mrj said:
poor flounder, as a worrying mom/grandma type person, I'm truly sorry you have so much time to spend on promoting your theories on this website....and however many others you frequent. And sorrier still that you put so much faith into this particular conspiracy type theory of USDA hiding the possibility of BSE in our cattle. You may not know that the cattle industry, animal health organizations, and USDA among others, in the USA was very early in working to PREVENT an outbreak in the USA by killing and disposing of all cattle imported from BSE prone countries well before the problem became widespread. Some other countries were not so successful as the US was. Other means were established to find and remove any cattle found with BSE from our herds and tissue established as possible source of contamination from our food supply very early in the situation. Considering the number of cases in the history of BSE/CJD with the populations of those many years in all countries involved in any way, there seems LOGICALLY to be far more danger of death in this world from falling planets, IMO.
Sandhusker, we both may live to see the day when "hormone free beef" is mandated......unfortunately! Just how can cattle live without the natural hormones their bodies produce, anyway???
mrj
mrj, i am sure many mothers, and grandmothers are worried for their children. and they should be. thanks to the USDA NSLP, our children all across the Nation were fed dead stock downer cows for 4 years. fathers should be worried too. how will watch our children for cjd for the next 5 decades. the usda? the nslp?
http://www.fns.usda.gov/fns/safety/pdf/Hallmark-Westland_byState.pdf
In the papers, the government alleges the meatpacking plant slaughtered and processed downer cows for nearly four years — from January 2004 to September 2007 — at the average rate of one every six weeks...
http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2009/09/suit-meatpacker-used-downer-cows-for-4.html
PLEASE SEE ALSO ;
Members of The HSUS are also concerned about the meat products provided to their children through the National School Lunch Program. More than 31 million school children receive lunches through the program each school day. To assist states in providing healthful, low-cost or free meals, USDA provides states with various commodities including ground beef.
As evidenced by the HallmarkNVestland investigation and recall, the potential for downed animals to make their way into the National School Lunch Program is neither speculative nor hypothetical.
http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/cases/FDA/hsus-v-schafer-usda-complaint.pdf
i see no conspiracy theories here mrj, just the plain old truth.
let's take another look at the USA BSE GBR risk assessment, for those that might have forgot. i have cut this short so old hopalong can sleep better ;
Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk (GBR) of the USA Question number: EFSA-Q-2003-083
Adopted: 1 July 2004
Summary
The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.
The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge in the early nineties.
A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90's when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.
EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753812_1211902594180.htm
Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 3, 1-17 on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk of USA - 1 - European Food Safety Authority Scientific Expert Working Group on GBR Working Group Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2004
Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 3, 1-17 on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk of USA - 7 - 2.3
Overall assessment of the external challenge
The level of the external challenge that has to be met by the BSE/cattle system is estimated according to the guidance given by the SSC in its final opinion on the GBR of July 2000 (as updated in January 2002). Live cattle imports: In total the country imported 2038 (other sources) or 1128 (CD) live cattle from BSE risk countries other than Canada, of which 327 (other sources) or 323 (CD) came from the UK. From Canada the imports were >500,000 animals per year. The numbers shown in table 1 are the raw import figures and are not reflecting the adjusted imports for the assessment of the external challenge. Broken down to 5 year periods the resulting external challenge is as given in table 3. This assessment takes into account the different aspects discussed above that allow to assume that certain imported cattle did not enter the domestic BSE-cattle system, i.e. were not rendered into feed. In the case of the USA, all the animals for which tracing information showed that they were not rendered were excluded from the external challenge.
MBM imports:
In total the country imported 689 tons MBM (CD) or 2,230 tons MBM (other sources) from BSE risk countries other than Canada, of which 5 tons (CD) or 101 tons (other sources) were exported from the UK (UK export data). From Canada, the imports were about 30 000 tons per year. The numbers shown in table 2 are the raw import figures and are not reflecting the adjusted imports for the assessment of the external challenge. Broken down to 5 year periods the resulting external challenge is as given in table 3. This assessment takes into account the different aspects discussed above that allow to assume that certain imported MBM did not enter the domestic BSE/cattle system or did not represent an external challenge for other reasons. As it was illegal to export mammalian MBM from UK since 27/03/1996, exports indicated after that date should only have included non-mammalian MBM. In the case of the USA imported MBM from UK in 1989 and between 1997 and 1999 was not taken into account.
