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McDonald's ISAC ''U.S. not protected against mad cow''

feeder said:
I know I might get slammed for this comment but I too am worried about OTM beef. I believe most of it goes to ground beef. What do most of our young people and grandkids eat? It isn't steak but something easy to chew like hamburger especially the little ones.

No " slam" intended here Feeder, but are you "worried" about domestic (US) OTM beef or just Canadian OTM beef???
Just a reminder, BSE has been discovered in a native US cow in Texas.
The number of cases is a no starter either, in view of the fact that the border slammed shut to CDN beef after case #1. The US has also had case #1.
 
TimH, I am worried about both. Why should the USDA restrict any BSE testing? Do they think they know everything?
 
Tim H, I'm worried about all OTM wherever it comes from. I feed cattle so that is why I figured someone might say I'm nuts for saying that. But I do believe everyone needs to do everything to try to eliminate the risks till we know more.
 
I see where NCBA is sticking with their packerbacking and blindly following the USDA and FDA...I wonder who Weber thinks pressured this group of scientists :???: I still can find no way that MacDonalds stands to gain...

--------------------------------------------

McDonald's wants more BSE protection
Friday, January 6, 2006, 11:39 AM

by Josh St. Peters

The Food and Drug Administration has proposed new rules to strengthen the ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban. Cattle group R-CALF USA had previously said the proposed rules do not go far enough, and now those sentiments are being echoed by researchers and corporate leaders with the McDonald's restaurant chain.

Seven scientists and specialists from McDonald's and a pharmaceutical supplier have all submitted comments saying that FDA falls short with their feed rules as they pertain to the cattle disease. The experts say FDA fails to fully protect animals and people from BSE infections.

The main complaint is that FDA's proposed feed ban rules fail to keep cattle from eating potentially infected feed. McDonald's says the government should take stronger steps to reduce the risk of exposure to the disease. The nation's top burger seller says the risk of exposure should be cut to zero.

Gary Weber with the National Cattlemen's Beef Association says the current feed ban is capable of eradicating BSE in the U.S. He says NCBA respects the opinions of McDonald's and others, but points out that FDA is bound by law to make science-based decisions, not decisions based on politics and pressure.

The NAFB News Service contributed to this report.
 
feeder said:
Tim H, I'm worried about all OTM wherever it comes from. I feed cattle so that is why I figured someone might say I'm nuts for saying that. But I do believe everyone needs to do everything to try to eliminate the risks till we know more.

Removing SRM's eliminates any possible risk,until we know more. Banning MMR or AMR(mechanical meat recovery) eliminates any possible risks until we know more. Killing techniques have been altered, to eliminate the possibility of SRM transfer. I'm sure that there are more measures that have been taken to eliminate any possible risks until we know more.
I guess it all boils down to one thing......people either believe that beef is safe or they don't. :)
 
Oldtimer said:
Big Muddy rancher said:
I suppose Big Mac has had more pressure because of the large amout of OTM that they use.

Yep- And thats what makes this report more believable...Unless a real risk existed, it would make no economical sense for MacDonalds to issue it as it may even be detrimental to them economically- by consumer demand dropping off and by possibly keeping access closed to a source of cheap burger meat (Canadian OTM's)...

I'm sure this will be brought up many times during the USDA's comment period on opening the Canadian border to OTM's- and any subsequent Congressional or Court hearings if the USDA again sells out to the Multinational Corporate Packers.......
What does this have to do with opening to Canadian OTM's? Has Mickey D's expressed concern about Canada's risk? They do have a large presence up here as well and maybe they feel Canada's OTMs are safer.
 
Subject: Re: McDonald's Corp. seven scientists and experts and a
pharmaceutical supplier Seriologicals Corp. U.S. NOT PROTECTED AGAINST MAD
COW DISEASE
Date: January 7, 2006 at 7:11 am PST

September 13,2004

USDA, FSTS

Docket Clerk

300 12* Street, SW

Room 102, Cotton Annex

Washington, DC 20250

04-021ANPR

04-021ANPR-70

Richard L. Crawford

Re: Docket No: 04-02 1 ANPR Federal Measures to Mitigate BSE Risks:
Considerations

for Further Action

Dear Sir or Madame:

On behalf of McDonald's Corporation, which operates more than 13,000
restaurants in

the United States, we appreciate the opportunity to submit comments to this
very

important Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM). 69 Fed. Reg. 42288
(July

14,2004).

In previous comments submitted to FSIS regarding the removal of SRI&,
McDonalds

fully supported this rule and its immediate implementation. The removal of
SRMs from

human food is the primary firewall to protect the US consumer from being
exposed to the

BSE agent. While we applaud the requirement for SRM removal, we feel that it
is

equally important for FSIS to insure that each slaughterplant which
processes cattle have

systems in place which prevent cross contamination between edible tissue and
SRMs.

This should include but not be limited to the use of separate equipment,
such as knives,

blades, etc. where appropriate. In addition, it is also important that
appropriate and

effective disinfection procedures for equipment used to handle SRMs be
developed and

approved for use.

It is our opinion that requiring SRM removal without a procedure to prevent
cross

contamination is inadequate as a protective public health measure. The TSE
agents

@ions) are sticky and highly resistant to disinfection. If SRMs such as
brain and spinal

cord are allowed to contact equipment and other surfaces such as deboning
tables which

then are used to handle and process edible tissue this could allow
contamination and

negates the intention of the ban. This is true not only in plants
slaughtering fed cattle

both under and over 30 months but also in plants slaughtering predominately
older cattle.

It is important that measure be taken to prevent cross contamination between
carcasses

and SRms in the cull plants. McDonalds requires their suppliers to prevent
cross

contamination and audits against certain measurable standards such as
requiring spinal

cord to bc removed on the kill floor. We would be willing to share these
standards with

FSIS as an example.

FSIS Docket No. 04-02 1 ANPR

dooqhl- =w c1qo -

McDonalds again recommends that dura (the covering around the brain and
spinal cord)

be added to the list of SRMs. While skull and vertebral column are included
as SRMs,

dura is not. If dura is not removed prior to processing on the fabrication
floor, it may

come loose and be incorporated into ground product. Bovine dura was never
tested for

infectivity. It was assumed that due to direct contact with spinal cord, it
may serve as a

vehicle to transmit disease. In addition, human dura has been the source of
human to

human transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD). (personal
communication - Dr.

Danny Matthews, UK, VLA) Our ISAC committee recommended that McDonalds add

the removal of dura as a specification in the production of our product.

McDonalds urges the USDA to make the appropriate adjustments in the SRM ban
if new

scientific findings and/or the results of the increased surveillance warrant
a change.

In regards to imported meat products from other countries, McDonalds
suggests that no

SRM exemption be made for countries based on BSE risk. The long incubation
period

and limited surveillance in many countries can limit the ability to
accurately determine

risk. Also, the risk level of a country could potentially change over night
if the trading

patterns of a country changed. It seems logistically impossible to maintain
a system

which could continually monitor the world's trading patterns. In addition,
science has

not provided all of the answers in regards to the transmission of BSE.
Requiring SRMs

to be removed from imported products for human food is prudent. If the US
would wait

until disease is confirmed the exposure would already have occurred.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on these very important issues.

Richard L. Crawford

Corporat,e Vice President, Government Relations

McDonalds Corporation

1 Kroc Drive

Oak Brook, Illinois 60523

FSIS Docket No. 04-021ANPR


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/04/sep04/092104/04n-0264-c00140-vol2
2.pdf



2004N-0264 Federal Measures to Mitigate BSE Risks: Considerations for
Further Action

C 136 National Cattlemen's Beef Assn (NCBA) Vol #: 22

C 137 Public Citizen Vol #: 22

C 138 Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) Vol #: 22

C 139 Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) Vol #: 22

C 140 McDonald's Corporation Vol #: 22

C 141 North American Natural Casing Assn (NANCA) Vol #: 22

C 142 National Renderers Assn Vol #: 22

C 143 G.A.O.B., Inc. Vol #: 22

C 144 Gelatin Manufacturers of Europe (GME) Vol #: 22

C 145 IBM Business Consulting Services Vol #: 22

C 146 L. Fischer Vol #: 22

C 147 C. Rothenfluch Vol #: 22

C 148 C. Addonizio Vol #: 22

C 149 M. Clifton Vol #: 22




http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/04/sep04/092104/092104.htm#04N0264



Dockets Entered on December 22, 2005
2005D-0330, Guidance for Industry and FDA Review Staff on Collection of
Platelets
by Automated ... EC 203, McDonald's Restaurants Corporation, Vol #:, 34 ...


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/05/Dec05/122205/122205.htm


03-025IF 03-025IF-631 Linda A. Detwiler [PDF]
Page 1. 03-025IF 03-025IF-631 Linda A. Detwiler Page 2. Page 3. Page 4.
Page 5. Page 6. Page 7. Page 8. Page 9. Page 10. Page 11. Page 12.
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-631.pdf - Text Version

03-025IF 03-025IF-634 Linda A. Detwiler [PDF]
Page 1. 03-025IF 03-025IF-634 Linda A. Detwiler Page 2.
Page 3. Page 4. Page 5. Page 6. Page 7. Page 8.
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-634.pdf - Text Version
[ More results from www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/ ]

Page 1 of 17 9/13/2005 [PDF]
... 2005 6:17 PM To: [email protected]. Subject: [Docket
No. 03-025IFA]
FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food ...
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf - Text Version

03-025IFA 03-025IFA-6 Jason Frost [PDF]
... Zealand Embassy COMMENTS ON FEDERAL REGISTER 9 CFR Parts 309 et al
[Docket No. 03-
025IF] Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food and
...
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-6.pdf - Text Version



http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Search/Search_Results/Index.asp?q=03-025IF&mode=sim
ple&num=10&as_occt=any&restrict=FSIS_DOCKET_COMMENTS



In its opinion of 7-8 December 2000 (EC 2000), the SSC ... [PDF]
Page 1. Linda A. Detwiler, DVM 225 Hwy 35 Red Bank, New Jersey 07701 Phone:
732-741-2290
Cell: 732-580-9391 Fax: 732-741-7751 June 22, 2005 FSIS Docket Clerk US ...
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-589.pdf



http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-589.pdf



Page 1 of 17 9/13/2005 [PDF]
... Page 1 of 17 From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [[email protected]] Sent:
Thursday,
September 08, 2005 6:17 PM To: [email protected].
Subject ...
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf



http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf





03-025IF 03-025IF-618 Richard L. Crawford [PDF]
Page 1. 03-025IF 03-025IF-618 Richard L. Crawford
Page 2. Page 3. Page 4.
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-618.pdf -



http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-618.pdf



03-038IF 03-038IF-15 Richard L. Crawford [PDF]
Page 1. 03-038IF 03-038IF-15 Richard L. Crawford
Page 2. Page 3. Page 4.


http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-038IF/03-038IF-15.pdf -



http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-038IF/03-038IF-15.pdf



http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-634.pdf




Link: TSS





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From: TSS ()
Subject: Re: McDonald's Corp. seven scientists and experts and a
pharmaceutical supplier Seriologicals Corp. U.S. NOT PROTECTED AGAINST MAD
COW DISEASE
Date: January 7, 2006 at 7:11 am PST

September 13,2004

USDA, FSTS

Docket Clerk

300 12* Street, SW

Room 102, Cotton Annex

Washington, DC 20250

04-021ANPR

04-021ANPR-70

Richard L. Crawford

Re: Docket No: 04-02 1 ANPR Federal Measures to Mitigate BSE Risks:
Considerations

for Further Action

Dear Sir or Madame:

On behalf of McDonald's Corporation, which operates more than 13,000
restaurants in

the United States, we appreciate the opportunity to submit comments to this
very

important Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM). 69 Fed. Reg. 42288
(July

14,2004).

In previous comments submitted to FSIS regarding the removal of SRI&,
McDonalds

fully supported this rule and its immediate implementation. The removal of
SRMs from

human food is the primary firewall to protect the US consumer from being
exposed to the

BSE agent. While we applaud the requirement for SRM removal, we feel that it
is

equally important for FSIS to insure that each slaughterplant which
processes cattle have

systems in place which prevent cross contamination between edible tissue and
SRMs.

This should include but not be limited to the use of separate equipment,
such as knives,

blades, etc. where appropriate. In addition, it is also important that
appropriate and

effective disinfection procedures for equipment used to handle SRMs be
developed and

approved for use.

It is our opinion that requiring SRM removal without a procedure to prevent
cross

contamination is inadequate as a protective public health measure. The TSE
agents

@ions) are sticky and highly resistant to disinfection. If SRMs such as
brain and spinal

cord are allowed to contact equipment and other surfaces such as deboning
tables which

then are used to handle and process edible tissue this could allow
contamination and

negates the intention of the ban. This is true not only in plants
slaughtering fed cattle

both under and over 30 months but also in plants slaughtering predominately
older cattle.

It is important that measure be taken to prevent cross contamination between
carcasses

and SRms in the cull plants. McDonalds requires their suppliers to prevent
cross

contamination and audits against certain measurable standards such as
requiring spinal

cord to bc removed on the kill floor. We would be willing to share these
standards with

FSIS as an example.

FSIS Docket No. 04-02 1 ANPR

dooqhl- =w c1qo -

McDonalds again recommends that dura (the covering around the brain and
spinal cord)

be added to the list of SRMs. While skull and vertebral column are included
as SRMs,

dura is not. If dura is not removed prior to processing on the fabrication
floor, it may

come loose and be incorporated into ground product. Bovine dura was never
tested for

infectivity. It was assumed that due to direct contact with spinal cord, it
may serve as a

vehicle to transmit disease. In addition, human dura has been the source of
human to

human transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD). (personal
communication - Dr.

Danny Matthews, UK, VLA) Our ISAC committee recommended that McDonalds add

the removal of dura as a specification in the production of our product.

McDonalds urges the USDA to make the appropriate adjustments in the SRM ban
if new

scientific findings and/or the results of the increased surveillance warrant
a change.

In regards to imported meat products from other countries, McDonalds
suggests that no

SRM exemption be made for countries based on BSE risk. The long incubation
period

and limited surveillance in many countries can limit the ability to
accurately determine

risk. Also, the risk level of a country could potentially change over night
if the trading

patterns of a country changed. It seems logistically impossible to maintain
a system

which could continually monitor the world's trading patterns. In addition,
science has

not provided all of the answers in regards to the transmission of BSE.
Requiring SRMs

to be removed from imported products for human food is prudent. If the US
would wait

until disease is confirmed the exposure would already have occurred.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on these very important issues.

Richard L. Crawford

Corporat,e Vice President, Government Relations

McDonalds Corporation

1 Kroc Drive

Oak Brook, Illinois 60523

FSIS Docket No. 04-021ANPR


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/04/sep04/092104/04n-0264-c00140-vol2
2.pdf



2004N-0264 Federal Measures to Mitigate BSE Risks: Considerations for
Further Action

C 136 National Cattlemen's Beef Assn (NCBA) Vol #: 22

C 137 Public Citizen Vol #: 22

C 138 Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) Vol #: 22

C 139 Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) Vol #: 22

C 140 McDonald's Corporation Vol #: 22

C 141 North American Natural Casing Assn (NANCA) Vol #: 22

C 142 National Renderers Assn Vol #: 22

C 143 G.A.O.B., Inc. Vol #: 22

C 144 Gelatin Manufacturers of Europe (GME) Vol #: 22

C 145 IBM Business Consulting Services Vol #: 22

C 146 L. Fischer Vol #: 22

C 147 C. Rothenfluch Vol #: 22

C 148 C. Addonizio Vol #: 22

C 149 M. Clifton Vol #: 22




http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/04/sep04/092104/092104.htm#04N0264



Dockets Entered on December 22, 2005
2005D-0330, Guidance for Industry and FDA Review Staff on Collection of
Platelets
by Automated ... EC 203, McDonald's Restaurants Corporation, Vol #:, 34 ...


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/05/Dec05/122205/122205.htm


03-025IF 03-025IF-631 Linda A. Detwiler [PDF]
Page 1. 03-025IF 03-025IF-631 Linda A. Detwiler Page 2. Page 3. Page 4.
Page 5. Page 6. Page 7. Page 8. Page 9. Page 10. Page 11. Page 12.
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-631.pdf - Text Version

03-025IF 03-025IF-634 Linda A. Detwiler [PDF]
Page 1. 03-025IF 03-025IF-634 Linda A. Detwiler Page 2.
Page 3. Page 4. Page 5. Page 6. Page 7. Page 8.
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-634.pdf - Text Version
[ More results from www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/ ]

Page 1 of 17 9/13/2005 [PDF]
... 2005 6:17 PM To: [email protected]. Subject: [Docket
No. 03-025IFA]
FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food ...
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf - Text Version

03-025IFA 03-025IFA-6 Jason Frost [PDF]
... Zealand Embassy COMMENTS ON FEDERAL REGISTER 9 CFR Parts 309 et al
[Docket No. 03-
025IF] Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food and
...
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-6.pdf - Text Version



http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Search/Search_Results/Index.asp?q=03-025IF&mode=sim
ple&num=10&as_occt=any&restrict=FSIS_DOCKET_COMMENTS



In its opinion of 7-8 December 2000 (EC 2000), the SSC ... [PDF]
Page 1. Linda A. Detwiler, DVM 225 Hwy 35 Red Bank, New Jersey 07701 Phone:
732-741-2290
Cell: 732-580-9391 Fax: 732-741-7751 June 22, 2005 FSIS Docket Clerk US ...
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-589.pdf



http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-589.pdf



Page 1 of 17 9/13/2005 [PDF]
... Page 1 of 17 From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [[email protected]] Sent:
Thursday,
September 08, 2005 6:17 PM To: [email protected].
Subject ...
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf



http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf





03-025IF 03-025IF-618 Richard L. Crawford [PDF]
Page 1. 03-025IF 03-025IF-618 Richard L. Crawford
Page 2. Page 3. Page 4.
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-618.pdf -



http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-618.pdf



03-038IF 03-038IF-15 Richard L. Crawford [PDF]
Page 1. 03-038IF 03-038IF-15 Richard L. Crawford
Page 2. Page 3. Page 4.
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-038IF/03-038IF-15.pdf -



http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-038IF/03-038IF-15.pdf



http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-634.pdf


TSS
 
To assume(: to SEEM to prove, or take for granted, or assume to be a fact) that the scientists on the McDonalds internationally based panel are totally free of their own political considerations or agendas' serves no one well.

Those who post here who seem so eager to believe ANYONE who even hints or suspects that USDA and/or NCBA and/or the international corporate packers or the SCIENTISTS whose work and conclusions re. BSE those various groups accept as credible HAS to be wrong serve no one well.

Sorting the credible, double blind, peer reviewed, published scientists searching for replicable truths regarding BSE must be extremely difficult when, it seems to me, most anyone with a premise, money to back them, and an agenda to serve can publish their work under the banner of SCIENCE. And, it seems to me, it that work also claims fraudulence or collusion or benefit to the current beef industry and government agencies of the USA, too many people are eager to ASSUME it to be the "true" science.

That said, I do believe there is validity and a need for dissenting scientific opinions and theories and honest research to prove OR disprove them.. I simply do not want the research starting out ASSUMING that industry and government agencies HAVE TO be in error at best or more likely attempting to use "bogus" research to enrich themselves "on the backs of" the "little guy" cattle producer, or the consumer.

MRJ
 
>DATA Charmaine's HD:BSE - AUGUST 95-fill in bse position paper spec<

FROM THE DIRECTOR GENERAL

24 August, 1995

STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL


Dear •salutation

UKASTA POLICY ON BSE

At the President's suggestion in the light of recent events, I have
reviewed the history of our policy on BSE so as to ensure that it fully
reflects the needs of our supporters In the feed Industry.

The paper enclosed with this letter is the result. For obvious reasons,
this is being circulated only to an extremely small circle within
UKASTA - basically, the National Executive Council.

If you have any comments on the policy, or the paper, I should be glad
to receive them under Private & Confidential cover.

Yours sincerely,

J.W. REED

JWR/cg

copied to SMT members - IJD; JN; JAS; REW


95/8.24/2.1


STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

UKASTA INTERNAL POSITION STATEMENT
BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY

POLICY AIMS

1. These have been consistent, although unstated except In FEC discussions, since at least 1989:-

• To minimise the risk of farmers' claims for compensation from feed
compounders.

• To minimise the potential damage to compound feed markets
through adverse publicity.

• To maximise freedom of action for feed compounders. notably by
maintaining the availability of meat and bone meal as a raw
material in animal feeds, and ensuring time is available to make
any changes which may be required.


STRATEGY ADOPTED/SUCCESS ACHIEVED

2. Strategy has depended upon the situation at a particular time.
UKASTA has sought to anticipate criticism from other industry sectors
and action by Government/Brussels as the epidemic has developed
and knowledge of the disease increased. Through dose liaison with
MAFF. we have to date avoided public statements seriously damaging
to the feed Industry and the adoption of policies likely to lead to such
damage.

3. Successful examples of this strategy include:

• "Voluntary Ban" on SBO's In all MBM purchase contracts from
November 1989. matching the Government ban on SBO'S in
human food but anticipating the statutory ban on SBO's in feed
which came in only from September 1990;

• Pressing Government for full compensation to farmers, which was
finally conceded in February 1990;

• evidence (not Just on BSE) to the Lamming Committee in 1991/92
resulted in their recommending tighter controls over home
mixers/integrated operations, and over the processing of fallen
animals. Government eventually tightened the fallen animals
legislation in December 1992. Other Lamming recommendations
could yet be useful to us.

continued.....

95/8.24/2.2

2

• UKASTA pressure dissuaded MAFF from publicly linking voluntary
ELISA tests of feed on farms with BAB's to (possibly compulsory)
tests at compounders' premises in June/July 1994:

• in August 1995. while tightening the SBO Order and responding
to the EU Decision requiring introduction of a testing programme.
MAFF has accepted UKASTA proposals for the presentation of the
changes to a wider audience, including farmers, and accepted our
help in preparing for an EU Commission visit to inspect
procedures and controls.


THE FUTURE

4. BSE has for more than seven years posed the greatest single potential
threat to feed compounders' profitability. Although the epidemic is in
sharp decline (275 cases per week compared to 1000 at the peak).
MAFF remains under pressure in Brussels and is not skilled at
handling potentially explosive issues.

5. Tests may show that ruminant feeds have been sold which contain
illegal traces of ruminant protein. More likely, a few positive test
results will turn up but proof that a particular feed mill knowingly
supplied it to a particular farm will be difficult if not impossible.

6. The threat remains real and it will be some years before feed
compounders are free of it. The longer we can avoid any direct
linkage between feed milling practices and actual BSE cases, the more
likely it is that serious damage can be avoided. In issue management
terms, the aims and the strategy remain valid, but must be kept
under review in the light of further events.

JWR/cg/23.8.95

95/8.24/2.3



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1995/08/24002001.pdf



From: TSS ()
Subject: THE MANIPULATION OF BSE/TSE SCIENCE IN PEER REVIEW JOURNALS ?
Date: July 11, 2005 at 11:23 am PST


1983


BSE CONSULTANT

APPROVAL OF MATERIAL FOR PUBLICATIONS

All material for publication including written works to be published in scientific journals, books, proceedings of scientific meetings, abstracts of verbally delivered papers and the like should be scrutinized for risk to the Ministry before dispatch to the publishers.............

full text;

