, why is it good to test for BSE for Japan and Korea consumer, but NOT the USA consumer $$$


tss

 

[flounder]

Prion disease and gene types

Dr Simon Mead and Professor John Collinge, NHS National Prion Clinic

Readers will be well aware that by eating contaminated food in the 1980s and early 1990s, much of the UK population has been potentially exposed to Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE, commonly known as 'mad cow disease'). For over a decade we have known that the infectious agent or prion that causes BSE may also infect humans, causing the fatal brain illness variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD). While, fortunately, numbers of patients developing vCJD have been relatively small so far, and indeed numbers of patients seen have been falling in recent years, we do not know how many people might be silently infected with BSE prions. It is known that it may take several decades for signs of the disease to show and that our genetic make up is important in determining this. From research in laboratory mice, we also know that some may become 'carriers' of the infection but do not themselves develop the disease. People with such a 'subclinical' infection would still pose a potential risk to others by blood donation or contamination of surgical instruments for example.

the importance of gene types

We have known for many years that a common variation in a gene, known as the prion protein gene, is very important in determining the risk of developing prion diseases and how long it takes for the disease to develop when someone becomes infected. There are three genetic types in the UK population known as MM, VV and MV. So far, vCJD has only affected people with MM genetic type. Around 40% of healthy people in the UK are MM, about 50% are MV and around 10% are VV. It is likely that BSE prions will infect people of the VV and MV types also, but they may have much longer incubation periods (the time taken from being infected with prions until the brain disease becomes apparent) and may also develop a pattern of disease which may be different to vCJD. We suspect this again as result of research in laboratory mice wher e those that had the VV and MV genes had a different type of disease and different types or 'strains' of prions developed. Kuru was an epidemic prion disease which affected the Fore people living in the Eastern Highlands of Papua New Guinea. It was the practice in these communities before 1960 to consume their dead at mortuary feasts as a mark of respect and mourning and this led to the prion infection passing between people. Kuru has now largely disappeared but from studies over the past decade we have learned that the incubation periods can be over 50 years and that the MM, VV and MV people have different incubation periods, MV individuals having the longest. A similar effect was seen in people accidentally infected with prions when they were treated with growth hormone injections before 1985 (so called iatrogenic CJD).

an unusual diagnosis

Some years ago at the National Prion Clinic we looked after a young woman with a severe dementia and loss of balance. Her examination and other tests such as her MRI brain scan suggested that her diagnosis was sporadic CJD. Most patients with sporadic CJD are MM, but the disease also occurs in VV and MV patients. Her genetic type was VV. After she died we investigated the cause of death further by microscopic examination of the brain, and by testing the abnormal prion protein deposits in the brain. Sporadic CJD is usually a disease of late adult life while vCJD has largely occurred in young adults. Because she was young, we obviously wished to consider the possibility that her illness was related to BSE rather than being a sporadic case. The autopsy findings were not typical of sporadic CJD, with a lot of prion protein deposited in the brain. However, these changes were not similar to vCJD either. Also in vCJD, prions are deposited at high levels in certain tissues outside the brain and spinal cord known as lymphoreticular tissues (lymph nodes, tonsil and spleen for example) but these samples were not available for analysis from this patient.

prion strains

Prions occur in different forms or strains. These can be distinguished by looking at the rogue prion protein (known as PrPSc) from brain tissue. In this patient we found a molecular strain different from any of the types we have seen in sporadic CJD and similar to that which we see in vCJD (which we call type 4 PrPSc). Although quite similar to type 4, we showed that the new type was different because it could be distinguished from the typical vCJD pattern by additional special tests.

summary

In summary, although this young woman clearly died of a prion disease, we could not conclude she had vCJD, but also we could not be sure this was sporadic CJD either. Although we were not able to make definite conclusions on the basis of a single patient, we felt it important to report this tragic death and these findings in the medical literature so as to bring this to the attention of other doctors who might see similar patients in the future. This unusual finding reminds us of the importance of keeping alert to the possibility that BSE prions will cause disease in individuals with different genetic types, who may develop a disease that may resemble sporadic CJD, or vCJD, or have a new pattern of disease. This work emphasises the importance of continuing to study the rogue prion protein type in patients and we thank all patients and families who have kindly consented to use their, or their loved one's, tissues for this medical research.