Feeding Use of MBM in cattle feed • Until 1997 ruminant MBM (RMBM) could legally be included in cattle feed and was indeed commonly fed to cattle of different age and type. Prior to the feed ban the US authorities estimated that 10% of all MBM would deliberately have been fed to cattle. Feed bans • A ban to feed (several types of) MMBM to ruminants was put in place in August 1997. Derogation from the ban was granted for pure porcine and equine protein (MBM) coming from designated (single species) rendering plants. This MMBM might still be fed to cattle. Therefore this feed ban is a ruminant to ruminant ban. • It is planned to prohibit the use of all mammalian and poultry protein in ruminant feed and prohibiting materials from non-ambulatory disabled cattle and dead stock from use in all animal feed.
Conclusion on the ability to avoid recycling
• Before 1997, US system would not have been able to avoid recycling of the BSEagent to any measurable extent. If the BSE-agent was introduced into the feed chain, it could have reached cattle.
• After the introduction of the 1997 ban in August 1997, the ability to avoid recycling of BSE-infectivity was somewhat improved. However, the rendering of ruminant material (including SRM and fallen stock) is inadequate (non pressurized), and cross-contamination potentials of cattle feed with other feeds remain.
• Therefore, the system is still unable to avoid recycling of BSE-infectivity if already present in the system or incoming.
Feeding
Until August 1997, RMBM was legally fed to cattle. Feeding was therefore "not OK". In August 1997 an RMBM-ban was introduced but feeding of non-ruminant MBM to cattle remained legal as well as feeding of RMBM to non-ruminant animals (farm animals and pets). An RMBM ban is difficult to maintain, as only labels can distinguish the various MMBMs. This makes control of the feed ban very difficult because analytical differentiation between ruminant and non-ruminant MBM is difficult if not impossible.
Due to the highly specialised production system in the USA, various mammalian MBM streams can be separated. Such a feed ban would therefore be assessed as "reasonably OK", for all regions where this highly specialised system exists. However, several areas in the USA do have mixed farming and mixed feed mills, and in such regions an RMBM ban would not suffice. Additionally, official controls for cattle feeds to control for compliance with the ban started in 2002. Thus, for the whole country, the assessment of the feeding after 1997 remains "not OK", but improving.
Rendering
The rendering industry is operating with processes that are not known to reduce
infectivity. It is therefore concluded that rendering was and is "not OK".
SRM-removal
SRM were and are still rendered for feed, as are (parts of) the fallen stock. SRMremoval
is therefore regarded as "not OK".
BSE-surveillance
Before 1989, the ability of the system to identify (and eliminate) BSE-cases was
limited. Since 1990 this ability is improved, thanks to a specific (passive) BSE
surveillance. The initiated introduction of active surveillance in risk populations
should improve the system significantly.
On the basis of the available information, it has to be concluded that the country's
BSE/cattle system was extremely unstable until today, i.e., it would have recycled and
amplified BSE-infectivity very fast, should it have entered the system. The stability of
the BSE/cattle system in the USA overtime is as given in table 4.
The present assessment modifies the stability assessment of the previous GBR report
in 2000 mainly due to a different perception of the impact of BSE surveillance on
stability and of the efficiency of the RMBM feed ban.
Interaction of stability and external challenge in the USA
Period Stability External Challenge Internal challenge
1980 to
1985
1986 to
1990
Moderate Possibly present
1991 to 1995
Very high
1996 to
2000
2001 to
2003
Extremely unstable Extremely high Likely to be present and growing
5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK
5.1 The current GBR as function of the past stability and challenge
• The current geographical BSE risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is likely but not
confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the
BSE-agent.