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1983/10/12001001.pdf


The BSE Inquiry / Statement No 67
Dr Iain McGill (scheduled to give oral evidence 08 June 98)
THE BSE INQUIRY
Statement by I S McGill
Curriculum Vitae
1. A brief CV is enclosed with this statement as Annex 1.
Periods particularly concerned with TSEs are as follows:
Spring/Summer 1988 Final Year Elective Research project
The astrocytic reaction in BSE and its comparison
with natural scrapie of sheep.
Royal Veterinary College (RVC), London University.
Performed at Pathology Dept, MAFF, CVL, Weybridge
Jan 1990 - Jun 1991 Veterinary Research Officer
Central Veterinary Laboratory (CVL), Weybridge.
Employer: MAFF
Funding Body: MAFF
Aug 1991 - Dec 1992 Post Doctoral Research Worker
Institute of Psychiatry, London University.
Employer: Institute of Psychiatry
Funding Body: AFRC
1994 - 1998 Director, Prion Interest Group
Independent Research Organisation.
Privately financed.
Incorporated as scientific wing of
Shift Ltd in 1995 : Company reg no 291 6731
Statement of Interests
2. I have no links of any nature with the farming community (other than
those from my work
with farms as a vet student or as a qualified vet) nor with the feedstock,
pet food or
rendering industries.
Advice to Governmental Committees
3. I have had no involvement in UK Governmental committees.I did, however,
act as
rapporteur for a conference of international experts held in 1990 at the
CVL. This was
held under the auspices of the Gibbs Committee, organised by Dr CJ Gibbs of
the National
2
Institutes of Health, Bethesda, USA. My draft report from this conference
was passed on
to MAFF. (The final report is at YB90/3.12/1.1)
How I became involved in work on TSEs.
4. In 1987/88, my final year at the RVC, the work of Gerald Wells and his
colleagues at the
CVL on BSE was the subject of much discussion. I approached Richard Barlow
Professor of Pathology at RVC, who had decades of experience in scrapie
research, with a
view to carrying out my final year elective research project outside the
RVC, with the
team at the CVL. He agreed to co-supervise a project with Gerald Wells.
5. The report of this work is available and also held in RVC library. The
external examiner
for this research was Dr W B Martin, at that time sitting on the Southwood
Committee.
This research achieved first place in the year in professional examinations
and contributed
to the award of the Cecil Aulden Second Prize (second place throughout
BVetMed
degree).
6. Once qualified, I worked for 18 months in practice, and then returned to
the Pathology
Department of the CVL in January 1990, to continue my work with Mr Wells.
Commissioning and Funding
Work at CVL, Weybridge, commissioned by MAFF
7. At CVL most of the projects I worked on were commissioned and directly
funded by
MAFF. All the research I pursued was as an employee of MAFF, excepting work
during
my final year at the RVC, when I was supported by a student grant.
8. I think it is worthwhile making a few salient points about my day to day
work for MAFF.
The facilities of the Pathology Department and the quality of technical and
administrative
support were in general excellent and the scientists I worked with were of a
uniformly
high calibre. Once the decision to fund a project had been reached, there
were no
restraints on rapidly seeking tangible results.
9. Publications arising from such work include references 2, 5, 7, 8 & 10 in
the list of
publications to be found at the end of this statement.
Uncommissioned Work at CVL, Weybridge
10. As I was not always encouraged to pursue work I regarded as essential, I
also worked on
projects (either practical or theoretical) beyond the narrow confines of
specific MAFF
commission. Often this was possible within my daily routine, but I would
periodically
have to 'clock off' from my MAFF job and work in my own time rather than
leave the
matter untouched.
11. Publications arising from non-commissioned work started whilst I was
still an employee of
MAFF include :
3
(i) Wood LJN, McGill IS, Done SH and Bradley R (1997). Neuropathology of
scrapie: a study of the distribution patterns of brain lesions in 222 cases
of natural
scrapie in sheep, 1982-1991; ref 12.
The project as a whole was commissioned by MAFF, but my own involvement was
voluntary (see para. 31).
(ii) Heretical Model of Scrapie (1991) paper to the annual conference of the
Association of veterinary Teachers and Research Workers, Scarborough 1991,
referred to in the Veterinary Record, 128, pp368-369.
See paras 52 et seq for details of research proposed to MAFF at this time.
(iii) Stack MJ, Aldrich AM, Davis LA (1997). Comparison of detergent and
protease
enzyme combinations for the detection of scrapie-associated fibrils from the
central
nervous system of sheep naturally affected with scrapie. Journal of
Comparative
Pathology, 1997, 116, pp.181-189 (J/CP/116/181).
12. Although this is not acknowledged in the published article, I introduced
Mick Stack to the
use of Subtilisin Carlsberg enzyme for SAF extraction, initially from
formalin-fixed
tissue. Following a theoretical discussion with Dr (now Professor) Ian Shaw
in 1991 I had
pioneered such use of this enzyme. My conceptual role (not commissioned by
MAFF) in
this work illustrates the sometimes unexpected fruits of the free pursuit of
scientific (as
opposed to Government) ideas.
Work at the Institute of Psychiatry funded by an AFRC Grant
13. Publications arising from this work include references 3, 4, 6 & 9 in
the attached list of
publications.
14. Two publications submitted to the Veterinary Record during this period
went unpublished.
(See para 22).
Constraints on publication of results
" Internal approval"
15. Every paper generated within MAFF is sent for approval by superiors; the
more serious
the topic (for example if the disease is zoonotic or notifiable), the higher
it is sent before
approval is given or refused. I only outline the system in operation within
MAFF at that
time, and it is not my intention to criticise individuals who were
performing their ascribed
roles within the structure of MAFF.
16. I would like to illustrate the process of 'approval' with reference to
the identification of
FSE and subsequent publication of findings. The first case of FSE was
discovered at
Bristol University by Janet Wyatt (now Bradshaw) working with Dr Geoff
Pearson and
others. Material was referred to Gerald Wells in April 1990 for his expert
opinion and he
passed histological sections to me for comment.
4
17. Over the next six months, the Bristol and Liverpool Veterinary Schools
(and possibly
others) and the CVL independently examined their archives of feline brains
to determine
whether this disease existed prior to the BSE epidemic, or whether it was a
new disease.
Neuropathological evidence suggested it was a new disease. This, along with
epidemiological and biochemical data, led Gerald Wells and myself to prepare
a paper for
an international TSE conference in Brussels including the indication that
there might be a
causal link between BSE and FSE. The abstract of this paper was faxed to
Brussels prior
to the conference for publication in a booklet for delegates. This abstract
(ref 5) includes
the suggestion of this link.
18. Following the conference, we prepared the full paper we had presented,
for publication in
a book of this European Commission-sponsored conference and sent it to our
superiors
for approval. (The correspondence which ensued in April and May 1991 is
found at
YB91/4.16/1.1;YB91/4.22/2.1;YB91/4.30/1.1;YB91/5.3/3.1). Specifically,
despite detailed
arguments supporting our statements, the following ultimatum was faxed to us
from the
then Assistant Chief Veterinary Officer, making it plain that he was taking
into account the
views of the then CVO:
"We are not willing for the paper to be published unless these references
are
removed. This may be unacceptable to the authors, in which case permission
to
publish is refused."
19. Despite protestations that the body of the text would no longer agree
with the already
published abstract, and our detailed knowledge on the subject
notwithstanding, the edict
stood. We were left with little alternative but to amend the paper, which by
this time had
missed the original deadline for submission and was in danger of not being
published at all
(see correspondence above).
20. Subsequent to its publication in the conference book (ref 5), the paper
was also published
in a refereed journal (ref 7). The original abstract from ref 5 was then
also altered to agree
with the altered text. Specifically the words "with BSE" were removed from
the phrase
"epidemiological association with BSE". I had left MAFF before this paper
was ever
published.
21. This episode was described in Dispatches (Channel 4, 9pm Thursday 11th
December
1997), and on two separate occasions in. The Independent newspaper
(YB97/12.11/1.1
and YB98/1.26/1.1).
Outright rejection of manuscripts submitted for publication, during
"Refereeing/Scrutineering" by Journals
22. The peer review system is in itself generally reasonable. However, an
issue of real concern
is that the Veterinary Record , the main channel of information for the
veterinary
profession, failed to provide an open forum for discussion of the TSEs
throughout the
period of the terms of reference of the Inquiry.
23. The following is a chronology of papers submitted to the Veterinary
Record, but which
went unpublished:
5
1988: Letter entitled 'Scrapie, Time to take HB Parry Seriously'
(YB88/6.8/4.1)
24. In this letter I stated that BSE had been officially confirmed as a TSE
(when much of the
veterinary profession still favoured a variety of alternate hypotheses). I
also suggested
that scrapie should be made a notifiable disease, and drew attention to the
work of HB
'James' Parry and the possibility that natural scrapie in sheep might be of
genetic origin.
25. I withdrew the letter following advice from Professor Barlow (who as far
as I can recall
had been contacted by MAFF and the Veterinary Record) that it might not be
in my
interests to pursue publication at that moment in time.
26. I received a letter from the then editor, Edward Boden, questioning my
permission to
release the information that BSE was indeed a proven TSE. I had no
permission, though
was unaware that any was needed, to inform my profession of this urgent and
important
fact.
1992: McGill and Wood
27. This paper summarises views as to why an open debate on TSEs and in
particular scrapie
were and remain essential. We drew attention to the work of Parry, Prusiner
and others,
and outlined novel explanations for recent research findings in light of
such work. We
suggested that not all the relevant questions were being asked in the
interpretation of data.
In particular, the possibility that the infectious agent was being generated
de novo from the
genome (the PrP gene) in certain families of sheep, was still not being
considered, despite
a body of scientific data going back over 30 years. It was to be a further 5
years before
publications from Government laboratories would start to cite Parry's work
as a possibly
correct theory.
28. The refereeing process for this work was at the time not transparent,
and I have yet to be
informed as to why this remains unpublished.
29. 1992 Book review commissioned - on "Sub-Acute Spongiform
Encephalopathies" Eds.
Bradley, Savey & Marchant, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dorchelt, for the
Commission
of the European Communities.
30. On 13th May 1992, I was commissioned by the Veterinary Record to review
this book
(YB92/5.13/1.1). After approximately 100 hours work for this review, an
editorial
decision was taken not to publish. Ironically, this book contained the very
paper by
Gerald Wells and myself over which "censorship" has been alleged.
Prolonged delay during "Refereeing/Scrutineering" of manuscripts submitted
for
publication
1997 Wood McGill Done and Bradley (ref 12).
31. This work was started in 1990 to screen for putative BSE in sheep, by
James Wood, a
colleague in the Pathology Department at CVL, although it was not finally
published until
1997. James sought my assistance in light of my greater experience in TSE
pathology. I
worked many many months to get this paper into print (YB95/6.29/2.1;
YB96/9.19/2.1)
6
refereeing process took two years, hardly an acceptable delay for crucial
work in this
field. The referees' comments (YB95/6.29/2.2) themselves require scrutiny.
One
scrutineer seemed to referee the paper in a balanced way, whilst the other
seemed more
intent on pushing his/her own opinions onto the paper.
32. Publication was finally expedited in the summer of 1996, when the
politically sensitive
question of whether or not BSE had indeed gone into the sheep population
started to be
asked in the public domain. This paper finally appeared (with some important
omissions
and watering down) in 1997, seven years after it was started, and two years
after it was
submitted. It was jointly funded by MAFF and the Prion Interest Group.
33. Had my ongoing research into sheep scrapie been funded and/or the McGill
and Wood
1992 paper been published, stimulating debate and further investigations,
this paper would
most certainly have appeared by 1995. Further work based on it could have
determined
by 1997 whether or not, and if so to what extent, BSE had gone into sheep.
34. In addition, the work may by now have led to a rapid diagnostic test and
a great deal of
information on the actual (as opposed to the theoretical/experimental)
causes of sheep
scrapie and the fundamental biology of this entire group of diseases. Some
of the work
suggested in 1991 has still not been started.
Aspects of TSE work with which I was involved
Analysis of the astrocytic response in BSE and its comparison with natural
scrapie.
35. I worked as a neuropathologist with Gerald Wells to establish that
astrocytic reaction, one
of the fundamental triad of neuropathological changes occurring in TSEs, was
indeed
present in BSE. This work was accomplished using antibodies to GFAP (a
structural
component characteristic of astrocytes) to quantify previously qualitative
interpretations
that an astrocytic reaction was present. The astrocytic reaction in natural
sheep scrapie
was assessed in parallel.
Published: 1988 RVC library.
1991 (Wells, Wilesmith and McGill) - details of astrocytic response in BSE
1997 (Wood, McGill, Done and Bradley) - details of astrocytic response in
natural sheep
scrapie
Surveillance for emerging scrapie-like diseases in animals in the UK
36. Working with Gerald Wells and other pathologists from the State
Veterinary Service, I
was involved with surveillance for neurological disease of animals in the
UK. This was
with particular reference to surveillance for, and subsequent confirmation
of TSEs.
During my time of employment, novel TSEs arose in domestic cats and in
exotic ungulates
in zoological collections. I also became involved in the investigation of a
putative TSE in
hound packs detected by Robert Higgins.
FSE, and BSE in exotic ungulates published in reviews:
1991 (Wells and McGill) ref 5
7
1992 (Wells and McGill) ref 7
FSE discussed in para 15.
37. Putative TSE in hounds - work started 1990 –(see para 41)
Robert Higgins, a Veterinary Investigation Officer at Thirsk, had been
working on a
hound survey in 1990. Gerald Wells and I myself received histological
sections from this
survey along with the accompanying letter (YB90/11.28/1.1) dated November
1990. This
letter details spongiform changes found in brains from hunt hounds failing
to keep up with
the rest of the pack, along with the results of SAF extractions from fresh
brain material
from these same animals. SAFs were not found in brains unless spongiform
changes were
also present. The spongiform changes were not pathognomonic (ie. conclusive
proof) for
prion disease, as they were atypical, being largely present in white matter
rather than grey
matter in the brain and spinal cord. However, Tony Scott, then head of
electron
microscopy work on TSEs, had no doubt that these SAFs were genuine and that
these
hounds therefore must have had a scrapie-like disease. I reviewed all the
sections myself
(original notes appended) and although the pathology was not typical, I
could not exclude
the possibility that this was a scrapie-like disorder, as white matter
vacuolation is seen in
TSEs and Wallerian degeneration was also present in the white matter of the
hounds,
another feature of scrapie.
38. I reviewed the literature on hound neuropathology, and discovered that
micrographs and
descriptive neuropathology from papers on 'hound ataxia' mirrored those in
material from
Robert Higgins' hound survey. Dr Tony Palmer (Cambridge) had done much of
this
work, and I obtained original sections from hound ataxia cases from him.
This enabled me
provisionally to conclude that Robert Higgins had in all probability
detected hound ataxia,
but also that hound ataxia itself was possibly a TSE. Gerald Wells confirmed
in 'blind'
examination of single restricted microscopic fields that there was no
distinction between
the white matter vacuolation present in BSE and scrapie cases, and that
occurring in
hound ataxia and the hound survey cases.
39. Hound ataxia had reportedly been occurring since the 1930's, and a known
risk factor for
its development was the feeding to hounds of downer cows, and particularly
bovine offal.
Circumstantial evidence suggests that bovine offal may also be causal in
FSE, and TME in
mink. Despite the inconclusive nature of the neuropathology, it was clearly
evident that
this putative canine spongiform encephalopathy merited further
investigation.
40. The inconclusive results in hounds were never confirmed, nor was the
link with hound
ataxia pursued. I telephoned Robert Higgins six years after he first sent
the slides to CVL.
I was informed that despite his submitting a yearly report to the CVO
including the
suggestion that the hound work be continued, no further work had been done
since 1991.
This was surprising, to say the very least.
41. The hound work could have provided valuable evidence that a scrapie-like
agent may have
been present in cattle offal long before the BSE epidemic was recognised.
The MAFF
hound survey remains unpublished.
Histopathological support to various other published MAFF experiments
8
42. These included neuropathological examination of material from
experiments studying the
attempted transmission of BSE to chickens and pigs (CVL 1991) and to mice
(RVC
1994).
Neuropathological findings in cattle with clinically suspect but
histologically unconfirmed
bovine spongiform encephalopathy
43. This was my main project during my employment at MAFF.
44. At this time, approximately 10% of cattle suspected of having BSE were
not being
diagnosed as BSE-positive. The purpose of this work was to establish what
other diseases
were being clinically mistaken for BSE and causing these cattle to be taken
as suspects
under the BSE Order.
45. Upon closer examination, three of the 200 'BSE-negative' brains proved
positive for
spongiform changes diagnostic of BSE (see YB87/12.14/1.2; YB87/12.15/2.1).
This
represents an overall diagnostic accuracy of 99.85%, exceeding the 99.6%
previously
published for the same standard diagnostic technique. Despite this, at the
behest of MAFF
managers, the emphasis of the study and its provisional title had to be
changed, from
accurately representing the whole negative 10%, to a study examining this
10% minus any
mention whatsoever of BSE-affected cattle going undiagnosed. I therefore had
to
reluctantly locate and analyse three new BSE-negative suspect brains.
46. Discussion of this would according to MAFF officials have resulted in
'lack of clarity' and
opened up debate as to the accuracy of diagnosis.
47. Although this may seem a minor consideration, it illustrates the
kneejerk and perhaps
unnecessary culture of secrecy operating within MAFF at that time.
48. As it was also a theoretical possibility that cases of BSE might exist
without the
characteristic spongiform changes, a further purpose of this work was to
examine selected
cases using immunocytochemistry for PrP to determine if any had BSE but
lacked the
characteristic pathology. Although the sensitivity of the technique used has
increased
dramatically since then, none were found at this time, and this was one of
the important
findings of the paper which was published.
49. In a number of informal conversations at that time, managers within MAFF
let me know
that the upper echelons of MAFF "had had it up to here with you scientists
finding out
about new diseases". As a Veterinary Research Officer employed in disease
surveillance, I
had considered that to be my job.
Published 1993 (McGill and Wells) ref 10
Theoretical models of TSE diseases
50. Published in the Veterinary Record 1991 (J/VR/128/368) as editorial of
AVTRW
conference. In 1991 Martin Alder, new editor of the. Veterinary Record ,
published a very
favourable account of my theoretical paper presented at AVTRW 1991 in
Scarborough
under the heading "Heretical Model of Scrapie". The Chairman of this session
was Bill
9
Blakemore, Cambridge Vet School. It was printed (after consultation with me)
in an
editorial article "Fruits of Research On Show in Scarborough". He devoted
considerably
more column inches to work by myself and Kenton Morgan than to work reported
by
NPU, although they had presented far more papers. It was to be the last time
my name
would appear in the Veterinary Record until 1997.
Unpublished 1988, 1992
Establishing that human prion disease can exist without characteristic
pathology.
51. This was the first conclusive proof that prion diseases can indeed exist
without any of the
characteristic pathology, extending the phenotypic diversity of prion
disease.
Published 1992 (Lantos, McGill et al) ref. 6
Setting up in vitro models of human prion diseases (GSS, familial CJD) in
neuroblastoma
cells in culture
(Resigned half way through project)
Neuropathology of natural sheep scrapie.
Started 1990, submitted 1995, published 1997 (Wood, McGill et al) ref 12
See para 11 for details of this work.
Contact with / Advice to Government
Contact with CVL / MAFF
52. I maintained regular contact with scientists at the CVL until 1997.
53. I cannot catalogue all the information, advice or recommendations I
offered to MAFF or
CVL between 1988 and 1997, as there is too much to include. However, I could
illustrate
with the following summary of two substantive suggestions for research.
Research on the biochemical/physical nature of "strains"
54. Prior to their publication as an editorial in the Veterinary Record, a
summary of these
ideas was presented to the CVL management for funding as a 'blue sky' PhD
project in
Spring 1991. The proposal was not taken up. This was the first occasion on
which I
proposed research to the Government in writing.
An abattoir survey for incidence of BSE
55. I suggested in 1990 that to improve the provision of control material I
should collect 20
cattle heads from a local abattoir.The purpose of this was to provide
BSE-negative
material to act as controls for our (CVL's) BSE work. However,
neuropathological
examination of these brains might also have given an indication of the
number of cattle
incubating BSE which were entering the human food chain. This research had
actually
been recommended in the Interim Report of the Tyrrell Committee, June 89.
10
56. I was instructed a few days after suggesting this to my head of
department that I was not
the first person to have thought of that, and that a decision had been taken
not to do that
research. I was also instructed, for some reason, not to put it in writing.
57. Budgets could hardly have been an issue contributing to the rejection of
this proposal, as
tongueless cattle heads were free, being banned from human consumption.
Contact with AFRC
58. I had contact with the AFRC in several capacities:
My work at the Institute of Psychiatry was funded by an AFRC grant.
Attending BSE Programme conferences in 1992 and 1994.
Submitted a further grant application to the AFRC in 1991.
59. This proposal was to continue research on natural scrapie, with which I
had been involved
at CVL (eventually published 1997; ref 12). I was to collaborate with John
Powell
(molecular neurobiologist) and David Male (co-author of the standard
Immunology text
worldwide: Roitt, Brostoff and Male). All five referees gave positive
statements about the
proposal, which was alpha-rated (see YB92/12.10/1.1 and YB92/12.17/1.1).
60. This was the second time that I suggested substantial investigations on
the TSEs to the
government in writing. Once more the proposal was not taken up.
61. In view of the continuing uncertainties as to the degree to which BSE
has affected the
sheep population, it would perhaps have been wise to fund this application
at that time.
62. Some of this work has still not been initiated, although the paper
(Wood, McGill et al
1997), after a two year delay from submission to publication, and the
original 1992 AFRC
grant submission, both described a unique series of characterised sheep
brains affected
with naturally occuring TSEs. The majority of them are natural scrapie
although further
work on this series of brains would give an indication of whether BSE was
also occurring
in sheep in the 1980s and early 1990s. Events have moved forward since this
grant
application was submitted, both in the nvCJD and scrapie fields, but this
still represents a
crucial question in the epidemiology of both scrapie and BSE which remains
unanswered.
This work should, in my opinion, be initiated forthwith, and further work
based on these
results pursued vigorously as results are obtained.Refer to discussion also
at para 31.
Additional Comments
63. I could perhaps sum up MAFF's approach to BSE with an observation which
is by no
means original:
"Absence of evidence" is not the same as "evidence of absence"
Publications
1. McGill IS (1986) The Shortcut to Elitism. The Guardian, December 1st,
p12.
11
2. Wells GAH, Wilesmith, JW & McGill IS (1991) Bovine spongiform
encephalopathy - a neuropathological perspective. Brain Pathology, 1, 69-78
3. McGill IS (1991) Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy. In: Practical Food
Hygiene,
Ed. Dickens T, Croner Publications Ltd, Kingston, UK, pp. 435-436
4. McGill IS & Whatley SA (1991) Understanding the causes of brain disease.
The
Independent, August 16th, p. 20
5. Wells GAH & McGill IS (1991) Recently described scrapie-like
encephalopathies of
animals - case definitions. In: Sub-acute Spongiform Encephalopathies, Eds.
Bradley
R, Savey M & Marchant B, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dorchelt, pp. 11-24.
6. Lantos P, McGill IS, Janota I, Doey J, Collinge J, Bruce M, Whatley SA,
Anderton BH, Clinton J, Roberts GW & Rosser N (1992) Prion protein
immunocytochemistry helps to establish the true incidence of prion disease.
Neuroscience Letters, 147, 67-71
7. Wells GAH & McGill IS (1992) Recently described scrapie-like
encephalopathies of
animals - case definitions. Research in Veterinary Science, 53, 1-10
8. Pollin MM, McGill IS & Wells GAH (1992) The differential
neurohistological
diagnoses of clinically suspect but unconfirmed BSE. Neuropathology and
Applied
Neurobiology, 18, 633 (abstract)
9. Guha M & McGill IS (1992) Book review of Black's Veterinary Dictionary
(17th
Edition), Ed, West GP, A & C Black, London. Reference Reviews, 6, 26
10. McGill IS & Wells GAH (1993). Neuropathological findings in cattle with
clinically
suspect but histologically unconfirmed bovine spongiform encephalopathy
(BSE).
Journal of Comparative Pathology, 108, 241-260
11. McGill IS (1995) Ayurvedic Medicine - The Documentary. Natural Medicine
Society
News, Spring 1995
12. Wood LJN, McGill IS, Done SH and Bradley R (1997) Neuropathology of
scrapie:
a study of the distribution patterns of brain lesions in 222 cases of
natural scrapie in
sheep, 1982-1991. Veterinary Record 140, 167-174
13. McGill IS, Hobson J (1998) Multi-centre evaluation of a herbal skin gel
for veterinary
practice - a questionnaire survey. Veterinary Times, 28, 1, 20-21
14. McGill IS (1998) BSE and Censorship. The Independent January 26th 1998,
p14
(YB98/1.26/1.1).
12
ANNEX 1:
CURRICULUM VITAE: IAIN STEWART McGILL
Education & Qualifications
1975 - 1982 Southend High School for Boys
GCE O-Levels (1980): 9 (6 A, 3 B)
GCE A-Levels (1982): Biology (A), Physics (A), Chemistry (A)
GCE S-Level (1982): Biology (2)
1982 - 1984 Royal Veterinary College, University of London
1984 - 1985 Kings College, University of London
B.Sc(Hons), II(i) Neuroscience and Immunology
1985 - 1988 Royal Veterinary College, University of London
B.Vet.Med., MRCVS.
Distinctions : Medicine , Clinical Pathology (Elective Subject)
First place for research project
Cecil Aulden Second Prize
Professional Experience
1988 - 1989 Veterinary Surgeon -- Blue Cross Animal Hospital, Victoria,
London
In addition to clinical duties, I upgraded clinical pathology services
within the hospital and established an interpretive service for laboratory
data for other clinicians.
1990 - 1991 Veterinary Research Officer -- MAFF Central Veterinary
Laboratory,
Weybridge, Surrey.
In this post I worked as a neuropathologist with Gerald Wells and William
Hadlow, in a large
interdisciplinary team researching the prion diseases of animals.
My work concentrated on the neuropathological characterisation of Bovine
Spongiform
Encephalopathy (BSE), the prion diseases of other animals and their
differential diagnosis.
This gave me good general experience of neurological disease, its diagnosis
and pathological
characteristics in a wide range of animals and an introduction to many
fields of neuroscience
research. Although broad-based, my research in these varying disciplines was
centred on the
Prion protein and its gene, and associated molecular pathology in the prion
diseases.
I described, amongst other things, the first cases in the UK of a chlamydial
disease of cattle
putatively equivalent to Sporadic Bovine Encephalomyelitis (see McGill and
Wells, 1993).
13
Additional responsibilities included:
Liaison with the Consultant Pathology Unit for neuropathological
surveillance, including
rabies diagnosis for the British Isles and characterisation of novel
diseases such as blue eared
pig disease.
Conducting occasional seminars introducing scrapie and BSE diagnosis for
visiting scientists
from abroad.
Rapporteur for The Gibbs Committee on Subacute Spongiform Encephalopathies
(held at
CVL in summer 1990).
Papers presented at AVTRW conferences at Scarborough (1990 & 1991), at
European
Community Seminar on Spongiform Encephalopathies, Brussels, (1991) and
International Pig
Veterinary Society, Holland, (1991).
Aug 91 - Dec 92 Research Worker (post-doctoral level)
Department of Neuroscience, Institute of Psychiatry, London
In this post I continued to follow my interest in the prion diseases, and
gained a good
grounding in both theoretical and practical molecular biology. I cloned PrP
genes from blood
samples taken from individuals with PrP mutations causal of familial CJD or
GSS and
transfected them into neuroblastoma cells in culture to investigate the
disease process in vitro.
I continued to work with colleagues from other disciplines, particularly
Neurology and
Neuropathology, and with Professor Peter Lantos and others established for
the first time that
prion disease can exist without its characteristic pathology (Lantos, McGill
et al, 1992).
Positions of responsibility included:
Lecturing on a course entitled "Molecular Mechanisms of Neurodegeneration",
to both
internal and external scientists, and as part of the London University M.Sc.
Neuroscience
course.
Lecturing on scrapie-like diseases as part of the London University M.Sc. in
Animal Health at
the RVC.
Liaison and research collaboration between the IOP and my previous employers
at CVL,
Weybridge.
Sole responsibility for the organisation and funding of the 1992/1993
seminar series for the
Department of Neuroscience, in which leading researchers from around the UK
were invited
to give seminars.
Paper presented at AFRC BSEP meeting, Reading, April 1992.
1994 - Present Scientific and Veterinary Consultant
14
(Spring 94) Acted as neuropathological consultant for research on the
transmissibility of BSE in collaboration with Dr David White and
Professor Neil Eddington at the Royal Veterinary College, University
of London.
(Summer 94) Veterinary Surgeon, Blue Cross Animal Hospital (Victoria,
London)
(Oct 94 - Dec 94) Lecturer in anatomy and histology, Optics Department, City
and
Islington College (London).
(1995) Re-established the Prion Interest Group (originally founded at the
Institute of Psychiatry in 1991) as a private organisation, continuing
research on prions.
Filmed and directed a documentary in India/Europe about Ayurvedic
medicine.
Acted as a locum veterinarian for the PDSA and the Veterinary Centre
Caterham.
(Jan 96 - Present) Veterinary Consultant to Ayuvet (UK) Ltd., co-ordinating
clinical and
laboratory research into the Ayurvedic system of medicine and its
application in European veterinary medicine. Continued co-ordination
of the Prion Interest Group.
Issued on behalf of the witness by:
The BSE Inquiry Press Office
6th Floor Hercules House
Hercules Road
London SE1 7DU
Tel: 0171 261 8377 / 8383
Fax: 0171 803 0893
Website: http://www.bse.org.uk
email: [email protected]

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s067.pdf

TSS

----- Original Message -----
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <[email protected]>
To: <[email protected]>
Sent: Monday, July 11, 2005 1:31 PM
Subject: THE MANIPULATION OF BSE/TSE SCIENCE IN PEER REVIEW JOURNALS ?


##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
#####################

From: TSS ()
Subject: THE MANIPULATION OF BSE/TSE SCIENCE IN PEER REVIEW JOURNALS ?
Date: July 11, 2005 at 11:23 am PST


1983


BSE CONSULTANT

APPROVAL OF MATERIAL FOR PUBLICATIONS

All material for publication including written works to be published in
scientific journals, books, proceedings of scientific meetings, abstracts of
verbally delivered papers and the like should be scrutinized for risk to the
Ministry before dispatch to the publishers.............

full text;

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1983/10/12001001.pdf


- 10 -

19. On 18th February, 1987 (YB87/2.18/1.1) I reported to Dr Watson and Dr
Shreeve on a further

case which we had received from Truro VIC. The brain had shown neuronal
vacuolation and

in brain extracts there were fibrils that were similar in size and
appearance to SAFs from sheep

with scrapie. The Virology Department was studying the brain further and
considering a

transmission study. A few weeks before this, I had discussed the possibility
of a transmission

study with Michael Dawson, a research officer in the Virology Department and
an expert in

viral diseases in sheep, and we were considering carefully the safety
aspects. In my note I

raised the question of whether we should disclose the information we had
more widely to the

VIS because this may assist in getting any other cases referred to CVL but
there was the

difficulty that we knew very little about the disorder and would be unable
to deal with queries

that might be raised.