Reference: Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease, Prion Protein Gene Codon 129VV, and a Novel PrPSc Type in a Young British Woman Simon Mead; Susan Joiner; Melanie Desbruslais; Jonathan A. Beck; Michael O' Donoghue; Peter Lantos; Jonathan D. F. Wadsworth; John Collinge Arch Neurol. 2007;64(12):1780-1784.

www.cjdsupport.net Newsletter issue 17 april 2008


USA 2008

Another Young Suspect Vcjd Case In Usa (3rd In Recent Weeks), TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY

http://organicconsumers.org/forum/index.php?s=71e4aa3ad5237e46d182cdfcdd167cb0&showtopic=1413&pid=5798&st=0&#entry5798


TSS

 

[fedup2]

I thought my statement: ["As far as testing, if a customer like Japan or Korea wants their beef tested, why the hell not? Test them and sell them!]
was simple enough so that anyone with an IQ at least equal to that of a fence post could understand. I apologize for overestimating yours flounderer. I am not sure what else to try here. If I dummy myself down enough to communicate on your level, I'm afraid I'd slip into a coma! As far as your interpretation of what I wrote, if you are looking for a diagnosis, I would have to say you are suffering from a severe case of Rectal-Cranial Inversion!

snip

snip

snip

 

[flounder]

I thought my statement: ["As far as testing, if a customer like Japan or Korea wants their beef tested, why the hell not? Test them and sell them!]
was simple enough so that anyone with an IQ at least equal to that of a fence post could understand. I apologize for overestimating yours flounderer. I am not sure what else to try here. If I dummy myself down enough to communicate on your level, I'm afraid I'd slip into a coma! As far as your interpretation of what I wrote, if you are looking for a diagnosis, I would have to say you are suffering from a severe case of Rectal-Cranial Inversion!

snip

snip

snip

well slap my momma and call me a fencepost there fedup2.

you still did not answer my question.


fedup2 wrote:

"As far as testing, if a customer like Japan or Korea wants their beef tested, why the hell not? Test them and sell them! Is that simple enough for you? "


then i ask


"what about consumers in America, what about bse testing for them ??? "


you have still failed to answer that question.


what about consumers in America, what about bse testing for US consumer, do you support this ???

call me a fencepost, an expert on cow farts, suffering from a severe case of Rectal-Cranial Inversion, call me anything, but answer that question. or do you dare $

don't come back and waste my time there fedup2, until you can answer that question, i got flounder to fry up, and there bigger fish than you will ever be i.e. i got bigger fish to fry :wink:


tss

 

[fedup2]

Do I dare answer your question! You are one arrogant sob. As I stated before, if Japan demands testing, test them and sell them. Why would it be any different here. If the American people demand testing, test them and sell them!
But! The American people are not demanding testing for BSE. Despite your best efforts, only your peta and vegi-head sites are hearing your cry of wolf & they don't eat beef anyway! As far as having bigger fish to fry, that is just your ego talking, floundered or should I say floundering!
I believe most people can see through your bs substantiated only by more of your own bs.
Oh ya, I forgot about your so called experts, "looks like, could be, maybe, this leans toward, blah blah! As far as your wanna-be insult, "you dance like a girl with a skirt on" :roll: :roll: :roll: I have to give you credit for one thing, that was the dumbest @ss wanna-be insult that I ever heard! :lol: :lol: :lol:

Most people already have you figured out. http://consumerfreedom.com/article_detail.cfm/article/138