Note1: It is also worth noting that the current GBR conclusions are not dependent on
the large exchange of imports between USA and Canada. External challenge due to
exports to the USA from European countries varied from moderate to high. These
challenges indicate that it was likely that BSE infectivity was introduced into the
North American continent.
snip...please see full text ;
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/scdocs/doc/3rax1.pdf
HOWEVER, my files show 44 tons of greaves for USA. ...TSS
Subject: Re: exports from the U.K. of it's MBM to U.S.???
From: S.J.Pearsall@esg.maff.gsi.gov.uk.
Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2000 14:03:16 +0000
To: flounder@wt.net (Receipt Notification Requested) (Non Receipt Notification Requested)
Terry Meat and bonemeal is not specifically classified for overseas trade purposes. The nearest equivalent is listed as flours and meals of meat or offals (including tankage), unfit for human consumption; greaves.
UK exports of this to the US are listed below:
Country Tonnes
1980
1981 12
1982
1983
1984 10
1985 2
1986
1987
1988
1989 20
1990
Data for exports between 1975 and 1979 are not readily available. These can be obtained (at a charge) from data retailers appointed by HM Customs and Excise: BTSL (Tel: 01372 463121) or Abacus (01245 252222).
Best wishes Simon Pearsall
Overseas trade statistics Stats (C&F)C
====================================== END...TSS
BANNED SUSPECT MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE 2006-2007, SOME 10 YEARS AFTER THE INFAMOUS PARTIAL AND VOLUNTARY MAD COW FEED BAN or August 4, 1997, that was nothing more than ink on paper, so really, there was no BSE triple fire wall at all, and this was improving ???
*** BANNED MAD COW FEED IN THE USA IN COMMERCE TONS AND TONS
THIS is just ONE month report, of TWO recalls of prohibited banned MBM, which is illegal, mixed with 85% blood meal, which is still legal, but yet we know the TSE/BSE agent will transmit blood. we have this l-BSE in North America that is much more virulent and there is much concern with blood issue and l-BSE as there is with nvCJD in humans. some are even starting to be concerned with sporadic CJD and blood, and there are studies showing transmission there as well. ... this is one month recall page, where 10 MILLION POUNDS OF BANNED MAD COW FEED WENT OUT INTO COMMERCE, TO BE FED OUT. very little of the product that reaches commerce is ever returned via recall, very, very little. this was 2007, TEN YEARS AFTER THE AUGUST 4, 1997, PARTIAL AND VOLUNTARY MAD COW FEED BAN IN THE USA, that was nothing but ink on paper. i have listed the tonnage of mad cow feed that was in ALABAMA in one of the links too, this is where the infamous g-h-BSEalabama case was, a genetic relation matching the new sporadic CJD in the USA. seems this saga just keeps getting better and better.......$$$
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007
CODE
Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
42,090 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
WI
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007
CODE
The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
9,997,976 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm
see Alabama banned suspect mad cow feed in commerce ;
Saturday, August 14, 2010
BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY
*** (see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)
BANNED MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE IN ALABAMA
Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST PRODUCT
a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6;
b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6;
c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6;
d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6.
CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 477.72 tons
DISTRIBUTION AL
______________________________
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00968.html
PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes,
Recall # V-120-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 350 tons
DISTRIBUTION AL and MS
______________________________
PRODUCT
a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6;
b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6;
c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6;
d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6;
e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-125-6;
f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-126-6;
g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6
CODE All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,541-50 lb bags
DISTRIBUTION AL, GA, MS, and TN
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2006/ENF00964.html
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006
Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST PRODUCT
a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;
b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6;
c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;
d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6;
e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6;
f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;
g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6;
h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6;
i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6;
j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;
k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6;
l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6;
m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6 CODE
Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.