20. On 23rd February, 1987 (YB87/2.23/1.1) I sent Mr Wells a note asking him
to prepare a

statement for publication in Vision, the in-house newsheet prepared by the
VIS for the SVS,

setting out details of what we had discovered. On 24th February, 1987
(YB87/2.25/2.1) Gerald

Wells indicated in a note to me that he had discussed the proposed article
with Mr Dawson and

they both believed that it could be damaging to publish anything at that
stage. They believed

cases would be referred to CVL in any event because they were unusual and
they did not feel

"Vision" was an appropriate publication because its confidentiality was
questionable and might

lead to referrals to veterinary schools rather than CVL. Gerald Wells was
also concerned

about the resources available in his section to deal with referred cases. I
replied

(YB87/2.25/2.1) indicating a draft statement was needed by the Director
before a decision on

publication could be made. Gerald Wells prepared a draft statement
(YB87/3.2/2.1) and sent it

to me on 2nd March, 1987. In his cover note (YB87/3.2/1.1) he commented that
he believed

the distribution of any statement about the new disease outside of CVL to be
premature

because there was so little information available about the new disease. I
passed on a copy of

Gerald Wells' note to Dr Watson (YB87/3.2/3.1). I discussed the matter of
publication with Dr

Watson. No decision had been taken to publish any material at that stage and
I sent a note to

Gerald Wells letting him know the position and confirming that his views and
those of Michael

Dawson would be taken into account when a decision was taken.

- 11 -

21. In March, 1987 serious consideration was given to possible transmission
(e.g. to hamsters) and

other experiments (other than the collection of epidemiological data by the
VIS and

clinicopathology which had been in progress since the first cases were
recognised in November,

1986).

22. On 23rd April, 1987 I sent a report (YB87/4.23/1.1) to Dr Watson and Dr
Shreeve informing

them that nine control brains were being examined for SAFs and a cow which
appeared to be

affected with BSE had been purchased for observation. The cow had come from
the farm

where the original cases had developed and had arrived at CVL on 22nd April,
1987.

23. On 15th May, 1987 Dr Watson informed me that the proposed "Vision" draft
would be

circulated to VICs in England and Wales if it was approved by management. On
22nd May,

1987 I was copied in on a note (YB87/5.22/2.1) from B.M Williams, (who I
believe was Head

of the VIS at this time but retired shortly after this), to Dr Watson. This
confirmed that the

draft prepared for publication in Vision was approved but that the final
paragraph should be

amended to make it clear that knowledge of the new disease should not be
communicated to

other research institutes or university departments. At a meeting with Dr
Watson on 2nd June,

1987 he informed me that no communication should be made with NPU until
after the meeting

with the CVO on 5th June, 1987 (see my note of 3rd June, 1987 –
YB87/6.3/1.1). We needed

much more data and information to answer inevitable queries. ...


http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s071.pdf

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmsctech/465/465m
48.htm


The Cultural Politics of Science and Decision-Making

An Anglo-German Comparison of Risk Political Cultures

 The BSE Case




by



Kerstin Dressel

sine-Institute Munich, Germany

[email protected].



The following report include excerpts of a thesis submitted in fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of

Doctor rerum politicarum (Dr. rer. pol.)

at the Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich

supervisor: Prof Dr Ulrich Beck

Institute for Sociology, Munich, Germany



The British case study was prepared at the Centre for the Study of
Environmental Change at Lancaster University, UK,

Supervisor: Prof Dr Brian Wynne

kindly supported by a grant of the Economic and Social Research Council, UK



Munich, 2nd October 2000


© Kerstin Dressel, 2000  all rights reserved.


http://bse.airtime.co.uk/dressel.htm#9



suppressed peer review of Harvard study October 31, 2002

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/oa/topics/BSE_Peer_Review.pdf



----- Original Message -----
From: "Galyean, Michael"
To:
Cc:
Sent: Saturday, May 28, 2005 3:34 PM
Subject: FW: Prion biology relevant to bovine spongiform encephalopathy
(ANIMALSCI Feedback Form)


Dr. Novakofski:

I recevied the following message and comments regarding your recent paper on
prion biology published in the Journal of Animal Science. I hope you will
take the time to look over the comments and respond to Mr. Singeltary.

Regards,

Michael Galyean
Editor-in-Chief
Journal of Animal Science

________________________________

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Thu 5/26/2005 9:20 AM
To: Amanda Kolling
Cc: Galyean, Michael
Subject: Re: Prion biology relevant to bovine spongiform encephalopathy
(ANIMALSCI Feedback Form)


I have forwarded this to Dr. Michael Gaylean as suggested.
thank you........

please note new email address [email protected]

any questions or follow ups, please do not hesitate to write...

thank you,

kindest regards,
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.


----- Original Message -----
From: Amanda Kolling
To: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Sent: Thursday, May 26, 2005 8:11 AM
Subject: RE: Prion biology relevant to bovine spongiform encephalopathy
(ANIMALSCI Feedback Form)


Dear Mr. Singeltary,

Thank you for your comments. Contrary to a previous e-mail sent to you by an
employee of HighWire, the Journal of Animal Science does accept Letters to
the Editor. If you are interested in submitting this as a letter to the
editor, I urge you to contact our editor-in-chief, Dr. Michael Gaylean at
[email protected]..

Best regards,

Amanda Kolling
Technical Editor,
Journal of Animal Science


At 09:11 AM 5/17/2005 -0700, Terry S. Singeltary Sr. wrote:
>------------------------------------------------------------
>Comments sent via JAS Feedback Page
>------------------------------------------------------------
> NAME: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
> EMAIL: [email protected]
> IP ADDRESS: 216.119.139.23
> HOSTNAME: pool139-23.dial-p1.hou.wt.net
> PREVIOUS PAGE: http://jas.fass.org/cgi/content/abstract/83/6/1455
> BROWSER: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Win98; en-US; rv:1.0.2)
> Gecko/20030208 Netscape/7.02
> PROMOTIONAL USE: Granted
>------------------------------------------------------------
>COMMENTS:
>J. Anim. Sci. 2005. 83:1455-1476
>© 2005 American Society of Animal Science
>SPECIAL TOPICS
>Prion biology relevant to bovine spongiform encephalopathy1
>J. Novakofski*,2, M. S. Brewer{dagger}, N.
>Mateus-Pinilla{ddagger}, J. Killefer* and R. H. McCusker*
>
>* Departments of Animal Sciences and {dagger} Food
>Science and Human Nutrition, University of Illinois at
>Urbana­Champaign 61801-4737; and {ddagger} Illinois
>Natural History Survey, Center for Wildlife and Plant
>Ecology, Champaign, IL 61820
>
>2 Correspondence: 1503 South Maryland Dr. (phone:
>217-333-6181; e-mail: [email protected]).
>
>Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and chronic
>wasting disease (CWD) of deer and elk are a threat to
>agriculture and natural resources, as well as a human
>health concern. Both diseases are transmissible
>spongiform encephalopathies (TSE), or prion diseases,
>caused by autocatalytic conversion of endogenously
>encoded prion protein (PrP) to an abnormal, neurotoxic
>conformation designated PrPsc. Most mammalian species
>are susceptible to TSE, which, despite a range of
>species-linked names, is caused by a single highly
>conserved protein, with no apparent normal function. In
>the simplest sense, TSE transmission can occur because
>PrPsc is resistant to both endogenous and environmental
>proteinases, although many details remain unclear.
>Questions about the transmission of TSE are central to
>practical issues such as livestock testing, access to
>international livestock markets, and wildlife
>management strategies, as well as intangible issues
>such as consumer confidence in the safety of the meat
>supply. The majority of BSE cases seem to have been
>transmitted by feed containing meat and bone meal from
>infected animals. In the United Kingdom, there was a
>dramatic decrease in BSE cases after neural tissue and,
>later, all ruminant tissues were banned from ruminant
>feed. However, probably because of heightened awareness
>and widespread testing, there is growing evidence that
>new variants of BSE are arising "spontaneously,"
>suggesting ongoing surveillance will continue to find
>infected animals. Interspecies transmission is
>inefficient and depends on exposure, sequence homology,
>TSE donor strain, genetic polymorphism of the host, and
>architecture of the visceral nerves if exposure is by
>an oral route. Considering the low probability of
>interspecies transmission, the low efficiency of oral
>transmission, and the low prion levels in nonnervous
>tissues, consumption of conventional animal products
>represents minimal risk. However, detection of rare
>events is challenging, and TSE literature is
>characterized by subsequently unsupported claims of
>species barriers or absolute tissue safety. This review
>presents an overview of TSE and summarizes recent
>research on pathogenesis and transmission.
>
>Key Words: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy . Chronic
>Wasting Disease . Prion
>
>http://jas.fass.org/cgi/content/abstract/83/6/1455
>
> >there is growing evidence that new variants of BSE are
>arising "spontaneously,"
>
>
>THERE is NO evidence of a 'spontaneous' TSE anywhere that
>is infectious and shows the pathology of any natural TSE.
>if i have missed something, could someone please site this
>science to me please.
>
>
> >Considering the low probability of interspecies
>transmission, the low efficiency of oral transmission,
>and the low prion levels in nonnervous tissues,
>consumption of conventional animal products represents
>minimal risk.
>
>
>I DISAGREE with all of the above. all one has to do is
>read transmission
>studies. scrapie infected sheep and goats, CWD infected
>deer and
>elk (who knows how many strains) and undocumented TSEs
>in the
>USA bovine have been rendered and fed to animals for
>humna/animal
>consumption for decades. it's only a pipe dream that
>none of this
>was infectious. to think of a 'spontaneous' TSE as just
>popping
>up from nowhere, is like believing in Santa Claus. remember
>the USA scrapie research in Mission, Texas. IT did NOT look
>like BSE...
>
>
>1: J Infect Dis 1980 Aug;142(2):205-8
>
> Oral transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob
>disease, and scrapie to nonhuman primates.
>
> Gibbs CJ Jr, Amyx HL, Bacote A, Masters CL,
>Gajdusek DC.
>
> Kuru and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease of humans and
>scrapie disease of sheep and goats were transmitted to
>squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) that were exposed
>to the infectious agents only by their nonforced
>consumption of known infectious tissues. The
>asymptomatic incubation period in the one monkey
>exposed to the virus of kuru was 36 months; that in the
>two monkeys exposed to the virus of Creutzfeldt-Jakob
>disease was 23 and 27 months, respectively; and that in
>the two monkeys exposed to the virus of scrapie was 25
>and 32 months, respectively. Careful physical
>examination of the buccal cavities of all of the
>monkeys failed to reveal signs or oral lesions. One
>additional monkey similarly exposed to kuru has
>remained asymptomatic during the 39 months that it has
>been under observation.
>
>PMID: 6997404
>http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_u
ids=6997404&dopt=Abstract
>
>
>3. You will recall that the advice provided by
>Professor Smith in
>1993 and by Dr. Gore this month used the sub-population
>of dairy
>farm workers who had had a case of BSE on their farms -
>63,000, which is approximately half the number of dairy
>farm
>workers - as a denominator. If the above sums are
>repeated using
>this denominator population, taking an annual incidence
>in the general
>population of 1 per million the observed rate in this
>sub-population
>is 10 TIMES, and taking an annual incidence of 0.7 per
>million,
>IT IS 15 TIMES (THE ''WORST CASE'' SCENARIO) than
>that in the general population...
>
>http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1995/01/31004001.pdf
>
>
>It was, however, performed in the USA in 1979, when it
>was shown that
>cattle inoculated with the scrapie agent endemic in the
>flock of Suffolk
>sheep at the United States Department of Agriculture in
>Mission, Texas,
>developed a TSE quite unlike BSE. 32 <
>
>http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume2/chaptea3.htm#820543
>
>The findings of the initial transmission, though not of
>the clinical or
>neurohistological examination, were communicated in
>October 1988 to Dr
>Watson, Director of the CVL, following a visit by Dr
>Wrathall, one of
>the project leaders in the Pathology Department of the
>CVL, to the
>United States Department of Agriculture. 33
>
>
>http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume2/chaptea3.htm#820546
>
>
>The results were not published at this point, since the
>attempted
>transmission to mice from the experimental cow brain
>had been
>inconclusive. The results of the clinical and
>histological differences
>between scrapie-affected sheep and cattle were
>published in 1995.
>Similar studies in which cattle were inoculated
>intracerebrally with
>scrapie inocula derived from a number of
>scrapie-affected sheep of
>different breeds and from different States, were
>carried out at the US
>National Animal Disease Centre. 34
>
>
>http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume2/chaptea3.htm#820549
>
>
>The results, published in 1994, showed that this source
>of scrapie
>agent, though pathogenic for cattle, did not produce
>the same clinical
>signs of brain lesions characteristic of BSE.
>
>
>http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume2/chaptea3.htm
>
>
>Visit to USA ... info on BSE and Scrapie
>
>
>http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1988/10/00001001.pdf
>
>
>HOUND STUDY
>
>AS implied in the Inset 25 we must not _ASSUME_ that
>transmission of BSE to other species will invariably
>present pathology typical of a scrapie-like disease.
>
>snip...
>
>http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1991/01/04004001.pdf
>
>
>In Confidence - Perceptions of unconventional slow
>virus diseases
>of animals in the USA - APRIL-MAY 1989 - G A H Wells
>
>
>http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11b/tab01.pdf
>
>WHY is USA insisting _now_ not to use WB, when on the
>1st _confirmed_
>case Dec. 23, 2003
>USA mad cow, WB was used ???
>
>maybe this is the reason ;
>
>JAPAN BSE # 8 & 9 cow
>
>8. 6/10/2003 Holstein Steer 13/10/2001 23 mths
>No clinical signs WB+, IHC-, HP-
>
>
>9. 4/11/2003 Holstein Steer 13/1/2002
>21 mths No clinical signs WB+, IHC-, HP-
>
>===========
>
>More information on the first 11 Japanese BSE-cases can
>be found on the

>website of the Japanese Embassy in the US:
>
>http://www.us.emb-japan.go.jp/english/html/fafacts/bse/bse.htm
>
>
>IN fact, the new strain of TSE in cattle BaSE, does not
>look like nvCJD in humans, but very similar
>to the sporadic CJD;
>
>
>BASE in cattle in Italy of Identification of a second
>bovine amyloidotic spongiform encephalopathy: Molecular
>similarities with sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
>
>http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/0305777101v1
>
>
>Adaptation of the bovine spongiform encephalopathy
>agent to primates and comparison with Creutzfeldt-
>Jakob disease: Implications for human health THE
>findings from Corinne Ida Lasmézas*, [dagger] ,
>Jean-Guy Fournier*, Virginie Nouvel*, Hermann Boe*,
>Domíníque Marcé*, François Lamoury*, Nicolas Kopp
>[Dagger ] , Jean-Jacques Hauw§, James Ironside¶, Moira
>Bruce [||] , Dominique Dormont*, and Jean-Philippe
>Deslys* et al, that The agent responsible for French
>iatrogenic growth hormone-linked CJD taken as a control
>is very different from vCJD but is similar to that
>found in one case of sporadic CJD and one sheep scrapie
>isolate;
>
>
>http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/041490898v1
>
>
>Characterization of two distinct prion strains derived
>from bovine spongiform encephalopathy transmissions to
>inbred mice
>
>
> http://vir.sgmjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/85/8/2471
>
>
>USA BSE GBR III
>
>http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/efsa_scientific_reports/gbr_assessments/scr_
annexes/574/sr03_biohaz02_usa_report_annex_en1.pdf
>
>http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/03n0312/03N-0312_emc-000001.txt
>
>https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/regpublic.nsf/0/eff9eff1f7c5cf2b87256ecf000df0
8d?OpenDocument
>
>https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/BSEcom.nsf/0/b78ba677e2b0c12185256dd300649f9d?
OpenDocument&AutoFramed
>
>
>Terry S. Singeltary SR.
>P.O. Box 42
>Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