Terry Singletary -- A retired machinist and high school dropout, Terry Singletary suffered the tragic loss of his mother to "sporadic" Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) in 1997. Desperate to find an explanation for his mother's death, he has devoted himself to the sad and fruitless task of connecting her death to her diet. Various reports confirm that Mrs. Singletary's life was claimed by the most common sub-type of CJD (one that accounts for 70 percent of "sporadic" cases). Sporadic CJD, unlike its newer "variant," is not linked to meat.
As the self-appointed international coordinator of CJD Watch, an organization he co-founded with social worker Deborah Oney, Singletary is cited in media reports as an apparent expert on tracking mad cow disease. This despite his lack of formal education and the absence for support from any credible academic, medical or scientific authority. His sensationalist allegations about the safety of U.S. beef have found their way into hundreds of newspapers and broadcasts. Singletary moderates a mad-cow discussion forum run by a vegetarian activist group; his contributions account for more than half the traffic on the "BSE-L" mailing list, which is generally read by real scientists. Animal rights activists and other food-scare artists frequently refer to him as "Dr. Terry Singletary," apparently an honorary degree as he has yet to finish high school.
Like many activists, Singletary ignores overwhelming epidemiological and laboratory evidence that rules out a connection between sporadic CJD and beef. Relying entirely on shallow circumstantial evidence and frequent repetition of claims which have been publicly refuted as false, he also blindly insists upon a mad-cow with Alzheimer's, Parkinson's, and Lou Gehrig's disease. His specific allegations have been clearly refuted by Centers for Disease Countrol and Prevention scientists in the journal Neurology.

 

[flounder]

Do I dare answer your question! You are one arrogant sob. As I stated before, if Japan demands testing, test them and sell them. Why would it be any different here. If the American people demand testing, test them and sell them!
But! The American people are not demanding testing for BSE. Despite your best efforts, only your peta and vegi-head sites are hearing your cry of wolf & they don't eat beef anyway! As far as having bigger fish to fry, that is just your ego talking, floundered or should I say floundering!
I believe most people can see through your bs substantiated only by more of your own bs.
Oh ya, I forgot about your so called experts, "looks like, could be, maybe, this leans toward, blah blah! As far as your wanna-be insult, "you dance like a girl with a skirt on" :roll: :roll: :roll: I have to give you credit for one thing, that was the dumbest @ss wanna-be insult that I ever heard! :lol: :lol: :lol:

Most people already have you figured out. http://consumerfreedom.com/article_detail.cfm/article/138

Terry Singletary -- A retired machinist and high school dropout, Terry Singletary suffered the tragic loss of his mother to "sporadic" Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) in 1997. Desperate to find an explanation for his mother's death, he has devoted himself to the sad and fruitless task of connecting her death to her diet. Various reports confirm that Mrs. Singletary's life was claimed by the most common sub-type of CJD (one that accounts for 70 percent of "sporadic" cases). Sporadic CJD, unlike its newer "variant," is not linked to meat.
As the self-appointed international coordinator of CJD Watch, an organization he co-founded with social worker Deborah Oney, Singletary is cited in media reports as an apparent expert on tracking mad cow disease. This despite his lack of formal education and the absence for support from any credible academic, medical or scientific authority. His sensationalist allegations about the safety of U.S. beef have found their way into hundreds of newspapers and broadcasts. Singletary moderates a mad-cow discussion forum run by a vegetarian activist group; his contributions account for more than half the traffic on the "BSE-L" mailing list, which is generally read by real scientists. Animal rights activists and other food-scare artists frequently refer to him as "Dr. Terry Singletary," apparently an honorary degree as he has yet to finish high school.
Like many activists, Singletary ignores overwhelming epidemiological and laboratory evidence that rules out a connection between sporadic CJD and beef. Relying entirely on shallow circumstantial evidence and frequent repetition of claims which have been publicly refuted as false, he also blindly insists upon a mad-cow with Alzheimer's, Parkinson's, and Lou Gehrig's disease. His specific allegations have been clearly refuted by Centers for Disease Countrol and Prevention scientists in the journal Neurology.

Hello there fedup2. i thought i must comment on your latest BSe, with a few scientific facts. i know how much you hate to hear about them.