REASON Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 tons
DISTRIBUTION AL and FL
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html
MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE
Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22 71.248.128.67
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II
______________________________
PRODUCT
a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6;
b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6;
c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6;
d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 CODE
a) Bulk
b) None
c) Bulk
d) Bulk
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons
DISTRIBUTION Nationwide
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00960.html
please see full text ;
http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/bse-case-associated-with-prion-protein.html
Tuesday, March 2, 2010
Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed/Adulterated/Misbranded Rangen Inc 2/11/10 USA
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/animal-proteins-prohibited-in-ruminant.html
Monday, March 1, 2010
ANIMAL PROTEIN I.E. MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE A REVIEW 2010
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/animal-protien-ie-mad-cow-feed-in.html
Tuesday, September 14, 2010
Feed Safety and BSE/Ruminant Feed Ban Support Project (U18)
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/09/feed-safety-and-bseruminant-feed-ban.html
Friday, October 8, 2010
Scientific reasons for a feed ban of meat-and-bone meal, applicable to all farmed animals including cattle, pigs, poultry, farmed fish and pet food
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/10/scientific-reasons-for-feed-ban-of-meat.html
P.9.21
Molecular characterization of BSE in Canada
Jianmin Yang1, Sandor Dudas2, Catherine Graham2, Markus Czub3, Tim McAllister1, Stefanie Czub1 1Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Research Centre, Canada; 2National and OIE BSE Reference Laboratory, Canada; 3University of Calgary, Canada
Background: Three BSE types (classical and two atypical) have been identified on the basis of molecular characteristics of the misfolded protein associated with the disease. To date, each of these three types have been detected in Canadian cattle.
Objectives: This study was conducted to further characterize the 16 Canadian BSE cases based on the biochemical properties of there associated PrPres. Methods: Immuno-reactivity, molecular weight, glycoform profiles and relative proteinase K sensitivity of the PrPres from each of the 16 confirmed Canadian BSE cases was determined using modified Western blot analysis.
Results: Fourteen of the 16 Canadian BSE cases were C type, 1 was H type and 1 was L type. The Canadian H and L-type BSE cases exhibited size shifts and changes in glycosylation similar to other atypical BSE cases. PK digestion under mild and stringent conditions revealed a reduced protease resistance of the atypical cases compared to the C-type cases. N terminal- specific antibodies bound to PrPres from H type but not from C or L type. The C-terminal-specific antibodies resulted in a shift in the glycoform profile and detected a fourth band in the Canadian H-type BSE.
Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada.
*** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.
http://www.prion2009.com/sites/default/files/Prion2009_Book_of_Abstracts.pdf
Saturday, November 6, 2010
TAFS1 Position Paper on Position Paper on Relaxation of the Feed Ban in the EU Berne, 2010 TAFS
INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL DISEASES AND FOOD SAFETY a non-profit Swiss Foundation
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/11/tafs1-position-paper-on-position-paper.html
Archive Number 20101206.4364 Published Date 06-DEC-2010 Subject PRO/AH/EDR> Prion disease update 2010 (11)
PRION DISEASE UPDATE 2010 (11)
http://www.promedmail.org/pls/apex/f?p=2400:1001:5492868805159684::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,86129
Saturday, June 19, 2010 U.S.
DENIED UPGRADED BSE STATUS FROM OIE
http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/06/us-denied-upgraded-bse-status-from-oie.html
2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html
now there mrj, you want to talk conspiracy theories about BSE, lets take a look shall we ;
PLEASE NOTE *
Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME.
snip...
The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle...
http://web.archive.org/web/20030516051623/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf
Monday, May 19, 2008
SPORADIC CJD IN FARMERS, FARMERS WIVES, FROM FARMS WITH BSE HERD AND ABATTOIRS
http://web.archive.org/web/20030326145325/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1995/06/21002001.pdf
http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080102141357/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1995/10/00003001.pdf
restricted policy 4th farmer with mad cow disease, yet documented as sporadic CJD.