La Vonne Gallo
HighWire Press
1454 Page Mill Road
Palo Alto, CA 94304
fax: 650.725.9335
[email protected]

~~~~~~~~~~~
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

#################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html
####################

#################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html ####################
 
##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################

Subject: Re: McDonald's Corp. seven scientists and experts and a
pharmaceutical supplier Seriologicals Corp. U.S. NOT PROTECTED AGAINST MAD
COW DISEASE
Date: January 11, 2006 at 9:27 am PST

December 19, 2005



Division of Dockets Management (HFA-305)

Food and Drug Administration

5630 Fishers Lane

Room 1061
Rockville, MD 20852


Re: Docket No: 2002N-0273 (formerly Docket No. 02N-0273)


Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food and Feed


Dear Sir or Madame:

The McDonalds Corporation buys more beef than any other restaurant in the
United States. It is essential for our customers and our company that the
beef has the highest level of safety. Concerning BSE, the most effective way
to insure this is to create a system that processes cattle that are not
exposed to the disease. As a company we take numerous precautions via our
strict specifications to help and assure this, however we feel that the
force of federal regulation is important to ensure that the risk of exposure
in the entire production system is reduced to as close to zero as possible.
The exemptions in the current ban as well as in the newly proposed rule make
this difficult if not impossible, as there are still legal avenues for
ruminants to consume potentially contaminated ruminant protein. In addition,
the USDA still has not implemented a system of identification and
traceability. It is our opinion that the government can take further action
to reduce this risk and appreciate the opportunity to submit comments to
this very important proposed rule.

After the identification of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in
indigenous North American cattle, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
responded rapidly to implement measures to protect public health in regard
to food. Our company recognizes and supports the importance of the current
feed ban which went into effect in August 1997. However, given what is known
about the epidemiology and characteristically long incubation period of BSE,
we urge the FDA to act without further delay and implement additional
measures which will reduce the risk of BSE recycling in the US cattle herd.
We caution against using the 18 month enhanced surveillance as a
justification to relax or impede further actions. While this surveillance
indicates an epidemic is not underway, it does not clear the US cattle herd
from infection. The positive cases indicate probable exposure prior to the
1997 feed ban, a time when BSE appears to have been circulating in animal
feed. BSE cases are most likely clustered in time and location, so while
enhanced surveillance provides an 18 month snapshot, it does not negate the
fact that US and Canadian cattle were exposed to BSE and that the current
feed controls contain "leaks".


We feel that for the FDA to provide a more comprehensive and protective feed
ban, specified risk materials (SRMs) and deadstock must be removed from all
animal feed and that legal exemptions which allow ruminant protein to be fed
back to ruminants (with the exception of milk) should be discontinued.


SRMs, as defined by the USDA, are tissues which, in a BSE infected animal,
are known to either harbor BSE infectivity or to be closely associated with
infectivity. If SRMs are not removed, they may introduce BSE infectivity and
continue to provide a source of animal feed contamination. Rendering will
reduce infectivity but it will not totally eliminate it. This is
significant, as research in the United Kingdom has shown that a calf may be
infected with BSE by the ingestion of as little as .001 gram of untreated
brain.


The current proposed rule falls short of this and would still leave a
potential source of infectivity in the system. In fact by the FDA's own
statement the exempted tissues which are known to have infectivity (such as
distal ileum, DRGs, etc) would cumulatively amount to approximately 10% of
the infectivity in an infected animal. Leaving approximately 10% of the
infectious tissues in the system is not good enough. The proposed rule still
allows the possibility for cattle to be exposed to BSE through:


Feeding of materials currently subject to legal exemptions from the ban
(e.g., poultry litter, plate waste)
Cross feeding (the feeding of non-ruminant rations to ruminants) on farms;
and
Cross contamination of ruminant and non-ruminant feed


We are most concerned that the FDA has chosen to include a provision that
would allow tissues from deadstock into the feed chain. We do not support
the provision to allow the removal of brain and spinal cord from down and
deadstock over 30 months of age for several reasons. These are the animals
with the highest level of infectivity in tissues which include more than
brain and spinal cord. Firstly, there are two issues regarding the complex
logistics of this option. We do not feel that it is possible to have
adequate removal especially during the warmer months. In addition, we do not
feel that there are adequate means to enforce complete removal. Unlike
slaughterhouses, there are no government inspectors at rendering plants or
deadstock collection points.


Most importantly, there is emerging information that at end stage disease (a
natural BSE case); infectivity may also be included in additional tissues
such as peripheral nerves (Buschmann and Groschup, 2005 – see attached).
This published work supports publicly reported studies in Japan where by
western blot testing, prions have been found in the peripheral nerves of a
naturally infected 94-month-old cow. If this is the case, the amount of
infectivity left in the system from an infected bovine would surpass 10% and
the full extent is still unknown.


McDonalds has convened it own International Scientific Advisory Committee
(ISAC) as well as co-sponsored a symposium of TSE scientists on the issue of
tissue distribution. The consensus of both groups was that the pathogenesis
of BSE might not be entirely different from TSEs in other species at the
point where the animal is showing signs of the disease. These scientists
feel that the studies as reported above have merit. The current studies not
only re-enforce the risk of down and deadstock but also appear to provide
additional information that these animals may be a potential source of
greater levels of infectivity into the feed system. Hence, we suggest that
the FDA consult with TSE scientists as well.


Leaving the tissues from the highest risk category of cattle in the animal
feed chain will effectively nullify the intent of this regulation. This
point is illustrated by the 2001 Harvard risk assessment model that
demonstrated that eliminating dead and downer, 4D cattle, from the feed
stream was a disproportionately effective means of reducing the risk of
re-infection.

"The disposition of cattle that die on the farm would also have a
substantial influence on the spread of BSE if the disease were introduced."
The base case scenario showed that the mean total number of ID50s (i.e.,
dosage sufficient to infect 50 percent of exposed cattle) from healthy
animals at slaughter presented to the food/feed system was 1500. The mean
total number of ID50s from adult cattle deadstock presented to the feed
system was 37,000. This illustrates the risk of "4D cattle" (i.e.,
deadstock).


From the Harvard Risk Assessment, 2001, Appendix 3A Base Case and Harvard
Risk Assessment, 2001 Executive Summary

McDonalds also urges agencies of the US government to work with academia and
industry on research in the following areas:

· Methods to inactivate TSEs agents which then may allow a product to be
used and even fed to animals without risk

· Alternative uses for animal byproducts which would maintain some value

In July 2004, McDonalds in cooperation with others sponsored a meeting at
Penn State. The purpose of the meeting was to review work conducted by Dr.
Bruce Miller looking at the feasibility of using carcasses and animal
byproducts as renewable alternatives to fossil fuels in large energy
generating boilers. A number of government representatives were also invited
to this meeting. We are aware that Dr. Miller continues this work which
shows great promise. We suggest that the FDA explore the possibility of this
alternative use that may also have a positive impact on the environment.

The McDonalds Corporation will continue to work with the FDA and other
government agencies to implement a strong BSE risk control program. We would
like to reiterate our opinion that for the FDA to provide a more
comprehensive and protective feed ban, specified risk materials (SRMs) and
deadstock must be removed from all animal feed and that legal exemptions
which allow ruminant protein to be fed back to ruminants (with the exception
of milk) should be discontinued. Thank you for the opportunity to submit
these comments to the public record.


Respectfully,

Dick Crawford

Corporate Vice President, Government Relations



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[email protected].


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December 20, 2005

Division of Dockets Management (HFA-305)

Food and Drug Administration

5630 Fishers Lane

Room 1061
Rockville, MD 20852


Re: Docket No: 2002N-0273 (formerly Docket No. 02N-0273)



Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food and Feed


Dear Sir or Madame:

As scientists and recognized experts who have worked in the field of TSEs
for decades, we are deeply concerned by the recent discoveries of indigenous
BSE infected cattle in North America and appreciate the opportunity to
submit comments to this very important proposed rule We strongly supported
the measures that USDA and FDA implemented to protect public health after
the discovery of the case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) found in
Washington State in 2003. We know of no event or discovery since then that
could justify relaxing the existing specified risk material (SRM) and
non-ambulatory bans and surveillance that were implemented at that time.
Further, we strongly supported the codification of those changes, as well as
additional measures to strengthen the entire feed and food system. The
discovery of additional cases of indigenous BSE in North America since that
time has validated our position and strengthened our convictions.

We caution against using the 18 month enhanced surveillance as a
justification to relax or impede further actions. While this surveillance
has not uncovered an epidemic, it does not clear the US cattle herd from
infection. While it is highly likely that US and Canadian cattle were
exposed to BSE prior to the 1997 feed ban, we do not know how many cattle
were infected or how widely the infection was dispersed. BSE cases are most
likely clustered in time and location, so while enhanced surveillance
provides an 18 month snapshot, it does not negate the fact that US and
Canadian cattle were exposed to BSE. We also do not know in any quantitative
or controlled way how effective the feed ban has been, especially at the
farm level. At this point we cannot even make a thorough assessment of the
USDA surveillance as details such as age, risk category and regional
distribution have not been released.



A number of countries initially attempted to take partial steps in regard to
feed controls only to face repeated disappointments in predicted downturns
of the epidemic course. We in North America could do this experiment all
over again, waiting for each new warning before adding more stringency to
our control measures, or we can benefit from the experience of others and
take decisive measures now to arrest any further development of underlying
cases that is implicit in those already discovered to date.

The discovery of 5 indigenous North American cases, including one born after
the implementation of the current feed ban, should provide the necessary
incentive to implement, monitor and enforce a comprehensive and protective
feed ban that is more congruent with the measures that have been proven to
be effective throughout the world. In particular, we urge the FDA to act
without further delay to strengthen the animal feed regulations by
implementing the program proposed by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency
(CFIA) in the December 11, 2004 Gazette. This includes removing all
specified risk materials (SRMs) and deadstock from all animal feed. We also
urge that the FDA discontinues the legal exemptions which allow ruminant
protein to be fed back to ruminants (with the exception of milk). Many of
these exemptions do not exist in other countries.


Bovine products and byproducts are used for both food and pharmaceuticals.
These human uses require the highest level of safety. Because of the hardy
nature of the BSE agent and its high potential for cross contamination, the
most effective way to protect bovine products and bovine derived materials
from contamination by BSE is to ensure that infected animals or carcasses
never enter processing plants. The goal would be to discover and remove
infected animals from production as early as possible in the infection and
long before they would be sent to slaughter. Until we have diagnostic tools
powerful enough to allow us to discover the disease early in its prolonged
pre-clinical incubation, we have to rely on the next best strategy which is
to prevent any exposure through feed. The exemptions in the current ban as
well as in the newly proposed rule make this difficult if not impossible, as
they still provide legal avenues for ruminants to consume potentially
contaminated ruminant protein.


It is our opinion that the proposed rule falls woefully short in effective
measures to minimize the potential for further transmissions of the disease.
By the FDA's own analysis, exempted tissues (such as distal ileum, DRGs,
etc) contain approximately 10% of the infectivity in affected animals. Thus
the proposed rule still allows the possibility for cattle to be exposed to
BSE through:


1. Feeding of materials currently subject to legal exemptions from the ban
(e.g., poultry litter, plate waste)

2. Cross feeding (the feeding of non-ruminant rations to ruminants) on
farms; and

3. Cross contamination of ruminant and non-ruminant feed


We are most concerned that the FDA has chosen to include a provision that
would allow tissues from deadstock into the feed chain. We do not believe
that down or dead stock should be allowed into the food or feed chain
whatever the age of the animal and whether or not the CNS tissues are
removed. We do not support the provision to allow removal of brain and
spinal cord from deadstock over 30 months for a number of reasons. [RR1]
This category of animals contains the highest level of infectivity and that
infectivity is in other tissues besides just brain and spinal cord. Recent
improvements in the BSE bioassay, have now made it possible to detect BSE
infectivity 1000 time more efficiently than before. This assay has revealed
the presence of BSE infectivity in some but not all peripheral nerves and in
one muscle. (Buschmann and Groschup, 2005) This published and peer reviewed
work is consistent with other publicly reported studies in Japan where, by
western blot testing, prions were found in the peripheral nerves of a
naturally infected 94-month-old cow. We feel that the studies as reported
above have merit. The current studies not only re-enforce the risk of down
and deadstock but also appear to provide additional information that these
animals may be a potential source of greater levels of infectivity into the
feed system. We also doubt that brain and spinal cord can be completely
removed especially during warmer weather. Given the biological composition
of these tissues, they are predisposed to rapid autolysis.


As world wide surveillance for BSE increases, several atypical cases of
bovine TSE have been discovered. These cases either show no clinical signs,
or present as 'downers', and have an atypical neuropathology with respect to
lesion morphology and distribution, causing problems in both clinical and
post-mortem diagnosis. The origin of the cases are unclear but they suggest
that even should typical BSE be eliminated, there may be other TSE diseases
of cattle that could result by "mutation" and selection. Refeeding of
contaminated protein could potentially perpetuate transmission much like
typical BSE. An effective feed ban could prevent the expansion of such
strains. We also note that there are other species which are susceptible to
BSE and the current regulations allow for SRMs to be included in feed for
these animals.



For BSE to be perpetuated, the animal production system must have a source
of agent and a means by which cattle or other susceptible species are
exposed to this agent. We feel that in North America, the source and routes
of exposure still exist, hence allowing for the continued recycling of BSE.
We have detailed the scientific justifications for our position below.

Source of the agent: SRMs (Specified Risk Materials)


SRMs, as defined by the USDA, are tissues which, in a BSE infected animal,
are known to either harbor BSE infectivity or to be closely associated with
infectivity. If SRMs are not removed, they may introduce BSE infectivity and
continue to provide a source of animal feed contamination. For example, the
skull and vertebral column which encase the brain and spinal cord,
respectively, can be assumed to have gross contamination. Rendering will
reduce infectivity but it will not totally eliminate it. This is significant
as research in the United Kingdom has shown that a calf may be infected with
BSE by the ingestion of as little as .001 gram of untreated brain.



The tissue distribution of infectivity in BSE infected cattle has primarily
been determined by 3 studies conducted in the United Kingdom all of which
had limitations.


In two of the studies, bioassays were done in mice which are at least 1000
fold less sensitive to BSE infection than cattle themselves. Only higher
titers of infectivity can be detected by this method. These investigations
found infectivity in the brain, spinal cord, retina, trigeminal ganglia,
dorsal root ganglia, distal ileum and bone marrow (the bone marrow finding
was from one animal). Infectivity was found in distal ileum of
experimentally infected calves beginning six months after challenge and
continuing at other intervals throughout life. (Wells et. al., 1994; 1998).
The bioassay study in calves has produced similar results and in addition
infectivity has been found in tonsil. The study is still in progress.
Another project has found infectivity in the lymphoid tissue of third eyelid
from naturally infected animals. (Dr. Danny Matthews, UK DEFRA, personal
communication).


While bioassay in cattle is far preferable to mice in terms of sensitivity,
cattle nevertheless present their own limitations in terms of the long
incubation time and the limited number of animals that can be used for assay
compared to rodents. As a consequence the significance of the negative
finding for many tissues is questionable. In fact, by the end of 2004 there
was increasing evidence in species other than cattle that peripheral nerves
and muscle have infectivity. (Bosque et al., 2002; Glatzel et al.,
2003;Bartz et al., 2002; Androletti et al., 2004; Mulcahy et al., 2004;
Thomzig et al., 2003; Thomzig et al., 2004)


In some of these species, studies indicate that the agent migrates to the
brain and spinal cord, replicates to high levels in the CNS and then spreads
centrifugally from the spinal cord back down through the spinal neurons to
the junction of the nerves and muscle into the muscle cells themselves. A
recent German study (Buschmann and Groschup, 2005) examined nerves and
muscle from a cow naturally infected with BSE and found that infectivity was
present in several peripheral nerves and one muscle. The method of detection
was bioassay in bovinized transgenic mice that show the same or greater
sensitivity to transmission of BSE as cattle. This research concurs with
findings by Japanese scientists that BSE infectivity is present in
peripheral nerves at least in the clinical stage of disease.


It is our opinion that there is increasing evidence that the pathogenesis of
BSE might not be entirely different from TSEs in other species at the point
of clinical disease in that there is peripheral involvement. We feel that
the studies as reported above have merit. The current studies not only
re-enforce the risk of down and deadstock but also appear to provide
additional information that these animals may be a potential source of
greater levels of infectivity into the feed system.


In the event that FDA may confer with USDA about the risks associated with
peripheral nerves we want to point out one issue. In the recent publication
of the final rule on the importation of whole cuts of boneless beef from
Japan, 9 CFR Part 94 [Docket No. 05-004-2] RIN 0579-AB93, we disagree with
the interpretation provided by USDA, APHIS.



APHIS seems to discount the studies conducted by Groschup et al. 2005. on
the basis that the transgenic mouse bioassay that they used may be too
sensitive. In taking this position they have failed to realize that the
point of an assay is to reveal in which tissues the infectivity resides and
its relative concentration to brain or spinal cord. For this purpose, no
assay can be too sensitive. Of course, the probability of an actual
infection will be affected by the efficiency of infection which will be a
function of dose, route of exposure and any host barrier effects that are
present.


We would also like to point out a factual error in the conclusion. APHIS
states, "Given these factors, APHIS has determined that the finding of BSE
infectivity in facial and sciatic nerves of the transgenic mice is not
directly applicable to cattle naturally infected with BSE. Therefore, we do
not consider it necessary to make any adjustments to the risk analysis for
this rulemaking or to extend the comment period to solicit additional public
comment on this issue." It is incorrect that the infectivity was found in
the peripheral nerves of transgenic mice. The peripheral nerves were
harvested from a cow naturally infected with BSE. Transgenic mice were used
as a bioassay model.



From [Docket No. 05-004-2] RIN 0579-AB93[RR2] :


"Peripheral Nerves

Issue: Two commenters stated that the underlying assumption of the proposed
rule, that whole cuts of boneless beef from Japan will not contain tissues
that may carry the BSE agent, is no longer valid because researchers have
found peripheral nervous system tissues, including facial and sciatic
nerves, that contain BSE infectivity.\2\ One of these commenters requested
APHIS to explain whether and what additional mitigation measures are needed
to reduce the risks that
these tissues may be present in Japanese beef. This commenter further
requested an additional comment period to obtain public comments to treat
this new scientific finding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\2\ Bushmann, A., and Groschup, M.; Highly Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy-Sensitive Transgenic Mice Confirm the Essential
Restriction of Infectivity to the Nervous System in Clinically
Diseased Cattle. The Journal of Infectious Diseases, 192: 934-42,
September 1, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Response: APHIS is familiar with the results of the study mentioned by the
commenters in which mice, genetically engineered to be highly susceptible to
BSE and to overexpress the bovine prion protein, were inoculated with
tissues from a BSE-infected cow. This study demonstrated low levels of
infectivity in the mouse assay in the facial and sciatic nerves of the
peripheral nervous system. APHIS has evaluated these findings in the context
of the potential occurrence of
infectivity in the peripheral nerves of cattle and the corresponding risks
of the presence of infectivity in such tissues resulting in cattle or human
exposure to the BSE agent. The results from these experiments in genetically
engineered mice should be interpreted with caution, as the findings may be
influenced by the overexpression of prion proteins and may not accurately
predict the natural distribution of BSE infectivity in cattle. Further, the
overexpression of prion
proteins in transgenic mice may not accurately mimic the natural disease
process because the transgenic overexpressing mice have been shown to
develop spontaneous lethal neurological disease involving spongiform changes
in the brain and muscle degeneration.\3\ In addition, the route of
administration to the mice was both intraperitoneal and intracerebral, which
are two very efficient routes of infection as compared to oral consumption.
Given these factors, APHIS has determined that the finding of BSE
infectivity in facial and sciatic nerves of the transgenic mice is not
directly applicable to cattle naturally infected with BSE. Therefore, we do
not consider it
necessary to make any adjustments to the risk analysis for this rulemaking
or to extend the comment period to solicit additional public comment on this
issue."



Source of the agent: Deadstock


The total amount of TSE infectivity in a TSE infected animal increases
steadily throughout the infection and exponentially once the infectivity
reaches the brain. Infected individuals only exhibit recognizable clinical
signs once infectivity titers have reached high levels in the brain.
Surveillance data collected throughout Europe indicates there is a much
greater likelihood for BSE to be detected in dead or down cattle than from
healthy normal animals. This has so far also been borne out by the
experience in North America. Animals that die of BSE harbor the greatest
amount of agent that can be produced by the disease. Leaving the tissues
from the highest risk category of cattle in the animal feed chain will
effectively nullify the purported intent of this regulation. This point is
supported by the 2001 Harvard risk assessment model that demonstrated that
eliminating dead and downer, 4D cattle, from the feed stream was a
disproportionately effective means of reducing the risk of re-infection.


"The disposition of cattle that die on the farm would also have a
substantial influence on the spread of BSE if the disease were introduced."
The base case scenario showed that the mean total number of ID50s (i.e.,
dosage sufficient to infect 50 percent of exposed cattle) from healthy
animals at slaughter presented to the food/feed system was 1500. The mean
total number of ID50s from adult cattle deadstock presented to the feed
system was 37,000. This illustrates the risk of "4D cattle" (i.e.,
deadstock).


From the Harvard Risk Assessment, 2001, Appendix 3A Base Case and Harvard
Risk Assessment, 2001 Executive Summary


It is likely that these numbers would have to be adjusted upwards, if the UK
attack rate and Groschup data were considered.



Inflammation and TSEs


There have been 3 recent peer reviewed publications which indicate that
chronic inflammatory conditions in a host with a TSE may induce prion
replication in, or distribution to organs previously thought to be low or no
risk. They are as follows:


Chronic Lymphocytic Inflammation Specifies the Organ Tropism of Prions
(Heikenwalder et. al. 2005 www.sciencexpress.org/20 January 2005/ Page 1/
10.1126/science.1106460)


2. Coincident Scrapie Infection and Nephritis Lead to Urinary Prion
Excretion (Seeger et al., Science 14 October 2005:Vol. 310. no. 5746, pp.
324 – 326 DOI: 10.1126/science.1118829)


3. PrPsc in mammary glands of sheep affected by scrapie and mastitis (Ligios
C., et al. Nature Medicine, 11. 1137 – 1138, 2005)



These studies from the Aguzzi laboratory warn that concurrent chronic
inflammatory disease could dramatically alter the distribution of BSE
infectivity in infected cattle. Down and dead stock are at higher risk for
both BSE and other systemic conditions. If the results reported above are
also applicable to cattle, the carcasses of dead and down stock affected by
BSE might contain even higher levels of infectivity, or contribute
infectivity via tissues that are not ordinarily at risk in normal animals.



Exposure: Industry Practices or Exemptions which may pose a risk


Poultry Litter


In the United States poultry litter can be fed to cattle. There are two
potential sources of risk from poultry litter. Poultry litter not only
consists of digested feed but also of feed which spills from the cages. As a
consequence, the practice of feeding litter back to cattle is by its nature
non-compliant with the current feed ban if the poultry themselves are being
fed ruminant protein. Given that ruminant protein can no longer be fed to
ruminants in the United States and that most, if not all, countries will no
longer import North American ruminant MBM, an even larger part of poultry
diets is now ruminant MBM. Spillage provides a direct link to back to cattle
but feces are also likely to contain infectivity.


There is no reason to expect that TSE infectivity would be inactivated by
passage through the poultry gut, and only a slim possibility that composting
would reduce infectivity at all. Thus poultry feces are another potential
route of transmission back to cattle. Evidence for this comes from rodent
experiments where infectivity was demonstrated in the feces after being fed:
"Laboratory experiments show that mice orally challenged with scrapie have
detectable infectivity that passes through the gut. Gut contents and fecal
matter may therefore contain infectivity, and it is noted that in
experimental oral challenges in cattle conducted in the UK, feces must be
treated as medical waste for one month following the challenge. It is
concluded that digestive contents and fecal material from livestock or
poultry currently being fed with MBM potentially contaminated with BSE
should not be used as a feed ingredient for animal feed." [Proceedings:
Joint WHO/FAO/OIE/ Technical Consultation on BSE: public health, animal
health and trade. Paris, 10-14 June 2001; and Alan Dickinson, personal
communication].


It may be possible to remove the risk from poultry litter by sterilization.
However, unless or until a method can be developed and validated, poultry
litter should be banned from ruminant feed.



Ruminant Blood


In contrast with humans, sheep, monkeys, mice and hamsters, including sheep
and mice infected with BSE and humans infected with vCJD considered
identical to BSE, no infectivity has so far been demonstrated in the blood
of BSE infected cattle. However, we consider it unlikely that cattle are the
sole outlier to what has been a consistent finding in all other TSE diseases
where the measurement has been made with sufficient sensitivity to detect
the low levels of infectivity that are present in blood. Rather, this
failure is more likely the result of the very small volumes of blood that
were used for the inoculations (less than 1 ml), whereas whole transfusions
were administered to assay animals in the published sheep scrapie/BSE
experiments. If blood is infected then all vascularized tissues can be
expected to contain some infectivity in proportion to the content of
residual blood.


Micro emboli are a possible source of blood-borne agent that could be at
much higher titer than blood itself, in slaughtered cattle carrying BSE
infection. Stunning can release micro emboli of brain tissue into the
circulatory system from where they can be distributed to other tissues in
the few moments before the exsanguination and death. (Anil, et al, 2001a &
b; Anil et al, 2002; Love, et al, 2000). This source of infection could
extend a higher infectivity risk to tissues that would otherwise be at low
risk, thereby allowing exposure of cattle through any of the legal
exemptions and potentially producing a feed and food risk. Blood-borne
contamination may be a special problem where spray-dried blood is being used
as a milk replacer for calves, as it is thought that young animals are
especially susceptible to infection.


Certainly, blood and blood proteins should not be used as feed without
conclusive evidence that they are safe.




Unfiltered Tallow


Ruminant tallow is exempted from the current feed ban. Tallow contains
protein impurities (i.e. MBM) that could be a source of TSE infectivity.
There are no impurity level requirements for this tallow. It has been
reported that it is standard practice to produce tallow which has an
impurity level of .15% or below, but it is not clear that this is fully
adequate to remove the risk of transmission and there is no requirement to
meet even this standard. We urge that protein contaminants be excluded from
tallow and that SRMs also be removed.



Plate Waste


Plate waste is not limited to meat (muscle tissue). For example, cuts that
include a portion of the spinal cord or that are contaminated by cord or
ganglia during preparation could contain high levels of infectivity if
derived from a TSE infected animal late in the preclinical stage of
infection. At best this material would only be exposed to normal cooking
temperatures. USDA, APHIS experience with the Swine Health Protection Act
has revealed that plate waste also includes uncooked trimmings and bones.
Although the current FDA regulation requires the plate waste be treated
again, there are no specifications which would render a TSE agent inactive.
Of greatest risk would be any bovine source of infectivity but also sheep
scrapie, although not known to be a risk for human consumption, is one of
the possible origins of BSE. The sheep scrapie agent is known to be widely
dispersed including relatively high titers in lymphoid as well as nervous
tissue. We support the USDA's opposition to the exemption of "plate waste"
as stated in written comments since 1997.




Exposure: Cross Feeding and Cross Contamination


The UK epidemiology has clearly shown that BSE contaminated feed is the
primary if not sole vehicle for the transmission of BSE between cattle.
Moreover, results from the United Kingdom's attack rate study indicate that
it does not take much exposure to transmit BSE to cattle. Recent results
from the attack rate study which is still in progress have found that .1 g
of brain transmitted BSE by the oral route to 3 cows out of 15 thus far, and
.01 and .001gr of brain have transmitted BSE (1 cow out of 15). (Danny
Matthews, DEFRA presentation at TAFS meeting, Washington, DC April 2004).


Rendering may reduce infectivity but it does not eliminate it. (Taylor et
al, 1995; Taylor et al, 1997; Schreuder et al, 1998). Given that BSE can be
transmitted to cattle via an oral route with just .001 gram of infected
tissue, it may not take much infectivity to contaminate feed and keep the
disease recycling. This is especially true in countries like the US and
Canada which do not have dedicated lines and equipment to manufacture and
process feed for ruminants and non-ruminants.


In addition, epidemiological investigations in European countries have shown
that cross feeding and cross contamination on farm can be a significant
vehicle for continued BSE transmission even after feed bans are well