1st off, if i wanted to insult you, you would know it. your child like insults and name calling only show what little of a man you really are. like i said before, call me what you like, but answer the question. in which you kinda finally did. but at the same time, you tried to make like the USA consumer does not want there beef tested for BSE. you claim that USA costumer does not want this, and i beg to differ. i could give you a list of about 500+ on cjdvoice that would challenge you on that claim. me being one of them. i even know ranchers that want USA beef testing for BSE.

2ndly, i want to personally thank you for posting that article on consumerfreedom site. i love that article, and every time someone tries to discredit me with it, all it does is give me more credit, because everything i wrote in the journal of neurology (peer review), has come to pass. i can't believe those folks still have that article up. let's take another look at it ;

>>>Terry Singletary -- A retired machinist and high school dropout, Terry Singletary suffered the tragic loss of his mother to "sporadic" Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) in 1997. Desperate to find an explanation for his mother's death, he has devoted himself to the sad and fruitless task of connecting her death to her diet. Various reports confirm that Mrs. Singletary's life was claimed by the most common sub-type of CJD (one that accounts for 70 percent of "sporadic" cases). Sporadic CJD, unlike its newer "variant," is not linked to meat.<<<

well, in part that statement is wrong and right. i have consistently said that i have no idea what the source and route of the hvCJD my mother had, but it could be iCJD i.e. friendly fire, and it could be eating beef, or both, considering that the USA has no documented cases of the BSE, the last two cases were _atypical BSE_, (BSE being only documented in imported case from Canada;-) so it is therefore possible and most likely that the USA strain of CJD from consumption of beef, would not look like the nvCJD of the UK BSE. one thing i do know, it did not just happen spontaneously, like everyone wanted me to believe. and indeed, science has shown that some of these atypical BSE cases, some of these atypical BSE cases have shown that they are more like some subtypes of sporadic CJD. this has been well documented in science literature and i have posted it one this site more times than i care to count. so, in fact, these comments have come to pass as being correct. and the statement that i am a high school drop out is correct, however i did go on to get my GED in the Navy, and i did get a few hours of junior college under my belt, but still no PhDs. BUT, the statement here is simply wrong ;

>>>Sporadic CJD, unlike its newer "variant," is not linked to meat.<<<

the meat of the issue i.e. facts are, they simply do not know yet, but have more evidence that in fact, there are more than one strain of BSE in the bovine, one that looks more like some sub-types of sporadic CJD. AS most folks have figured out by now, sporadic CJD is not a single strain, it is simply a term used for CJD of unknown routes and sources, of many strains, and they are mounting. and why would this be so difficult to understand, when Scrapie, the key model to all TSEs, over 20 typical strains are documented, with atypical strains growing. the routes and sources of these TSE will be known eventually, once the government and the industry allow science to move along.

This study further confirms that BASE is caused by a distinct prion isolate and discloses a novel disease phenotype in cattle, closely resembling the phenotype previous reported in scrapie-inoculated cattle

*** and in some subtypes of inherited and sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.

http://www.prion2007.com/pdf/Prion%20Book%20of%20Abstracts.pdf

The Italian cases (11 and 15 years of age) originally named bovine amyloidotic spongiform encephalopathy (BASE) were characterized by an unglycosylated protein band with a lower molecular mass (thus named L cases) and the predominance of the monoglycosylated band. In addition, immunohistochemical detection of PrPres in these cases found greater deposits in the cerebral cortex and thalamus versus the brain stem. The French cases found a higher molecular mass associated with the unglycosylated protein band and were called H cases (see figure 1). *** The different "strains" are now called atypical BSE. ...

full text, skroll down to page 6 ;

http://www.usaha.org/committees/reports/2006/report-fe-2006.pdf

MAD COW DISEASE terminology UK c-BSE (typical), atypical BSE H or L, and or Italian L-BASE

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/03/mad-cow-disease-terminology-uk-c-bse.html

AS implied in the Inset 25 we must not _ASSUME_ that transmission of BSE to other species will invariably present pathology typical of a scrapie-like disease.

snip...