http://web.archive.org/web/20030331213802/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1995/10/23006001.pdf
http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20081106124255/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1995/11/03008001.pdf
http://web.archive.org/web/20030516181226/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1995/01/31004001.pdf
http://bseinquiry.blogspot.com/2008/05/sporadic-cjd-in-farmers-farmers-wives.html
no need to start ringing bells
http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20090506055019/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1989/10/13007001.pdf
http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20090114073403/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1989/10/13003001.pdf
sporadic cjd in farmers and farmers wives with BSE mad cow herds
http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/06/novel-human-disease-with-abnormal-prion.html
BSE SCIENTIST WAS 'CENSORED'
He says that when he worked at MAFF, ''the way it was structurally set up was not that science would drive the politics, but that the politics will drive the science. And that's wrong.''
http://web.archive.org/web/20030526121511/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1997/12/11001001.pdf
Richard Horton Waffles on Lancet's Wakefield Retraction
Sally Beck Posted: February 12, 2010 03:00 PM
The Lancet has officially retracted a study which sparked a health scare over the MMR vaccine. The leading British medical journal said that it accepts that claims made by Dr. Andrew Wakefield and two fellow researchers were 'false.'
SNIP...
The paper was peer reviewed and duly published back in early 1998. The researchers included a line stating that eight of the parents felt the MMR vaccine had played a part in their children's decline. Horton knew this was controversial but published anyway. He said: "We felt it was important not to censor the information. We had censored information regarding BSE (Bovine spongiform encephalopathy, known as mad cow disease) and CJD (Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, the human form of BSE). We knew there was a risk that BSE could be transferred from cows to humans, but at the time we thought the risk was small so we didn't include the information. It was a big mistake and we should have published it."
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sally-beck/richard-horton-waffles-on_b_460550.html
8. I was in receipt of no extra funds beyond those provided by the NHS and the University of London to run my laboratories and pay my salary as a senior lecturer/honorary Consultant and I suffered no constraints over my publications, lectures to my students, or statements to the media. However, I became increasingly aware after 1988 that questioning official dogma about BSE brought difficulties to one's career. I was myself about to retire from the Charing Cross Hospital, where I worked as a Consultant Neuropathologist, but I observed with horror that the good reputations of dissenting scientists in the field, not least Dr Stephen Dealler and especially Dr Harash Narang were systematically undermined.
http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080102135133/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s410.pdf
THEY KNEW 2 DECADES AGO the damn BSE mad cow testing were not finding cases ;
NEW BRAIN DISORDER
3. WHAT ABOUT REPORTS OF NEW FORM OF BSE?
THE VETERINARY RECORD HAS PUBLISHED AN ARTICLE ON A NEW BRAIN DISORDER OF CATTLE DISCOVERED THROUGH OUR CONTROL MEASURES FOR BSE. ALTHOUGH IT PRESENTS SIMILAR CLINICAL SIGNS TO BSE THERE ARE MAJOR DIFFERENCES IN THE HISTOPATHOLOGY AND INCUBATION PERIODS BETWEEN THE TWO. MUST EMPHASISE THAT THIS IS NOT BSE.
4. IS THIS NEW BRAIN DISORDER A THREAT?
WE DO NOT EVEN KNOW WHETHER THE AGENT OF THIS DISEASE IS TRANSMISSIBLE. IN ANY CASE, CASES SO FAR IDENTIFIED HAD SHOWN SIMILAR SYMPTOMS TO THOSE OF BSE, AND THEREFORE HAVE BEEN SLAUGHTERED AND INCINERATED, SO THAT IF A TRANSMISSIBLE AGENT WERE INVOLVED IT WOULD HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED. .......
http://web.archive.org/web/20030714222309/www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1992/10/26001001.pdf
BSE-NON-CONFIRMATION OF DISEASE
3. A question posed by Mr Whaley (para 2) is that classical lesions of BSE may not occur in all cases. Supposing we had a strain variant that produced it's lesions in the cerebrum these would not be detected by our current method. I think this would be unlikely but not impossible - another reason why at least a proportion of complete brains (or blocks) should be retained during the epidemic so if the problem Mr Whaley indicates escalates, it can be investigated.
snip...