established. Cross feeding is the practice of feeding meal for poultry or
pigs or pet food (which can legally contain ruminant MBM) to cattle on the
same farm. This is usually due to simple human error or negligence.
(Hoinville, 1994; Hoinville et al, 1995; Doherr et al, 2002a; Stevenson et
al, 2000)



FDA, CVM reports that compliance with the existing feed ban is high. For the
most part this does not include the compliance level on the farm. There are
hundreds of thousands of farms in the US. Many of these have multiple
species. That is, they raise cattle, pigs, chickens etc., on the same
premises. The sheer numbers of farms make it very difficult to assure
compliance on farm and to adequately cover all farms by inspection. Even if
the rendering industry and feed industry can maintain 100% compliance at
their facilities, if a producer inadvertently feeds chicken feed containing
bovine MBM to their cattle, they negate a perfect compliance rate higher in
the chain. Recent data from the Harvard BSE risk assessment suggest that the
level of misfeeding on farms plays a significant role in the ability of the
agent to recycle. In fact George Gray, principal investigator for the study,
stated that if, in the United States, misfeeding were to occur at a level of
15%, the R0 would be over 1, indicating that the BSE level would not be
declining. (George Gray presentation at the Meeting on BSE Prevention in
North America: An Analysis of the Science and Risk; January 27, 2005,
Washington, DC.)


The May 2003 Canadian BSE case illustrates the difficulty of on farm
enforcement and its serious ramifications. The BSE positive cow was rendered
and the MBM distributed to various locations. Two of these locations were
poultry farms which mixed their own feed. The farms also had cattle. The
subsequent investigation could not eliminate the possibility that the cattle
had been fed the same feed as the poultry. The cattle on these farms were
completely depopulated.


Human error is extremely difficult to prevent, and managing the risk through
enforcement is problematical when confronted with the extreme logistical
challenges of on farm monitoring. By eliminating the highest risk materials
(SRMs and deadstock) which could introduce infectivity into the feed stream,
the MBM resulting from processing becomes inherently safer. If mistakes are
then made on farm, they no longer contribute to the recycling of BSE.









Exposure: Susceptibility of other Species


Felines


A transmissible spongiform encephalopathy has been diagnosed in eight
species of captive wild ruminants as well as exotic felines (cheetahs,
pumas, a tiger and an ocelot) and domestic cats (Wyatt 1991). There have
been over 80 domestic cat cases of Feline Spongiform Encephalopathy (FSE) in
Great Britain, and cats in Norway, Northern Ireland, Lichtenstein and
Switzerland. The agent isolated from several of these cases is
indistinguishable from BSE in cattle using strain typing in mice, suggesting
that FSE is actually BSE in exotic and domestic cats. Epidemiological
evidence suggests BSE contaminated feed to be the probable source of
infection in these species. (MAFF Progress Report, June 1997), thus
providing additional supporting evidence for the dangers of BSE contaminated
feed and reinforcing the necessity of removing all sources of potential
contamination from the feed stream.



Other species


Studies conducted at the National Institutes of Health Rocky Mountain
Laboratory caution against assuming that animals which do not become
clinically ill are not infected. It is unknown if certain animals may become
carriers, i.e., become infected, shed agent but do not progress to clinical
disease. Infection of certain rodent species with different TSE strains
suggests the possibility of a carrier state (Race and Chesebro, 1998; Race
et. al, 2001, Race et al., 2002). In the more recent studies, mice were
inoculated with 263K hamster scrapie. There was a prolonged period
(approximately one year) where there was no evidence of replication of
infectivity. Furthermore, there was no evidence of PrPres during this phase
of inactive persistence, which was followed by a period of active
replication of infectivity and agent adaptation. In most cases, PrPres was
not detected in the active phase as well. It is important to determine if
this persistence and adaptation occurs in other species exposed to TSEs as
it may have significance in feeding programs which continually expose other
species to BSE infectivity. For example, if BSE infected brain and spinal
cord are continually fed to certain species, it may be possible for the
agent to persist and adapt in these new species. Over time, the 'resistant'
species may become a source of agent. The results of Race and colleagues,
warns that an inactive persistent phase might not produce detectable PrPres,
yet there would be infectivity (Race et. al., 2001).


Pigs displayed evidence of TSE infection after exposure to BSE by 3 distinct
parenteral routes. Evidence of infectivity was found in the CNS, stomach,
intestine and pancreas (Dawson et. al., 1990). Oral transmission has also
been attempted in swine, but after an observation period of 84 months there
was neither clinical nor pathological evidence of infection (Dawson et. al.,
1990). Parenteral and oral transmission has also been attempted in chickens
with no evidence of disease. Tissues from the BSE-challenged pigs and
chickens were inoculated into susceptible mice to look for residual
infectivity, but to date none has been found. In both instances the
detection sensitivity was limited by the use of mice for bioassay instead of
same species transmissions into cattle (or pigs and chickens).



If any of these scenarios played out and inapparent infections became
established in commercial species, those species could become reservoirs for
reinfection of cattle and perpetuation or reintroduction of the epidemic. We
also do not know if atypical cases of BSE are more pathogenic for other
species and if chronic inflammation may influence the susceptibility of
other species. We offer these possibilities to reinforce the need to
eliminate all possible sources of infectivity from the feed stream.


In January 2005, the European Union announced that BSE had been confirmed in
a goat in France illustrating that the disease can be naturally transmitted
to one of the small ruminants. The potential ramifications of this and the
logistical challenges associated with controlling BSE in sheep or goats also
provides a justification for removing SRMs from all animal feed. Although
these species are covered under the current regulations the cross
contamination and cross feeding aspects stated for cattle are applicable.


The need to remove high risk material from all animal feed is also supported
by other bodies with expertise in the field of TSEs:




Recommendations of the World Health Organization (WHO)


The World Health Organization (WHO) has issued the following recommendations
for countries with BSE or those where a known exposure exists:


· No part or product of any animal which has shown signs of a TSE should
enter any food chain (human or animal). In particular:

o All countries must ensure the killing and safe disposal of all parts or
products of such animals so that TSE infectivity cannot enter any food
chain.

o Countries should not permit tissues that are likely to contain the BSE
agent to enter any food chain (human or animal).


From the report of a WHO Consultation on Public Health Issues related to
Human and Animal Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies WHO/EMC/DIS
96.147, Geneva, 2-3 April 1996.


Office of International Epizooties (OIE)


The OIE is recommending that a list of SRMs which include brain, spinal
cord, eyes, skull and vertebral column be removed from preparations used for
food, feed, fertilizer, etc. If these tissues should not be traded we feel
that they should not be used in domestic products either.

BSE Code Article 2.3.13.18

"From cattle, originating from a country or zone with a minimal BSE risk,
that were at the time of slaughter over 30 months of age, the following
commodities, and any commodity contaminated by them, should not be traded
for the preparation of food, feed, fertilizers, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals
including biologicals, or medical devices: brains, eyes and spinal cord,
skull, vertebral column and derived protein products. Food, feed,
fertilizers, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals or medical devices prepared using
these commodities should also not be traded."


Conclusion


In conclusion we urge the FDA to implement, monitor and enforce a
comprehensive and protective feed ban that is more congruent with the
measures that have been proven to be effective in other countries that have
experienced BSE. We do not feel that we can overstate the dangers from the
insidious threat from these diseases and the need to control and arrest them
to prevent any possibility of spread.


We also wish to emphasize that as scientists who have dedicated substantive
portions of our careers to defining the risks from TSEs as well as
developing strategies for managing those risks, we are confident that
technical solutions will be found for many of the challenges posed by these
diseases. Thus, we urge the FDA to frame its regulations in terms that allow
for the future use of any banned material if it can be proven safe for a
given application.




Signatories:



Paul W. Brown, M.D.

Medical Director, USPHS, and Senior Investigator, NIH (retired)

Consultant, TSE Risk Management

xxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxx

Email: [email protected]


Neil R. Cashman MD
Professor, Department of Medicine (Neurology)
Diener Chair of Neurodegenerative Diseases
Centre for Research in Neurodegenerative Diseases
6 Queen's Park Crescent West
Toronto Ontario M5S3H2
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

e-mail: [email protected].


Linda A. Detwiler, DVM
Consultant, TSE Risk Management

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Email: [email protected]


Laura Manuelidis, MD

Professor and Head of Neuropathology,
Department of Surgery and Faculty of Neurosciences
Yale Medical School

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
email: [email protected].
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx





Jason C. Bartz, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
Department of Medical Microbiology and Immunology
Creighton University
2500 California Plaza
Omaha, NE 68178
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

[email protected]



Robert B. Petersen, Ph.D.

Associate Professor of Pathology and Neuroscience

Case Western Reserve University

5-123 Wolstein Building

2103 Cornell Road

Cleveland, OH 44106-2622

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Email [email protected]





Robert G. Rohwer, Ph.D.
Director, Molecular Neurovirology Laboratory
Veterans Affairs Medical Center
Medical Research Service 151
Assoc. Professor of Neurology
School of Medicine
University of Maryland at Baltimore
10 N. Greene St.
Baltimore, MD 21201
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

email: [email protected]





REFERENCES



Andreoletti O, Simon S, Lacroux C, Morel N, Tabouret G, Chabert A, Lugan S,
Corbiere F, Ferre P, Foucras G, Laude H, Eychenne F, Grassi J, Schelcher F.
PrPSc accumulation in myocytes from sheep incubating natural scrapie. Nat
Med. 2004 Jun;10(6):591-3. Epub 2004 May 23.


Anil,M.H.; Love,S.; Helps,C.R.; McKinstry,J.L.; Brown,S.N.; Philips,A.;
Williams,S.; Shand,A.; Bakirel,T.; Harbour,D.A. - Jugular venous emboli of
brain tissue induced in sheep by the use of captive bolt guns - Veterinary
Record 2001 May 19; 148: 619-20


Anil,M.H.; Harbour,D.A. - Current stunning and slaughter methods in cattle
and sheep. Potential for carcass contamination with central nervous tissue
and microorganisms - Fleischwirtschaft 2001; 11: 123


Anil,M.H.; Love,S.; Helps,C.R.; Harbour,D. - Potential for carcass
contamination with brain tissue following stunning and slaughter in cattle
and sheep - Food Control 2002; 13: 431-6


Bartz JC, Kincaid AE, Bessen RA. Retrograde transport of transmissible mink
encephalopathy within descending motor tracts. J Virol. 2002
Jun;76(11):5759-68.


Bosque PJ, Ryou C, Telling G, Peretz D, Legname G, DeArmond SJ, Prusiner SB.
Prions in skeletal muscle. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2002 Mar
19;99(6):3812-7.



Bushmann, A., and Groschup, M.; Highly Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy-Sensitive Transgenic Mice Confirm the Essential Restriction
of Infectivity to the Nervous System in Clinically Diseased Cattle. The
Journal of Infectious Diseases, 192: 934-42, September 1, 2005.


Dawson,M.; Wells,G.A.H.; Parker,B.N.; Scott,A.C. - Primary parenteral
transmission of bovine spongiform encephalopathy to the pig - Veterinary
Record 1990 Sep 29; 127(13): 338


Doherr,M.G.; Hett,A.R.; Rufenacht,J.; Zurbriggen,A.; Heim,D. - Geographical
clustering of cases of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) born in
Switzerland after the feed ban - Veterinary Record 2002 Oct 19; 151(16):
467-72


Glatzel M, Abela E, Maissen M, Aguzzi A. Extraneural pathologic prion
protein in sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. N Engl J Med. 2003 Nov
6;349(19):1812-20.



Hadlow W. J., Kennedy R. C. & Race R. E. (1982) Natural infection of Suffolk
sheep with Scrapie virus. J. Infect. Dis., 146, 657-664


Hoinville,L.J. - Decline in the incidence of BSE in cattle born after the
introduction of the 'feed ban' - Veterinary Record 1994 Mar 12; 134(11):
274-5


Hoinville,L.J.; Wilesmith,J.W.; Richards,M.S. - An investigation of risk
factors for cases of bovine spongiform encephalopathy born after the
introduction of the 'feed ban' - Veterinary Record 1995 Apr 1; 136(13):
312-8


Houston,E.F.; Foster,J.D.; Chong,A.; Hunter,N.; Bostock,C.J. – Transmission
of BSE by blood transfusion in sheep – Lancet 2000 Sep 16; 356(9234);
999-1000


Hunter,N.; Foster,J; Chong,A.; McCutcheon,S.; Parnham,D.; Eaton,S.;
MacKenzie,C.; Houston,E.F. – Transmission of prion diseases by blood
transfusion – Journal of General Virology 2002 Nov, 83(Pt 11); 2897-905.


Love,S.; Helps,C.R.; Williams,S.; Shand,A.; McKinstry,J.L.; Brown,S.N.;
Harbour,D.A.; Anil,M.H. - Methods for detection of haematogenous
dissemination of brain tissue after stunning of cattle with captive bolt
guns - Journal of Neuroscience Methods 2000 Jun 30; 99(1-2): 53-8


Mulcahy ER, Bartz JC, Kincaid AE, Bessen RA. Prion infection of skeletal
muscle cells and papillae in the tongue. J Virol. 2004 Jul;78(13):6792-8.


Race, R.; Chesebro, B. – Scrapie infectivity found in resistant species.
Nature -1998 Apr 23;392(6678):770.


Aguzzi,A.; Weissmann,C. - Spongiform encephalopathies. The prion's
perplexing persistence. - Nature. 1998 Apr 23;392(6678):763-4


Race,R.E.; Raines,A.; Raymond,G.J.; Caughey,B.W.; Chesebro,B. - Long-term
subclinical carrier state precedes scrapie replication and adaptation in a
resistant species: analogies to bovine spongiform encephalopathy and variant
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. - Journal of Virology 2001 Nov; 75(21):
10106-12


Race,R.E.; Meade-White,K.; Raines,A.; Raymond,G.J.; Caughey,B.W.;
Chesebro,B. - Subclinical Scrapie Infection in a Resistant Species:
Persistence, Replication, and Adaptation of Infectivity during Four
Passages. - Journal of Infectious Diseases 2002 Dec 1; 186 Suppl 2: S166-70


Schreuder, B.E.C., Geertsma, R.E., van Keulen, L.J.M., van Asten, J.A.A.M.,
Enthoven, P., Oberthür, R.C., de Koeijer, A.A., Osterhaus, A.D.M.E., 1998.
Studies on the efficacy of hyperbaric rendering procedures in inactivating
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and scrapie agents. Veterinary Record
142, 474-480


Stevenson, M. A., Wilesmith, J. W., Ryan, J. B. M., Morris, R.S., Lockhart,
J. W., Lin, D. & Jackson, R. (2000) Temporal aspects of bovine spongiform
encepalopathy in Great Britain: individual animal-associated risk factors
for the disease. Vet. Rec. 147, 349-354.


Stevenson, M. A., Wilesmith, J. W., Ryan, J. B. M., Morris, R. S., Lawson,
A.B., Pfeiffer, D. U. & Lin, D. (2000) Descriptive spatial analysis of the
epidemic of bovine spongiform encephalopathy in Great Britain to June 1997.
Vet. Rec. 147, 379-384.


Taylor, D.M., Woodgate, S.L., Atkinson, M.J., 1995. Inactivation of the
bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent by rendering procedures. Veterinary
Record, Vol.137: pp.605-610.


Taylor, D.M., Woodgate, S.L., Fleetwood, A.J., Cawthorne, R.J.G., 1997. The
effect of rendering procedures on scrapie agent. Veterinary Record, Vol.141,
pp 643-649.


Thomzig A, Schulz-Schaeffer W, Kratzel C, Mai J, Beekes M. Preclinical
deposition of pathological prion protein PrPSc in muscles of hamsters orally
exposed to scrapie.
J Clin Invest. 2004 May;113(10):1465-72.


Thomzig A, Kratzel C, Lenz G, Kruger D, Beekes M. Widespread PrPSc
accumulation in muscles of hamsters orally infected with scrapie. EMBO Rep.
2003 May;4(5):530-3.



Wilesmith, J.W., Ryan, J. B. M., Hueston, W. D., & Hoinville, L. J. (1992)
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy: epidemiological features 1985 to 1990.
Vet. Rec., 130, 90-94.


Wilesmith, J. W., Wells, G. A. H., Ryan, J. B. M., Gavier-Widen, D., &
Simmons, M. M. (1997) A cohort study to examine maternally associated risk
factors for bovine spongiform encephalopathy. Vet. Rec., 141, 239-243.


Wells G.A.H., Dawson M., Hawkins, S.A.C., Green R. B., Dexter I., Francis M.
E., Simmons M. M., Austin A. R., & Horigan M. W. (1994) Infectivity in the
ileum of cattle challenged orally with bovine spongiform encephalopathy.
Vet. Rec., 135, 40-41.


Wells G.A.H., Hawkins, S.A.C., Green R. B., Austin A. R., Dexter I.,
Spencer, Y. I., Chaplin, M. J., Stack, M. J., & Dawson, M. (1998)
Preliminary observations on the pathogenesis of experimental bovine
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE): an update. Vet. Rec., 142, 103-106.

Wyatt. J. M. et al. 1991. Naturally occurring scrapie-like spongiform
encephalopathy in five domestic cats. Veterinary Record. 129. 233.


----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----

[RR1] I am not sure of the point here. If they are going to use dead stock
then certainly they should at a minimum remove the CNS tissue but rather I
would think the point should be that we don't want them using dead stock
with or without the CNS included.

[RR2]I am not sure that the actual text of the CFR is still required to make
the point. However, I am glad I had it to verify the original argument.



============================================================================
==================

============================================================================
==================



[Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk
Materials for Human Food and Requirement for the Disposition of
Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle

03-025IFA
03-025IFA-2
Terry S. Singeltary


Page 1 of 17

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [[email protected]]

Sent: Thursday, September 08, 2005 6:17 PM

To: [email protected].

Subject: [Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified
Risk Materials for Human Food and Requirements

for the Disposition of Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle

Greetings FSIS,

I would kindly like to submit the following to [Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS
Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food and

Requirements for the Disposition of Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle

THE BSE/TSE SUB CLINICAL Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle

Broken bones and such may be the first signs of a sub clinical BSE/TSE
Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle ;

snip...FULL TEXT ;


http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf


Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1]
RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION


http://docket.epa.gov/edkfed/do/EDKStaffItemDetailView?objectId=090007d48099
3808


http://docket.epa.gov/edkfed/do/EDKStaffAttachDownloadPDF?objectId=090007d48
0993808


http://docket.epa.gov/edkfed/do/EDKStaffCollectionDetailView?objectId=0b0007
d48096b40d


EPA's EDOCKET has been migrated into a federal-wide system to better serve
citizens
EDOCKET Replaced by FDMS

As of Friday, November 25, 2005 at 8 am, EDOCKET became permanently
unavailable.


http://docket.epa.gov/edkfed/do/EDKStaffAttachDownloadPDF?objectId=090007d48
0993808


FIRST time they ever omitted one of my submissions ?


HERE is my submission in full ;


----- Original Message -----
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
To: [email protected]
Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2005 12:04 PM
Subject: Fw: Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket
No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION


Greetings again Honorable Phyllis Fong,

I thought you should have this data. some important BSE transmission studies
out of Japan on the #11 cow. again, many thanks for your courage. That Texas
mad cow would never have been confirmed if not for your courage...

with warmest regards,
I am sincerely,

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

----- Original Message -----
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
To: [email protected]. ; [email protected].
Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2005 9:16 AM
Subject: Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No.
05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION


Greetings Dr. Colgrove and Miss Johnson,

Thank you for taking this submission via email. i have had trouble
submitting via the comment page due to the length of my submission. I was
not sure that my file attachment that i submitted via the ;

EDOCKET: Go to http://www.epa.gov/feddocket


I submitted yesterday, just did not know if the file reached anyone. so to
make sure, I am sending to you to submit for me.

many thanks,

Terry


From: TSS ()
Subject: Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No.
05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION
Date: August 24, 2005 at 2:47 pm PST

August 24, 2005

Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1]
RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION


Greetings APHIS ET AL,

My name is Terry S. Singeltary Sr.


I would kindly like to comment on [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 ;


PROPOSED RULES
Exportation and importation of animals and animal products:
Whole cuts of boneless beef from-
Japan,
48494-48500 [05-16422]



[Federal Register: August 18, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 159)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 48494-48500]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr18au05-7]

========================================================================
Proposed Rules
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________

This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.

========================================================================


[[Page 48494]]


DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

9 CFR Part 94

[Docket No. 05-004-1]
RIN 0579-AB93


Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan

AGENCY: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: We are proposing to amend the regulations governing the
importation of meat and other edible animal products by allowing, under
certain conditions, the importation of whole cuts of boneless beef from
Japan. We are proposing this action in response to a request from the
Government of Japan and after conducting an analysis of the risk that
indicates that such beef can be safely imported from Japan under the
conditions described in this proposal.

DATES: We will consider all comments that we receive on or before
September 19, 2005.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any of the following methods:
EDOCKET: Go to http://www.epa.gov/feddocket to submit or


snip...


BSE infectivity has never been demonstrated in the muscle tissue of
cattle experimentally or naturally infected with BSE at any stage of
the disease. Studies performed using TSEs other than BSE in non-bovine
animals have detected prions in muscle tissue. However, the
international scientific community largely considers that these studies
cannot be directly extrapolated to BSE in cattle because of the
significant interactions between the host species and the prion strain
involved.
Pathogenesis studies of naturally and experimentally infected
cattle have not detected BSE infectivity in blood. However,
transmission of BSE was demonstrated in sheep that received a
transfusion of a large volume of blood drawn from other sheep that were
experimentally infected with the BSE agent. The United Kingdom's
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs' Spongiform
Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC) and the European Commission's
Scientific Steering Committee (SSC), which are scientific advisory
committees, evaluated the implication of this finding in relation to
food safety.\5\ The SEAC concluded that the finding did not represent
grounds for recommending any changes to the current control measures
for BSE. The SSC determined that the research results do not support
the hypothesis that bovine blood or muscle meat constitute a risk to
human health.\6\


snip...


BSE Risk Factors for Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef


The most significant risk management strategy for ensuring the
safety of whole cuts of boneless beef is the prevention of cross-
contamination of the beef with SRMs during stunning and slaughter of
the animal. Control measures that prevent contamination of such beef
involve the establishment of procedures for the removal of SRMs,
prohibitions on air-injection stunning and pithing, and splitting of
carcasses. These potential pathways for contamination and the control
measures that prevent contamination are described in detail in the risk
analysis for this rulemaking.
SRM Removal. Research has demonstrated that SRMs from infected
cattle may contain BSE infectivity. Because infectivity has not been
demonstrated in muscle tissue, the most important mitigation measure
for whole cuts of boneless beef is the careful removal and segregation
of SRMs. Removal of SRMs in a manner that avoids contamination of the
beef with SRMs minimizes the risk of exposure to materials that have
been demonstrated to contain the BSE agent in cattle.

snip...


Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD), a chronic and fatal
neurodegenerative disease of humans, has been linked since 1996 through
epidemiological, neuropathological, and experimental data to exposure
to the BSE agent, most likely through consumption of cattle products
contaminated with the agent before BSE control measures were in place.
To date, approximately 170 probable and confirmed cases of vCJD have
been identified worldwide. The majority of these cases have either been
identified in the United Kingdom or were linked to exposure that
occurred in the United Kingdom, and all cases have been linked to
exposure in countries with native cases of BSE. Some studies estimate
that more than 1 million cattle may have been infected with BSE
throughout the epidemic in the United Kingdom. This number of infected
cattle could have introduced a significant amount of infectivity into
the human food supply. Yet, the low number of cases of vCJD identified
to date indicates that there is a substantial species barrier that
protects humans from widespread illness due to exposure to the BSE
agent.


snip...


International Guidelines on BSE

International guidelines for trade in animal and animal products
are developed by the World Organization for Animal Health (formerly
known as the Office International des Epizooties (OIE)), which is
recognized by the World Trade Organization (WTO) as the international
organization responsible for the development of standards, guidelines,
and recommendations with respect to animal health and zoonoses
(diseases that are transmissible from animals to humans). The OIE
guidelines for trade in terrestrial animals (mammals, birds, and bees)
are detailed in the Terrestrial Animal Health Code (available on the
internet at http://www.oie.int). The guidelines on BSE are contained in

Chapter 2.3.13 of the Code and supplemented by Appendix 3.8.4 of the
Code.


snip...end
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/01jan20051800/edocket.ac
 
[Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk
Materials for Human Food and Requirement for the Disposition of
Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle

03-025IFA
03-025IFA-2
Terry S. Singeltary


Page 1 of 17

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [[email protected]]

Sent: Thursday, September 08, 2005 6:17 PM

To: [email protected].

Subject: [Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified
Risk Materials for Human Food and Requirements

for the Disposition of Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle

Greetings FSIS,

I would kindly like to submit the following to [Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS
Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food and

Requirements for the Disposition of Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle

THE BSE/TSE SUB CLINICAL Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle

Broken bones and such may be the first signs of a sub clinical BSE/TSE
Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle ;

snip...FULL TEXT ;


http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf


Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1]
RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION


http://docket.epa.gov/edkfed/do/EDKStaffItemDetailView?objectId=090007d48099
3808


http://docket.epa.gov/edkfed/do/EDKStaffAttachDownloadPDF?objectId=090007d48
0993808


http://docket.epa.gov/edkfed/do/EDKStaffCollectionDetailView?objectId=0b0007
d48096b40d


EPA's EDOCKET has been migrated into a federal-wide system to better serve
citizens
EDOCKET Replaced by FDMS

As of Friday, November 25, 2005 at 8 am, EDOCKET became permanently
unavailable.


http://docket.epa.gov/edkfed/do/EDKStaffAttachDownloadPDF?objectId=090007d48
0993808


FIRST time they ever omitted one of my submissions ?


HERE is my submission in full ;


----- Original Message -----
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
To: [email protected]
Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2005 12:04 PM
Subject: Fw: Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket
No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION


Greetings again Honorable Phyllis Fong,

I thought you should have this data. some important BSE transmission studies
out of Japan on the #11 cow. again, many thanks for your courage. That Texas
mad cow would never have been confirmed if not for your courage...

with warmest regards,
I am sincerely,

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

----- Original Message -----
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
To: [email protected]. ; [email protected].
Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2005 9:16 AM
Subject: Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No.
05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION


Greetings Dr. Colgrove and Miss Johnson,

Thank you for taking this submission via email. i have had trouble
submitting via the comment page due to the length of my submission. I was
not sure that my file attachment that i submitted via the ;

EDOCKET: Go to http://www.epa.gov/feddocket


I submitted yesterday, just did not know if the file reached anyone. so to
make sure, I am sending to you to submit for me.

many thanks,

Terry


From: TSS ()
Subject: Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No.
05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION
Date: August 24, 2005 at 2:47 pm PST

August 24, 2005

Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1]
RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION


Greetings APHIS ET AL,

My name is Terry S. Singeltary Sr.


I would kindly like to comment on [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 ;


PROPOSED RULES
Exportation and importation of animals and animal products:
Whole cuts of boneless beef from-
Japan,
48494-48500 [05-16422]



[Federal Register: August 18, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 159)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 48494-48500]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr18au05-7]

========================================================================
Proposed Rules
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________

This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.

========================================================================


[[Page 48494]]


DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

9 CFR Part 94

[Docket No. 05-004-1]
RIN 0579-AB93


Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan

AGENCY: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: We are proposing to amend the regulations governing the
importation of meat and other edible animal products by allowing, under
certain conditions, the importation of whole cuts of boneless beef from
Japan. We are proposing this action in response to a request from the
Government of Japan and after conducting an analysis of the risk that
indicates that such beef can be safely imported from Japan under the
conditions described in this proposal.

DATES: We will consider all comments that we receive on or before
September 19, 2005.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any of the following methods:
EDOCKET: Go to http://www.epa.gov/feddocket to submit or


snip...


BSE infectivity has never been demonstrated in the muscle tissue of
cattle experimentally or naturally infected with BSE at any stage of
the disease. Studies performed using TSEs other than BSE in non-bovine
animals have detected prions in muscle tissue. However, the
international scientific community largely considers that these studies
cannot be directly extrapolated to BSE in cattle because of the
significant interactions between the host species and the prion strain
involved.
Pathogenesis studies of naturally and experimentally infected
cattle have not detected BSE infectivity in blood. However,
transmission of BSE was demonstrated in sheep that received a
transfusion of a large volume of blood drawn from other sheep that were
experimentally infected with the BSE agent. The United Kingdom's
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs' Spongiform
Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC) and the European Commission's
Scientific Steering Committee (SSC), which are scientific advisory
committees, evaluated the implication of this finding in relation to
food safety.\5\ The SEAC concluded that the finding did not represent
grounds for recommending any changes to the current control measures
for BSE. The SSC determined that the research results do not support
the hypothesis that bovine blood or muscle meat constitute a risk to
human health.\6\


snip...


BSE Risk Factors for Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef


The most significant risk management strategy for ensuring the
safety of whole cuts of boneless beef is the prevention of cross-
contamination of the beef with SRMs during stunning and slaughter of
the animal. Control measures that prevent contamination of such beef
involve the establishment of procedures for the removal of SRMs,
prohibitions on air-injection stunning and pithing, and splitting of
carcasses. These potential pathways for contamination and the control
measures that prevent contamination are described in detail in the risk
analysis for this rulemaking.
SRM Removal. Research has demonstrated that SRMs from infected
cattle may contain BSE infectivity. Because infectivity has not been
demonstrated in muscle tissue, the most important mitigation measure
for whole cuts of boneless beef is the careful removal and segregation
of SRMs. Removal of SRMs in a manner that avoids contamination of the
beef with SRMs minimizes the risk of exposure to materials that have
been demonstrated to contain the BSE agent in cattle.

snip...


Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD), a chronic and fatal
neurodegenerative disease of humans, has been linked since 1996 through
epidemiological, neuropathological, and experimental data to exposure
to the BSE agent, most likely through consumption of cattle products
contaminated with the agent before BSE control measures were in place.
To date, approximately 170 probable and confirmed cases of vCJD have
been identified worldwide. The majority of these cases have either been
identified in the United Kingdom or were linked to exposure that
occurred in the United Kingdom, and all cases have been linked to
exposure in countries with native cases of BSE. Some studies estimate
that more than 1 million cattle may have been infected with BSE
throughout the epidemic in the United Kingdom. This number of infected
cattle could have introduced a significant amount of infectivity into
the human food supply. Yet, the low number of cases of vCJD identified
to date indicates that there is a substantial species barrier that
protects humans from widespread illness due to exposure to the BSE
agent.


snip...


International Guidelines on BSE

International guidelines for trade in animal and animal products
are developed by the World Organization for Animal Health (formerly
known as the Office International des Epizooties (OIE)), which is
recognized by the World Trade Organization (WTO) as the international
organization responsible for the development of standards, guidelines,
and recommendations with respect to animal health and zoonoses
(diseases that are transmissible from animals to humans). The OIE
guidelines for trade in terrestrial animals (mammals, birds, and bees)
are detailed in the Terrestrial Animal Health Code (available on the
internet at http://www.oie.int). The guidelines on BSE are contained in

Chapter 2.3.13 of the Code and supplemented by Appendix 3.8.4 of the
Code.


snip...end
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/01jan20051800/edocket.access.gpo.gov
/2005/05-16422.htm
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/01jan20051800/edocket.access.gpo.gov
/2005/pdf/05-16422.pdf

Greetings again APHIS ET AL,


THIS is not correct. IN fact, there are several factors i would like to
kindly address.

Muscle tissue has recently been detected with PrPSc
in the peripheral nerves (sciatic nerve, tibial nerve, vagus nerve) of the
11th BSE
cow in Japan (Yoshifumi Iwamaru et al). also recently, Aguzzi et al Letter
to the Editor
Vet Pathol 42:107-108 (2005), Prusiner et al CDI test is another example of
detection
of the TSE agent in muscle in sCJD, Herbert Budka et al CJD and inclusion
body myositis:
Abundant Disease-Associated Prion Protein in Muscle, and older studies from
Watson
Meldrum et al Scrapie agent in muscle - Pattison I A (1990), references as
follow ;


PrPSc distribution of a natural case of bovine
spongiform encephalopathy

Yoshifumi Iwamaru, Yuka Okubo, Tamako Ikeda, Hiroko Hayashi, Mori-
kazu Imamura, Takashi Yokoyama and Morikazu Shinagawa

Priori Disease Research Center, National Institute of Animal Health, 3-1-5
Kannondai, Tsukuba 305-0856 Japan [email protected]

Abstract

Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) is a disease of cattle that causes
progressive neurodegeneration of the central nervous system. Infectivity
of BSE agent is accompanied with an abnormal isoform of prion protein
(PrPSc).

The specified risk materials (SRM) are tissues potentially carrying BSE
infectivity. The following tissues are designated as SRM in Japan: the
skull including the brain and eyes but excluding the glossa and the masse-
ter muscle, the vertebral column excluding the vertebrae of the tail, spinal
cord, distal illeum. For a risk management step, the use of SRM in both
animal feed or human food has been prohibited. However, detailed
PrPSc distribution remains obscure in BSE cattle and it has caused con-
troversies about definitions of SRM. Therefore we have examined PrPSc
distribution in a BSE cattle by Western blotting to reassess definitions of
SRM.

The 11th BSE case in Japan was detected in fallen stock surveillance.
The carcass was stocked in the refrigerator. For the detection of PrPSc,
200 mg of tissue samples were homogenized. Following collagenase
treatment, samples were digested with proteinase K. After digestion,
PrPSc was precipitated by sodium phosphotungstate (PTA). The pellets
were subjected to Western blotting using the standard procedure.
Anti-prion protein monoclonal antibody (mAb) T2 conjugated horseradish
peroxidase was used for the detection of PrPSc.

PrPSc was detected in brain, spinal cord, dorsal root ganglia, trigeminal
ganglia, sublingual ganglion, retina. In addition, PrPSc was also detected
in the peripheral nerves (sciatic nerve, tibial nerve, vagus nerve).

Our results suggest that the currently accepted definitions of SRM in
BSE cattle may need to be reexamined. ...

179

T. Kitamoto (Ed.)
PRIONS
Food and Drug Safety
================


ALSO from the International Symposium of Prion Diseases held in Sendai,
October 31, to
November 2, 2004;


Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in Japan


snip...


"Furthermore, current studies into transmission of cases of BSE that are
atypical or that develop in young cattle are expected to amplify the BSE
prion"


NO. Date conf. Farm Birth place and Date Age at diagnosis


8. 2003.10.6. Fukushima Tochigi 2001.10.13. 23


9. 2003.11.4. Hiroshima Hyogo 2002.1.13. 21


Test results


# 8b, 9c cows Elisa Positive, WB Positive, IHC negative, histopathology
negative


b = atypical BSE case


c = case of BSE in a young animal


b,c, No PrPSc on IHC, and no spongiform change on histology


International Symposium of Prion Diseases held in Sendai, October 31, to
November 2, 2004.

The hardback book title is 'PRIONS' Food and Drug Safety
T. Kitamoto (Ed.)


Tetsuyuki Kitamoto
Professor and Chairman
Department of Prion Research
Tohoku University School of Medicine
2-1 SeiryoAoba-ku, Sendai 980-8575, JAPAN
TEL +81-22-717-8147 FAX +81-22-717-8148
e-mail; [email protected]
Symposium Secretariat
Kyomi Sasaki
TEL +81-22-717-8233 FAX +81-22-717-7656
e-mail: [email protected]


================================

107

Vet Pathol 42:107–108 (2005)

Letters to the Editor

Editor:

Absence of evidence is not always evidence of absence.

In the article ''Failure to detect prion protein (PrPres) by

immunohistochemistry in striated muscle tissues of animals

experimentally inoculated with agents of transmissible spongiform

encephalopathy,'' recently published in Veterinary

Pathology (41:78–81, 2004), PrPres was not detected in striated

muscle of experimentally infected elk, cattle, sheep, and

raccoons by immunohistochemistry (IHC). Negative IHC,

however, does not exclude the presence of PrPSc. For example,

PrPres was detected in skeletal muscle in 8 of 32

humans with the prion disease, sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob

disease (CJD), using sodium phosphotungstic acid (NaPTA)

precipitation and western blot.1 The NaPTA precipitation,

described by Wadsworth et al.,3 concentrates the abnormal

isoform of the prion, PrPres, from a large tissue homogenate

volume before western blotting. This technique has increased

the sensitivity of the western blot up to three orders

of magnitude and could be included in assays to detect

PrPres. Extremely conspicuous deposits of PrPres in muscle

were detected by IHC in a recent case report of an individual

with inclusion body myositis and CJD.2 Here, PrPres was

detected in the muscle by immunoblotting, IHC, and paraf-

fin-embedded tissue blot. We would therefore caution that,

in addition to IHC, highly sensitive biochemical assays and

bioassays of muscle are needed to assess the presence or

absence of prions from muscle in experimental and natural

TSE cases.

Christina Sigurdson, Markus Glatzel, and Adriano Aguzzi

Institute of Neuropathology

University Hospital of Zurich

Zurich, Switzerland

References

1 Glatzel M, Abela E, et al: Extraneural pathologic prion

protein in sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. N Engl J

Med 349(19):1812–1820, 2003

2 Kovacs GG, Lindeck-Pozza E, et al: Creutzfeldt-Jakob

disease and inclusion body myositis: abundant diseaseassociated

prion protein in muscle. Ann Neurol 55(1):

121–125, 2004

3 Wadsworth JDF, Joiner S, et al: Tissue distribution of protease

resistant prion protein in variant CJD using a highly

sensitive immuno-blotting assay. Lancet 358:171–180,

2001


===================================


Corinna Kaarlela, News Director
Source: Jennifer O'Brien
[email protected]
415-476-2557
14 February 2005

Diagnosis of prions in patients should utilize novel strategy, team says

A technique for detecting prions in tissue, developed in recent years by
UCSF scientists, is significantly more sensitive than the diagnostic
procedures currently used to detect the lethal particles in samples of
brain tissue from patients, according to a study performed by a UCSF team.

The finding indicates that the diagnostic technique, known as the
conformation-dependent immunoassay (CDI), should be established as the
standard approach for brain biopsies of patients suspected of having the
disease, they say. The team is exploring whether the CDI might be
adapted to detect prions in blood and muscle.

The finding suggests that reliance on the current methods for detecting
prions in human brain tissue -- microscopic examination of tissue for
the telltale vacuoles that form in brain cells and immunohistochemistry
(IHC), which involves detecting prions in brain sections using prion
protein-specific antibodies -- may have led to an under diagnosis of the
disease in patients in recent years, they say. (A definitive diagnosis
of the disease in humans is made only on autopsy, when a
neuropathologist can analyze multiple brain regions for vacuoles and
evidence of prions by IHC, and it is estimated that only 50 percent of
human cases are autopsied, in part because many pathologists do not want
to risk infection during the autopsy.)

In the study, the team compared the ability of the CDI and the two
traditional diagnostic techniques to detect prions in various brain
samples from 28 patients diagnosed on autopsy as having one of several
human forms of the disease -- sporadic, familial or iatrogenic
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD). While the CDI detected the biochemical
signal for prions in 100 percent of the samples studied, the traditional
tests failed to detect the prion in a high proportion of cases. For
example, in an experiment that focused on 18 brain regions from eight
patients with sporadic CJD, the CDI detected prions in 100 percent of
the samples, while IHC detected them in 22 percent and routine tissue
examination in 17 percent.

"In about 80 percent of the different brain regions examined, prions
were not consistently detected by either IHC or routine histology that
measure vacuolation. In contrast, the CDI was always positive in all
regions of the brain," says the lead author of the study, Jiri Safar,
MD, associate adjunct professor of neurology and a member of the UCSF
Institute for Neurodegenerative Diseases, which is directed by senior
author Stanley B. Prusiner, MD, UCSF professor of neurology and
biochemistry.

"These findings indicate that histology and immunohistochemistry should
no longer be used to rule out prion disease in single-site biopsy
samples," says Safar. "The superior performance of the CDI in diagnosing
prion disease suggests that the CDI be used in future diagnostic
evaluations of prion disease, particularly for single-site brain
biopsies during life"

"If the traditional techniques are used at autopsy, they must be applied
to many cortical and subcortical samples," says co-author Stephen J.
DeArmond, MD, PhD, UCSF professor of neuropathology.

Moreover, while the study examined the efficacy of the CDI in comparison
to the two techniques routinely used by neuropathologists to detect
prions in human brain tissue, previous studies at UCSF indicate that the
CDI is also significantly more sensitive than Western blot analysis, the
technology used with IHC to detect prions in brain tissue from cattle
suspected of having bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). That IHC and
Western blot analysis are relatively insensitive methods, the
researchers say, supports their ongoing assertion that the CDI should
also be used to evaluate the brain tissue of cattle.

"The studies reported here are likely to change profoundly the approach
to the diagnosis of prion disease in both humans and livestock," says Safar.

More broadly, the scientists say, the high sensitivity of the CDI
suggests that CDI-like tests could also prove useful for diagnosing
other neurodegenerative diseases, such as Alzheimer's disease,
Parkinsons's disease and fronto-temporal dementias, all of which, like
prion diseases, involve various forms of protein misprocessing. These
diseases currently are diagnosed by neuropathological analysis and
immunohistochemistry.

"Whether immunohistochemistry underestimates the incidence of one or
more of these common neurodegenerative diseases is unknown, but the CDI
could shed light on these diseases," says co-author Bruce Miller, MD,
UCSF A.W. and Mary Margaret Clausen Distinguished Professor of Neurology
and director of the UCSF Memory and Aging Center.

The finding will be printed on-line and in print on March 1, 2005 in
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

The study brings into high relief the different detection strategies of
immunohistochemistry and the CDI, both of which involve revealing the
presence of prions, known as PrPsc, by applying antibodies to brain tissue.

Standard immunohistochemistry, developed in the DeArmond lab 20 years
ago, involves using an enzyme known as a protease, or a combination of
harsh acid and high temperature treatment, to destroy normal prion
protein (PrPC), which is ubiquitous in brain tissue. Once this occurs,
scientists apply fluorescently lit antibodies that react with residues
of the relatively resistant abnormal prion protein (PrPSc), thereby
highlighting it.

The limitation of this technique is that scientists have since learned
that there is a large part of the abnormal prion protein that is
protease sensitive, and that portion escapes detection by the standard
technique. Thus, this traditional method underestimates the level of
PrPSc in tissue.

The CDI addresses this limitation by revealing the region of PrPSc that
is exposed in the normal PrPC but is buried in infectious PrPSc, using
high affinity, newly generated antibodies that identify PrPSc through
the distinct shape of the molecule, independent of proteolytic
treatments. This makes it possible to detect potentially large
concentrations of protease sensitive PrPSc molecules.

Detractors would say that it is not necessary to detect the minute level
of infectious agent that the CDI is capable of revealing, as it would be
unlikely to be lethal, says Safar. But Prusiner and his colleagues
maintain that any risk is too great when it comes to having prions in
the food supply. In addition, because even low levels of prions are
extremely resistant to inactivation, they may contaminate the
environment for many years.

Prusiner won the 1997 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine for
discovering that a class of neurodegenerative diseases known as
spongiform encephalopathies was caused by prions. Prion diseases develop
in humans, cattle, sheep, deer, elk and mink.

The CDI was developed by members of the Prusiner lab. The CDI
methodology has been licensed to InPro Biotechnology, Inc.

Prusiner, Safar, DeArmond and other members of the Institute for
Neurodegenerative Diseases are scientific advisors to, or own stock in,
InPro.

Other co-authors of the study were Michael D. Geschwind, Camille
Deering, Svetlana Didorenko, Mamta Sattavat, Henry Sanchesz, Ana Serban,
Kurt Giles, of UCSF, and Martin Vey, of Behring, Marburg, Germany, and
Henry Baron, of Behring, Paris.

The study was funded by the National Institutes of Health, the John
Douglas French Foundation for Alzheimer's research, the McBean
Foundation, the State of California, Alzheimer's Disease Research Center
of California and the RR00079 General Clinical Research Center.

The UCSF Institute for Neurodegenerative Diseases:
http://ind.medschool.ucsf.edu/.

FURTHER COMPARISON OF THE CDI TO THE STANDARD DIAGNOSTIC PROCEDURES,
PROVIDED BY STEPHEN J. DEARMOND, MD, PHD, UCSF PROFESSORS OF NEUROPATHOLOGY:

Explanation as to why the CDI is more sensitive than Western blot
analysis: Studies at UCSF during development of the CDI showed that CDI
could detect prions in brain homogenates at levels that fail to produce
disease in animals (bioassay for prions). Therefore, the CDI is more
sensitive than the bioassay method, which was considered to be the most
sensitive technique for detecting prions. In contrast, Western blot
analysis for prions is significantly less sensitive than the bioassay
and is, therefore, significantly less sensitive than the CDI. Currently,
the USDA uses a combination of Western blot analysis of brainstem
homogenates and immunohistochemistry of the medulla to test cattle
suspected of having bovine spongiform encephalopathy ("mad cow
disease"). The relative insensitivity of IHC and Western blot analysis,
says DeArmond, supports the UCSF scientists' ongoing assertion that the
CDI should also be used to evaluate the brain tissue of cattle.

DeArmond cites additional evidence about Western blot analysis from a
World Health Organization (WHO) study group, which compared the CDI
method with Western blots for detection of prions in sporadic and
variant CJD brains. Based on the smallest amount of prions that could
detected by the two techniques, they found that the CDI was from 1000-
to 100,000-fold more sensitive than Western blot analysis performed in
six different research laboratories (Minor et al. Standards for the
assay of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease specimens. J. Gen. Virol. 85:
1777-1784, 2004).

Explanation as to why IHC for prions is less sensitive than the CDI: IHC
is routinely performed on formalin-fixed, paraffin-embedded samples of
brain. Formalin fixation markedly decreases the ability of antibodies to
bind to proteins in general, which greatly weakens the IHC signal for
prions (PrPSc). In contrast, homogenates for the CDI are not treated
with reagents that decrease prion antigenicity. Moreover, to concentrate
the PrPSc for measurement by the CDI, the homogenates are exposed to
phosphotungstic acid, which selectively precipitates both
protease-sensitive and protease-resistant PrPSc that comprise prions,
but not the normal prion protein conformer found in uninfected animals,
PrPC. This step results in a higher concentration of PrPSc for detection
by the CDI. Because the PrPSc was not exposed to proteases, the CDI
measures all forms of abnormally folded PrPSc molecules.
Protease-sensitive PrPSc can account for 50 percent of the total PrPSc.
For Western analysis, homogenates of brain are treated with protease to
eliminate PrPC; however, this step also eliminates protease-sensitive
PrPSc leaving only protease-resistant PrPSc for Western blot detection
and decreasing the PrPSc signal at least in half.

###

http://pub.ucsf.edu/newsservices/releases/200502147/


PNAS | March 1, 2005 | vol. 102 | no. 9 | 3501-3506

NEUROSCIENCE

Diagnosis of human prion disease

Jiri G. Safar *, , Michael D. Geschwind , , Camille Deering
*, Svetlana Didorenko *, Mamta Sattavat ¶, Henry Sanchez ¶,
Ana Serban * , Martin Vey ||, Henry Baron **, Kurt Giles *,
, Bruce L. Miller , , Stephen J. DeArmond * , ¶ and Stanley
B. Prusiner *, , ,

*Institute for Neurodegenerative Diseases, Memory and Aging
Center, and Departments of Neurology, ¶Pathology, and
Biochemistry and Biophysics, University of California, San
Francisco, CA 94143; ||ZLB Behring, 35041 Marburg, Germany;
and **ZLB Behring, 75601 Paris, France

Contributed by Stanley B. Prusiner, December 22, 2004

Abstract

With the discovery of the prion protein (PrP),
immunodiagnostic procedures were applied to diagnose
Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease (CJD). Before development of the
conformation-dependent immunoassay (CDI), all immunoassays
for the disease-causing PrP isoform (PrPSc) used limited
proteolysis to digest the precursor cellular PrP (PrPC).
Because the CDI is the only immunoassay that measures both
the protease-resistant and protease-sensitive forms of
PrPSc, we used the CDI to diagnose human prion disease. The
CDI gave a positive signal for PrPSc in all 10–24 brain
regions (100%) examined from 28 CJD patients. A subset of 18
brain regions from 8 patients with sporadic CJD (sCJD) was
examined by histology, immunohistochemistry (IHC), and the
CDI. Three of the 18 regions (17%) were consistently
positive by histology and 4 of 18 (22%) by IHC for the 8
sCJD patients. In contrast, the CDI was positive in all 18
regions (100%) for all 8 sCJD patients. In both gray and
white matter, 90% of the total PrPSc was protease-sensitive
and, thus, would have been degraded by procedures using
proteases to eliminate PrPC. Our findings argue that the CDI
should be used to establish or rule out the diagnosis of
prion disease when a small number of samples is available as
is the case with brain biopsy. Moreover, IHC should not be
used as the standard against which all other
immunodiagnostic techniques are compared because an
immunoassay, such as the CDI, is substantially more
sensitive.


snip...


Discussion

The clinical diagnosis of human prion disease is often
difficult until the patient shows profound signs of
neurologic dysfunction. It is widely accepted that the
clinical diagnosis must be provisional until a tissue
diagnosis either confirms or rules out the clinical
assessment. Before the availability of Abs to PrP, a tissue
diagnosis was generally made by histologic evaluation of
neuropil vacuolation. IHC with
anti-glial-fibrillary-acidic-protein Abs in combination with
H&E staining preceded the use of anti-PrP Ab staining.

Recently, the role of IHC in the diagnosis of scrapie in the
brains of eight clinically affected goats inoculated with
the SSBP1 prion isolate has been challenged (14). Thalamic
samples taken from seven of eight goats with scrapie were
positive for PrPSc by Western blotting but negative by IHC.
The eighth goat was negative by Western blotting and IHC.
Consistent with these findings in goats are the data
reported here, in which IHC of formalin-fixed,
paraffin-embedded human brain samples was substantially less
sensitive than the CDI.

The CDI was developed to quantify PrPSc in tissue samples
from mammals producing prions. Concerned that limited PK
digestion was hydrolyzing some or even most of the PrPSc, we
developed a CDI that does not require PK digestion. The CDI
revealed that as much as 90% of PrPSc is sPrPSc; thus, it
was being destroyed during limited proteolytic digestion
used to hydrolyze PrPC. sPrPSc comprises 80% of PrPSc in the
frontal lobe and in the white matter (Fig. 4).

The CDI detected HuPrPSc with a sensitivity comparable to
the bioassay for prion infectivity in Tg(MHu2M) mice (Fig.
1). The high sensitivity achieved by the CDI is due to
several factors (8, 10, 11, 15). First, both sPrPSc and
rPrPSc conformers are specifically precipitated by PTA
(Table 5) (8, 9). PTA has also been used to increase the
sensitivity of Western blots enabling the detection of
rPrPSc in human muscle and other peripheral tissues (16,
17). Second, a sandwich protocol was used with the
high-affinity MAR1 mAb (11) to capture HuPrPSc and
Eu-labeled 3F4 mAb to detect HuPrPSc (12). Third, the CDI
detects PrPSc by Ab-binding to native and denatured forms of
the protein and, therefore, does not depend on proteolytic
degradation of PrPC. We chose not to perform Western blots
on most of the samples used in this study because such
immunoblots require denaturation of the sample, which
eliminates measurement of the native signal corresponding to
PrPC (Table 5). Moreover, a comparison between the CDI and
Western blotting on brain samples from sCJD and variant CJD
patients showed that the CDI was 50- to 100-fold more
sensitive (15). Additionally, Western blots combined with
densitometry are linear over a 10- to 100-fold range of
concentrations, whereas the CDI is linear over a >104-fold
range. The CDI has been automated, which not only improves
accuracy and reproducibility (10) but also allows numerous
samples to be analyzed, as reported here. Western blots are
difficult to automate and are labor intensive.

Our studies show that only the CDI detected PrPSc in all
regions examined in 24 sCJD and 3 fCJD(E200K) brains (Figs.
2 and 6). Comparative analyses demonstrated that the CDI was
vastly superior to histology and IHC. When 18 regions of 8
sCJD and 2 fCJD(E200K) brains were compared, we discovered
that histology and IHC were unreliable diagnostic tools
except for samples from a few brain regions. In contrast,
the CDI was a superb diagnostic procedure because it
detected PrPSc in all 18 regions in 8 of 8 sCJD and 2 of 2
fCJD(E200K) cases (Tables 1 and 2).

Histologic changes in prion disease have been shown to
follow the accumulation of prions as measured by bioassay of
infectivity and by PrPSc accumulation (18–22). Because low
levels of PrPSc are not associated with neuropathologic
changes, some discrepancy between vacuolation and PrPSc was
expected. In contrast to histology, IHC measures PrP
immunostaining after autoclaving tissue sections exposed to
formic acid. Because IHC measures PrP, we expected the
sensitivity of this procedure might be similar to the CDI,
but that proved not to be the case. Whether exposure of
formic acid-treated tissue sections to elevated temperature
destroys not only PrPC but also sPrPSc and only denatures
rPrPSc remains to be determined. Such a scenario could
account for the lower sensitivity of IHC compared with CDI
or bioassay (Tables 1 and 2).

Studies of the white matter in CJD brains were particularly
informative with respect to the sensitivity of the CDI,
where PrPSc levels were low but readily detectable, 10- to
100-fold above the threshold value (Fig. 4). Because animal
studies have shown that PrPSc and infectivity are
transported anterogradely from one brain region to another
along neuroanatomical pathways (23–25), we expected to find
PrPSc in white matter as demonstrated by the CDI but not
IHC. Axonal transport of PrPSc is also suggested by
diffusion-weighted MRI scans of CJD cases, which show
high-intensity signals in analogous neocortical regions of
the right and left cerebral hemispheres (26). This symmetry
of neuroradiological abnormalities is consistent with spread
of PrPSc to the contralateral cortex by means of callosal
commissural pathways.

Most immunoassays that detect HuPrPSc do so only after
subjecting the sample to limited proteolysis to form PrP
27–30, followed by denaturation. Because the CDI measures
the immunoreactivity before and after denaturation to an
epitope that is exposed in native PrPC but buried in PrPSc,
limited proteolysis to eliminate PrPC is unnecessary. Assays
based on limited proteolysis underestimate the level of
PrPSc because they digest sPrPSc, which represents 80–90% of
PrPSc in CJD and scrapie brains (Fig. 4 and Table 5).

Gerstmann–Sträussler–Scheinker, an inherited human prion
disease, is caused by the P102L mutation in the PRNP gene.
In mice expressing the Gerstmann–Sträussler–Scheinker mutant
PrP transgene, the CDI detected high levels of sPrPSc(P101L)
as well as low levels of rPrPSc(P101L) long before
neurodegeneration and clinical symptoms occurred (9).
sPrPSc(P101L) as well as low concentrations of rPrPSc(P101L)
previously escaped detection (27). Whether a similar
situation applies in other genetic forms of prion disease,
sCJD, or variant CJD remains to be determined. Because most
of the PrPSc in the brains of sCJD patients is
protease-sensitive (Fig. 4), it is likely that the lower
sensitivity of IHC is due to its inability to detect sPrPSc.
Presently, we have no information about the kinetics of
either sPrPSc or rPrPSc accumulation in human brain. Limited
information on the kinetics of PrPSc accumulation in
livestock comes from studies of cattle, sheep, and goats
inoculated orally, but most of the bioassays were performed
in non-Tg mice (28–30) in which prion titers were
underestimated by as much as a factor of 104 (10).

The studies reported here are likely to change profoundly
the approach to the diagnosis of prion disease in both
humans and livestock (31–33). The superior performance of
the CDI in diagnosing prion disease compared to routine
neuropathologic examination and IHC demands that the CDI be
used in future diagnostic evaluations of prion disease.
Prion disease can no longer be ruled out by routine
histology or IHC. Moreover, the use of IHC to confirm cases
of bovine spongiform encephalopathy after detection of
bovine PrPSc by the CDI (10) seems an untenable approach in
the future. Clearly, the CDI for HuPrPSc is as sensitive or
more sensitive than bioassays in Tg(MHu2M) mice (Fig. 1).

Our results suggest that using the CDI to test large numbers
of samples for human prions might alter the epidemiology of
prion diseases. At present, there is limited data on the
frequency of subclinical variant CJD infections in the U.K.
population (34). Because appendixes and tonsils were
evaluated only by IHC, many cases might have escaped
detection (Tables 1 and 2). Equally important may be the use
of CDI-like tests to diagnose other neurodegenerative
disorders, such as Alzheimer's disease, Parkinson's disease,
and the frontotemporal dementias. Whether IHC underestimates
the incidence of one or more of these common degenerative
diseases is unknown. Moreover, CDI-like tests may help
determine the frequency with which these disorders and the
prion diseases occurs concomitantly in a single patient (35,
36).

Acknowledgements


snip...END


http://www.pnas.org/


Volume 349:1812-1820 November 6, 2003 Number 19


Extraneural Pathologic Prion Protein in Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease


Background In patients with sporadic Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease, pathologic
disease-associated prion protein (PrPSc) has been identified only in the
central nervous system and olfactory-nerve tissue. Understanding the
distribution of PrPSc in Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease is important for
classification and diagnosis and perhaps even for prevention.

Methods We used a highly sensitive method of detection — involving the
concentration of PrPSc by differential precipitation with sodium
phosphotungstic acid, which increased the sensitivity of Western blot
analysis by up to three orders of magnitude — to search for PrPSc in
extraneural organs of 36 patients with sporadic Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease
who died between 1996 and 2002.

Results PrPSc was present in the brain tissue of all patients. In addition,
we found PrPSc in 10 of 28 spleen specimens and in 8 of 32 skeletal-muscle
samples. Three patients had PrPSc in both spleen and muscle specimens.
Patients with extraneural PrPSc had a significantly longer duration of
disease and were more likely to have uncommon molecular variants of sporadic
Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease than were patients without extraneural PrPSc.

Conclusions Using sensitive techniques, we identified extraneural deposition
of PrPSc in spleen and muscle samples from approximately one third of
patients who died with sporadic Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease. Extraneural PrPSc
appears to correlate with a long duration of disease.


Source Information

From the Institute of Neuropathology and National Reference Center for Prion
Diseases, University Hospital of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland.

Dr. Glatzel and Mr. Abela contributed equally to the article.

Address reprint requests to Dr. Aguzzi at the Institute of Neuropathology,
University Hospital of Zurich, Schmelzbergstr. 12, CH-8091 Zurich,
Switzerland, or at [email protected] .


http://content.nejm.org/cgi/


Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and inclusion body myositis: Abundant
disease-associated prion protein in muscle

Gabor G. Kovacs, MD PhD 1 2, Elisabeth Lindeck-Pozza, MD 1, Leila Chimelli,
MD, PhD 3, Abelardo Q. C. Araújo, MD, PhD 4, Alberto A. Gabbai, MD, PhD 5,
Thomas Ströbel, PhD 1, Markus Glatzel, MD 6, Adriano Aguzzi, MD, PhD 6,
Herbert Budka, MD 1 *
1Institute of Neurology, University of Vienna, and Austrian Reference Centre
for Human Prion Diseases, Vienna, Austria
2National Institute of Psychiatry and Neurology, Budapest, Hungary
3Department of Pathology, School of Medicine, Federal University of Rio de
Janeiro
4Department of Neurology, School of Medicine, Federal University of Rio de
Janeiro
5Department of Neurology, School of Medicine, Federal University of Sao
Paulo, Brazil
6Institute of Neuropathology, University Hospital of Zürich, Zürich,
Switzerland
email: Herbert Budka ([email protected]. )

*Correspondence to Herbert Budka, Institute of Neurology, AKH 4J, Wühringer
Gürtel 18-20, POB 48, A-1097 Vienna, Austria

Funded by:
European Union (EU) Project; Grant Number: TSELAB QLK2-CT-2002-81523
EU Concerted Action PRIONET; Grant Number: QLK2-2000-CT-00837

Abstract

Pathologicalprion protein (PrPSc) is the hallmark of prion diseases
affecting primarily the central nervous system. Using immunohistochemistry,
paraffin-embedded tissue blot, and Western blot, we demonstrated abundant
PrPSc in the muscle of a patient with sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and
inclusion body myositis. Extraneural PrPC-PrPSc conversion in
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease appears to become prominent when PrPC is
abundantly available as substrate, as in inclusion body myositis muscle.

--------------

Received: 16 June 2003; Revised: 11 September 2003; Accepted: 11 September
2003
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)


10.1002/ana.10813 About DOI

http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/

AS Professor Aguzzi kindly put it most recently ;

107
Vet Pathol 42:107 108 (2005)
Letters to the Editor
Editor:
Absence of evidence is not always evidence of absence. In the article