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1991/01/04004001.pdf

NOT to forget the 5 cases of the NOR-98 atypical scrapie documented in the USA in 2007, in five different states. WHICH pathologically looks like some sub-types of sporadic CJD, of which Stanely Prusiner warns of a public health risk ;

***The pathology features of Nor98 in the cerebellum of the affected sheep showed similarities with those of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.

http://www.prion2007.com/pdf/Prion%20Book%20of%20Abstracts.pdf

Here we report that both Nor98 and discordant cases, including three sheep homozygous for the resistant PrPARR allele (A136R154R171), efficiently transmitted the disease to transgenic mice expressing ovine PrP, and that they shared unique biological and biochemical features upon propagation in mice. These observations support the view that a truly infectious TSE agent, unrecognized until recently, infects sheep and goat flocks and may have important implications in terms of scrapie control and public health.

Edited by Stanley B. Prusiner, University of California, San Francisco, CA, and approved September 12, 2005 (received for review March 21, 2005)

http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/0502296102v1

http://nor-98.blogspot.com/

NEXT

>>>As the self-appointed international coordinator of CJD Watch, an organization he co-founded with social worker Deborah Oney, Singletary is cited in media reports as an apparent expert on tracking mad cow disease. This despite his lack of formal education and the absence for support from any credible academic, medical or scientific authority. His sensationalist allegations about the safety of U.S. beef have found their way into hundreds of newspapers and broadcasts. Singletary moderates a mad-cow discussion forum run by a vegetarian activist group; his contributions account for more than half the traffic on the "BSE-L" mailing list, which is generally read by real scientists. Animal rights activists and other food-scare artists frequently refer to him as "Dr. Terry Singletary," apparently an honorary degree as he has yet to finish high school. <<<


well lets see there fedup2, for a high school drop out, etc. etc. let's look at a few peer review journals ;


Journal of American Medical Association

Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734. Vol. 285 No. 6, February 14, 2001 JAMA

Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

To the Editor: In their Research Letter, Dr Gibbons and colleagues1 reported that the annual US death rate due to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) has been stable since 1985. These estimates, however, are based only on reported cases, and do not include misdiagnosed or preclinical cases. It seems to me that misdiagnosis alone would drastically change these figures. An unknown number of persons with a diagnosis of Alzheimer disease in fact may have CJD, although only a small number of these patients receive the postmortem examination necessary to make this diagnosis. Furthermore, only a few states have made CJD reportable. Human and animal transmissible spongiform encephalopathies should be reportable nationwide and internationally.

Terry S. Singeltary, Sr Bacliff, Tex

1. Gibbons RV, Holman RC, Belay ED, Schonberger LB. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States: 1979-1998. JAMA. 2000;284:2322-2323. FREE FULL TEXT

http://jama.ama-assn.org/


2 January 2000 British Medical Journal

U.S. Scientist should be concerned with a CJD epidemic in the U.S., as well

http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/320/7226/8/b#6117


15 November 1999 British Medical Journal vCJD in the USA * BSE in U.S.

http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/319/7220/1312/b#5406


JOURNAL OF NEUROLOGY

MARCH 26, 2003

RE-Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States

Terry S. Singeltary:

http://www.neurology.org/cgi/eletters/60/2/176#535


NEXT


>>>Like many activists, Singletary ignores overwhelming epidemiological and laboratory evidence that rules out a connection between sporadic CJD and beef. Relying entirely on shallow circumstantial evidence and frequent repetition of claims which have been publicly refuted as false, he also blindly insists upon a mad-cow with Alzheimer's, Parkinson's, and Lou Gehrig's disease. His specific allegations have been clearly refuted by Centers for Disease Countrol and Prevention scientists in the journal Neurology.<<<


THIS is my favorite part. please let me explain why.


first off, let's look at exactly what that article said ;


JOURNAL OF NEUROLOGY

MARCH 26, 2003

RE-Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob

disease in the United States

Email Terry S. Singeltary:

[email protected]

I lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain Variant CJD). I would like to comment on the CDC's attempts to monitor the occurrence of emerging forms of CJD. Asante, Collinge et al [1] have reported that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest sporadic CJD. However, CJD and all human TSEs are not reportable nationally. CJD and all human TSEs must be made reportable in every state and internationally. I hope that the CDC does not continue to expect us to still believe that the 85%+ of all CJD cases which are sporadic are all spontaneous, without route/source. We have many TSEs in the USA in both animal and man. CWD in deer/elk is spreading rapidly and CWD does transmit to mink, ferret, cattle, and squirrel monkey b y intracerebral inoculation. With the known incubation periods in other TSEs, oral transmission studies of CWD may take much longer. Every victim/family of CJD/TSEs should be asked about route and source of this agent. To prolong this will only spread the agent and needlessly expose others. In light of the findings of Asante and Collinge et al, there should be drastic measures to safeguard the medical and surgical arena from sporadic CJDs and all human TSEs. I only ponder how many sporadic CJDs in the USA are type 2 PrPSc?

http://www.neurology.org/cgi/eletters/60/2/176#535


secondly, it was not epidemiological or laboratory evidence i was ignoring, it was the junk science the cattle industry and the bush administration is putting out, i.e. 'trust us, were your government speaking, and it's the truth'. TO date, i have proven them wrong with 'overwhelming epidemiological and laboratory evidence' of the atypical TSEs in human and animal. the shallow evidence they speak of has become stronger and stronger. the evidence in question has NOT been refuted as false i.e. common links to TSE and Alzheimers, in fact, the evidence is mounting. but all i stated in the JAMA journal and the Neurology journal was that CJD was being misdiagnosed and undercounted, due to Alzheimer's, and the fact CJD is not being reportable in every state, of every age group. ...


www.cjdsupport.net
Newsletter issue 17
april 2008


the importance of gene types

We have known for many years that a common variation in a gene, known as the prion protein gene, is very important in determining the risk of developing prion diseases and how long it takes for the disease to develop when someone becomes infected. There are three genetic types in the UK population known as MM, VV and MV. So far, vCJD has only affected people with MM genetic type. Around 40% of healthy people in the UK are MM, about 50% are MV and around 10% are VV. It is likely that BSE prions will infect people of the VV and MV types also, but they may have much longer incubation periods (the time taken from being infected with prions until the brain disease becomes apparent) and may also develop a pattern of disease which may be different to vCJD. We suspect this again as result of research in laboratory mice wher e those that had the VV and MV genes had a different type of disease and different types or 'strains' of prions developed.

snip...

This unusual finding reminds us of the importance of keeping alert to the possibility that BSE prions will cause disease in individuals with different genetic types, who may develop a disease that may resemble sporadic CJD, or vCJD, or have a new pattern of disease.

Prion disease and gene types

Dr Simon Mead and Professor John Collinge, NHS National Prion Clinic

Reference: Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease, Prion Protein Gene Codon 129VV, and a Novel PrPSc Type in a Young British Woman Simon Mead; Susan Joiner; Melanie Desbruslais; Jonathan A. Beck; Michael O' Donoghue; Peter Lantos; Jonathan D. F. Wadsworth; John Collinge Arch Neurol. 2007;64(12):1780-1784.


NEXT

Alzheimer's, CJD, and prions


Association between Deposition of Beta-Amyloid and Pathological Prion Protein in Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

Laura Debatin a Johannes Streffer b Markus Geissen c Jakob Matschke c Adriano Aguzzi a Markus Glatzel a, c

a Institute of Neuropathology, and b Division of Psychiatry Research, University Hospital Zurich, Zurich , Switzerland; c Institute of Neuropathology, University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf, Hamburg , Germany

Copyright © 2008 S. Karger AG, Basel

Abstract

Background: Alzheimer's disease (AD) and prion diseases such as sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (sCJD) share common features concerning their molecular pathogenesis and neuropathological presentation and the coexistence of AD and CJD in patients suggest an association between the deposition of the proteolytically processed form of the amyloid precursor protein, B -amyloid (A B ), which deposits in AD, and the abnormal form of the prion protein, PrP Sc , which deposits in sCJD. Methods: We have characterized sCJD patients (n = 14), AD patients (n = 5) and nondemented controls (n = 5) with respect to the deposition of PrP Sc and A B morphologically, biochemically and genetically and correlated these findings to clinical data. Results: sCJD-diseased individuals with abundant deposits of A B present with a specific clinicopathological profile, defined by higher age at disease onset, long disease duration, a genetic profile and only minimal amounts of PrP Sc in the cerebellum. Conclusion: The co-occurrence of pathological changes typical for sCJD and AD in combination with the inverse association between accumulation of A B and PrP Sc in a subgroup of sCJD patients is indicative of common pathways involved in the generation or clearance of A B and PrP Sc in a subgroup of sCJD patients.