5. IF you had the information what benefit would there be ? what would you do with it ?
CONCLUSION
I do not recommend any action. The situation should be accepted. I do not think the VIS can do more at present. The situation should be kept under review particularly if there is an escalation in numbers in this category.
R BRADLEY
15 MAY 1990
90/5.15/3.2
http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20090505194948/http://bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/05/15003001.pdf
http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20090505194948/http://bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/05/15003001.pdf
Tuesday, November 17, 2009
SEAC NEW RESULTS ON IDIOPATHIC BRAINSTEM NEURONAL CHROMATOLYSIS (IBNC) FROM THE VETERINARY LABORATORIES AGENCY (VLA) SEAC 103/1
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/11/seac-new-results-on-idiopathic.html
NEW RESULTS ON IDIOPATHIC BRAINSTEM NEURONAL CHROMATOLYSIS "All of the 15 cattle tested showed that the brains had abnormally accumulated PrP" 2009
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/02/new-results-on-idiopathic-brainstem.html
2. The Collinge/Will dispute appears to rumble on. Dr. Collinge had told Dr. Tyrrell that Dr. Will's response to his criticism about sharing material had been ''quite unacceptable'' (in spite of it's apparently conciliatory tone). Apparently Professor Allen was now going to try and arrange a meeting to resolve the dispute. No action here for MAFF, although Mr. Murray may be interested.
3. Dr. Tyrrell regretted that the Committee had not seen the article on BBD. However he felt that for the time being NO specific action was called for. The most important need was to consider the possibility that the condition might be transmissible. As we have discussed, I suggested that we might circulate a paper to the members of the committee giving our appreciation of this condition (and perhaps of other non-BSE neurological conditions that had been identified in negative cases) and of any necessary follow up action. IF any Committee member felt strongly about this, or if the issue CAME TO A HEAD, we would call an interim meeting. He was happy with this approach. I would be grateful if Mr. Maslin could, in discussion with CVL and veterinary colleagues draft such a note, which will presumably very largely follow what Mr. Bradley's briefing paper has already said, taking account of DOH comments, We can then clear a final version with DOH before circulating it to Committee members.
http://web.archive.org/web/20030714222309/www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1992/10/29005001.pdf
IN CONFIDENCE
This is a highly competitive field and it really will be a pity if we allow many of the key findings to be published by overseas groups while we are unable to pursue our research findings because of this disagreement, which I hope we can make every effort to solve.
http://web.archive.org/web/20030714222309/www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1992/10/26002001.pdf
COLLINGE THREATENS TO GO TO MEDIA
http://web.archive.org/web/20030714222309/www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1992/12/16005001.pdf
Wednesday, August 20, 2008
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Mad Cow Disease typical and atypical strains, was there a cover-up ? August 20, 2008
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/08/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-mad.html
Suppressed peer review of Harvard study October 31, 2002.
October 31, 2002 Review of the Evaluation of the Potential for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in the United States Conducted by the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, Harvard School of Public Health and Center for Computational Epidemiology, College of Veterinary Medicine, Tuskegee University Final Report Prepared for U.S. Department of Agriculture Food Safety and Inspection Service Office of Public Health and Science Prepared by RTI Health, Social, and Economics Research Research Triangle Park, NC 27709 RTI Project Number 07182.024
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/oa/topics/BSE_Peer_Review.pdf
Sunday, February 14, 2010
[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/02/docket-no-fsis-2006-0011-fsis-harvard.html
PLEASE SEE FULL TEXT 98 PAGES HERE ;
[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf
Response to Public Comments on the Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
Update, October 31, 2005 INTRODUCTION The United States Department of Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) held a public meeting on July 25, 2006 in Washington, D.C. to present findings from the Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Update, October 31, 2005 (report and model located on the FSIS website: http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Science/Risk_Assessments/index.asp).