Failure to detect prion protein (PrPres) by immunohistochemistry in striated
muscle tissues of animals experimentally inoculated with agents of
transmissible spongiform encephalopathy, recently published in Veterinary
Pathology (41:78 81, 2004), PrPres was not detected in striated muscle of
experimentally infected elk, cattle, sheep, and raccoons by
immunohistochemistry (IHC). Negative IHC, however, does not exclude the
presence of PrPSc. For example, PrPres was detected in skeletal muscle in 8
of 32 humans with the prion disease, sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
(CJD), using sodium phosphotungstic acid (NaPTA) precipitation and western
blot.1 The NaPTA precipitation, described by Wadsworth et al.,3 concentrates
the abnormal isoform of the prion, PrPres, from a large tissue homogenate
volume before western blotting. This technique has increased the sensitivity
of the western blot up to three orders of magnitude and could be included in
assays to detect PrPres. Extremely conspicuous deposits of PrPres in muscle
were detected by IHC in a recent case report of an individual with inclusion
body myositis and CJD.2 Here, PrPres was detected in the muscle by
immunoblotting, IHC, and paraf- fin-embedded tissue blot. We would therefore
caution that, in addition to IHC, highly sensitive biochemical assays and
bioassays of muscle are needed to assess the presence or absence of prions
from muscle in experimental and natural TSE cases.

Christina Sigurdson, Markus Glatzel, and Adriano Aguzzi
Institute of Neuropathology
University Hospital of Zurich
Zurich, Switzerland
References
1 Glatzel M, Abela E, et al: Extraneural pathologic prion
protein in sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. N Engl J
Med 349(19):1812 1820, 2003
2 Kovacs GG, Lindeck-Pozza E, et al: Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease and inclusion body myositis: abundant diseaseassociated
prion protein in muscle. Ann Neurol 55(1):
121 125, 2004
3 Wadsworth JDF, Joiner S, et al: Tissue distribution of protease
resistant prion protein in variant CJD using a highly
sensitive immuno-blotting assay. Lancet 358:171 180,
2001...///


EMBO reports AOP Published online: 11 April 2003


Widespread PrPSc accumulation in muscles of hamsters orally infected with
scrapie

http://www.emboreports.org/



Watson Meldrum et al Scrapie agent in muscle - Pattison I A (1990)
Veterinary record, 20 January 1990. p.68

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/01/19009001.pdf


===============================


GREETINGS AGAIN APHIS ET AL,


FURTHERMORE, WE HAVE FAILED TO EVEN STOP THE SRMs FROM WHOLE
CUTS OF BONELESS BEEF IMPORTED FROM CANADA IN THE VERY ONSET OF
THE NEW BSE MRR (MINIMAL RISK REGION). THIS IS THE VERY REASON I HAVE
SAID TIME AND TIME AGAIN THAT BY THIS ADMINISTRATION ABANDONING THE
BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENTS BECAUSE THEY DID NOT LIKE THE ASSESSMENT
OF BSE GBR III, AND ADHERING TO A NEW BSE MRR POLICY THAT WAS DESIGNED
NOT FOR HUMAN HEALTH, BUT ONLY FOR COMMODITIES AND FUTURES, WILL FURTHER
EXPOSE NEEDLESSLY MILLIONS AND MILLIONS OF HUMANS AND ANIMALS VIA THE FREE
TRADING OF ALL STRAINS OF TSE GLOBALLY. references as follow ;


Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Products


Recall Release CLASS II RECALL
FSIS-RC-032-2005 HEALTH RISK: LOW

Congressional and Public Affairs
(202) 720-9113
Steven Cohen

WASHINGTON, Aug. 19, 2005 - Green Bay Dressed Beef, a Green Bay, Wis.,
establishment, is voluntarily recalling approximately 1,856 pounds of beef
products that may contain portions of the backbone from a cow just over 30
months old, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection
Service announced today. The product was from a cow imported directly for
slaughter from Canada.

Based on information provided by Canada, the products subject to this Class
II recall are from a cow that is approximately one month older than the
30-month age limit. Both ante-mortem and post-mortem inspection were done on
the cow in question. FSIS inspection program personnel determined the cow to
be healthy and fit for human food. FSIS' designation of this recall as Class
II is because it is a situation where there is a remote probability of
adverse health consequences from the use of the product.

FSIS learned about this as a result of a Canadian audit of their health
certificate that accompanied the imported cow. Prior to slaughter, the
health certificate accompanying the cow was presented to the establishment,
and it appeared complete and accurate. However, a subsequent audit of
information related to the health certificate by Canadian officials found
that it was not accurate. Action has been taken by Canadian Food Inspection
Agency officials in response to findings from the audit.

The products subject to recall are:
Five boxes of 243 lb. vacuum pouched packages of "American Foods Group,
NECKBONE UNTRIM'D, USDA CHOICE OR HIGHER" with the case code of 77333;
One box of 50 lb. vacuum pouched package of "American Foods Group, SHORTLOIN
2X2, USDA SELECT OR HIGHER" with the case code of 75231;
One box of 60 lb. vacuum pouched package of "American Foods Group, SHORTLOIN
2X2, USDA CHOICE OR HIGHER" with the case code of 75060;
Five boxes of 258 lb. vacuum pouched packages of "Dakota Supreme Beef,
SHORTLOIN 0X11/4, USDA SELECT OR HIGHER" with the case code of 75442;
Sixteen boxes of 811 lb. vacuum pouched packages of "American Foods Group,
BLADE BI N/O CHUCK, USDA CHOICE OR HIGHER" with the case code of 75955;
Nine boxes of 435 lb. vacuum pouched packages of "American Foods Group,
BLADE BI N/O CHUCK, USDA SELECT OR HIGHER" with the case code of 75952.

Each box bears the establishment number "410" inside the USDA seal of
inspection. The products were produced on August 4, and were distributed to
wholesale distributors in Pennsylvania, Florida, Illinois, Maryland,
Minnesota and Wisconsin.

Under the interim final rules FSIS implemented on January 12, 2004, certain
specified risk materials must be removed from all cattle depending on the
age of the animal. On this animal all specified risk materials for cattle 30
months and over were removed, with the exception of the vertebral column. At
the time of slaughter, the animal was certified to be under 30 months of age
and removal of the vertebral column was not required. A subsequent audit
determined the animal was just over 30 months of age; therefore, the
vertebral column is required to be removed. This is the reason for the
recall of the selected products.

Consumers with questions about the recall may contact Sally VandeHei,
Executive Assistant at 1-877-894-3927. National media with questions may
contact Jim Mulhern at (202) 496-2468. Local media with questions may
contact Susan Finco at (920) 965-7750 ext.158.

Consumers with other food safety questions can phone the toll-free USDA Meat
and Poultry Hotline at 1-888-MPHotline (1-888-674-6854). The hotline is
available in English and Spanish and can be reached from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m.
(Eastern Time), Monday through Friday. Recorded food safety messages are
available 24 hours a day.
Sample Product Labels: These are similar to, but not identical to, labels on
the recalled product.


#


USDA Recall Classifications
Class I This is a health hazard situation where there is a reasonable
probability that the use of the product will cause serious, adverse health
consequences or death.
Class II This is a health hazard situation where there is a remote
probability of adverse health consequences from the use of the product.
Class III This is a situation where the use of the product will not cause
adverse health consequences.


http://www.fsis.usda.gov/News_&_Events/Recall_032_2005_Release/index.asp


:

Docket No. 03-080-1 -- USDA ISSUES PROPOSED RULE TO ALLOW LIVE ANIMAL
IMPORTS FROM CANADA
[TSS SUBMISSION 11/03/2003 01:19 PM To: [email protected] ]


https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/BSEcom.nsf/0/b78ba677e2b0c12185256dd300649f9d?O
penDocument&AutoFramed


THE BSE MRR POLICY SHOULD BE ABOLISHED/REPEALED IMMEDIATELY AND THE BSE GBR
RISK ASSESSMENTS AND POLICY SHOULD BE STRICTLY ENFORCED AND FURTHER ENHANCED
TO INCLUDE CWD AND ALL TSEs...TSS


EFSA Scientific Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR)
of the United States of America (USA)
Publication date: 20 August 2004
Adopted July 2004 (Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083)

Report

Summary
Summary of the Scientific Report

The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group
on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an
up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United States of America,
i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected
with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific
report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering
the period 1980-2003.

The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic
cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid
eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to
an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported
meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to
an internal challenge in the early nineties.

A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports
from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly)
into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist,
and grew significantly in the mid 90's when domestic cattle, infected by
imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the
risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from
BSE risk countries.

EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely
but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically)
infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in
rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus,
the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with
the BSE-agent persistently increases.



http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/efsa_scientific_reports/gbr_assessments/573_e
n.html


From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [[email protected]]
Sent: Tuesday, July 29, 2003 1:03 PM
To: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]; [email protected].; BSE-L
Subject: Docket No. 2003N-0312 Animal Feed Safety System [TSS SUBMISSION
TO DOCKET 2003N-0312]

Greetings FDA,

snip...

PLUS, if the USA continues to flagrantly ignore the _documented_ science to
date about the known TSEs in the USA (let alone the undocumented TSEs in
cattle), it is my opinion, every other Country that is dealing with BSE/TSE
should boycott the USA and demand that the SSC reclassify the USA BSE GBR II
risk assessment to BSE/TSE GBR III 'IMMEDIATELY'. for the SSC to _flounder_
any longer on this issue, should also be regarded with great suspicion as
well. NOT to leave out the OIE and it's terribly flawed system of disease
surveillance. the OIE should make a move on CWD in the USA, and make a risk
assessment on this as a threat to human health. the OIE should also change
the mathematical formula for testing of disease. this (in my opinion and
others) is terribly flawed as well. to think that a sample survey of 400 or
so cattle in a population of 100 million, to think this will find anything,
especially after seeing how many TSE tests it took Italy and other Countries
to find 1 case of BSE (1 million rapid TSE test in less than 2 years, to
find 102 BSE cases), should be proof enough to make drastic changes of this
system. the OIE criteria for BSE Country classification and it's
interpretation is very problematic. a text that is suppose to give
guidelines, but is not understandable, cannot be considered satisfactory.
the OIE told me 2 years ago that they were concerned with CWD, but said any
changes might take years. well, two years have come and gone, and no change
in relations with CWD as a human health risk. if we wait for politics and
science to finally make this connection, we very well may die before any
decisions
or changes are made. this is not acceptable. we must take the politics and
the industry out of any final decisions of the Scientific community. this
has been the problem from day one with this environmental man made death
sentence. some of you may think i am exaggerating, but you only have to see
it once, you only have to watch a loved one die from this one time, and you
will never forget, OR forgive...yes, i am still very angry... but the
transmission studies DO NOT lie, only the politicians and the industry do...
and they are still lying to this day...TSS


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/03n0312/03N-0312_emc-000001.txt


GREETINGS AGAIN APHIS ET AL,


Moving on to the theory that BSE agent is not in blood. THIS is what they
use to think with nvCJD. However
the nvCJD agent has now been detected and transmitted the TSE agent by
blood. nvCJD is the BSE agent
that has transmitted to humans. nvCJD is human BSE. so if nvCJD transmits by
blood, why not BSE? with
the limited testing to date, the limited sensitivity of the detection of the
BSE/TSE agent blood to date, i would
not be so sure that the BSE/TSE agent does not transmit by blood. just
recent Ag. Comm. Johanns stated
that they would not address the blood issue being fed to cattle. a foolish
and careless mistake. but typical.
we now have detected new atypical strains of the BSE/TSE agent in cattle in
many countries i.e. Japan, France,
Belgium, Germany, and Italy. In the Italian study of BASE, a new? TSE in
cattle they have discovered that is
not like the nvCJD, but very similar to sporadic CJD. They have detected 2
such cattle at printing of this study
March 2, 2004. Identification of a second bovine amyloidotic spongiform
encephalopathy: Molecular similarities
with sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease PNAS. MY point is that with these
new atypical TSEs showing up in
cattle, sheep and goats, we don't know if blood and other tissues transmits
the disease. THE SRM list may
and should be reevaluated. WE know BSE is in the USA, but we also know that
in the studies of Mission Texas,
where USA suffolk scrapie sheep were inoculated into USA cattle, the PRION
agent that was produced did not
look like the UK BSE strain. so why would all CJD cases in the USA look like
the UK human BSE i.e. nv/v CJD?
WHY wait and expose millions and millions needlessly as in the past with
previous TSE blunders, why wait to
act. why not act first with what we know, which is very concerning, then as
science evolves, go from there.
references as follow ;


UK Strategy for Research and

Development on Human and Animal

Health Aspects of Transmissible

Spongiform Encephalopathies

2005-2008


snip...


3.2 Tackling the spread of infection

3.2.1 The species barrier and the carrier state

3.2.1.1 The possibility of 'carrier' states in animals and humans, and our
present inability

to identify them, pose a potential threat to public and animal health. The
susceptibility of

humans to BSE infection, and the ability of the disease to remain clinically
silent for

many years, is of major concern to DH. Although the death of a UK blood
donor from

vCJD in 1999 three years after making the donation and the subsequent death
from vCJD

of the recipient in 2003 have not been causally linked, transmission of
infection through

blood transfusion is the most likely explanation327. The case heightens
concerns that

'carriers' could be transmitting the disease through blood, tissue and organ
donation or

by contaminating surgical instruments when undergoing surgery. DH will
continue to

support research to detect infectious prions in human tissue, to investigate
the

decontamination of surgical instruments and to develop measures to protect
blood

supplies.

3.2.1.2 Animal models of some TSEs have detected infectivity in blood.
Experiments,

which have involved transfusing large volumes of blood from infected sheep
to healthy

recipient sheep, have demonstrated that infectivity can be transmitted by
blood

transfusion. A central part of DH policy in this area has been the
leucodepletion of blood

donations and the efficacy of this technology can now be tested in sheep.


snip...


4.5.4 In 1987, epidemiological studies of BSE cases identified meat and bone
meal as the

probable means by which the disease was being spread. In an attempt to
prevent

further infections a ban on incorporating ruminant protein in ruminant feed
was

introduced in July 1988. Due to the long incubation period associated with
this disease

the efficacy of this control measure was not immediately apparent. As time
passed it

became clear from the number of cases born after the ban that it was not
wholly

effective.

4.5.5 Epidemiological analysis of these cases showed that a high proportion
of them

occurred in areas where the pig population was high. This observation,
coupled with

research data that showed that only a very small dose of the infective
material was

needed to cause disease in cattle, led to the conclusion that
cross-contamination of feed

was occurring.

4.5.6 Since 1988, increasingly stringent feed controls have been put in
place. Key

amongst these have been:

• the ban on the use of specified bovine offal in all animal feed (September
1990);

• the ban on feeding any farmed animal, including horses and fish, with
mammalian

meat and bone meal. (This began in March 1996 but following this ban there
was

a recall scheme and the date from which the ban was considered to be fully

effective is regarded as being 1 August 1996);

62

v6.1

• EU-wide controls on feed which extended the ban to include all processed
animal

protein, including that derived from birds and fish (implemented in the UK
from 1

August 2001).

4.5.7 As illustrated in fig. [ ] these later measures have reduced the
spread of BSE.

However, they have not been one hundred per cent effective. As at 31st
December 2003

there had been 81 cases of BSE in animals born since 1 August 1996 in the
UK.


full text 91 pages;


http://www.mrc.ac.uk/pdf-about-tse_uk_strategy_june2005.pdf


GREETINGS AGAIN APHIS ET AL,


JUST what about those old studies at Mission Texas and the atypical TSE in
cattle?
would it not be prudent for human health purpose, the question that, with
all the atypical
TSEs showing up in animal and man in different countries, the fact that most
all of these
TSEs transmit as freely or not as freely as BSE (depending whom you have
witnessed die from
this agent either directly or indirectly via a multitude of potential routes
and sources) to primates.
would it not be prudent to ask yourself if some if not all of these sporadic
CJDs might be a
by-product of these TSEs either directly or indirectly via a multitude of
proven routes and sources
in animal studies? it is unethical for human transmission studies
considering the fact that the agent
is 100% fatal, slow, but fatal. there has been no sound science in any of
the recent decisions in the
USA in regards to BSE/TSE human or animal, all one has to do is look at
TEXAS, the mad cow that
got away, the stumbling and staggering one that NO TSE TEST AT ALL was done,
ordered rendered,
and then the infamous positive, positve, secret positive, inconclusive (NO
WB), negative, 8 month delay,
then the 'Fong Effect' took place, THEN FINALLY CONFIRMED SOME 8 MONTHS
LATER IN WEYBRIDGE.
Finally recently, another inconclusive that took place that sat untested on
some shelf for about 4 months while
the Texas mad cow blunder was going on. the tissues of this cow this time
were preserved in preservative as
to render any WB for further confirmation, what i called the 'FONG SYNDROME'
or the 'end around' the WB
ordered previously by the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG. Politics at its
finest, to hell with human health.
WE find now that 9,200 USA POTENTIAL MAD COWS IN JUNE 2004 ENHANCED COVER-UP
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM WENT UNTESTED WITH NO RAPID TEST OR WB, ONLY IHC, the
test
that fails the most, that is very unreliable as noted above in my submission
by Prusiner et al and other scientist.


NOW, back to Mission, Texas ;


>> Differences in tissue distribution could require new regulations
>> regarding specific risk material (SRM) removal.


snip...end

full text 33 PAGES ;


http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11b/tab01.pdf

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1988/10/00001001.pdf


It was, however, performed in the USA in 1979, when it was shown that cattle
inoculated with the scrapie agent endemic in the flock of Suffolk sheep at
the United States Department of Agriculture in Mission, Texas, developed a
TSE quite unlike BSE. 32 The findings of the initial transmission, though
not of the clinical or neurohistological examination, were communicated in
October 1988 to Dr Watson, Director of the CVL, following a visit by Dr
Wrathall, one of the project leaders in the Pathology Department of the CVL,
to the United States Department of Agriculture. 33 The results were not
published at this point, since the attempted transmission to mice from the
experimental cow brain had been inconclusive. The results of the clinical
and histological differences between scrapie-affected sheep and cattle were
published in 1995. Similar studies in which cattle were inoculated
intracerebrally with scrapie inocula derived from a number of
scrapie-affected sheep of different breeds and from different States, were
carried out at the US National Animal Disease Centre. 34 The results,
published in 1994, showed that this source of scrapie agent, though
pathogenic for cattle, did not produce the same clinical signs of brain
lesions characteristic of BSE.

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/


1: J Infect Dis. 1994 Ap
 
##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################

Subject: Docket No. 2002N – 0273 (Formerly Docket No. 02N-0273) RIN 0910 – AF46 Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed R-CALF USA
Date: January 11, 2006 at 6:13 pm PST
December 20, 2005

Division of Dockets Management (HFA – 305)

Food and Drug Administration

5630 Fishers Lane, Rm. 1061

Rockville, MD 20852

Re: Docket No. 2002N – 0273 (Formerly Docket No. 02N-0273)

RIN 0910 – AF46

Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed

Comments by R-CALF USA

Dear Administrator:

The Ranchers-Cattlemen Action Legal Fund, United Stockgrowers of

America (R-CALF USA) appreciates this opportunity to provide comments on the

proposed rule by the Food and Drug Administration, Health and Human Services

(FDA) to amend the regulations governing substances prohibited from use in

animal food or feed (Proposed Rule).

R-CALF USA is a non-profit association that represents over 18,000 U.S.

cattle producers in 47 states and approximately 60 state and local affiliated cattleproducer

associations. R-CALF USA's membership consists primarily of cowcalf

operators, cattle backgrounders, and feedlot owners. R-CALF USA's

concerns encompass trade and marketing issues that affect the health and welfare

of the U.S. cattle herd, the economic welfare of U.S. cattle producers, the health

and safety of U.S. beef consumers, and the sustainability of the environment.

INTRODUCTION

R-CALF USA previously submitted comments concerning the subject

matter covered by this Proposed Rule on September 13, 2004. Specifically, RCALF

USA's comments were in response to the Animal and Plant Health

Inspection Service (APHIS) Docket No. 04-047-1, Food Safety Inspection

Service (FSIS) Docket No. 04-021 ANPR, and FDA Docket No. 2004N-0264

(RIN 0910 – AF46). R-CALF USA's September 13, 2004 comments to the

aforementioned agencies under the combined agency heading, "In the Matter of

Federal Measures to Mitigate BSE Risks: Consideration for Further Action," and

are filed herewith and incorporated herein as Attachment A.

2

R-CALF USA appreciates the FDA's efforts to eliminate the potential pathways of BSE

infectivity by strengthening the U.S. feed ban. However, although a step in the right direction,

the Proposed Rule to prohibit only brains and spinal cords from cattle over 30 months of age, the

brains and spinal cords from cattle of any age not inspected and passed for human consumption,

the entire carcass of cattle not inspected and passed for human consumption if the brains and

spinal cords have not been removed, tallow that is derived from prohibited tissues that contain

more than 0.15 percent insoluble impurities, and mechanically separated beef that is derived

from the prohibited materials falls well short of addressing the increased risk of bovine

spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in several respects.

A. The Proposed Rule Does Not Comply With Even The Minimal Standards

Recommended By The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) For Managing

The Human And Health Risks Associated With The Presence Of BSE.

1. The Proposed Rule does not prohibit tonsils and distal ileums for use in feed

as recommended by the OIE

The 2005 recommendations of the OIE clearly state that tonsils and distal ileums should

not be traded for the preparation of food, feed, or fertilizers if such tissues are derived from cattle

of any age originating from a country defined as a "Controlled BSE risk."1 The United States

Department of Agriculture - Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) considers

Canada a "Controlled BSE risk."2 Because the United States allows the importation of cattle

from Canada and does not propose to restrict the use of tonsils and distal ileums derived from

these imported cattle in the production of animal feed, the Proposed Rule does not comport with

OIE recommendations and will likely exacerbate problems associated with fully reopening U.S.

beef export markets that have remained fully or partially closed since the discovery of a BSEinfected

Canadian cow imported into the U.S. in 2003.

Given that APHIS likewise considers the United States a "Controlled BSE risk,"3 the

aforementioned problem will be further compounded unless FDA bans the use of tonsils and

distal ileums from animal feed in its final rule.

2. The Proposed Rule does not prohibit eyes, skulls, or vertebral columns from

all animals over 30 months of age for use in feed as recommended by the OIE

The 2005 recommendations of the OIE clearly state that eyes, skulls and vertebral

columns, in addition to brains and spinal cords, and any commodity contaminated by them,

should not be traded for the preparation of food, feed, or fertilizer if such tissues are derived

from cattle that were over 30 months of age originating from a country defined as a "Controlled

BSE risk."4 Inasmuch as the United States considers both the U.S. and Canada a "Controlled

1 Office International des Epizooties (OIE) 2005 Terrestrial Animal Health Code, Bovine Spongiform

Encephalopathy, Chapter 2.3.13, at 2.3.13.13(1). See also Article 2.2.13.4.

2 See R-CALF USA v. USDA, CV-05060-BLG-RFC, Third Declaration of Lisa Ferguson, D.V.M., at ¶ 5, attached

hereto as Attachment B.

3 Ibid.

4 Office International des Epizooties (OIE) 2005 Terrestrial Animal Health Code, Bovine Spongiform

Encephalopathy, Chapter 2.3.13, at 2.3.13.13(2). See also Article 2.2.13.4.

3

BSE risk," the failure of the United States to follow the international science-based

recommendations of the OIE will further add to the United States' ongoing difficulty of fully

reopening U.S. beef export markets that have remained fully or partially closed since 2003. In

addition, the Proposed Rule will subject the United States to the unnecessary and avoidable risks

that the OIE's recommendations are intended to address. Moreover, the USDA has recently

restated its intention to resume imports of Canadian cattle over 30 months of age.5 This future

action in combination with the Proposed Rule which does not comport with minimal OIE

recommendations will obviously exacerbate the United States ongoing difficulty of fully

restoring lost export markets and will further subject the U.S. to the unnecessary and avoidable

risks that the OIE's recommendations are designed to address.

3. The Proposed Rule does not prohibit eyes, skulls, and vertebral columns for

use in feed from cattle over 12 months of age that originate in a country that

does not meet the criteria of a "Controlled BSE risk" country as

recommended by the OIE

Notwithstanding APHIS's assertion that Canada is a "Controlled BSE risk" country,

Canada has not established that it is testing a sufficient number of cattle to comport with the

OIE's "Type A Surveillance" requirements.6 Based on the OIE's Type A Surveillance

recommendations found at Tables 1 and 2 of the OIE code, Canada would need to test 187,000

consecutive targeted cattle (with a BSE risk equal to that in the "Casualty slaughter, age between

4 and 7 years" subpopulation in Table 2), in order to comply with the OIE's minimal

recommendation for countries that (unlike Canada) have not identified any cases of BSE.

However, Canada has only tested 54,481 cattle from January 1, 2005 through December 15,

2005, and it tested only 23,550 cattle in 2004.7

Because Canada has not established that it is testing sufficient numbers of cattle to

maintain a "Controlled BSE risk" designation, Canada should be considered a country with an

"Undetermined BSE risk."8 As such, the OIE recommends that eyes, skulls and vertebral

columns, in additions to brains and spinal cords, from cattle over 12 months of age not be traded

for the preparation of food, feed, and fertilizer.9

Because Canada is testing an insufficient number of cattle to maintain a "Controlled BSE

risk" designation, and because the United States is currently importing Canadian cattle under 30

months of age, the Proposed Rule would need to prohibit eyes, skulls and vertebral columns, in

addition to brains and spinal cords, from Canadian cattle over 12 months of age in order to meet

the minimal standards recommended by the OIE. Failure to meet the OIE's minimal standards

will further complicate the United States ability to fully reopen its lost export markets.

5 Federal Register, Vol. 70, No. 239, December 14, 2005, at 73915.

6 See Office International des Epizooties (OIE) 2005 Terrestrial Animal Health Code, Bovine Spongiform

Encephalopathy, Chapter 2.3.13, at 2.3.13.4(2).

7 BSE Enhanced Surveillance Program, Canadian Food Inspection Agency, available at

http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/heasan/disemala/bseesb/surv/surve.shtml#num, downloaded on

December 19, 2005.

8 See Office International des Epizooties (OIE) 2005 Terrestrial Animal Health Code, Bovine Spongiform

Encephalopathy, Chapter 2.3.13, at 2.3.13.4(5).

9 See Id. at Article 2.3.13.13(3).

4

B. The Proposed Rule Fails To Close The Direct Pathways Of BSE Infectivity Left

Open When USDA Resumed Importation of Canadian Cattle

Unlike the United States, which has confirmed BSE only in a cow approximately 12

years of age, Canada has detected multiple cases of BSE in cattle averaging only 6 years and 10

months of age, with the youngest less than 6 years of age.10 This evidence suggests that the BSE

agent has been amplifying in Canada for several generations, including the generation of cattle

born after the implementation of Canada's 1997 feed ban.11 Further evidence shows that the

BSE agent has entered the Canadian feed supply as recently as 2003.

1. Canadian cattle were exposed to contaminated feed in 2003

A BSE infected cow was rendered into pet food and animal feed in Canada in 2003.12

The feed was distributed to 1800 farms but the Canadian government only surveyed 200 of these

farms.13 The Canadian government found that ruminants may have been exposed on 1 percent of

the 200 farms surveyed and it destroyed 63 cattle that may have eaten contaminated poultry feed

on 3 of the surveyed farms.14

2. Only a fraction of potentially exposed cattle were destroyed

Because the Canadian government found that exposure likely occurred in 3 out of 200

farms surveyed, exposure likely occurred on 27 farms total (3/200 = 27/1800). But, only 3 were

mitigated. Therefore, it is likely that cattle on approximately 24 additional farms were exposed

to contaminated feed in 2003, and no mitigation measures were reported to have been

implemented on these farms.

3. Canadian cattle that were exposed to BSE infectivity and under 30 months of

age are eligible for export to the United States.

BSE infectivity has been confirmed in the distal ileum of cattle as early as 6 months postexposure

and in the tonsils, where infectivity was confirmed at 10 months post-exposure.15

Thus, Canadian cattle born in 2003 and exposed to the contaminated feed may well be harboring

BSE infectivity. The United States presently allows the importation of Canadian cattle under 30

months of age.

4. Tonsils and distal ileums from potentially infected Canadian cattle under 30

months of age may be lawfully rendered into poultry feed in the United States.

10 See R-CALF USA v. USDA, CV-05060-BLG-RFC, Statement of Facts in Support of Defendants' Opposition to

Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, at ¶ 41, Footnote 5, attached hereto as Attachment C.

11 Id. at ¶ 41.

12 Regulations Amending Certain Regulations Administered and Enforced by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency,

Canadian Gazette, Vol. 138, No. 50, December 11, 2004, available at

http://gazetteducanada.gc.ca/partI/2004/20041211/html/regle2-e.html, downloaded on December 20, 2005.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Federal Register, Vol. 70. No. 2, January 4, 2005, at 483.

5

The Proposed Rule does not prohibit the tonsils and distel ileums derived from Canadian

cattle under 30 months of age that may be harboring BSE infectivity to be used in poultry feed in

the United States. This presents a direct pathway of BSE infectivity into the United States

poultry feed supply.

5. The Proposed Rule understates the lowest minimum infectious dose for BSE

The Proposed Rule acknowledges that the minimum infectious dose for BSE may be

lower than previously thought, citing a study in which infectivity was transmitted to an animal

after ingesting only 0.01 gram of brain tissue from a BSE-infected animal.16 However, APHIS

has cited a scientific study that indicates the infectious dose for BSE is many times lower than

that reported in the Proposed Rule. APHIS claims that the lowest infectious dose for BSE is only

0.001 gram and BSE was orally transmitted to an animal after consuming this minute amount

within a 68-month incubation period.17

This new scientific evidence belies the assumption within the Proposed Rule that the risk

of spreading BSE to cattle via the consumption of spilled poultry feed contained in poultry litter

poses "only a small baseline risk of BSE for ruminants."18 The evidence instead shows that

because the infectious dose is so minute, any direct pathway of BSE infectivity to cattle is

significant and must be mitigated.

6. The Proposed Rule is inadequate because it does not prohibit the feeding of

poultry litter containing spilled poultry feed infected with BSE to be lawfully fed

directly to U.S. cattle.

Given that the Canadian border was reopened in July 2005 to Canadian cattle that may

have been exposed to BSE-infected feed, and because the infectious dose is much lower than the