Copyright © 2008 S. Karger AG, Basel

http://content.karger.com/produktedb/produkte.asp?typ=fulltext&file=000121389

Regarding Alzheimer's disease

(note the substantial increase on a yearly basis)

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1988/07/08014001.pdf

snip...

The pathogenesis of these diseases was compared to Alzheimer's disease at a molecular level...

snip...

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/03/12003001.pdf

And NONE of this is relevant to BSE?

There is also the matter whether the spectrum of ''prion disease'' is wider than that recognized at present.

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/07/06005001.pdf

Human BSE

snip...

These are not relevant to any possible human hazard from BSE nor to the much more common dementia, Alzheimers.

snip...

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/07/09001001.pdf


IN STRICT CONFIDENCE

TRANSMISSION OF ALZHEIMER-TYPE PLAQUES TO PRIMATES

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1993/01/05004001.pdf


please see full text ;

http://betaamyloidcjd.blogspot.com/


PLEASE see the old Duke, Pa, and other studies proving CJD being misdiagnosed as Alzheimer's

http://betaamyloidcjd.blogspot.com/2008/03/association-between-deposition-of-beta.html


Completely Edited Version

PRION ROUNDTABLE

PARKINSON'S, ALS, AND PRIONS STANLEY PRUSINER NOBEL PRIZE WINNER

snip...page 5

Dr. Prusiner made some comments about Parkinson's disease. He said a protein being improperly handled in the substantia nigra cells is what causes Parkinson's disease because it causes a decrease in dopamine production. His theory is that Parkinson's disease is a prion-related problem, that Parkinson's disease is the direct result of those cells being killed because of prion accumulation that he believes is a familial transfer.

"Can it be transmitted by blood transfusions?" His answer is that We don't know.

We believe that ALS, or Lou Gehrig's disease, is a prion-related disease.

The last question that was asked of Dr. Prusiner was a simple question. The person said, "Dr. Prusiner, do you eat meat?" He answered immediately "Not in Europe." He was asked to elaborate, and he said these prion-related diseases are all over Europe. He said wherever you go, if you eat meat, you have the potential of picking them up. He believes the prions are in the muscle tissue. He does not believe they're just in the spinal column.

My son is an M.D. and they are getting a lot of information on these prion-related diseases and most of it is coming from Dr. Prusiner. The medical community has an understanding about prion-related diseases that's much different from that of the veterinary community, from what I can determine. ...

Accomplished this day, Wednesday, December 11, 2003, Denver, Colorado

The roundtable presentations and discussions were recorded. A transcript will be made available to the Academy of Veterinary Consultants, the American Association of Bovine Practitioners, and the Colleges of Veterinary Medicine throughout the United States and Canada. A condensed version translated for the livestock industry will be made available to educate livestock producers about prion related diseases.

http://www.r-calfusa.com/Newsletter/2004January.pdf


>>>His specific allegations have been clearly refuted by Centers for Disease Countrol and Prevention scientists in the journal Neurology.<<<


AND several months later, my allegations were substantiated of the under counting of CJD victims, and Schonberger et al 'conceded' i was correct. i wonder why the consumerfreedom site does not post that $$$ probably because they are nothing more than a bunch of industry goons $$$ but here are the facts ;


THE PATHOLOGICAL PROTEIN

Hardcover, 304 pages plus photos and illustrations. ISBN 0-387-95508-9

June 2003

BY Philip Yam

CHAPTER 14 LAYING ODDS

Answering critics like Terry Singeltary, who feels that the U.S. under- counts CJD, Schonberger conceded that the current surveillance system has errors but stated that most of the errors will be confined to the older population.

http://www.thepathologicalprotein.com/


AND now in 2008 we find that indeed, my 'specific allegations', were confirmed, and that includes the Journal of American Medical Association, where i merely stated that CJD was being undercounted due to the fact in some cases, CJD was being misdiagnosed as Alzheimer's. That proven in many studies. BUT now we find evidence that there may be a common link between the two. hopefully one that will unlock all the unknowns to date. ...