Comments on technical aspects of the risk assessment were then submitted to FSIS. Comments were received from Food and Water Watch, Food Animal Concerns Trust (FACT), Farm Sanctuary, R-CALF USA, Linda A Detwiler, and Terry S. Singeltary. This document provides itemized replies to the public comments received on the 2005 updated Harvard BSE risk assessment. Please bear the following points in mind:
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/BSE_Risk_Assess_Response_Public_Comments.pdf
another famous conspiracy here, or what i like to call 'false flag'.
you can call it what you want.
but please explain to me why it took 10 years to finally get the truth via FOIA ?
Thursday, April 24, 2008
RE-FOIA OF DECLARATION OF EXTRAORDINARY EMERGENCY BECAUSE OF AN ATYPICAL T.S.E. OF FOREIGN ORIGIN IN THE UNITED STATES [Docket No. 00-072-1]
http://foiamadsheepmadrivervalley.blogspot.com/2008/04/re-foia-of-declaration-of-extraordinary.html
http://foiamadsheepmadrivervalley.blogspot.com/
Saturday, February 27, 2010
FINAL REPORT OF THE TESTING OF THE BELGIAN (VERMONT) SHEEP February 27, 2010 Veterinary Laboratories Agency - Weybridge New Haw, Addlestone, Surrey KT15 3NB United Kingdom Telephone +44 (0)1932 341111 Facsimile +44 (0)1932 347046 ' Web site http://www.vla.gov.uk
http://foiamadsheepmadrivervalley.blogspot.com/2010/02/final-report-of-testing-of-belgian.html
THOSE sheep were TSE free.
who's kidding whom here mrj $$$
so, it's June 2011, and where do we stand today mrj ???
Monday, May 23, 2011
Atypical Prion Diseases in Humans and Animals 2011
Top Curr Chem (2011)
DOI: 10.1007/128_2011_161
# Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011
Michael A. Tranulis, Sylvie L. Benestad, Thierry Baron, and Hans Kretzschmar
Abstract
Although prion diseases, such as Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease (CJD) in humans and scrapie in sheep, have long been recognized, our understanding of their epidemiology and pathogenesis is still in its early stages. Progress is hampered by the lengthy incubation periods and the lack of effective ways of monitoring and characterizing these agents. Protease-resistant conformers of the prion protein (PrP), known as the "scrapie form" (PrPSc), are used as disease markers, and for taxonomic purposes, in correlation with clinical, pathological, and genetic data. In humans, prion diseases can arise sporadically (sCJD) or genetically (gCJD and others), caused by mutations in the PrP-gene (PRNP), or as a foodborne infection, with the agent of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) causing variant CJD (vCJD). Person-to-person spread of human prion disease has only been known to occur following cannibalism (kuru disease in Papua New Guinea) or through medical or surgical treatment (iatrogenic CJD, iCJD). In contrast, scrapie in small ruminants and chronic wasting disease (CWD) in cervids behave as infectious diseases within these species. Recently, however, so-called atypical forms of prion diseases have been discovered in sheep (atypical/Nor98 scrapie) and in cattle, BSE-H and BSE-L. These maladies resemble sporadic or genetic human prion diseases and might be their animal equivalents. This hypothesis also raises the significant public health question of possible epidemiological links between these diseases and their counterparts in humans.
M.A. Tranulis (*)
Norwegian School of Veterinary Science, Oslo, Norway
e-mail: Michael.Tranulis@nvh.no.
S.L. Benestad
Norwegian Veterinary Institute, Oslo, Norway
T. Baron
Agence Nationale de Se´curite´ Sanitaire, ANSES, Lyon, France
H. Kretzschmar
Ludwig–Maximilians University of Munich, Munich, Germany
Keywords Animal Atypical Atypical/Nor98 scrapie BSE-H BSE-L Human Prion disease Prion strain Prion type
http://resources.metapress.com/pdf-preview.axd?code=f433r34h34ugg617&size=largest
snip...SEE MORE HERE ;
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/05/atypical-prion-diseases-in-humans-and.html
i could go on, but i promised hopalong i would keep it short...
kind regards, terry