FDA originally believed, the Proposed Rule must be amended to block the direct pathways of

BSE infectivity from Canada by prohibiting the practice of feeding poultry litter to cattle and

prohibiting the use of tonsils and distal ileum from cattle of all ages in all animal feed.

7. The FDA's assumption that reducing 90 percent of infectivity by the removal of

only brains and spinal cords from animal feed does not adequately mitigate the

remaining risk associated with a direct pathway of BSE infectivity from poultry

feed to cattle.

Until and unless the FDA conducts scientific studies to determine that the actual

infectious dose for BSE from contaminated tissues, including but not limited to tonsils and distal

ileums, entering poultry feed is significantly less than that associated with the consumption of

brains and spinal cords, the FDA must not assume that poultry feed does not present a direct and

unacceptable pathway of BSE infectivity for the U.S. cattle herd.

16 Federal Register, Vol. 70, No. 193, October 6, 2005, at 58577.

17 See R-CALF USA v. USDA, CV-05060-BLG-RFC, Declaration of William D. Hueston, Guy H. Loneragan, and

Srinand Sreevatsan, at ¶ 10.4, Table 2, attached hereto as Attachment D.

18 Federal Register, Vol. 70, No. 193, October 6, 2005, at 58594.

6

C. The Proposed Rule Mistakenly Assumes, And Is Predicated On The Assumption,

That The United States Has Implemented A Scientifically Valid Surveillance

Program

That the decision by FDA not to prohibit all tissues known to harbor BSE infectivity

from all animal feed is dependent on the scientific validity of the current BSE surveillance

program is evidenced by the FDA's listing of U.S. surveillance results as one of four major

factors underpinning the Proposed Rule.19 However, the current U.S. surveillance program has

been audited by the USDA Office of Inspector General in 2004 and was found lacking in several

critical areas that severely undermine the scientific validity, and therefore the utility, of the

surveillance program for making decisions regarding additional measures needed to adequately

protect U.S. cattle, and by extension, consumers, from BSE.20

1. The Office of Inspector General (OIG) raised concerns regarding the

integrity of the surveillance data

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) concluded that the U.S. surveillance program

contained several limitations including that the surveillance program was not truly random

because participation in the program was voluntary and that APHIS's sampling plan assumes

BSE is confined to the high-risk cattle population while other studies show that healthy-looking

animals may also have BSE.21 The OIG also identified several challenges inherent to the

operations of the surveillance program as it conducted prior to June 2004 and stated that such

challenges still exist under the expanded program. These challenges include that cattle

condemned at slaughter plants for CNS symptoms were not always tested for BSE.22 Most

significantly, the OIG found that APHIS's sampling and collection processes raise questions

about the integrity of the surveillance data.23

2. The United States and Canada are the only BSE-affected countries in the

world that have not implemented a mandatory testing program, even for

high-risk animals

The United States' will continue to be challenged in its efforts to fully restore lost export

markets so long as the U.S. refuses to adopt internationally practiced and accepted testing

protocols for BSE.24 Further complicating this dilemma is that the U.S. continues to accept

Canadian cattle and beef produced under the least stringent BSE risk mitigation measures

recommended by the OIE, including a testing regime that does not comport to recommendations

19 Federal Register, Vol. 70, No. 193, October 6, 2005, at 58579.

20 See Audit Report, USDA Office of Inspector General, Great Plains Region, Report No. 50601-9-KC, August

2004, attached hereto as Attachment E.

21 Id. at i-ii.

22 Id. at ii.

23 Id. at 32.

24 John A. Fox, Hikaru Hanawa Peterson, Risks and Implications of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy for the

United States: Insights from Other Countries, Kansas State University, at 53 (All casualty animals over 24 months

tested for BSE in the European Union), at 54 (Japan BSE tests all slaughtered cattle for human consumption),

attached hereto as Attachment F.

7

for "Controlled BSE risk" countries as stated above. No other BSE-affected countries are

satisfied with these least stringent measures and have opted, instead, for the more stringent

measures in order to ensure the eventual eradication of BSE.25 The FDA governs the most

important control measure for preventing the amplification of BSE – an effective feed ban. Until

and unless the USDA begins implementing BSE risk mitigation measures comparable to those

implemented elsewhere in the world where BSE is known to exist, e.g., significantly increased

testing particularly for high-risk cattle and full SRM removal at 12 months of age, the FDA must

implement more stringent measures than are currently proposed in the Proposed Rule to ensure

that BSE can not spread if introduced into or present in the U.S. feed system.

D. The Proposed Rule Assumes The Existing Ruminant Feed Ban Has Provided Strong

Protection Against BSE Despite Findings By The Government Accountability Office

(GAO) That Compliance Was Uncertain Until Recently

In a report released in 2002, the General Accountability Office (formally General

Accounting Office) (GAO) stated that FDA did not take prompt enforcement action after the

1997 implementation of the existing U.S. feed ban to compel firms to comply with the feed

ban.26 The report indicates that although the FDA reported hundreds of firms out of compliance

prior to April 2001, FDA enforcement action was limited.27 The GAO found also that in light of

the long incubation period for BSE (up to 8 years) the possibility that some contaminated

animals or products have entered the United States cannot be ruled out.28

Based on these combined findings, the FDA should not assume that the feed ban has

provided adequate protection against the recycling of BSE within the U.S. feed system during the

early years of its implementation. Unfortunately, without significant improvements in USDA's

testing program as described above, there is insufficient scientific data to support a conclusion

that only limited tissues known to harbor BSE infectivity need to be excluded from the animal

feed supply.

Even the more recent GAO report published in 2005 stated that program weaknesses

continued to limit the effectiveness of the FDA feed ban.29 Moreover, the GAO found that

claims regarding a high level of compliance with the feed ban cannot be supported. The GAO

concluded in its study:

Given these [program] weaknesses and the fact that FDA does not include all

violations in its estimates, we believe FDA is overstating industry's compliance

with the animal feed ban and understating the potential risk of BSE for U.S. cattle

in its reports to Congress and the American people. Despite the problems in

FDA's calculation, some in the feed industry claim that overall compliance with

25 See Appendix 1.

26 Mad Cow Disease, Improvements in the Animal Feed Ban and Other Regulatory Areas Would Strengthen U.S.

Prevention Efforts, General Accounting Office, GAO-02-183, January 2002, at 23.

27 See Id. at 23-26.

28 Id. at 14.

29 Mad Cow Disease: FDA's Management of the Feed Ban has Improved but Oversight Weaknesses Continue to

Limit Program Effectiveness, GAO, GAO-05-101, February 2005. at 16.

8

the feed ban is nearly 100 percent—a claim that FDA's compliance information

does not support.30

The conclusion of the GAO belies the FDA's assumption that the existing ruminant feed

ban has provided adequate protection against BSE. When combined with the OIG's strong

critique against the validity of USDA's current testing program discussed above, three of the

four factors underpinning the FDA's decision to allow tissues known to harbor BSE into the

animal feed supply and to not require dedicated feed facilities are shown to be unjustified.31

Contrary to FDA's fourth listed factor underpinning the Proposed Rule, i.e., that the Proposed

Rule should be considered a "secondary level of protection," the evidence shows that

circumstances in the U.S. call for the implementation of the most robust and stringent feed ban

rules that will ensure that any undetected or underlying BSE infectivity, spread during the period

when mitigation measures were lacking, is completely arrested.

The relaxation of such robust and comprehensive feed ban measure should not be

considered until after a scientifically valid and internationally accepted surveillance program in

the United States, and in countries that export beef and cattle to the United States, demonstrates

that the BSE agent is no longer circulating in the animal feed chain.

E. Even With The Proposed Rule The United States Will Continue To Have An

Inferior Feed Ban When Compared To Countries That Have Proven Track Records

For Reducing The Spread Of BSE

The European experience provides the only empirical evidence of the effectiveness of

various BSE risk mitigation measures. Europe first implemented a ruminant-to-ruminant feed

ban comparable to the current U.S. feed ban in 1988.32 This early feed ban resulted in a 67

percent reduction of BSE cases in animals born in the first 12 months after the feed ban was

implemented.33 However, these results were considered inadequate and Europe upgraded its

feed ban in 1990 to exclude ruminant brain, spinal cord, thymus, tonsils, spleen, and intestines in

all animal feed (including pet feed).34 This upgrade further reduced the hazard of the disease for

cattle born in the first 12 months after its implementation by 46 percent.35 The Proposed Rule by

FDA is less restrictive than this early European upgrade. But by 1994, Europe reported almost

10,000 BSE cases born after the 1988 feed ban, suggesting serious problems with cross-

30 Id. at 30.

31 See Federal Register, Vol. 70, No. 193, October 6, 2005, at 58579.

32 John A. Fox, Hikaru Hanawa Peterson, Risks and Implications of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy for the

United States: Insights from Other Countries, Kansas State University, at 53, attached hereto as Attachment F; See

also Prince, M.J., et. al., Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, Revue Scientifique et Technique, OIE, 22(1), 37-60,

at 49.

33 Prince, M.J., et. al., Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, Revue Scientifique et Technique, OIE, 22(1), 37-60, at

49.

34 John A. Fox, Hikaru Hanawa Peterson, Risks and Implications of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy for the

United States: Insights from Other Countries, Kansas State University, at 48, attached hereto as Attachment F; See

also Prince, M.J., et. al., Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, Revue Scientifique et Technique, OIE, 22(1), 37-60,

at 49; See also Brown, Paul, et. al., Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease:

Background, Evolution, and Current Concerns, Emerging Infectious Diseases 7(1): 6-16 (2001).

35 Prince, M.J., et. al., Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, Revue Scientifique et Technique, OIE, 22(1), 37-60, at

49.

9

contamination both in feed mills and on farms.36 In response to the continuing epidemic Europe

upgraded its feed ban for the second time in 1994, expanding its feed ban to exclude all

mammalian protein in ruminant feed.37

From 1990 to 2004 Europe experienced 12,000 cases of BSE in cattle born after the 1990

ban on SRMs in all animal feed.38 In response to this disappointing result, Europe upgraded its

feed ban for a third time in 1996, prohibiting all mammalian meat-and-bone meal from all animal

feed and fertilizer.39 And Europe upgraded its feed ban for the fourth time in 2001 by expanding

the feed ban to include meat-and-bone meal and blood meal in feed for any farmed animal

species.40

In Great Britain, where the epidemic was known to be severe, the number of BSE cases

born during the year the 1st feed ban was implemented was 22,265.41 In 1990, the year of the 1st

feed ban upgrade, 5,745 BSE cases were born.42 In 1994, the year of the 2nd upgrade, 2,150 new

cases were born.43 In 1996, the year of the 3rd upgrade, only 65 new cases were born.44 In 2001,

the year of the 4th upgrade, only 2 new BSE cases are known to have been born.45

As revealed by the foregoing discussion, new cases of BSE continued to occur after the

implementation of the first European feed ban and after each of the four upgrades made over the

course of 13 years. The United States can either learn from the European experience by adopting

the most comprehensive measures arrived at by the application of the latest scientific evidence

and trial and error, or the United States can risk repeating the European experiment by basing

decisions on assumptions and wishful thinking, which could result in devastating consequences

for the U.S. cattle industry. R-CALF USA urges the FDA to proceed with an abundance of

caution by adopting a more comprehensive feed ban that is comparable to the feed ban now

practiced in Europe. Such a feed ban should remain in effect until FDA has sufficient

surveillance data to definitively determine whether the BSE case identified in the U.S. was

indeed a rare occurrence and whether the BSE epidemic in Canada, or in any other BSE-affected

country that imports cattle or beef into the United States, has subsided.

36 John A. Fox, Hikaru Hanawa Peterson, Risks and Implications of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy for the

United States: Insights from Other Countries, Kansas State University, at 50, attached hereto as Attachment F.

37 John A. Fox, Hikaru Hanawa Peterson, Risks and Implications of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy for the

United States: Insights from Other Countries, Kansas State University, at 50, attached hereto as Attachment F; see

also Brown, Paul, et. al., Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease: Background,

Evolution, and Current Concerns, Emerging Infectious Diseases 7(1): 6-16 (2001).

38 John A. Fox, Hikaru Hanawa Peterson, Risks and Implications of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy for the

United States: Insights from Other Countries, Kansas State University, at 50, attached hereto as Attachment F.

39 John A. Fox, Hikaru Hanawa Peterson, Risks and Implications of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy for the

United States: Insights from Other Countries, Kansas State University, at 50, attached hereto as Attachment F; see

also Brown, Paul, et. al., Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease: Background,

Evolution, and Current Concerns, Emerging Infectious Diseases 7(1): 6-16 (2001).

40 Ibid.

41 BSE: Statistics – Confirmed Cases of BSE Reported Worldwide, Year of Birth, DEFRA, available at

http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/statistics/bse/worldwide.htm, downloaded on December 19, 2005.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

10

F. The Proposed Rule Ignores The Most Recent Scientific Research On BSE That Has

Found Infectivity In Tissues Not Previously Known To Harbor The Disease

The underlying assumption of the Proposed Rule is that FDA knows which tissues harbor

BSE infectivity and at what levels. This assumption is no longer valid. Researchers in Germany

have now found additional peripheral nervous system tissues, including the facial nerve and the

sciatic nerve, which contain sufficient BSE infectivity to cause BSE infection.46 Before FDA

decides to ban only the limited high-risk tissues from animal feed that it is presently proposing it

should explain what additional mitigation measures are needed to reduce the risks that these new

tissues present if they are allowed to enter the feed system where they may be inadvertently fed

to cattle.

It is important to note that the German study involved a cow naturally infected with BSE

and various tissues of the infected cow were inoculated into transgenic mice. Thus, the outset of

BSE infectivity in the subject mice demonstrated that the infectivity originated from the various

tissues. In this study, the distal ileum, retina, optical nerve, facial nerve, and sciatic nerve, in

addition to the brain stem and spinal cord, of the naturally infected cow all demonstrated

infectivity.47 With this recent empirical evidence, it would not be prudent for FDA to allow the

distal ileum into the animal food chain.

According to a scientific abstract located on the website of the USDA-Food and Safety

Inspection Service (FSIS), the recent finding of BSE infectivity in peripheral nerves by German

researchers has been corroborated by researchers in Japan.48 The abstract points out that because

detailed PrPSc distribution is obscure in BSE-infected cattle, the researchers set out to reassess

the definitions of SRMs. Their findings included the detection of BSE in tissues previously

known to harbor BSE and in previously unknown tissues including the sciatic nerve, tibial nerve,

and vagus nerve.49

The FDA states that it does not have evidence that BSE is transmitted to cattle via blood

or blood products.50 However, a recent scientific research paper published in August 2005

reveals how nascent the research surrounding BSE infectivity in blood has been by the

announcement of the scientific advancement of biochemically detecting prions in blood for the

first time.51 The researchers, from the U.S. (University of Texas) and Spain (Madrid) stated:

We are currently studying the detection of prions in blood from infected animals

during the presymptomatic phase as well as detection of PrPSc [prions] in plasma

46 See Anne Buschmann and Martin H. Gruschup, Highly Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy–Sensitive Transgenic

Mice Confirm the Essential Restriction of Infectivity to the Nervous System in Clinically Diseased Cattle, The

Journal of Infectious Diseases, 192:934-42, September 1, 2005, Attached hereto as Attachment G.

47 Id. at 938.

48 See Abstract from the Priori Disease Research Center, National Institute of Animal Health, available at

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf, downloaded on December 20, 2005.

49 Ibid.

50 Federal Register, Vol. 70, No. 193, October 6, 2005, at 58596.

51 Joaquin Castilla et al., Detection of Prions in Blood, Nature Medicine, doi:10.1038/nm1286, August 28, 2005,

Attached hereto as Attachment H.

11

and other blood fractions. The implementation of a similar blood-detection

procedure for human and cattle samples will undoubtedly contribute to

minimizing the risk of infection . . . and will have a tremendous impact on the

beef industry. . ."52

Given the seriousness of this disease, i.e., it is incurable and always fatal, and based on

this latest scientific discovery, the FDA should at least act with reasonable caution by instituting

the reasonable safety measure of banning blood from cattle feed as is the current practice in both

Europe53 and Japan.54

G. The Proposed Rule Continues to Ignore The Recommendations Of BSE Experts

Regarding Appropriate Measures The United States Must Implement To Provide

Adequate Protection Against The Potential Spread Of BSE

1. The Proposed Rule dismisses and ignores key recommendations made by

Canada's expert international team which included a BSE expert from the

USDA.

In response to its 2003 BSE case, Canada convened an "expert international team

comprised of distinguished representatives from three continents."55 Members of the team

included Prof. Kihm, Switzerland, Prof. W. Hueston, USA, and Dr. D. Heim, Switzerland. This

expert international team of scientists specifically recommended the following measures after

Canada had detected only one indigenous case of BSE:

a. "Measures to ensure that SRM are not included in human food and animal feed should

be implemented, enforced and audited for compliance." (Emphasis in original.)56

b. "The review team strongly endorses the exclusion of Specified Risk Materials from the

feed chain as an effective means to reduce infectivity in meat and bone meal (MBM).

The difficulty in distinguishing ruminant derived MBM from other mammalian and

poultry derived MBM must be considered. Inclusion of any ruminant-derived MBM in

ruminant feed rations should be avoided and opportunities for possible cross

contamination eliminated. Whether this can be guaranteed by introduction of a

mammalian MBM ban to ruminants or other specific measures has to be evaluated."57

52 Joaquin Castilla et al., Detection of Prions in Blood, Nature Medicine, doi:10.1038/nm1286, August 28, 2005, at

3, Attached hereto as Attachment H.

53 Consolidated Text, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, CONSLEG: 2001/R0999 –

01/07/2004, at 27, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/consleg/pdf/2001/en_2001R0999_do_001.pdf.

54 APHIS' Consideration of Japan in Light of the World Organization for Animal Health's (OIE) Guidelines,

Veterinary Services, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA, at 16.

55 Narrative Background to Canada's Assessment of and Response to the BSE Occurrence in Alberta, Canadian

Food Inspection Agency, July 2003, at 11, available at

http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/heasan/disemala/bseesb/evale.shtml, downloaded on December 20, 2005.

56 Report on Actions Taken by Canada in Response to the Confirmation of an Indigenous Case of BSE, Canadian

Food Inspection Agency, at 5, available at

http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/heasan/disemala/bseesb/internate.shtml, downloaded on December 20,

2005.

57 Ibid.

12

Canada did not follow the scientific advice of its international review team. As a result,

the BSE risk in Canada was not adequately or mitigated in a timely manner and the BSE agent

may be continually recycling in Canada, through and among the deficiencies identified by the

experts. Notwithstanding Canada's inadequate response to these scientific recommendations, the

U.S. has assumed the greater risk associated with Canada's failure to implement needed

measures by resuming imports of Canadian cattle and beef. This circumstance involving

increased BSE risk from Canada necessitates a far more aggressive BSE defense than is

proposed in the Proposed Rule. The United States has been dilatory in not responding in a

timelier manner to the increased risks associated with Canada's unwillingness to adopt needed

measures.

2. The FDA did not timely respond to recommendations made by the United

States Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (TSE) Working Group

and the Proposed Rule further ignores the recommendations made by this

group of experts.

In response to the May 2003 detection of a BSE-infected cow in Canada, the United

State's TSE Working Group was convened to make recommendations regarding appropriate

measures to protect the U.S. against this new BSE threat. The TSE Working Group issued a

report in June 2003 that recommended that significant trade in Canadian Commodities should

not resume until "an assessment is completed to determine whether the BSE risk mitigation steps

applied by Canada are sufficient. These should include: SRM removal from human and animal

food [and] [d]edicated rendering facilities and mills for processing of ruminant byproducts."58 In

addition, the TSE Working Group made the following recommendations regarding specific

measures needed to improve the feed bans in both the United States and in Canada:

a. The TSE Working Group recommended that significant trade in Canadian commodities

should not resume until "[a]dditional BSE risk mitigation steps are put in place in the US

to address the handling of waste from edible product and from the byproducts from

slaughter animals imported from Canadian [sic] including:

• SRM removal from human and animal food

• Dedicated rendering facilities and mills for processing of ruminant products

• Elimination of the U.S. plate waste exemption by FDA or APHIS."59

b. The TSE Working Group additionally recommended that FDA strengthen the U.S. feed

ban to include:

1. "Dedicated facilities both for rendering and feed mills. Do not allow flushing as a

means of separating ruminant and non-ruminant products,

2. remove plate waste and blood exemptions,

3. Prohibit poultry litter in ruminant feed."60

58 Recommendations of APHIS TSE Working Group for allowing certain commodities from Canada to be imported

into the United States, June 16, 2003, at 2, attached hereto as Attachment I.

59 Ibid.

13

c. The TSE Working Group also urged the FDA to take actions to prohibit the feeding of

distressed pet food to cattle, "and require labeling to state that the product should not be

fed to ruminants given that the highest risk segment of the cattle population (dead and

down dairy cattle) is being used in pet food."61

d. The TSE Working Group recommended that Canada be required to remove SRMs

(defined as the brain, spinal cord, intestine, eyes, and tonsils from cattle of all ages) from

human food.62

e. The TSE Working Group recommended that only beef from cattle slaughtered before

reaching the age of 24 months, and which have had their brain, spinal cord, tonsil, eyes,

and intestines removed, should be eligible for importation to the United States.63

f. Cognizant of the potential ramifications resulting from the resumption of trade with a

country with BSE, the TSE Working Group recommended that USDA complete an

assessment of trade impacts with the rest of the world before resuming trade with

Canada.64

Neither the USDA nor the FDA heeded the aforementioned, specific advice of the BSE

experts that comprise the TSE Working Group. As a result, for over two years the known risk of

BSE has not been adequately mitigated either in Canada or in the United States. This failure to

adequately mitigate the known BSE risk while simultaneously subjecting the U.S. to even greater

risk by resuming imports of beef and cattle has contributed to the United State's inability to fully

restore lost export markets. The Japan government, for example, had submitted official

comments to USDA calling for the segregation of U.S. beef and cattle from Canadian beef and

cattle as well as calling upon the U.S. to not establish a "lower level of requirement" than that

established in the OIE Code.65

Largely the result of its failure to heed this important advice from its own scientists, the

USDA now finds itself in the unenviable position of trying to convince U.S. export countries that

they should accept the BSE measures the USDA Final Rule imposed on Canada, which measures

are far more lenient than the measures applied by every other BSE-affected country in the world.

Because the FDA did not timely respond to the increased risk associated with Canada's

2003 detection of BSE, the potential pathways of BSE infectivity that the TSE Working Group

attempted to address have remained unabated, allowing for the potential amplification of BSE. It

is, therefore, necessary to immediately strengthen the FDA feed ban to ensure completely that all

60 Recommendations of APHIS TSE Working Group for allowing certain commodities from Canada to be imported

into the United States, June 16, 2003, at 2, attached hereto as Attachment I.

61 Ibid.

62 Id. at 7.

63 Id. at 8.

64 Id. at 2.

65 Comments of Government of Japan on Amendments by the Department of Agriculture of the United States Under

Parts 93, 94, and 95 and notified in WTO Notification G/SPS/N/USA828, dated 11 November 3003 (Docket No. 03-

080-1), December 26, 2003.

14

tissues presently known or suspected to harbor BSE infectivity are excluded from the animal

feed chain.

4. The Proposed Rule dismisses and ignores key scientific recommendations made

by the United States' International Review Team, which again included a USDA

BSE expert, after a Canadian cow with BSE was detected in the United States

Convened by the Secretary of Agriculture to review the response to the detection of a

BSE case discovered in an imported Canadian cow in December 2003, the Foreign Animal and

Poultry Disease Advisory Committee's Subcommittee (International Review Team or IRT) was

asked to review, among other things, the response actions taken by the United States to the BSE

case detected in an imported Canadian cow, and to provide recommendations in the areas of

SRM removal, slaughter methods, surveillance design and approaches, feed restrictions, feed

manufacturing and sales, traceability enhancements, and other areas which could provide

meaningful additional public or animal health benefits in light of the "North American"

experience. The IRT team consisted of Prof. U.Kihm (Switzerland), Prof. W. Hueston (USA),

Dr. D. Matthews (UK), Prof. S.C. MacDiarmid (New Zealand), and Dr. D. Heim (Switzerland).66

This esteemed collection of scientists, most with first-hand experience in managing the

BSE epidemic in the U.K and Europe, recommended a number of key science-based risk

mitigation measures that the Proposed Rule either ignores or only partially implements. These

science-based measures include:

a. The IRT urged USDA to give "strong consideration" to the removal of SRMs from both

the human food and animal feed supplies.67

b. The IRT recommended that SRMs including brain, spinal cord, skull, vertebral column

from cattle over 12 months of age and the intestine (from pylorus to anus) from cattle of

all ages be removed "unless aggressive surveillance proves the BSE risk in the USA to be

minimal according to OIE standards." The IRT made its recommendation for a 12-month

cut-off in "recognition of the fact that some cattle under 30 months of age may be

slaughtered with infectivity present in the tissues described above [SRM tissues,

including vertebral column].68 Even for Canada, where limited testing produced 4 cases

of BSE within a two-year period, the USDA Final Rule uses a 30-month cut-off for the

removal of all tissues except the tonsils and small intestines. This is over twice the age

limit recommended by the IRT. Moreover, the 30-month cut-off reflects a dismissal of

the scientific determination that infectivity may be present in cattle under 30 months of

age.

66 Report on Measures Relating to Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in the United States, February 2,

2004, at 1, attached hereto as Attachment J.

67 Id. at 5.

68 Ibid.

15

c. The IRT emphatically recommended that all SRM "must be excluded from all animal

feed, including pet food."69

d. The IRT stated the "partial (ruminant to ruminant) feed ban that is currently in place is

insufficient to prevent exposure of cattle to the BSE agent" because it doesn't address the

dangers highlighted in Europe from accidental exposure by cattle to prohibited feed. The

IRT stated it was "virtually impossible" to prevent cross contamination of unauthorized

feed given the small dose of infected tissue required to infect cattle with BSE.

Furthermore, the scientists cautioned, allowing protein from porcine or avian intestines,

as both the U.S. and Canadian feed bans do, presents a risk from unauthorized protein

that may remain in the digestive tracts of such animals and birds at slaughter.70

AR008029. Again, the USDA did not heed this scientific advice.

e. The IRT signified the importance of strengthening the feed ban by separately reiterating

its recommendation that the current feed ban be extended to exclude all mammalian and

poultry protein from all ruminant feeds, "and that this ban as well as measures to prevent

cross contamination be strongly enforced."71 AR008030.

CONCLUSION

Neither the USDA nor the FDA have timely implemented the aforementioned

recommendations made by leading U.S. and international scientists. As a result, the numerous

pathways of BSE infectivity mentioned above have remained unabated. This has increased,

rather than decreased the United States risk of BSE, particularly given that the U.S. has now

resumed imports of cattle and cattle products from countries with an inherently greater risk for

BSE. This has also exacerbated efforts to restore lost U.S. export markets.

The solution is to immediately correct the known deficiencies of the United States' BSE

protection program. The FDA controls the single most important factor in preventing the spread

and amplification of BSE – an effectively enforced feed ban. R-CALF USA urges the FDA to

adopt far more comprehensive measures to strengthen the feed ban than those proposed in the

Proposed Rule. R-CALF USA recommends the adoption of the measures listed above and

recommended by U.S. and international scientists, along with the OIE.

Specifically, R-CALF USA urges the adoption of the following measures:

1. Prohibit all SRMs in all animal feed with SRMs defined as brains, eyes, skull,

spinal cord, trigeminal ganglia, vertebral column (excluding the vertebrae of

the tail, the transverse processes of the thoracic and lumbar vertebrae, and the

wings of the sacrum) and dorsal root ganglia of all cattle over 12 months of

age and the tonsils and entire intestine (from pylorus to anus) of cattle

regardless of age.

69 Report on Measures Relating to Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in the United States, February 2,

2004, at 8, attached hereto as Attachment J.

70 Id. at 8.

71 Id. at 9.

16

2. Prohibit all mammalian protein and mammalian byproducts in ruminant feed

including poultry litter, plate waste, and blood.

3. Require facilities that manufacture ruminant feed to maintain dedicated

facilities.

As stated previously, these measures are now necessary because of the known

deficiencies in the enforcement and effectiveness of the existing feed ban, the delay in

implementation of any additional measures designed to address the spread of BSE after the risk

became known in 2003, the acceptance of additional BSE risks associated with accepting cattle

and beef products from a country where the scope of the risk is not scientifically known, and the

need to comport with the OIE recommendations that are applied and practiced elsewhere in the

world.

These more stringent measures would need to remain in effect at least until the USDA

improves its BSE surveillance program to a level that would allow for a scientifically valid and

internationally accepted determination of the current status of the BSE epidemic in the United

States and within any country that exports cattle and cattle products to the United States.

Sincerely,

Bill Bullard

CEO


==================================

==================================


Appendix I

BSE Affected

Countries

Removal of at least

brain, skull,

vertebral column,

etc.

Testing High-risk

Cattle (Downers,

etc.)

Testing at Normal

Slaughter

Meat and Bone

Meal (MBM) Ban

Ruminant

Blood in

Ruminant

Feed

EU > 12 months > 24 months > 30 months

(> 24 for Germany)

All animal feed No

Japan All cattle All cattle All cattle All animal feed No

Canada > 30 months Limited testing

> 30 months

None Ruminant feed

only

Allowed


====================

TSS


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