The statistical incidence of CJD cases in the United States has been revised to reflect that there is one case per 9000 in adults age 55 and older. Eighty-five percent of the cases are sporadic, meaning there is no known cause at present.

http://www.cjdfoundation.org/fact.html


***Atypical forms of BSE have emerged which, although rare, appear to be more virulent than the classical BSE that causes vCJD.***

Progress Report from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center

An Update from Stephen M. Sergay, MB, BCh & Pierluigi Gambetti, MD

April 3, 2008

http://www.aan.com/news/?event=read&article_id=4397&page=72.45.45


Communicated by: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. <[email protected]>

[In submitting these data, Terry S. Singeltary Sr. draws attention to the steady increase in the "type unknown" category, which, according to their definition, comprises cases in which vCJD could be excluded. The total of 26 cases for the current year (2007) is disturbing, possibly symptomatic of the circulation of novel agents. Characterization of these agents should be given a high priority. - Mod.CP]

http://pro-med.blogspot.com/2007/11/proahedr-prion-disease-update-2007-07.html

http://www.promedmail.org/pls/askus/f?p=2400:1001:6833194127530602005::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1010,39963


There is a growing number of human CJD cases, and they were presented last week in San Francisco by Luigi Gambatti(?) from his CJD surveillance collection.

He estimates that it may be up to 14 or 15 persons which display selectively SPRPSC and practically no detected RPRPSC proteins.


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/1006-4240t1.htm

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/2006-4240t1.pdf


SO there fedup2, once again i have shown just how full of BSe you really are, and there is not a field or pasture that could hold it all.

for once, please bring something to the table that is not just BSe.


p.s. LOL, those fried up flounder were gooooood last night, wish you could have been here. ...


TSS

 

[PORKER]

AND now in 2008 we find that indeed, my 'specific allegations', were confirmed, and that includes the Journal of American Medical Association, where i merely stated that CJD was being undercounted due to the fact in some cases, CJD was being misdiagnosed as Alzheimer's. That proven in many studies. BUT now we find evidence that there may be a common link between the two. hopefully one that will unlock all the unknowns to date. ...

 

[fedup2]

You are a proven fraud! What amazes me most is how you can come on a site where people raise cattle & bad mouth beef to everyone here & nobody says $hit about it!

You lied to Korea about our beef not being safe & had the balls to brag about it on this site!
You have provided proof of nothing! Just more of your usual garbage & the tactic that if one throws enough $hit around, some might stick! As far as your schooling, the article only brought that up to question the Dr. title that some of your anti- meat followers call you. Many of the people I know who didn't finish school are very intelligent, you are a glowing exception to that statement!

Lets look at the proof that you claim to have.
---------------------------------------

but it could be iCJD

so it is therefore possible and most likely

it did not just happen spontaneously, like everyone wanted me to believe. and indeed, science has shown that some of these atypical BSE cases, some of these atypical BSE cases have shown that they are more like

prion accumulation that he believes

His answer is that We don't know

We believe that

from what I can determine

Yep! That proof looks pretty indisputable floundered! I don't think anyone could refute evidence like that! :roll: :roll: :roll:

As far as the article's statements about you
["Singletary ignores overwhelming epidemiological and laboratory evidence"]

["Relying entirely on shallow circumstantial evidence and frequent repetition of claims which have been publicly refuted as false"]

I believe they were right on the money!

I won't be bothering you for awhile as I need to take a break from this apparent anti-beef site! You keep spewing out your lies and I imagine no one will call for more of you indisputable proof! :roll: :roll: :roll: