5 Min. with Thornsberry

[Sandhusker]

Chuck Jolley: Five Minutes With Max Thornsberry, DVM



I stole this introduction from the internet. So sue me. It's a great description of the man.



Max Thornsberry, DVM, MBA, Richland, Missouri: Thornsberry is a past president of Missouri Stockgrower's Association and Missouri Cattlemen's Association and is the Region VI Director for R-CALF USA; he is licensed to practice veterinary medicine in Kansas, Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, and Nebraska. Thornsberry owns TNT Cattle Company, a certified feeder calf preconditioning enterprise and Avanco Feeds, a veterinary and nutrition company serving the beef, dairy, swine and companion animal owners of central Missouri.



It makes Dr. Thornsberry a very busy man.



So in his spare time, he decided to get even more deeply involved with R-Calf. In an era when super-achievers often go 24/7/365, he's kicked it up a notch - - - to 24/8/365. As an incoming Vice President – he assumes his new duties at the R-CALF convention in Denver in less than two weeks - he'll have at least a second and maybe even a third full-time job on his hands.



He comes from a long line of cattlemen and he's damn proud of his heritage. Maybe that's the reason behind that big bush of a mustache that would make him look at home in a Civil War era Matthew Brady daguerreotype with a six gun strapped to his hip. It's definitely the reason he's so completely involved in the politics of cattle raising in America.

We spent five minutes with him between the holidays.



How did you get involved in the cattle business?



My ancestors were pioneer settlers of central Missouri, coming to Camden County in the 1830s. I live in the same county, and my father lives on the same farm that my great-grandfather homesteaded immediately after completing his service with the Union Cavalry. My grandfather bought local feeder cattle, fed them out on corn silage and cottonseed meal, and shipped fat cattle to St. Louis by rail. I have a letter he wrote in the 1920s to a Missouri congressman concerning the Packers and Stockyard Act. Our family has always been involved in cattle production, and the politics of grassroots agriculture. I continue the tradition. I have owned cattle since I was 9 years old.



What do you do in your free time?



I am a Deacon at Cornerstone Baptist Church in Richland, Missouri. I participate in the shooting sports, pistol and rifle. I have very little "free time."



You made a pre-CAFTA fact-finding tour of Central America. What did you see and what effects do you think the CAFTA agreement will have on the participating countries?



I visited Costa Rica, Honduras, and Nicaragua in June of 2005. In no case did we find any U.S. beef, poultry, or pork sold in any of these countries. Because of the BSE issue in Canada, and the lax policy of the USDA towards BSE, all of these countries prohibited importation of meat, and in some cases, fish, from the United States.



The local Spanish and Latin culture desires lean, grass-fed beef. There is no demand for corn-fed beef in any of these countries, outside of a few upper scale restaurants and hotels. Even in restaurants that advertised "imported beef," it was discovered the beef was grass-fed from Australia. In one packing plant in Honduras, we were told that fat trimmings were allowed to be imported. These fat trimmings were then mixed with local very lean ground beef for export to fast food restaurants in Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic.



Basically, the CAFTA agreement will be good for Central American corporations that sell meat items. It will eventually harm cull cow, canner, and cull bull prices in the United States. There is no recourse should these countries dump increasingly larger amounts of lean red beef into our country. I did discover that each of these countries is rapidly expanding their beef production systems in anticipation of free access to our U.S. marketplace, while prohibiting U.S. access to their respective marketplaces.



CAFTA will not benefit grassroots beef producers in the United States, unless hundreds of years of cultural desire for grass-fed lean beef can be altered. I doubt it will!



You own TNT Cattle Company, which is a feeder calf preconditioning business, and AvanCo Feeds, a veterinary and nutrition company. It is a unique position that lets you look at the cattle business from two perspectives. What have you learned in the last 10 years?



That the U.S. market is the best market for our beef producers. We have determined that without our major export markets, demand for our beef is greatest, and best, in the USA. We should focus on positioning our beef as the safest, tastiest, cleanest, most nutritious beef in the world. Without the tools to identify our superior product in the marketplace, we are just selling a commodity.



We have proven in this expanding economy that U.S. citizens prefer our domestic product, and they are willing to pay prices that will allow us to remain economically solvent. Producers will buy feed, supplies, tractors, pickup trucks, medicine, vaccines, feed bunks, feed storage units, and much more if they are making a profit. In the last three years, with better beef prices, we have seen an infusion of capital into our local economies that rivals the 1950s. That is what I have learned.



The Japanese have conditionally reopened their markets to North American beef. What does that really mean to the average cattleman?



Anytime a market expands, producers should benefit. In the past, prices to Japan were much higher than domestic beef, but producers realized very little of that price differential. I seriously doubt if grassroots producers will directly benefit from the Japanese market this time, either.



Local market outlets for very high quality beef could pass on some of that price differential to local cattle feeders. What is really sad about all this concerns the Japanese request for testing of animals for BSE. The U.S. could have sold all the beef it wanted to Japan immediately after the Canadian cow was discovered in Washington state, if the USDA had allowed packers to simply perform a BSE screening test (ELISA) followed by a confirmatory Western Blot test, costing about $30 to $40 per carcass for the Japanese market place. Japan has been performing such tests on all beef carcasses in its own country, and has identified 21 cases of BSE, thereby preventing the movement of BSE-contaminated beef to the consuming public.



The economics are there. A $30 - $40 test to generate a $300 to $400 return for each carcass does not require a degree in agriculture economics to realize the potential profit to the industry. The U.S. could have had the Japanese market back much sooner. The market we now have is quite limited by comparison, and we have not yet regained the Japanese consumers' confidence.



The USDA has told us they cannot abide by two classes of cattle, those tested negative for BSE and those not tested. That argument holds no merit, since we have USDA approved and sanctioned Brucellosis Certified Free Herds, Tuberculosis Certified Free Herds, Bovine Virus Diarrhea Free Herds, etc., marketed on the basis of cattle testing negative for those respective diseases.



Let's talk about COOL. The cost of implementing it has been pegged at somewhere between $2 billion and $9 billion – a staggering figure even at the low end. What marketplace advantages does it bring, and is it worth the cost?



First, let me say that I believe the cost estimates are exaggerated. Our country performs a country-of-origin labeling program each and every day for our public schools. Meat cannot be served in public schools unless it is of U.S. origin, and proven so. A similar system would work quite well for the U.S. cattle production system. I find it ironic that the same USDA that adamantly refuses to implement COOL has determined to electronically identify each and every animal in the U.S., the cost to be borne by the individual beef producer. Talk about a staggering cost!



While visiting Central America, I found that each country I visited had mandatory COOL implemented at the meat counter. Consumers could choose meat from a variety of countries, except no meat that originated from the United States was allowed in any of the countries I visited. If the poorest countries in the Western Hemisphere can implement mandatory Country-of-Origin Labeling at their meat counters, why can't the richest country in the Western Hemisphere do the same?



There are consumers in the United States that simply don't care where their food originates. Surveys conducted over the last 10 years do indicate that a vast majority of food consumers want the right to know where their food originated. These surveys are well documented. Opponents say if consumers wanted COOL, they would demand it themselves. How is that to work? How does a consumer of beef demand COOL? Most consumers already believe whenever they purchase USDA inspected meat, the meat originates from the United States. If only they knew!



The real issue here is market position. Meat packers and meat purveyors desire to keep beef a commodity item. They want to identify their products with product identifying marks and labels, but they do not want to have to identify U.S. beef any differently than Canadian, Mexican, or beef from any of the approximately 40 different beef-exporting nations. It is to their benefit to keep beef a generic item.



It is the grassroots producers' aim to position U.S. beef in the marketplace as being a superior product. U.S. beef is safe, wholesome, and has no antibiotic residues. U.S. beef is raised, fed, processed, and marketed under the most strict hygiene rules in the world. Should we not draw attention to our superior product? That is the real issue, not what COOL will cost to implement.



Thousands of cattlemen and women read Cattlenetwork.com. What would you like to say to them?



First and foremost, we are the last bastion of grassroots free enterprise animal production agriculture left in the United States. We have sat idly by while other well established traditional animal production systems have been fully integrated and centrally incorporated. If we are not careful, the same thing will happen to beef production.



To keep beef production free of corporate takeover, it is important that producers join up with organizations that speak for them and them alone. R-CALF USA is the only national cattle producer organization that is entirely grassroots in its origin and intent. To be a voting member of R-CALF, you must own cattle and be involved in the day-to-day business of cattle production. R-CALF represents those producers that have calluses on their hands, and dirt under their fingernails.



I would say to your readers, send a check for $50.00 to R-CALF USA. It will be the best money you will ever spend to promote your industry and protect your future livelihood. Get involved. If you don't, someone else will!

 

[Anonymous]

MT: "Our country performs a country-of-origin labeling program each and every day for our public schools. Meat cannot be served in public schools unless it is of U.S. origin, and proven so."

"M"COOL is not comparable to the school lunch program. An animal that is born in Canada, fed in the United States, and slaughtered in the United States is eligible for the school lunch program. In comparison, "M"COOL demands proof of where cattle were born, raised, and slaughtered.

More R-CALF deception or ignorance, take your pick.


MT: "Meat packers and meat purveyors desire to keep beef a commodity item."

Isn't that interesting? In the next breath they will claim that packers are pushing for source verification. Which way is it?


Sending money to R-CALF is the worst money you could spend. They haven't won a court case yet.



~SH~

 

[Sandhusker]

You want to show us where R-CALF said the packers are pushing for source verification?

 

[Anonymous]

Sand: "You want to show us where R-CALF said the packers are pushing for source verification?"

So you can split the hair between "OFFICIAL R-CALF POSITIONS" and "CONFLICTING STATEMENTS MADE BY R-CALF REPRESENTATIVES"?

Do you honestly think I am going to fall for your stupid little game of qualifying every statement I make when you qualify nothing?

Are you suggesting that no R-CALF representative ever stated that the packers are pushing for source verification?

Yes or No?



~SH~

 

[Sandhusker]

You want to show us where R-CALF said the packers are pushing for source verification?

 

[Anonymous]

Are you suggesting an R-CALF representative has never sad that the packers are pushing for source verification?

Yes or no?


~SH~

 

[Sandhusker]

Are you suggesting an R-CALF representative has never sad that the packers are pushing for source verification?

Yes or no?


~SH~

You want to show us where R-CALF said the packers are pushing for source verification?

 

[Anonymous]

Are you suggesting an R-CALF representative has never sad that the packers are pushing for source verification?

Yes or no?

What's wrong Sandbag? Afraid to committ again?


~SH~

 

[Sandhusker]

Are you suggesting an R-CALF representative has never sad that the packers are pushing for source verification?

Yes or no?

What's wrong Sandbag? Afraid to committ again?


~SH~

I believe my question was in the hopper first. Afraid to back your statements with facts?

 

[flounder]

R. M. Thornsberry, D.V.M., M.B.A.





Perplexed by the USDA



I am perplexed by the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). At Cattlemen's Day, in Billings, Montana, on November 13, 2004, Dr. Jose Diez, Director Western Region, Veterinary Services, made a presentation to the Montana Cattlemen's Association concerning the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE-Mad Cow Disease) situation in the United States and Canada. Dr. Diez told the large group of cattlemen, cattlewomen, press, including press from Japan, and four practicing veterinarians, that the USDA was pursuing a "Risk Based Trade" with Canada.



This Risk Based Trade is actually an attempt to negotiate down guidelines set in place by the Office of International Epizootics (OIE). The OIE is an international group of scientists and veterinarians that set guidelines and regulations that attempt to control and limit the spread of diseases that could potentially spread from animals to humans. The OIE has very specific guidelines concerning countries that have had BSE identified within their borders. Countries that have identified natural cases of BSE, but have not completed at least 7 years of Risk Assessment, are classified as BSE Moderate Risk Countries. Since BSE is a disease with an extremely long incubation period, the 7-year waiting period is utilized to protect a BSE free country from receiving animals from a known infected country that could be harboring the disease. Potentially infected cattle could be exhibiting no symptoms of BSE, but could be incubating the disease while shedding the infective agent.



The OIE issued these complex guidelines in response to a severe outbreak of BSE in Europe, which resulted in the death or destruction of several million head of cattle. The object of the OIE guidelines is to contain the prions that cause BSE in a known geographical location and prevent their contamination to areas known to be free of BSE, while establishing guidelines for future trade in live cattle and beef. Canada is a country with five known cases of BSE: One case in the early 1990's, one case in May 2003, and one case in December 2003. Two more cases have been identified in 2004 and early 2005. Although the number of known cases is small, Canada is classified as a BSE infected country, either with Moderate or High Risk. Prions that cause BSE have potentially contaminated areas of the country of Canada. These prions probably made their way to Canada in cattle imported from Europe in the 1980's and early 1990's. Several head of cattle were imported into Canada during the hottest period of the European BSE epidemic. Fortunately, the United States did not import many cattle from Europe. The United States was capable of identifying the few head that were imported from Europe and destroyed those cattle quickly or studied them until their natural death. Canada has a much closer trading relationship with Europe, and as a result, has reaped the harvest.



Knowing all this, the USDA has taken a leading role in discussions with other countries to lower the standards of classification for medium and low risk BSE infected countries. In other words, instead of following closely the guidelines and regulations that have kept BSE out of the United States in the past, the USDA has proposed a new set of guidelines that would shorten the BSE code allowing three new classifications, based on what they term as acceptable risk. The process is designed to allow Canadian beef and live cattle into the United States without satisfying the 7-year waiting period. The USDA has determined that the risk of spreading BSE to the United States is minimal. In addition, the USDA has determined that the risk of spreading BSE into the United States is acceptable. This means they recognize the possibility of spreading BSE into the United States exists, but they believe the USDA proposed rules for dealing with Specified Risk Materials, such as bovine meat and bone meal, will contain it.



If this disease were Brucellosis, Tuberculosis, or Foot and Mouth Disease, the USDA would require several years of negative tests before allowing cattle into the US from Canada. Even within the United States itself, a state cannot be considered Brucellosis free until it has satisfied a rigorous series of tests, and several years of no reported cases. If Brucellosis was known to exist in a state, cattle would have to be tested negative before interstate movement would be allowed. In most cases, another test would be required on live animals 60 to 90 days later, and then again at 1 year. In the case of BSE and Canada, the USDA wants to reclassify Canada as a country with Proposed Negligible BSE Risk or Proposed Controlled BSE Risk. This decision is based on Canada's proposed control program. Remember that Canada discovered a case of BSE in a cow in May of 2003. After convincing the USDA that control measures were adequate, the USDA reopened trade in beef with Canada. Then another case was identified in a Canadian cow in December of 2003, which had been exported into the State of Washington. When this second case in 2003 was discovered, the USDA was supposed to shut off all beef trade with Canada until new trading rules had been established. They failed to do so.



Surveillance is an important measure for determining if a particular disease contaminates a given population of cattle. The United States has tested nearly 130,000 cattle since January 1, 2004 for BSE, and has plans to test over 200,000 higher risk animals. No positive cases have been identified. During the same time period, Canada has tested less than 10,000 head of high-risk cattle. Several countries have pressured Canada to step up surveillance. Only recently has Canada issued press releases stating the country intends to step up surveillance in 2005. In those press releases, the Canadian Agricultural officials state they expect to find more cases of BSE in Canada. If that is the case, why would the USDA be attempting to get the border open and risk contamination of US soil with BSE prions? Even if a natural case of BSE was identified within the borders of the Untied States, why would the USDA be willing to allow additional cases to enter the US from Canada? Let's put out one fire at a time, thank you.



The prions that cause BSE are basically indestructible. Research has determined that Scrapie prions buried for three years are still capable of causing disease when injected into laboratory animals. Cattle with BSE could potentially shed prions in their feces, nasal discharges, saliva, and reproductive discharges. Mirror image diseases, like Scrapie in sheep and goats and Chronic Wasting Disease in deer and elk, have been identified to spread prions to negative sheep, goats, deer, and elk by these bodily discharges. These prions could contaminate soil in paddocks, lots, feeding pens, and pastures. In Europe, it has been demonstrated that less than one intake of 10 milligrams of neural tissue can spread Mad Cow Disease from one animal to another. That is why keeping meat and bone meal out of cattle diets is so very important. Prions are ingested and replicate in lymphatic tissues in the intestinal tract before making their way to the central nervous system. There they cause the destruction of brain tissue, which results in the typical symptoms of Mad Cow Disease. The truly scary thing about all this is new variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (nvCJD). The prions that cause BSE are the same prions that cause nvCJD. Although the most common mode of infection is oral ingestion of contaminated beef or beef byproducts, prions in the environment are considered biological hazards by many governments and research facilities. Patients that ingest BSE prions and develop nvCJD die a horrible death. There is no treatment for BSE or nvCJD. Dr. Stanley Prusiner, the medical researcher who discovered and identified the structure of BSE prions, has told the USDA that any exposure to BSE prions is potentially dangerous. Although consumers cannot consume enough prions to cause BSE, the prions they do consume may trigger an irreversible conversion process that converts normal cellular prions into the prions that cause nvCJD. Dr. Prusiner does not know how many exposures it takes to cause this conversion process, but some individuals with a particular genetic code are known to be extremely susceptible to developing nvCJD.



It is the mandate of USDA APHIS to protect the health of cattle and livestock within the borders of the United States. It is not their mandate to lower the standards so Canada may export cattle into the US. If this was any other disease that had three cases identified within the last 10 years, one case less than 12 months ago, the USDA would not consider allowing possibly infected cattle to cross the border into the United States. As a veterinarian I have been trained to assist the USDA in maintaining the health of the US cattle population. I have been accredited by APHIS to assist in disease control, cattle testing, and containment of disease outbreaks. I would have never guessed that USDA APHIS would be considering "Risk Based Trade". The risk is there, and it is not acceptable. The answer to the Canadian BSE problem cannot be found by potentially spreading the disease into the United States. Let's solve this disease problem in one country at a time.



Researchers are feverishly working to develop a live animal test to identify cattle carrying BSE prions. Why not wait a few months, or even a few years, until this test is available? Once Canada has performed the proper surveillance and satisfied OIE guidelines, then test each animal being imported. If the animal is negative, permanently identify the animal when it enters the US, and continue surveillance until the animal dies or is slaughtered. This method would reduce the risk of introduction of BSE prions into the United States to a minimum. At the least, proper identification would allow for trace back, slaughter of exposed animals, and control of a potentially dangerous disease.



In Europe and Japan, BSE is being identified in younger and younger animals. Mad Cow Disease prions apparently become more virulent when they are passed down to successive generations. Countries all over Europe are currently identifying new cases of BSE, even though those countries have not fed any meat and bone meal since the early 1990's. Early cases were identified in older animals. Presently, 2 or 3 generations removed, cases are being identified in animals less than 2 years of age. At least one case has even been identified in an animal less than one year of age. This phenomenon is consistent with what researchers have discovered about BSE in laboratory animals. As the disease is transferred down several generations, the incubation period becomes shorter.



No one has given an acceptable explanation as to how cattle are being exposed to BSE prions in countries where the feeding of meat and bone meal has been outlawed for over 15 years!!! The unfortunate victims of BSE are coming into contact with the prions somewhere. Knowing the fact that prions are indestructible, knowing the fact that prions may seed down the environment, knowing there is no method of satisfactory disinfection for BSE prions, and knowing there is no treatment for animals that contract BSE, why would the USDA consider allowing such a horrendous disease to enter the United States of America? The real answer will surprise you:



1) The USDA subscribes to the idea that BSE can arise in a particular population of cattle spontaneously. In other words, the USDA believes BSE may, in fact, already infect cattle in the United States through the process of spontaneous generation of the abnormal prions that cause BSE. I have heard with my own ears this theory espoused by a USDA veterinarian at the January 2003 annual Kansas Cattlemen's Association convention at Dodge City, Kansas. This USDA veterinarian even expressed his view that the US may have exported BSE to Canada in the early 1990's with the exportation of US meat and bone meal to the Canadian feed industry.

2) The USDA has determined that the US beef cattle industry is part of a North American system. Beef cattle in Canada, the United States, and Mexico are all part of one big integrated system. Chandler Keys, a National Cattlemen's Association spokesman has stated this concept in this manner, and I quote, "It's a good lesson for all of us," said Keys. "We've got to strive to work together. We're a North American system." The last time I looked, no Canadian has offered to pay my income taxes, property taxes, or veterinary inspection fees. When I called the Canadian Embassy and asked about exporting cattle from Missouri to Alberta, I was told Canada would not accept cattle from Missouri because of the possibility of Missouri cattle being infected with Blue Tongue and Anaplasmosis. So much for a North American cattle industry.

3) The USDA is convinced that by boning out meat and removing certain Specified Risk Materials (brain, spinal chord, lymph nodes, ileum, etc), the risk of spreading BSE prions is minimal. This may well be an acceptable method to reduce spread of BSE prions associated with raw meat, but what about live cattle? Live cattle harboring BSE prions, like live deer and elk that harbor Chronic Wasting Disease prions, shed BSE prions into their environment and may take months or years to actually die of this dread disease. Italy, England, Ireland, and Spain all have discovered many new cases of BSE in live cattle during this past year. They have had control measures in place since the late 1980's and early 1990's. Japan continues to discover new cases of BSE in younger and younger animals. We cannot afford to have consumer confidence in beef potentially undermined by continually finding new, and unexplained, cases of BSE in the United States.



As a practicing veterinarian who has taken an oath to protect the health of humans and the animals that feed, clothe, and provide emotional comfort for humans, I am disturbed that the agency charged with protecting the United States cattle industry seems to have their judgment swayed by free trade issues. In the past, both Canada and the United States have maintained the hard line of no trade in beef with any country that has identified a case of Mad Cow Disease, even to the point of prohibiting importation of embryo's or semen from a country with a known natural case of BSE. This hard line of defense has kept BSE out of the United States. I cannot understand why this line of defense, which has served the United States so well, should be relaxed before a live animal test has been developed to identify BSE positive cattle. Relaxing such standards may result in the same circumstances that Europe and Japan find themselves in currently. I have just attended a day-long seminar on Epizootic Diseases conducted by the USDA and the Missouri Department of Agriculture and the Missouri Department of Health. Mad Cow Disease has been identified as a political disease. Where countries with Foot and Mouth Disease virus cases are prevented to trade with the United States, countries with Mad Cow Disease (BSE) will be allowed to trade with the United States. Canada is not the only BSE positive country that wants to trade with the United States. When this Pandora's Box is opened, the United States will be required to receive beef and live animals from any BSE positive country that has satisfied the new OIE qualifications. Basically, any country that can prove it has developed a satisfactory BSE control program will be allowed to export beef into the United States.



I know that I am not the only perplexed practicing veterinarian in the United States. Our education and training have not prepared us to understand a political disease. Canada has been forbidden to trade beef with most of her former trading partners except Mexico. There is no doubt that Canada has suffered immensely because of BSE. Because the USDA APHIS failed to announce that the positive cow in December 2003 was a Canadian cow, all of the US trading partners have forbidden beef trade. By not announcing that fact immediately, our trading partners consolidated their resistance to trade with the United States. That trade has not resumed, and opening the border to a know BSE infected country will not improve those severed trade relationships. Thus, the desire by the USDA to reclassify OIE guidelines, and reclassify Canada as a Moderate to Minimal Risk BSE country. Go figure!!!



=============================================



Preposterous



I believe that Secretary of Agriculture, Mike Johanns, is making a mistake that could be detrimental to cattle producers and beef consumers. The USDA wants the border with Canada open. It appears they will compromise all the past history of the Animal Plant Health Inspection Service to open the border with a known BSE infected country, no matter what the consequences to consumers and the beef cattle production system in the United States. Any country that has identified cases of BSE has suffered immensely. The presence of BSE in a given country decreases consumer confidence, causes disruption of export markets, and generally sows discord among the cattle production system of that specific country and its trading partners.



In Japan, the first case of BSE caused a 50 percent reduction in beef consumption, almost over night. By assuring consumers that no meat would be allowed into the system from animals that were not tested for BSE, or were of a specific age limit, the Japanese have recovered consumer confidence. They gained back that confidence by testing all animals at slaughter for BSE. The system worked, and the Japanese have identified many cases of BSE in cattle before the meat from those animals was allowed into the beef consumption system. By performing this testing, the Japanese have discovered a number of cases of BSE in their cattle population, with some cases identified to be under 30 months of age.



The Japanese have told the USDA that they will resume trade in beef with this country if we will only test the beef animals at slaughter, and like the Japanese system of testing, assure the Japanese consumers the meat originates from an animal that has tested free of BSE disease causing prions. That test is available. That test is accurate and can detect infectivity months before an animal begins exhibiting symptoms of BSE. That test costs less than $30.00 per animal tested. That test is utilized in many countries in Europe to assure consumers the beef they consume is safe. The USDA has refused to allow the use of the diagnostic test by any entity other than itself. Creekstone Farms, a high quality Certified Angus Beef purveyor, has told the USDA they will pay for the testing themselves, they will take the samples, they will submit the samples, they will manage the data, and they will provide the funds for all the costs of testing. To date, the USDA refuses to allow diagnostic testing for BSE at slaughter. The question is, why?



The USDA, the National Cattleman's Beef Association, and specifically, Secretary Mike Johanns, continues to tell Americans that BSE does not occur in animals under 30 months of age. That is a false statement!!! Research into the records of countries around the world that have the misfortune of identifying cases of BSE in their native cattle, reveals 88 cases in cattle that were 30 months of age or younger. In addition to the two recently diagnosed Japanese cases of BSE, Germany discovered two cases of BSE in cattle less than 30 months of age in 2001. While it is true that BSE is primarily a disease of older cattle, it is by no means correct to state that BSE does not occur in cattle younger than 30 months of age. It is disturbing to me, as a practicing veterinarian, that the USDA and other notable industry representatives like the National Cattleman's Beef Association, would continue to mislead the public and cattle producers by stating that BSE does not occur in cattle under 30 months of age. The known facts state otherwise.



There are those in the industry that believe it is time to negotiate with the USDA and compromise on the border issue. I do not believe any negotiating with the USDA is appropriate at this time. What would we negotiate? The USDA has gone blindly down the path of free trade and is willing to compromise our beef herd's health, our beef herd's economics, and the health of our human population by opening the border with a known BSE infected country before a live animal test is in place. I can think of no disease that veterinary specialists have eradicated successfully within the United States that was eradicated without a specific live animal test. It is true that specific risk mitigation procedures assist in eradication of diseases. Those risk mitigation procedures for BSE have been in place in Europe since 1998. In 2004, over 300 cases of BSE were identified in Great Britain alone. Obviously, risk mitigation procedures alone cannot eradicate a given disease condition in a given geographical area. This particularly applies to a disease like BSE, where the infective prion agent is nearly indestructible. The USDA knows that point quite well. I say again, what would the beef cattle industry compromise that the USDA has not already compromised to secure their free trade principles?



To eradicate a specific disease in a specific animal population, a live animal diagnostic test is important. The live animal test does not replace or supercede risk mitigation procedures, such as preventing the feeding of ruminant derived meat and bone meal to ruminant animals, but it does work hand in hand with those, and other, risk mitigation procedures to determine the disease dynamics in a given population of at-risk animals. There are presently three laboratories working on a live animal test, including Dr. Stanley Pruisner's laboratory in California. It is Dr. Pruisner's laboratory that discovered the actual agent that causes BSE, a misshapen protein called a prion. Dr. Pruisner's people tell me a live animal test is close. We have an acceptable filter for blood to filter out prions in blood transfusions. How long can it be before we can test for the prions on that filter? Surveillance is a very important part of any epidemiological system, but without a live animal test, disease eradication is much more difficult. Once the live animal test is available, the issue of animal import into the United States becomes simpler. In any disease condition, two live animal tests are usually required, at a predetermined time period, before that animal or group of animals is regarded as disease free. At the least, a live animal test would allow government agencies to identify those herds that are currently infected. Although a live animal test is not the only determining factor in disease eradication, it certainly assists in speeding up the process.



In a submission to the Food and Drug Administration on August 13, 2004, a group of three scientists that study Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy diseases, like BSE in cattle, Scrapie in sheep and goats, and Chronic Wasting Disease in deer and elk, have made the following statement on page 2 of that submission, and I quote: "…we do not see how this can be accomplished credibly without universal testing. Without sound data on the actual prevalence of the infection it will not be possible to track the effectiveness of any control measures that are implemented." I agree fully with this statement.



The FDA has prohibitions in place to prevent any person that has lived or spent considerable time in a BSE infected country, from giving blood. Blood transfusions are known to have spread the disease in two cases in Europe, yet, the USDA wants to allow Canadian animals under 30 months of age to cross the border, be slaughtered in US plants, allow their blood to go into our blood meal and meat and bone meal, and allow our citizens to consume the beef from those animals without any kind of diagnostic testing, either before or after slaughter. That is a paradox of standards. There are 88 known cases of BSE diagnosed in cattle 30 months of age and younger, world wide. The USDA wants to allow cattle 30 months of age and younger, from a country known to be infected with BSE, to enter our meat production system without any form of diagnostic testing. I find that preposterous!!!



I also find it preposterous that notable livestock and farm organizations are rabidly calling on our government to open the border with a known BSE infected country before a means to identify BSE positive animals is available. It is known to countries that have already experienced nearly a decade of BSE, that cattle can carry the infective agent that causes BSE before that animal exhibits symptoms of the disease to the point a veterinarian might suspect the animal was infected. That simply means, that without a live animal diagnostic test, potentially BSE infected animals, even those under 30 months of age, could enter our meat production system, appear perfectly normal, but in the process of slaughtering and processing, spread the infective prions into the meat slaughter facility.



With testing, it would be possible to identify the positive animals before the carcass was processed, thus preventing the hypothetical situation discussed previously. The USDA's primary responsibility is to protect the health and well being of the human population of this great country. Its second primary responsibility is to protect the health and well being of the animal population of this great country. Advocating for the opening of the border with a known BSE infected country without a diagnostic plan is not the method to accomplish either of those responsibilities. I think it is time the USDA left free trade issues to the State Department, and took their primary responsibilities seriously.



I do not want to frighten beef consumers. There has never been a case of BSE discovered in a native-born beef animal within the United States, and under our current regulations, the U.S. has implemented significant safety measures to prevent BSE introduction and spread. Nearly 350,000 animals born, bred, and raised in the USA have been tested for BSE. These animals were all either exhibiting some form of neurological disease or were animals that could not rise on their feet without assistance, or were otherwise dead, distressed, or dying. Most of these animals were advanced in age and were from that portion of the population dynamic that most often would exhibit a positive test to BSE. None of those 350,000 animals tested positive for BSE. By contrast, Canada has tested nearly 50,000 of the same class of animals, but the Canadians have discovered 4 indigenous cases of BSE. That is about one case for every 12,000 animals tested. What is the actual incidence of BSE in the cattle population of Canada? To date, that is an unanswered question. If the incidence is 1 in 12,000, then the possibility of receiving a BSE prion shedding animal from Canada is a real risk. Not a great risk, but a real risk.



Without a means to identify foreign beef within the United States, consumers do not have the choice to refuse to serve Canadian beef to their families. Canadian beef is entering the United States at rates nearly as high as before the first case of BSE was identified in May of 2003. That Canadian meat is boxed in Canada and sent across our border to restaurants and grocery stores in the United States. Congress enacted a Country of Origin Labeling law that was to go into effect this year. That law, through politically maneuvering, has been effectively emasculated, and has never been implemented.



I would urge beef consumers to write or telephone their US legislators and ask them to implement the County of Origin Labeling law already passed by Congress. It will give you a choice. If the USDA has its way, the United States will be forced to take beef from a number of countries that have BSE, not just Canada.



I say all that to say this. We should work with Canada to eradicate BSE where it is known to exist. A live animal test is a very important tool for this eradication process, but it is not the only tool. Continued surveillance should be mandatory, and conducted at high levels. A strengthened feed ban to prevent the possibility of recycling the BSE infective agent should be implemented. Preventing the movement of the infective, nearly indestructible BSE prions, is essential. Opening borders to free trade without diagnostic testing is an invitation to disaster. I, for one, do not want to be a part of that disaster.



R-CALF-USA continues to stand up for the beef cattle producers in the United States and Canada. A number of Canadian producers have filed a lawsuit against their own government for not enacting stricter guidelines to control BSE within Canada once BSE was discovered in their country. I believe they are correct in that endeavor. R-CALF does not dislike Canadian cattle or Canadian cattle producers. R-CALF hates BSE and its devastating effects on beef cattle production systems. Let us work with R-CALF to accomplish a common goal: The eradication of BSE where it is known to exist and the prevention of the spread of BSE to BSE free countries.



R. M. Thornsberry, D.V.M., M.B.A.



==========================================





----- Original Message -----
From: "Gary Burkholder" <[email protected]>
To: <[email protected]>
Sent: Friday, May 27, 2005 10:53 AM
Subject: Re: Fw: Found: BSE Research Expert


> Dear Terry:
>
> This just came in.
>
>
> I've laid the ground work for you to do what you do
> best.
>
> All the best,
>
> Burkie
> -----------------------------------------------------
>
>
> --- RM Thornsberry <[email protected]> wrote:
> > Mr. Burkholder,
> >
> > I am chairman of the BSE Committee for R-CALF. I am
> > looking for information
> > concerning a Japanese company developing a live
> > animal BSE test which was to
> > be available by summer of 2005.
> >
> > I would be very interested in visiting with the
> > gentleman you referr to.
> > R-CALF may be conducting a BSE Roundtable again this
> > summer. This gentleman
> > may want to be involved. If he allows, send me his
> > email address and I will
> > send him the Proceedings from the BSE Roundtable
> > that I put together in
> > December, 2003.
> >
> > Dr. Thornsberry
> >
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: Mike Callicrate <[email protected]>
> > To: R. Max Thornsberry <[email protected]>
> > Sent: Friday, May 27, 2005 11:37 AM
> > Subject: FW: Found: BSE Research Expert
> >
> >
> > >xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > >xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > [email protected]
> > > www.nobull.net
> > > www.ranchfoodsdirect.com
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Gary Burkholder [mailto:[email protected]]
> > > Sent: Sunday, February 27, 2005 9:26 PM
> > > To: [email protected]
> > > Cc: Tom F Spencer; Kathleen Kelley
> > > Subject: Found: BSE Research Expert
> > >
> > > [Private to you three recipients]
> > >
> > > Dear Mike, Kathleen and Tom,
> > >
> > > I have gained the confidence of an individual who
> > > lives here in the States, who probably has done
> > the
> > > most independent catalogueing of BSE research that
> > > exists. He has done over seven years of
> > accumulating
> > > this information, and can supply so much stuff up
> > in a
> > > matter of a few minutes that it just plain boggles
> > my
> > > mind.
> > >
> > > He can site incidents, cases, USDA lies, UK
> > research,
> > > European research, at will.
> > >
> > > His mother died of vCJD....hence the impetus of
> > his
> > > personal interest and research.
> > >
> > > Just like myself and my Dutch girl-friend, Lina,
> > and
> > > this individual I am talking about, as we all
> > began
> > > studying things independently, it has become more
> > and
> > > more apparent that alot of the "so-called" science
> > > driving world BSE policy has been "a little bit
> > less
> > > than scientific, and much more developed to serve
> > > special interests," which continues to compromise
> > any
> > > policy in any country.
> > >
> > > I have talked personally to this person, find him
> > to
> > > be credible and very much opposed to USDA's flaws
> > and
> > > failures, regarding food safety, in general. He
> > is
> > > colorful and believeable.
> > >
> > > Now then, why I am I writing to tell you this?
> > >
> > > Well, I am just plain wondering, out loud, if
> > R-Calf
> > > would be willing to have him testify at these
> > > hearings.
> > >
> > > I have asked him if he would be willing to
> > testify.
> > > His answer is that he would.
> > >
> > > As with any "expert witness," he would be entitled
> > to
> > > some kind of compensation for his time and
> > research
> > > and testimony. Air fare, hotel accomodation,
> > food
> > > and remuneration for the testimony would seem to
> > be
> > > reasonable for such a witness.
> > >
> > > So, I guess my old commodity brokerage skills come
> > > into play, in that I am asking you folks, if a
> > person
> > > like this could be of use to the R-Calf cause?
> > >
> > > I am asking for your input and feedback.
> > >
> > > I do believe his testimony could be useful.
> > >
> > > What do you all think?
> > >
> > >
> > > Hope to hear back from you soon, either way. Yes
> > or
> > > no. Perhaps you can contact your folks at R-Calf
> > to
> > > see what they think, too.
> > >
> > > Best Regards,
> > >
> > >
> > > Gary "Burkie" Burkholder
> > > Abilene, Kansas USA
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > __________________________________




--- Gary Burkholder <[email protected]> wrote:

> Hello, Dr. Thornsberry:
>
> I am pleased to acknowledge your request. Amazing
> events with regard to reportable animal disease
> issues
> this week, world-wide.
>
> I have forwarded your request to the individual I
> have
> been corresponding with.
>
> He is:
>
> Mr. Terry S. Singletary, Sr.
> Baycliff, Texas
>
> e-mail address: [email protected]
>
> I really hope the two of you can work together, to
> provide insight into the "real" science of BSE.
>
> Best Regards,
>
> Gary "Burkie" Burkholder
> xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Abilene, Kansas 67410 USA
>
> P.S. Terry has an unlisted phone number. I don't
> feel
> that I have the latitude to reveal that, although I
> feel certain Terry will be glad to visit with you.
>
> P.P.S. My telephone is: xxxxxxxxxxxx. It also
> works
> as a voice mail, if we're not able to answer a call.
>
------------------------------------------------------
>
> I assure you that Terry can be of help to the R-Calf
> cause.
>
>
------------------------------------------------------
> --- RM Thornsberry <[email protected]> wrote:
> > Mr. Burkholder,
> >
> > I am chairman of the BSE Committee for R-CALF. I
> am
> > looking for information
> > concerning a Japanese company developing a live
> > animal BSE test which was to
> > be available by summer of 2005.
> >
> > I would be very interested in visiting with the
> > gentleman you referr to.
> > R-CALF may be conducting a BSE Roundtable again
> this
> > summer. This gentleman
> > may want to be involved. If he allows, send me
> his
> > email address and I will
> > send him the Proceedings from the BSE Roundtable
> > that I put together in
> > December, 2003.
> >
> > Dr. Thornsberry
> >
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: Mike Callicrate <[email protected]>
> > To: R. Max Thornsberry <[email protected]>
> > Sent: Friday, May 27, 2005 11:37 AM
> > Subject: FW: Found: BSE Research Expert
> >
> >
> > >
> > >
> > > Mike Callicrate
> > > xxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > [email protected]
> > > www.nobull.net
> > > www.ranchfoodsdirect.com
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Gary Burkholder
> [mailto:[email protected]]
> > > Sent: Sunday, February 27, 2005 9:26 PM
> > > To: [email protected]
> > > Cc: Tom F Spencer; Kathleen Kelley
> > > Subject: Found: BSE Research Expert



snip...


----- Original Message -----
From: "Gary Burkholder" <[email protected]>
To: <[email protected]>
Sent: Saturday, June 04, 2005 10:35 AM
Subject: R-Calf Takes Heed of Your Information


> Dear Terry: This has not been the most auspicious
> week for us, here at Abilene. Nearly all week long,
> weather conditions have been less than nice,
> culminating in an 8" deluge yesterday. Flash Flooding
> and the whole nine yards, all kinds of lightning.
>
> Bottom line, we were barely able to access the
> internet from home all week long....am sending this
> over the Public Library system, in Abilene, right
> now...as it's the only way I can have a look at what's
> been going on.
>
> I want to thank you for sending me copies of your
> communications with Dr. Thornsberry. Looks like the
> two of you have made contact. I'm sure the two of
> you and the other's at R-Calf provide alot of
> arguments to the USDA stance.
>
> As soon as I am able to get things dried out at home,
> will be back in touch.
>
> All the Best,
>
> Burkie and Lina
> ------------------------------------------------------
>
> http://www.meatnews.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=Article&artNum=9656
>
> WARNINGS IGNORED?
>
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Beef ranchers' group claims USDA ignored warnings
> about the risk of BSE.
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> The Ranchers-Cattlemen Action Legal Fund, Billings,
> Montana, said recent news reports show that USDA
> officials ignored warnings about food safety and
> health risks associated with bovine spongiform
> encephalopathy and related risks associated with
> importing Canadian cattle and beef products. R-CALF
> also claims that USDA disregarded administrative
> policies that require public comment on such
> decisions.
>
> "The information in these reports shows a consistent
> pattern and philosophy at USDA, and that's to
> de-emphasize its mission of protecting the health and
> safety of the U.S. livestock industry while the agency
> aggressively pursues the unregulated traditional trade
> models coveted by foreign governments and
> multi-national meatpackers alike," R-CALF CEO Bill
> Bullard said. "USDA has not, and is not, doing enough
> to stop the potential spread of BSE from Canada into
> the United States. Once the BSE problem in Canada is
> addressed, it will become easier to reopen the more
> than 50 markets around the world that are currently
> closed to U.S. beef exports."
>
> According to an R-CALF release, reporter Bill Tomson,
> author of both news stories, wrote about an internal
> USDA document called a "decision memorandum" from
> October 2003, in which top USDA officials reversed a
> May 2003 ban on imports of certain Canadian processed
> and rendered beef products, including ground beef that
> could have potentially contained the BSE-infective
> agent - a prion. The ban was implemented after Canada
> announced its first indigenous case of BSE on May 20,
> 2003. Three additional cases of BSE have been
> discovered since, all in Canadian-origin cattle. No
> cases have been discovered in native U.S. cattle.
>
> The memo stated the requested expansion of imports
> "increases the possibility that higher risk product .
> . . may be imported into the United States," and
> warned that the decision would be a "significant
> change in policy without opportunity for public
> comment."
>
> R-CALF said Tomson also interviewed Caroline Smith
> DeWaal, food safety director for the consumer watchdog
> group Center for Science in the Public Interest, who
> reacted to the October 2003 memo by saying it "makes
> clear 'that USDA was putting the industry concerns
> about access to this meat from Canada in front of both
> public health concerns and in front of their own
> requirements to abide by administrative procedures.'"
>
> According to Tomson, USDA claims that it weighed the
> pros and cons before making the decision to import
> these additional products from Canada. "But when you
> look at USDA's points in favor of these additional
> imports, and the points the agency weighed against
> making this decision, it's surprising that USDA would
> have taken this risk to food safety simply to appease
> the meat-processing industry," Bullard noted.
>
> "It's important to note that this is not the first
> time USDA has ignored the science surrounding BSE,"
> Bullard said. "Another memo, dated June 16, 2003, was
> sent to top USDA officials from the very scientists --
> experts on transmissible spongiform encephalopathies
> -- the agency had assigned to a working group to
> advise USDA on how to best handle the BSE situation,
> and yet, USDA chose to ignore the safety
> recommendations of those experts."
>
> R-CALF pointed out USDA scientists recommended the
> agency disallow ground beef from cattle of any age - a
> recommendation USDA ignored - when it began in October
> 2003 to allow ground-beef imports from Canadian cattle
> under 30 months of age.
>
> Bullard said these examples reinforce the fact that
> USDA has not adhered to sound scientific principles,
> but rather has been basing critical decisions on
> inappropriate considerations, including pressure from
> the meat-processing and packing industries.
>
> "We're pleased that Mr. Tomson has brought this
> important information to the public's attention, as it
> helps shed light on the motives behind USDA's attempt
> to prematurely reopen the U.S. border to a country
> where BSE exists," Bullard concluded.
>
>
> Web posted: June 2, 2005
> Category: Announcement,Food Safety,Legislation and
> Regulation,Trade
> Domenick Castaldo, Ph.D.
>
>

snip...


----- Original Message -----
From: "Gary Burkholder" <[email protected]>
To: <[email protected]>
Sent: Friday, July 15, 2005 5:24 AM
Subject: House vote on COOL


> Dear Mike: Terry tried to warn everyone.
>
> With all eyes focused on the 9th Circuit's decision,
> the House took action.....absolutely incredible!!!!!!
>
> There is not a doubt in my mind that the "strings"
> were pulled to divide and conquer any party who
> opposed.
>
> If this is the reality of how our government
> functions, today, my optimism of free, public,
> democratic government is no longer existent...it died
> today.
>
> Burkie
> ------------------------------------------------------
>
> http://www.vegsource.com/talk/madcow/messages/94584.html
>
> From: TSS ()
> Subject: COOL, PACKERS, Rep. Henry Bonilla R-Texas,
> BSE, HUMAN HEALTH, AND why you should be concerned
> Date: June 11, 2005 at 7:06 am PST
>
> House Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee Makes
> Quiet Attempt to Delay COOL Once Again
> By R-CALF USA
> May 18, 2005, 20:19
>
>
> (Billings, Mont.) - In a meeting earlier this week,
> the U.S. House of Representatives' Agriculture
> Appropriations Subcommittee ramped up opposition to
> Mandatory Country-of-Origin Labeling (M-COOL) for meat
> products.
>
> Chairman Henry Bonilla, R-Texas, persuaded the
> subcommittee - through a voice vote - to postpone the
> implementation date of M-COOL to September 2007.
> Opponents of M-COOL already were successful once
> before in delaying the implementation date to Sept.
> 30, 2006, which still stands as the effective date
> unless Bonilla's effort takes hold in budget
> discussions in the entire House Appropriations
> Committee.
>
> "U.S. cattle producers want the ability to remain
> competitive here in the U.S. - the largest
> beef-consuming nation in the world - and to be
> competitive, we need the ability to differentiate our
> superior product, which is produced under higher
> standards, from generic, imported beef," said Danni
> Beer, R-CALF USA's COOL Committee Co-Chair. "This is
> an underhanded maneuver to not only attempt to
> completely do away with Mandatory COOL, but it also
> denies consumers their right to know where the meat
> they serve their families actually comes from."
>
> "As boxed beef imports continue to climb to record
> levels, there has never been a more intense level of
> competition or such a huge mix of products in the
> marketplace," said Chuck Kiker, R-CALF USA Region V
> Director. "To remain competitive, U.S. producers need
> the ability to utilize Mandatory COOL as a tool to
> remain No. 1 in the global marketplace, and this tool
> is the one that's most widely supported by consumers
> and producers alike."
>
> R-CALF USA, along with the many producer and consumer
> organizations that successfully passed M-COOL in the
> 2002 Farm Bill, believe they have already waited too
> long for the law to be implemented.
>
> "We look forward to working with our broad coalition
> in the House and Senate to implement Mandatory COOL as
> quickly as possible," Beer said.
>
>
> http://www.foodconsumer.org/777/8/House_Agriculture_Appropriations_Subcommittee.shtml
>
> http://www.foodconsumer.org/777/8/printer_House_Agriculture_Appropriations_Subcommittee.shtml
>
> HOUSE COMMITTEE VOTES TO DELAY MANDATORY COOL
>
> The House Appropriations subcommittee on agriculture
> votes to block funding for mandatory country-of-origin
> labeling (COOL) for beef and other meats. The vote
> came as markup began Tuesday on the fiscal 2004 Ag
> Appropriations bill. The subcommittee under chairman
> Henry Bonilla, R-Texas, voted that none of the funds
> in the bill shall be used for implanting mandatory
> COOL. This effectively delays implementation of
> mandatory COOL for one year to Sept 30, 2005. The
> funds cutoff would apply to all meat products affected
> by COOL but not seafood, peanuts and fresh produce.
>
> The delay will give lawmakers and USDA ample time to
> sort out objections to the labels by retailers,
> meatpackers and some livestock producers, says
> Bonilla. He acted on the "controversial, difficult"
> issue because the House Agriculture Committee wants to
> review the law, he says. It's essential that it
> provide time for Congress to properly evaluate this
> issue. "We will not jump blindly. We must consider all
> implications and make an educated decision," he says.
> At the same time, the chairman of the House Ag
> Committee, Bob Goodlatte, R-Va., announced a June 24
> hearing on COOL.
>
> Reaction to the vote was immediate. Recent discussions
> have brought to light serious concerns about the COOL,
> says Bryan Dierlam, NCBA's director of legislative
> affairs. NCBA strongly agrees that Rep. Bonilla's
> actions will stop the freight train of heated rhetoric
> out there and start a realistic debate, in front of
> Congress, about mandatory labeling. The Texas and
> Southwestern Cattle Raisers Association (TSCRA) and
> the Texas Cattle Feeders Association (TCFA) praised
> the actions in a joint statement. This law was adopted
> as part of the 2002 Farm Bill without adequate debate
> on cost and benefits, they say. Given the burdensome
> costs that will be associated with COOL, going forward
> with COOL at this time is premature. The long-term
> implications of mandatory COOL are too important to be
> considered anywhere other than through a full
> Congressional debate, they say.
>
> However, House Rep. Marcy Kaptur, D-Ohio, says she
> intends to argue at the full committee level for
> letting USDA proceed with writing rules for mandatory
> labeling. The Appropriations Committee is expected to
> vote on agriculture funding next week. Consumers have
> the right to know where their food is coming from, she
> says.
>
>
> http://www.farms.com/cool/mcool_article.htm
>
>
> HOUSE BLOCKS FUNDING FOR MCOOL
>
> The House yesterday rejected by a vote of 193-208, an
> amendment to the Fiscal Year 2004 Agriculture
> appropriations bill that Reps. Dennis Rehberg
> (R-Mont.) and Darlene Hooley (D-Ore.) introduced that
> would have mandated funding for implementation of the
> mandatory country-of-origin labeling (MCOOL) program
> for meat products. The amendment sought to strike
> language included in the underlying spending bill by
> Rep. Henry Bonilla (R-Texas) that would prohibit
> funding to implement mandatory COOL for meat and meat
> products until Oct. 1, 2005. "The country of origin
> labeling law as currently written clearly requires
> more Congressional attention," Caspers said. "NPPC is
> pleased that members have recognized that there are
> many concerns among producers over the tremendous
> potential for unintended consequences."
>
>
> http://www.farms.com/cool/hbffm.htm
>
>
> Greetings,
>
> VOTES mean absolutely nothing to these folks. I
> thought COOL had already been voted on and passed?
> NO matter, with this administration votes mean nothing
> and laws they change to suit themselves, and even
> when laws have been passed (as with the Canadian beef
> that was illegally imported into the USA), they freely
> break them. a bunch of renegade bandits i say. that's
> all they are.
>
> WELL, we see what happened with the 1st _documented_
> mad cow in the USA, it's cohorts, and the people
> that were exposed to those products, from the secrecy
> that followed;
>
>
>
> * GAO-05-51 October 2004 FOOD SAFETY (over 500
> customers receiving
> potentially BSE contaminated beef) - TSS 10/20/04
>
>
> October 2004 FOOD SAFETY
> USDA and FDA Need
> to Better Ensure
> Prompt and Complete
> Recalls of Potentially
> Unsafe Food
>
> snip...
>
> Page 38 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
> To examine the voluntary recall of beef products
> associated with the
> December 2003 discovery of an animal infected with
> BSE, we analyzed the
> distribution lists USDA collected from companies and
> the verification
> checks it conducted to develop a diagram illustrating
> the location and
> volume of recalled beef that reached different levels
> of the distribution
> chain. We compared the distribution lists and
> verification checks to
> identify how many customers listed on the distribution
> lists did not
> receive
> the recalled beef and the number of customers not
> listed on distribution
> lists that received the recalled beef. We interviewed
> USDA and FDA staff
> involved with the recall to understand the timing of
> recall actions and the
> challenges encountered during the recall.
> To develop information on the 2002 recall of ground
> beef by a ConAgra
> plant in Greeley, Colorado, we reviewed USDAs recall
> file and other
> documents on the recall. We also met with the
> departments Office of
> Inspector General and reviewed the Inspector Generals
> September 2003
> report.1
> We conducted our review from May 2003 through August
> 2004 in
> accordance with generally accepted government auditing
> standards.
> 1U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector
> General, Great
> Plains Region Audit
> Report: Food Safety and Inspection Service: Oversight
> of Production
> Process and Recall at
> ConAgra Plant (Establishment 969), Report No.
> 24601-2-KC (September 2003).
> Page 39 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
> Appendix II
> Federal Actions Associated with the
> Discovery of an Animal in the United States
> Infected with BSE Appendix II
> On December 23, 2003, USDA announced that a cow in the
> state of
> Washington had tested positive for BSEcommonly
> referred to as mad
> cow disease. This appendix describes the actions USDA
> took to recall the
> meat and the actions FDA took with respect to
> FDA-regulated products,
> such as animal feed and cosmetics, made from rendered
> parts of the
> animal.
> Beef Recall Was
> Triggered by a BSEPositive
> Sample from
> One Cow
> On December 9, 2003, the recalling company slaughtered
> 23 cows. USDA,
> in accordance with its BSE surveillance policy at the
> time, took a
> sample of
> 1 cow that was unable to walk, although the condition
> of the tested cow is
> now disputed. USDA did not process the sample in its
> Ames, Iowa National
> Veterinary Services Laboratory in an expedited manner
> because the cow
> did not show symptoms of neurological disorder. USDA
> test results
> indicated a presumptive positive for BSE on December
> 23, 2003.
> Recall Begun in
> December 2003 Was
> Completed in March
> 2004
> On December 23, 2003, after learning about the
> positive BSE test, USDA
> headquarters notified the Boulder District Office,
> which is the field
> office
> with jurisdiction over the recalling firm. The Boulder
> District began
> gathering information about the recalling companys
> product distribution.
> Field staff telephoned the recalling company and were
> on-site at 7:00 p.m.
> The Boulder District initially thought 3 days of the
> recalling companys
> production would have to be recalled, but further
> examination of facility
> cleanup and shipping records revealed that it was only
> necessary to
> recall 1
> day of production. USDA recall staff convened at 9:15
> p.m. and discussed
> the science related to BSE and whether the recalling
> companys cleanup
> practices were sufficient to limit the recall to 1 day
> of production.
> Following USDAs determination to conduct a Class II
> recallthat is, the
> beef posed a remote possibility of adverse health
> consequencesUSDA
> contacted the recalling company to discuss recall
> details and the press
> release. The press release and Recall Notification
> Report were released
> that evening.
> On December 24, 2003, USDAs Food Safety and
> Inspection Service (FSIS)
> sent inspectors to the recalling companys primary
> customers to obtain
> secondary customer distribution lists and product
> shipping records. USDA
> conducted 100 percent verification checks for this
> recallit contacted
> every customer that received the recalled meat. This
> level of verification
> checks is well above the percentage of checks
> conducted by USDA district
> offices for the Class I recalls we reviewed.
> Appendix II
> Federal Actions Associated with the
> Discovery of an Animal in the United States
> Infected with BSE
> Page 40 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
> On December 26, 2003, USDA began checking the primary
> and secondary
> customers of the recalling company that it was aware
> of, although the
> entire product distribution chain was unknown. During
> the checks, USDA
> tried to determine if the product was further
> distributed, and it used
> verification checks to acquire distribution lists for
> secondary and
> tertiary
> customers of the recalling company.
> Verification checks continued until February 25, 2004.
> Three USDA
> districts conducted these verification checks. The
> Boulder District
> coordinated the checks and assigned checks to the
> Minneapolis District
> Office for customers in Montana and to the Alameda
> District Office for
> customers in California. USDA required that 100
> percent of the primary
> checks, 50 percent of the secondary checks, and 20
> percent of the tertiary
> checks be conducted on-site. According to USDA, more
> than 50 percent of
> the secondary checks were actually conducted on-site.
> FDA officials
> helped conduct verification checks. According to USDA,
> the recall took a
> long time to complete because USDA contacted each
> customer at least
> twice. USDA first contacted each customer to conduct
> the check and again
> to verify product disposition.
> On February 25, 2004, the Boulder District concluded
> that the recall was
> conducted in an effective manner. On March 1, 2004,
> USDAs Recall
> Management Division recommended that the agency
> terminate the recall,
> and USDA sent a letter to the recalling company to
> document that USDA
> considered the recall to be complete.
> Recall Was
> Complicated by
> Inaccurate Distribution
> Lists and Mixing of
> Potentially
> Contaminated and
> Noncontaminated Beef
> USDA used distribution lists and shipping records to
> piece together where
> the recalled product was distributed. According to
> USDA, one of the
> recalling companys three primary customers was slow
> in providing its
> customer list. USDA could not begin verification
> activities for that
> primary
> customer without this list. Furthermore, some
> customers of the recalling
> company provided USDA with imprecise lists that did
> not specify which
> customers received the recalled product. As a
> consequence, USDA could
> not quickly determine the scope of product
> distribution and had to take
> time conducting extra research using shipping invoices
> to determine which
> specific customers received the product.
> Even when USDA determined the amount and location of
> beef, the agency
> still had trouble tracking the beef in certain types
> of establishments,
> such
> as grocery store distributors. USDA could not easily
> track the individual
> stores where those distributors sent the beef because
> of product mixing
> Appendix II
> Federal Actions Associated with the
> Discovery of an Animal in the United States
> Infected with BSE
> Page 41 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
> and the distributors record-keeping practices.
> Generally, distributors
> purchase beef from multiple sources, mix it in their
> inventory, and lose
> track of the source of the beef they send to the
> stores that they
> supply. To
> deal with this problem, USDA first identified the
> dates when recalled beef
> was shipped to the distributors and then asked for a
> list of the stores
> that
> were shipped any beef after those dates. Consequently,
> some stores were
> included in the recall that may never have received
> recalled beef.
> The recall was also complicated by repeated mixing of
> recalled beef with
> nonrecalled beef, thereby increasing the amount of
> meat involved in the
> recall. The recalling company slaughtered 23 cows on
> December 9, 2003,
> and shipped those and 20 other carcasses to a primary
> customer on
> December 10, 2003. The recalling companys carcasses
> were tagged to
> identify the slaughter date and the individual cow.
> The primary customer
> removed the identification tags and mixed the 23
> recalled carcasses with
> the 20 nonrecalled carcasses. Because the carcasses
> could not be
> distinguished, the recall included all 43 carcasses at
> the primary
> customer.
> After one round of processing at the primary customer,
> the meat from the
> carcasses was shipped to two other processing
> facilities. Both
> establishments further mixed the recalled meat from
> the 43 carcasses with
> meat from other sources. In all, the mixing of beef
> from 1 BSE-positive cow
> resulted in over 500 customers receiving potentially
> contaminated beef.
> Imprecise distribution lists and the mixing of
> recalled beef combined to
> complicate USDAs identification of where the product
> went. Specifically,
> on December 23, 2003, USDAs initial press release
> stated that the
> recalling
> company was located in Washington State. Three days
> later, on December
> 26, 2003, USDA announced that the recalled beef was
> distributed within
> Washington and Oregon. On December 27, 2003, USDA
> determined that one
> of the primary customers of the recalling firm
> distributed beef to
> facilities
> in California and Nevada, in addition to Washington
> and Oregon, for a total
> of four states. On December 28, 2003, USDA announced
> that some of the
> secondary customers of the recalling company may also
> have distributed
> the product to Alaska, Montana, Hawaii, Idaho, and
> Guam, for a total of
> eight states and one territory.
> On January 6, 2004, over 2 weeks from recall
> initiation, USDA determined
> that the beef went to only six statesWashington,
> Oregon, California,
> Nevada, Idaho, and Montanaand that no beef went to
> Alaska, Hawaii, or
> Guam. To reach that conclusion, USDA used the
> distribution lists, shipping
> records, and sales invoices that it received from
> companies to piece
> together exactly where the recalled beef may have been
> sent. The lists
> Appendix II
> Federal Actions Associated with the
> Discovery of an Animal in the United States
> Infected with BSE
> Page 42 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
> showed that 713 customers may have received the
> recalled beef; 6 of those
> may have received beef from more than one source. USDA
> determined that
> 176 customers on the lists did not actually receive
> recalled beef,
> including
> the custo

 

[flounder]

> may have received beef from more than one source. USDA
> determined that
> 176 customers on the lists did not actually receive
> recalled beef,
> including
> the customers in Guam and Hawaii. USDAs review also
> indicated that
> recalled beef was probably not shipped to Alaska or
> Utah, and USDA
> checked 2 retailers in Alaska and 3 retailers in Utah
> to confirm that
> was the
> case. In total, USDA conducted verification checks on
> 537 of the 713
> customers on the lists. USDAs initial checks
> identified an additional 45
> customers that may have received the recalled beef
> that were not included
> on the distribution lists, for a total of 582
> verification checks. Figure 4
> summarizes USDAs verification efforts during the
> recall.
> Appendix II
> Federal Actions Associated with the
> Discovery of an Animal in the United States
> Infected with BSE
> Page 43 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
> Figure 4: USDAs Recall Verification Checks by
> Location and Customer
> Type for Meat Associated with the Animal Infected with
> BSE
> Note: USDA checked 15 primary, 40 secondary, and 526
> tertiary customers
> plus the recalling
> company, for a total of 582 verification checks.
> USDAs press release stated that the recall involved
> 10,410 pounds of beef
> products, and the USDA recall coordinator for this
> recall told us that
> downstream processors mixed the recalled beef with
> nonrecalled beef, for
> a total of more than 38,000 pounds of beef that was
> distributed at the
> secondary customer level. According to USDA officials
> involved with the
> D = Distributor
> R = Retailer
> SF = Storage facility
> P = Processor
> Primary customers
> (15 total)
> Recalling
> slaughterhouse
> (WA) 1 R
> (OR)
> 1 P
> (WA) 1 P
> (OR)
> 1 P
> (OR)
> 11 R
> (WA)
> Secondary customers
> (40 total)
> Tertiary customers
> (526 total)
> 1 R
> (OR)
> 1 SF
> (OR)
> 3 D
> (OR)
> 3 D
> (WA)
> 2 dual D
> (OR)
> 59 R
> (OR)
> 79 R
> (WA)
> 5 R
> (ID)
> 3 R
> (UT)
> 4 R
> (MT)
> 161 R
> (WA)
> 8 R
> (ID)
> 15 R
> (OR)
> 2 R
> (AK)
> 31 R
> (OR) 8 R
> (WA)
> 10 R
> (NV)
> 5 R
> (ID)
> 10 R
> (CA)
> 2 R
> (CA)
> 17 R
> (OR)
> 5 R
> (WA)
> 1 D
> (NV)
> 11 R
> (CA)
> 85 R
> (NV)
> 3 D
> (OR) 11 R
> (OR)
> 2 D
> (CA) 26 R
> (CA)
> 2 R
> (WA)
> ( ) Acronyms in parentheses are postal abbreviations
> for each state.
> Source: GAO analysis of USDA verification check
> documents.
> Appendix II
> Federal Actions Associated with the
> Discovery of an Animal in the United States
> Infected with BSE
> Page 44 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
> recall, the precise amount of meat that was sold at
> the retail level is
> unknown because retailers at the tertiary level
> further mixed nonrecalled
> meat with potentially contaminated meat. USDA told us
> that more than
> 64,000 pounds of beef was ultimately returned or
> destroyed by customers,
> and that, because of the mixing, it was not able to
> determine how much of
> the original 10,410 pounds of recalled beef was
> contained in the 64,000
> pounds that were recovered.
> FDAs Role in USDAs
> Recall
> Parts of the BSE-infected animal slaughtered on
> December 9, 2003, were
> not used for food, but they were sent to renderers to
> be separated into raw
> materials, such as proteins and blood. Rendered
> materials are used for
> many purposes, including cosmetics and vaccines. FDA
> has jurisdiction
> over renderers.
> When USDA learned of the BSE-infected cow on December
> 23, 2003, the
> agency immediately notified FDA. On December 24, 2003,
> FDA sent an
> inspection team to a renderer that handled materials
> from the BSE cow.
> Inspectors confirmed that the parts of the slaughtered
> BSE positive cow
> were on the premises. FDA later identified a second
> company that
> potentially rendered material from the slaughtered BSE
> cow. Both
> renderers agreed to voluntarily hold all product
> processed from the
> diseased cow and dispose of the product as directed by
> FDA and local
> authorities.
> On January 7, 2004, 15 containers of potentially
> contaminated, rendered
> material (meat and bone meal) were inadvertently
> loaded on a ship, and on
> January 8, 2004, the ship left Seattle, Washington,
> for Asia. The renderer
> initiated steps to recover the shipped material, so it
> could be disposed
> of as
> directed by FDA and local authorities. The ship
> carrying the material
> returned to the United States on February 24, 2004,
> and the material was
> disposed of in a landfill on March 2, 2004.
> On January 12, 2004, FDA asked both renderers to
> expand their voluntary
> holds to rendered materials processed from December
> 23, 2003, through
> January 9, 2004, because they may have rendered some
> recalled meat or
> trim that was recovered from retail establishments.
> Both renderers agreed
> to the expanded product hold. In total, FDA requested
> that renderers
> voluntarily hold approximately 2,000 tons of rendered
> material. FDA
> confirmed that none of the potentially contaminated,
> rendered material
> entered commerce, because FDA accounted for all
> rendered material. FDA
> Appendix II
> Federal Actions Associated with the
> Discovery of an Animal in the United States
> Infected with BSE
> Page 45 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
> reported that no recall was necessary because no
> product was distributed
> commercially by the rendering companies.
> USDA and FDA
> Worked Together on
> the Recall
> USDA and FDA worked together in two ways. First, both
> agencies notified
> each other if their investigations yielded any
> information about products
> within the jurisdiction of the other agency. For
> instance, when conducting
> the second round of verification checks, USDA tracked
> the disposition of
> the product to renderers and landfills and notified
> FDA when the product
> went to renderers. Second, FDA officials helped
> conduct verification
> checks. FDA conducted 32 of the 582 verification
> checks (approximately 5
> percent) for the USDA recall. Officials from both
> agencies indicated they
> regularly interacted and shared information. Table 3
> outlines the agencies
> actions.
> Table 3: Detailed Timeline of USDA, FDA, and Company
> Actions Related to
> the Discovery of an Animal Infected with BSE
> Date USDA recall actions FDA actions Company actions
> 12/9/03 " USDA samples cow for BSE. " BSE cow is
> slaughtered.
> 12/11/03 " Sample is sent to Ames, Iowa, for BSE
> testing.
> " Recalling company sends
> carcasses to primary customer for
> processing.
> 12/12/03 " Primary customer sends meat
> products to two other primary
> customers for further processing.
> 12/12 -
> 12/23/03
> " Other primary customers distribute
> recalled product to secondary
> customers.
> " Secondary customers distribute
> recalled product to tertiary
> customers.
> 12/23/03 " BSE test results are presumptively
> positive.
> " Recall meeting.
> " Initiation of voluntary recall.
> " Press release.
> " FDA notified of BSE test results.
> " FDA dispatches investigation teams.
> 12/24/03 " FDA inspects Renderer 1.
> " FDA determines some rendered
> material from Renderer 1 is intended
> for Indonesia.
> " FDA discovers some material may
> have been sent to Renderer 2.
> " Renderer 1 agrees to hold remaining
> rendered material.
> " Recalling company contacts
> primary customers.
> " Primary customers contact their
> customers.
> Appendix II
> Federal Actions Associated with the
> Discovery of an Animal in the United States
> Infected with BSE
> Page 46 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
> 12/25/03 " USDA receives confirmation from
> reference lab in England that cow in
> question is BSE positive.
> 12/26/03 " Verification checks begin
> " USDA announces recalled product in
> Washington State and Oregon.
> " FDA begins process of comparing
> records to ensure all products from
> Renderers 1 and 2 are accounted for.
> " Renderer 2 agrees to hold all material
> that may have been derived from
> BSE cow. None of the rendered
> material has been distributed.
> 12/27/03 " USDA announces recalled product was
> distributed in Washington State,
> Oregon, California, and Nevada.
> " FDA issues statement confirming that
> the rendering plants that processed
> all of the nonedible material from the
> BSE cow have placed a voluntary
> hold on all of the potentially infectious
> product, none of which had left the
> control of the companies and entered
> commercial distribution.
> 12/28/03 " USDA announces recalled product was
> distributed in Washington State,
> Oregon, California, Nevada, Montana,
> Idaho, Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam.
> 12/29/03 " Food Safety and Inspection Service
> determines that the recalled meat
> products were distributed to 42
> locations, with 80 percent of the
> products distributed to stores in
> Oregon and Washington State.
> 12/31/03 " FDA offers assistance to USDA to
> complete recall verification checks.
> 1/6/04 " USDA determines recalled product
> was only distributed in Washington
> State, Oregon, California, Nevada,
> Montana, and Idaho.
> 1/8/04 " FDA is notified by the renderer that
> some of the rendered material on
> hold from Renderer 1 was
> inadvertently shipped to Asia.
> Renderer 1 commits to isolate and
> return the rendered material.
> " Rendering company notifies FDA of
> shipment of product on hold.
> (Continued From Previous Page)
> Date USDA recall actions FDA actions Company actions
> Appendix II
> Federal Actions Associated with the
> Discovery of an Animal in the United States
> Infected with BSE
> Page 47 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
> Source: GAO analysis of USDA and FDA information.
> 1/12/04 " FDA advises Renderers 1 and 2 that
> they may have rendered meat or trim
> subject to recall from retail stores.
> " FDA requests Renderers 1 and 2 to
> place all rendered material from
> December 23 to January 9 on hold.
> " FDA determines neither renderer had
> shipped rendered material
> manufactured after December 23,
> 2003.
> 2/9/04 " All rendered material was disposed of
> in landfill, except material shipped to
> Asia.
> 2/24/04 " Ship carrying rendered material
> returns to U.S. port.
> 2/25/04 " Verification checks complete.
> " USDA Boulder District Office
> concludes recall is effective.
> 3/1/04 " Recall is closed.
> 3/2/04 " FDA observes disposal in landfill of
> remaining rendered material...
>
> snip...
>
> REPORTS
>
> 1. Food Safety: USDA and FDA Need to Better Ensure
> Prompt and Complete
> Recalls of Potentially Unsafe Food. GAO-05-51, October
> 7.tss
> http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-51
> Highlights -
> http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d0551high.pdf
>
>
> Greetings again,
>
>
> WITH politicians like Rep. Henry Bonilla, R-Texas,
> who needs assisted suicide law, his policy on COOL
> will
> have us all exposed to the mad cow agent. Nothing like
> being in the pockets of the packers and such, and
> dying
> old and demented, or maybe young and demented.
>
> WONDER how much the industry has donated to his
> campaign fund?
>
>
> I see here that the biggest contributor seems to be
> (i will give you 3 guess and the first 2 don't count);
>
>
> 2004
>
> Sector Total PACs Indivs
>
> Agribusiness $440,516 $296,566 $ 143,950
>
>
> http://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/sector.asp?CID=N00005985&cycle=2004
>
>
> let's break this down a bit;
>
>
>
> The top industries supporting Henry Bonilla are:
>
>
>
> #1 Livestock $131,900
>
> snip...
>
> #3 Lobbyist $91,147
>
> #4 Food Processing & Sales $90,140
>
> snip...
>
> #11 Agricultural Services/Products $60,800
>
> snip...
>
> #19 Dairy $36,750
>
>
> http://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/indus.asp?CID=N00005985&cycle=2004
>
>
>
> Henry Bonilla is a top House recipient from the
> following industries for the 2003-2004 election cycle:
>
>
> Livestock (#1)
>
>
> Meat processing & products:
> Top 20 Members of the House
>
>
> Election cycle: 2004
> Rank
>
> Candidate
>
> Amount
>
> #1
>
> Bonilla, Henry (R-TX)
>
> $32,250
>
>
> http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/recips.asp?Ind=A06&cycle=2004&recipdetail=h&Mem=Y&sortorder=U
>
>
>
> Meat processing & products:
> Top 20 Members of the House
>
>
> Election cycle: 20042002200019981996199419921990
> List Top 20: All RecipientsPresidential
> CandidatesSenatorsMembers of the HouseSenate
> CandidatesHouse CandidatesAll Members of Congress
> Rank
> Candidate
> Amount
>
> 1
> Bonilla, Henry (R-TX)
> $16,750
>
>
>
> http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/recips.asp?Ind=G2300&Cycle=2002&recipdetail=H&Mem=Y&sortorder=U
>
>
> Agricultural Svcs (#4)
>
> http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/recips.asp?Ind=A07&cycle=2004&recipdetail=h&Mem=Y&sortorder=U
>
> Dairy (#5)
>
> http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/recips.asp?Ind=A04&cycle=2004&recipdetail=h&Mem=Y&sortorder=U
>
> Food and kindred products manufacturing (#2)
>
> http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/recips.asp?Ind=G2100&cycle=2004&recipdetail=h&Mem=Y&sortorder=U
>
> Food Process/Sales (#2)
>
> http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/recips.asp?Ind=A09&cycle=2004&recipdetail=h&Mem=Y&sortorder=U
>
> Meat processing & products (#1)
>
> http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/recips.asp?Ind=G2300&cycle=2004&recipdetail=h&Mem=Y&sortorder=U
>
> Poultry & Eggs (#3)
>
> http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/recips.asp?Ind=A05&cycle=2004&recipdetail=h&Mem=Y&sortorder=U
>
> DO a search for his name ''Bonilla'' and then it gives
> you a bunch of different options to break down
> campaign contributions. His number 3 contributor is
> the National Cattleman's Beef Association at $16,000.
> Number 10 is a big beef company, Sam Kane Beef
> Processors and tied for number 13 is the American Meat
> Institute and the Texas Southwestern Cattle Raisers.
>
> http://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/index.asp
>
>
> NOT about human health. it's about commodities and
> futures and who can bribe or donate the most to
> whom$$$TSS
>
>
> JUST look how the feed compounders handled things in
> the UK;
>
>
> >DATA Charmaine's HD:BSE - AUGUST 95-fill in bse
> position paper spec<
>
> FROM THE DIRECTOR GENERAL
>
> 24 August, 1995
>
> STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
>
>
> Dear .salutation
>
> UKASTA POLICY ON BSE
>
> At the President's suggestion in the light of recent
> events, I have
> reviewed the history of our policy on BSE so as to
> ensure that it fully
> reflects the needs of our supporters In the feed
> Industry.
>
> The paper enclosed with this letter is the result. For
> obvious reasons,
> this is being circulated only to an extremely small
> circle within
> UKASTA - basically, the National Executive Council.
>
> If you have any comments on the policy, or the paper,
> I should be glad
> to receive them under Private & Confidential cover.
>
> Yours sincerely,
>
> J.W. REED
>
> JWR/cg
>
> copied to SMT members - IJD; JN; JAS; REW
>
>
> 95/8.24/2.1
>
>
> STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
>
> UKASTA INTERNAL POSITION STATEMENT
> BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY
>
> POLICY AIMS
>
> 1. These have been consistent, although unstated
> except In FEC discussions, since at least 1989:-
>
> . To minimise the risk of farmers' claims for
> compensation from feed
> compounders.
>
> . To minimise the potential damage to compound feed
> markets
> through adverse publicity.
>
> . To maximise freedom of action for feed compounders.
> notably by
> maintaining the availability of meat and bone meal as
> a raw
> material in animal feeds, and ensuring time is
> available to make
> any changes which may be required.
>
>
> STRATEGY ADOPTED/SUCCESS ACHIEVED
>
> 2. Strategy has depended upon the situation at a
> particular time.
> UKASTA has sought to anticipate criticism from other
> industry sectors
> and action by Government/Brussels as the epidemic has
> developed
> and knowledge of the disease increased. Through dose
> liaison with
> MAFF. we have to date avoided public statements
> seriously damaging
> to the feed Industry and the adoption of policies
> likely to lead to such
> damage.
>
> 3. Successful examples of this strategy include:
>
> . "Voluntary Ban" on SBO's In all MBM purchase
> contracts from
> November 1989. matching the Government ban on SBO'S in
> human food but anticipating the statutory ban on SBO's
> in feed
> which came in only from September 1990;
>
> . Pressing Government for full compensation to
> farmers, which was
> finally conceded in February 1990;
>
> . evidence (not Just on BSE) to the Lamming Committee
> in 1991/92
> resulted in their recommending tighter controls over
> home
> mixers/integrated operations, and over the processing
> of fallen
> animals. Government eventually tightened the fallen
> animals
> legislation in December 1992. Other Lamming
> recommendations
> could yet be useful to us.
>
> continued.....
>
> 95/8.24/2.2
>
> 2
>
> . UKASTA pressure dissuaded MAFF from publicly linking
> voluntary
> ELISA tests of feed on farms with BAB's to (possibly
> compulsory)
> tests at compounders' premises in June/July 1994:
>
> . in August 1995. while tightening the SBO Order and
> responding
> to the EU Decision requiring introduction of a testing
> programme.
> MAFF has accepted UKASTA proposals for the
> presentation of the
> changes to a wider audience, including farmers, and
> accepted our
> help in preparing for an EU Commission visit to
> inspect
> procedures and controls.
>
>
> THE FUTURE
>
> 4. BSE has for more than seven years posed the
> greatest single potential
> threat to feed compounders' profitability. Although
> the epidemic is in
> sharp decline (275 cases per week compared to 1000 at
> the peak).
> MAFF remains under pressure in Brussels and is not
> skilled at
> handling potentially explosive issues.
>
> 5. Tests may show that ruminant feeds have been sold
> which contain
> illegal traces of ruminant protein. More likely, a few
> positive test
> results will turn up but proof that a particular feed
> mill knowingly
> supplied it to a particular farm will be difficult if
> not impossible.
>
> 6. The threat remains real and it will be some years
> before feed
> compounders are free of it. The longer we can avoid
> any direct
> linkage between feed milling practices and actual BSE
> cases, the more
> likely it is that serious damage can be avoided. In
> issue management
> terms, the aims and the strategy remain valid, but
> must be kept
> under review in the light of further events.
>
> JWR/cg/23.8.95
>
> 95/8.24/2.3
>
>
> http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1995/08/24002001.pdf
>
>
>
> 95\08.01\7.1-7.2 01/08/95 T E D Eddy PS/Mrs Browning
> Confidential - BSE : SBOs
>
> snip...
>
> 4. Subject to furhter clarification on the problem at
> the two plants we can no longer maintain publicly that
> our visits to slaughterhouses have shown no
> implications for human health. I would advise against
> an immediate response to Farming News. We need to
> investigate the two reports in greater detail to
> clarify whether the circumstances were such as to
> suggest there was a genuine risk to human health.
>
> TED EDDY
>
> http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1995/08/01007001.pdf
>
> INDUSTRY NEWS
>
> 6. Although it normally occurs in elderly people, CJD
> has been found in young people - in the US, for
> example, where BSE does not exist...
>
> http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1995/08/10004001.pdf
>
>
> THEY EACH protect there own, to hell with human
> health$$$TSS
>
>
> Although many observers anticipated amendments and
> heated debate on the controversial country-of-origin
> labeling law, there was little discussion. The bill
> includes a provision offered by Subcommittee Chairman
> Henry Bonilla (R-Texas) that would stop USDA from
> implementing the country-of-origin labeling law for
> meat and meat products.
>
>
> http://www.vermontagriculture.com/Agriview%20Online/Agriview070103/agriviewonline1.htm
>
>
> House Passes Amendment Blocking COOL
>
>
> http://www.porknet.com/page.cfm?PageID=&PassLevel=&menu=&AppContinue=Articles%2FArticle&ID=99981&Newsletter=true
>
>
>
> The House Agriculture Appropriations bill was passed
> in July," Katy Ziegler, of the National Farmers Union,
> said. "It contains language to prohibit (the) USDA
> from spending any more funds to implement COOL for
> meat products for one year. This rider was included by
> Rep. (Henry) Bonilla (R-Texas) via the request of
> meatpackers in Texas who hate COOL."
>
>
> http://64.233.187.104/search?q=cache:ZzvXcUoDyGIJ:www.the-land.com/column.php%3Fstoryid%3D66+COOL+Bonilla-R-Texas+++PACKERS&hl=en
>
>
>
> Rep. Henry Bonilla, R-Texas: "This country-of-origin
> labeling provision that was put in the Farm Bill last
> year is controversial and costly."
>
>
> http://www.iptv.org/mtom/archivedfeature.cfm?Fid=220
>
>
>
> News Release
> USDA seeks comments on animal-ID plan, May 10, 2005
> Last week Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns unveiled
> a "thinking paper" and timeline on the National Animal
> Identification System and asked for feedback on the
> draft plan from industry stakeholders. The timeline
> calls for operational premises registration in all
> states by July 2005. Beginning in April 2007, the plan
> calls for the USDA to begin issuing "alerts" prior to
> premises registration and animal identification
> becoming mandatory in January 2008. The timeline calls
> for reporting of defined animal movements to become
> mandatory in January 2009. The agency will accept
> comments on the plan until June 6.
>
>
> http://www.ezidavid.com/News%20Release%20USAHA%2010-02.htm
>
>
>
> Gerald Wells: Report of the Visit to USA, April-May
> 1989
>
> snip...
>
> The general opinion of those present was that BSE, as
> an
> overt disease phenomenon, _could exist in the USA, but
> if it did,
> it was very rare. The need for improved and specific
> surveillance
> methods to detect it as recognised...
>
> snip...
>
> It is clear that USDA have little information and _no_
> regulatory
> responsibility for rendering plants in the US...
>
> snip...
>
> 3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The
> US approach
> was to accord it a _very low profile indeed_. Dr. A
> Thiermann showed
> the picture in the ''Independent'' with cattle being
> incinerated and thought
> this was a fanatical incident to be _avoided_ in the
> US _at all costs_...
>
> snip...
>
> http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11b/tab01.pdf
>
> To be published in the Proceedings of the
> Fourth International Scientific Congress in
> Fur Animal Production. Toronto, Canada,
> August 21-28, 1988
>
> Evidence That Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy
> Results from Feeding Infected Cattle
>
> R.F. Marsh* and G.R. Hartsough
>
> .Department of Veterinary Science, University of
> Wisconsin-Madison, Madison,
> Wisconsin 53706; and ^Emba/Creat Lakes Ranch Service,
> Thiensville, Wisconsin 53092
>
> ABSTRACT
> Epidemiologic investigation of a new incidence of
> transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) in
> Stetsonville, Wisconsin
> suggests that the disease may have resulted from
> feeding infected
> cattle to mink. This observation is supported by the
> transmission of
> a TME-like disease to experimentally inoculated
> cattle, and by the
> recent report of a new bovine spongiform
> encephalopathy in
> England.
>
> INTRODUCTION
>
> Transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) was first
> reported in 1965 by Hartsough
> and Burger who demonstrated that the disease was
> transmissible with a long incubation
> period, and that affected mink had a spongiform
> encephalopathy similar to that found in
> scrapie-affecied sheep (Hartsough and Burger, 1965;
> Burger and Hartsough, 1965).
> Because of the similarity between TME and scrapie, and
> the subsequent finding that the
> two transmissible agents were indistinguishable (Marsh
> and Hanson, 1969), it was
> concluded that TME most likely resulted from feeding
> mink scrapie-infecied sheep.
> The experimental transmission of sheep scrapie to mink
> (Hanson et al., 1971)
> confirmed the close association of TME and scrapie,
> but at the same time provided
> evidence that they may be different. Epidemiologic
> studies on previous incidences of
> TME indicated that the incubation periods in field
> cases were between six months and
> one year in length (Harxsough and Burger, 1965).
> Experimentally, scrapie could not be
> transmitted to mink in less than one year.
> To investigate the possibility that TME may be caused
> by a (particular strain of
> scrapie which might be highly pathogenic for mink, 21
> different strains of the scrapie
> agent, including their sheep or goat sources, were
> inoculated into a total of 61 mink.
> Only one mink developed a progressive neurologic
> disease after an incubation period of
> 22 mon..s (Marsh and Hanson, 1979). These results
> indicated that TME was either caused
> by a strain of sheep scrapie not yet tested, or was
> due to exposure to a scrapie-like agent
> from an unidentified source.
>
> OBSERVATIONS AND RESULTS
>
> A New Incidence of TME. In April of 1985, a mink
> rancher in Stetsonville, Wisconsin
> reported that many of his mink were "acting funny",
> and some had died. At this time, we
> visited the farm and found that approximately 10% of
> all adult mink were showing
> typical signs of TME: insidious onset characterized by
> subtle behavioral changes, loss of
> normal habits of cleanliness, deposition of droppings
> throughout the pen rather than in a
> single area, hyperexcitability, difficulty in chewing
> and swallowing, and tails arched over
> their _backs like squirrels. These signs were followed
> by progressive deterioration of
> neurologic function beginning with locomoior
> incoordination, long periods of somnolence
> in which the affected mink would stand motionless with
> its head in the corner of the
> cage, complete debilitation, and death. Over the next
> 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of
> all the adult mink on the farm died from TME.
> Since previous incidences of TME were associated with
> common or shared feeding
> practices, we obtained a careful history of feed
> ingredients used over the past 12-18
> months. The rancher was a "dead stock" feeder using
> mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy
> cattle and a few horses. Sheep had never been fed.
>
> Experimental Transmission. The clinical diagnosis of
> TME was confirmed by
> histopaihologic examination and by experimental
> transmission to mink after incubation
> periods of four months. To investigate the possible
> involvement of cattle in this disease
> cycle, two six-week old castrated Holstein bull calves
> were inoculated intracerebrally
> with a brain suspension from affected mink. Each
> developed a fatal spongiform
> encephalopathy after incubation periods of 18 and 19
> months.
>
> DISCUSSION
> These findings suggest that TME may result from
> feeding mink infected cattle and
> we have alerted bovine practitioners that there may
> exist an as yet unrecognized
> scrapie-like disease of cattle in the United States
> (Marsh and Hartsough, 1986). A new
> bovine spongiform encephalopathy has recently been
> reported in England (Wells et al.,
> 1987), and investigators are presently studying its
> transmissibility and possible
> relationship to scrapie. Because this new bovine
> disease in England is characterized by
> behavioral changes, hyperexcitability, and
> agressiveness, it is very likely it would be
> confused with rabies in the United Stales and not be
> diagnosed. Presently, brains from
> cattle in the United States which are suspected of
> rabies infection are only tested with
> anti-rabies virus antibody and are not examined
> histopathologically for lesions of
> spongiform encephalopathy.
> We are presently pursuing additional studies to
> further examine the possible
> involvement of cattle in the epidemiology of TME. One
> of these is the backpassage of
> our experimental bovine encephalopathy to mink.
> Because (here are as yet no agent-
> specific proteins or nucleic acids identified for
> these transmissible neuropathogens, one
> means of distinguishing them is by animal passage and
> selection of the biotype which
> grows best in a particular host. This procedure has
> been used to separate hamster-
> adapted and mink-udapted TME agents (Marsh and Hanson,
> 1979). The intracerebral
> backpassage of the experimental bovine agent resulted
> in incubations of only four months
> indicating no de-adaptation of the Stetsonville agent
> for mink after bovine passage.
> Mink fed infected bovine brain remain normal after six
> months. It will be essential to
> demonstrate oral transmission fiom bovine to mink it
> this proposed epidemiologic
> association is to be confirmed.
>
> ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
> These studies were supported by the College of
> Agricultural and Life Sciences,
> University of Wisconsin-Madison and by a grant
> (85-CRCR-1-1812) from the United
> States Department of Agriculture. The authors also
> wish to acknowledge the help and
> encouragement of Robert Hanson who died during the
> course of these investigations.
>
> REFERENCES
> Burger, D. and Hartsough, G.R. 1965. Encephalopathy of
> mink. II. Experimental and
> natural transmission. J. Infec. Dis. 115:393-399.
> Hanson, R.P., Eckroade, R.3., Marsh, R.F., ZuRhein,
> C.M., Kanitz, C.L. and Gustatson,
> D.P. 1971. Susceptibility of mink to sheep scrapie.
> Science 172:859-861.
> Hansough, G.R. and Burger, D. 1965. Encephalopathy of
> mink. I. Epizoociologic and
> clinical observations. 3. Infec. Dis. 115:387-392.
> Marsh, R.F. and Hanson, R.P. 1969. Physical and
> chemical properties of the
> transmissible mink encephalopathy agent. 3. ViroL
> 3:176-180.
> Marsh, R.F. and Hanson, R.P. 1979. On the origin of
> transmissible mink
> encephalopathy. In Hadlow, W.J. and Prusiner, S.P.
> (eds.) Slow transmissible
> diseases of the nervous system. Vol. 1, Academic
> Press, New York, pp 451-460.
> Marsh, R.F. and Hartsough, G.R. 1986. Is there a
> scrapie-like disease in cattle?
> Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Western Conference
> for Food Animal Veterinary
> Medicine. University of Arizona, pp 20.
> Wells, G.A.H., Scott, A.C., Johnson, C.T., Cunning,
> R.F., Hancock, R.D., Jeffrey, M.,
> Dawson, M. and Bradley, R. 1987. A novel progressive
> spongiform encephalopathy
> in cattle. Vet. Rec. 121:419-420.
>
> MARSH
>
> http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf
>
>
> WE need to vote these BOUGHT AND PAID FOR, CORPORATE
> OWNED @holes out of office,
> NO MATTER WHAT PARTY THEY ARE WITH. IT should be about
> the people, for the people, but
> it is just the opposite, it's about the industry and
> for the industry, to hell with human health...
>
>
> 1: J Infect Dis 1980 Aug;142(2):205-8
>
>
>
> Oral transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease,
> and scrapie to nonhuman primates.
>
> Gibbs CJ Jr, Amyx HL, Bacote A, Masters CL, Gajdusek
> DC.
>
> Kuru and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease of humans and
> scrapie disease of sheep and goats were transmitted to
> squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) that were exposed
> to the infectious agents only by their nonforced
> consumption of known infectious tissues. The
> asymptomatic incubation period in the one monkey
> exposed to the virus of kuru was 36 months; that in
> the two monkeys exposed to the virus of
> Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease was 23 and 27 months,
> respectively; and that in the two monkeys exposed to
> the virus of scrapie was 25 and 32 months,
> respectively. Careful physical examination of the
> buccal cavities of all of the monkeys failed to reveal
> signs or oral lesions. One additional monkey similarly
> exposed to kuru has remained asymptomatic during the
> 39 months that it has been under observation.
>
> PMID: 6997404
> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=6997404&dopt=Abstract
>
>
>
>
> 1: J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry 1994 Jun;57(6):757-8
>
>
>
> Transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease to a
> chimpanzee by electrodes contaminated during
> neurosurgery.
>
> Gibbs CJ Jr, Asher DM, Kobrine A, Amyx HL, Sulima MP,
> Gajdusek DC.
>
> Laboratory of Central Nervous System Studies, National
> Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke,
> National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD 20892.
>
> Stereotactic multicontact electrodes used to probe the
> cerebral cortex of a middle aged woman with
> progressive dementia were previously implicated in the
> accidental transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
> (CJD) to two younger patients. The diagnoses of CJD
> have been confirmed for all three cases. More than two
> years after their last use in humans, after three
> cleanings and repeated sterilisation in ethanol and
> formaldehyde vapour, the electrodes were implanted in
> the cortex of a chimpanzee. Eighteen months later the
> animal became ill with CJD. This finding serves to
> re-emphasise the potential danger posed by reuse of
> instruments contaminated with the agents of spongiform
> encephalopathies, even after scrupulous attempts to
> clean them.
>
> PMID: 8006664 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]
> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=8006664&dopt=Abstract
>
>
> SCRAPIE USA MONTHLY REPORT 2005
>
> AS of March 31, 2005, there were 70 scrapie infected
> source flocks (Figure 3). There were 11 new infected
> and source flocks reported in March (Figure 4) with a
> total of 51 flocks reported for FY 2005 (Figure 5).
> The total infected and source flocks that have been
> released in FY 2005 are 39 (Figure 6), with 1 flock
> released in March. The ratio of infected and source
> flocks released to newly infected and source flocks
> for FY 2005 = 0.76 : 1. IN addition, as of March 31,
> 2005, 225 scrapie cases have been confirmed and
> reported by the National Veterinary Services
> Laboratories (NVSL), of which 53 were RSSS cases
> (Figure 7). This includes 57 newly confirmed cases in
> March 2005 (Figure 8). Fourteen cases of scrapie in
> goats have been reported since 1990 (Figure 9). The
> last goat cases was reported in January 2005. New
> infected flocks, source flocks, and flocks released or
> put on clean-up plans for FY 2005 are depicted in
> Figure 10. ...
>
> FULL TEXT ;
>
> http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/nahps/scrapie/monthly_report/monthly-report.html
>
>
>
> USDA CWD PROGRAM
>
> http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/nahps/cwd/
>
> USDA CWD MAP (slow to update)
>
> http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/nahps/cwd/cwd-distribution.html
>
>
> CWD NEW YORK
>
> http://www.agmkt.state.ny.us/AI/cwd.html
>
> http://www.nyhealth.gov/nysdoh/zoonoses/cwd.htm
>
>
>
> Gerald Wells: Report of the Visit to USA, April-May
> 1989
>
> snip...
>
> The general opinion of those present was that BSE, as
> an
> overt disease phenomenon, _could exist in the USA, but
> if it did,
> it was very rare. The need for improved and specific
> surveillance
> methods to detect it as recognised...
>
> snip...
>
> It is clear that USDA have little information and _no_
> regulatory
> responsibility for rendering plants in the US...
>
> snip...
>
> 3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The
> US approach
> was to accord it a _very low profile indeed_. Dr. A
> Thiermann showed
> the picture in the ''Independent'' with cattle being
> incinerated and thought
> this was a fanatical incident to be _avoided_ in the
> US _at all costs_...
>
> snip...
>
> http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11b/tab01.pdf
>
> To be published in the Proceedings of the
> Fourth International Scientific Congress in
> Fur Animal Production. Toronto, Canada,
> August 21-28, 1988
>
> Evidence That Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy
> Results from Feeding Infected Cattle
>
> R.F. Marsh* and G.R. Hartsough
>
> .Department of Veterinary Science, University of
> Wisconsin-Madison, Madison,
> Wisconsin 53706; and ^Emba/Creat Lakes Ranch Service,
> Thiensville, Wisconsin 53092
>
> ABSTRACT
> Epidemiologic investigation of a new incidence of
> transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) in
> Stetsonville, Wisconsin
> suggests that the disease may have resulted from
> feeding infected
> cattle to mink. This observation is supported by the
> transmission of
> a TME-like disease to experimentally inoculated
> cattle, and by the
> recent report of a new bovine spongiform
> encephalopathy in
> England.
>
> INTRODUCTION
>
> Transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) was first
> reported in 1965 by Hartsough
> and Burger who demonstrated that the disease was
> transmissible with a long incubation
> period, and that affected mink had a spongiform
> encephalopathy similar to that found in
> scrapie-affecied sheep (Hartsough and Burger, 1965;
> Burger and Hartsough, 1965).
> Because of the similarity between TME and scrapie, and
> the subsequent finding that the
> two transmissible agents were indistinguishable (Marsh
> and Hanson, 1969), it was
> concluded that TME most likely resulted from feeding
> mink scrapie-infecied sheep.
> The experimental transmission of sheep scrapie to mink
> (Hanson et al., 1971)
> confirmed the close association of TME and scrapie,
> but at the same time provided
> evidence that they may be different. Epidemiologic
> studies on previous incidences of
> TME indicated that the incubation periods in field
> cases were between six months and
> one year in length (Harxsough and Burger, 1965).
> Experimentally, scrapie could not be
> transmitted to mink in less than one year.
> To investigate the possibility that TME may be caused
> by a (particular strain of
> scrapie which might be highly pathogenic for mink, 21
> different strains of the scrapie
> agent, including their sheep or goat sources, were
> inoculated into a total of 61 mink.
> Only one mink developed a progressive neurologic
> disease after an incubation period of
> 22 mon..s (Marsh and Hanson, 1979). These results
> indicated that TME was either caused
> by a strain of sheep scrapie not yet tested, or was
> due to exposure to a scrapie-like agent
> from an unidentified source.
>
> OBSERVATIONS AND RESULTS
>
> A New Incidence of TME. In April of 1985, a mink
> rancher in Stetsonville, Wisconsin
> reported that many of his mink were "acting funny",
> and some had died. At this time, we
> visited the farm and found that approximately 10% of
> all adult mink were showing
> typical signs of TME: insidious onset characterized by
> subtle behavioral changes, loss of
> normal habits of cleanliness, deposition of droppings
> throughout the pen rather than in a
> single area, hyperexcitability, difficulty in chewing
> and swallowing, and tails arched over
> their _backs like squirrels. These signs were followed
> by progressive deterioration of
> neurologic function beginning with locomoior
> incoordination, long periods of somnolence
> in which the affected mink would stand motionless with
> its head in the corner of the
> cage, complete debilitation, and death. Over the next
> 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of
> all the adult mink on the farm died from TME.
> Since previous incidences of TME were associated with
> common or shared feeding
> practices, we obtained a careful history of feed
> ingredients used over the past 12-18
> months. The rancher was a "dead stock" feeder using
> mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy
> cattle and a few horses. Sheep had never been fed.
>
> Experimental Transmission. The clinical diagnosis of
> TME was confirmed by
> histopaihologic examination and by experimental
> transmission to mink after incubation
> periods of four months. To investigate the possible
> involvement of cattle in this disease
> cycle, two six-week old castrated Holstein bull calves
> were inoculated intracerebrally
> with a brain suspension from affected mink. Each
> developed a fatal spongiform
> encephalopathy after incubation periods of 18 and 19
> months.
>
> DISCUSSION
> These findings suggest that TME may result from
> feeding mink infected cattle and
> we have alerted bovine practitioners that there may
> exist an as yet unrecognized
> scrapie-like disease of cattle in the United States
> (Marsh and Hartsough, 1986). A new
> bovine spongiform encephalopathy has recently been
> reported in England (Wells et al.,
> 1987), and investigators are presently studying its
> transmissibility and possible
> relationship to scrapie. Because this new bovine
> disease in England is characterized by
> behavioral changes, hyperexcitability, and
> agressiveness, it is very likely it would be
> confused with rabies in the United Stales and not be
> diagnosed. Presently, brains from
> cattle in the United States which are suspected of
> rabies infection are only tested with
> anti-rabies virus antibody and are not examined
> histopathologically for lesions of
> spongiform encephalopathy.
> We are presently pursuing additional studies to
> further examine the possible
> involvement of cattle in the epidemiology of TME. One
> of these is the backpassage of
> our experimental bovine encephalopathy to mink.
> Because (here are as yet no agent-
> specific proteins or nucleic acids identified for
> these transmissible neuropathogens, one
> means of distinguishing them is by animal passage and
> selection of the biotype which
> grows best in a particular host. This procedure has
> been used to separate hamster-
> adapted and mink-udapted TME agents (Marsh and Hanson,
> 1979). The intracerebral
> backpassage of the experimental bovine agent resulted
> in incubations of only four months
> indicating no de-adaptation of the Stetsonville agent
> for mink after bovine passage.
> Mink fed infected bovine brain remain normal after six
> months. It will be essential to
> demonstrate oral transmission fiom bovine to mink it
> this proposed epidemiologic
> association is to be confirmed.
>
> ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
> These studies were supported by the College of
> Agricultural and Life Sciences,
> University of Wisconsin-Madison and by a grant
> (85-CRCR-1-1812) from the United
> States Department of Agriculture. The authors also
> wish to acknowledge the help and
> encouragement of Robert Hanson who died during the
> course of these investigations.
>
> REFERENCES
> Burger, D. and Hartsough, G.R. 1965. Encephalopathy of
> mink. II. Experimental and
> natural transmission. J. Infec. Dis. 115:393-399.
> Hanson, R.P., Eckroade, R.3., Marsh, R.F., ZuRhein,
> C.M., Kanitz, C.L. and Gustatson,
> D.P. 1971. Susceptibility of mink to sheep scrapie.
> Science 172:859-861.
> Hansough, G.R. and Burger, D. 1965. Encephalopathy of
> mink. I. Epizoociologic and
> clinical observations. 3. Infec. Dis. 115:387-392.
> Marsh, R.F. and Hanson, R.P. 1969. Physical and
> chemical properties of the
> transmissible mink encephalopathy agent. 3. ViroL
> 3:176-180.
> Marsh, R.F. and Hanson, R.P. 1979. On the origin of
> transmissible mink
> encephalopathy. In Hadlow, W.J. and Prusiner, S.P.
> (eds.) Slow transmissible
> diseases of the nervous system. Vol. 1, Academic
> Press, New York, pp 451-460.
> Marsh, R.F. and Hartsough, G.R. 1986. Is there a
> scrapie-like disease in cattle?
> Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Western Conference
> for Food Animal Veterinary
> Medicine. University of Arizona, pp 20.
> Wells, G.A.H., Scott, A.C., Johnson, C.T., Cunning,
> R.F., Hancock, R.D., Jeffrey, M.,
> Dawson, M. and Bradley, R. 1987. A novel progressive
> spongiform encephalopathy
> in cattle. Vet. Rec. 121:419-420.
>
> MARSH
>
> http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf
>
>
> TSS
>
>
>


September 13,2004

USDA, FSTS

Docket Clerk

300 12* Street, SW

Room 102, Cotton Annex

Washington, DC 20250

04-021ANPR

04-021ANPR-70

Richard L. Crawford

Re: Docket No: 04-02 1 ANPR Federal Measures to Mitigate BSE Risks: Considerations

for Further Action

Dear Sir or Madame:

On behalf of McDonald's Corporation, which operates more than 13,000 restaurants in

the United States, we appreciate the opportunity to submit comments to this very

important Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM). 69 Fed. Reg. 42288 (July

14,2004).

In previous comments submitted to FSIS regarding the removal of SRI&, McDonalds

fully supported this rule and its immediate implementation. The removal of SRMs from

human food is the primary firewall to protect the US consumer from being exposed to the

BSE agent. While we applaud the requirement for SRM removal, we feel that it is

equally important for FSIS to insure that each slaughterplant which processes cattle have

systems in place which prevent cross contamination between edible tissue and SRMs.

This should include but not be limited to the use of separate equipment, such as knives,

blades, etc. where appropriate. In addition, it is also important that appropriate and

effective disinfection procedures for equipment used to handle SRMs be developed and

approved for use.

It is our opinion that requiring SRM removal without a procedure to prevent cross

contamination is inadequate as a protective public health measure. The TSE agents

@ions) are sticky and highly resistant to disinfection. If SRMs such as brain and spinal

cord are allowed to contact equipment and other surfaces such as deboning tables which

then are used to handle and process edible tissue this could allow contamination and

negates the intention of the ban. This is true not only in plants slaughtering fed cattle

both under and over 30 months but also in plants slaughtering predominately older cattle.

It is important that measure be taken to prevent cross contamination between carcasses

and SRms in the cull plants. McDonalds requires their suppliers to prevent cross

contamination and audits against certain measurable standards such as requiring spinal

cord to bc removed on the kill floor. We would be willing to share these standards with

FSIS as an example.

FSIS Docket No. 04-02 1 ANPR

dooqhl- =w c1qo -

McDonalds again recommends that dura (the covering around the brain and spinal cord)

be added to the list of SRMs. While skull and vertebral column are included as SRMs,

dura is not. If dura is not removed prior to processing on the fabrication floor, it may

come loose and be incorporated into ground product. Bovine dura was never tested for

infectivity. It was assumed that due to direct contact with spinal cord, it may serve as a

vehicle to transmit disease. In addition, human dura has been the source of human to

human transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD). (personal communication - Dr.

Danny Matthews, UK, VLA) Our ISAC committee recommended that McDonalds add

the removal of dura as a specification in the production of our product.

McDonalds urges the USDA to make the appropriate adjustments in the SRM ban if new

scientific findings and/or the results of the increased surveillance warrant a change.

In regards to imported meat products from other countries, McDonalds suggests that no

SRM exemption be made for countries based on BSE risk. The long incubation period

and limited surveillance in many countries can limit the ability to accurately determine

risk. Also, the risk level of a country could potentially change over night if the trading

patterns of a country changed. It seems logistically impossible to maintain a system

which could continually monitor the world's trading patterns. In addition, science has

not provided all of the answers in regards to the transmission of BSE. Requiring SRMs

to be removed from imported products for human food is prudent. If the US would wait

until disease is confirmed the exposure would already have occurred.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on these very important issues.

Richard L. Crawford

Corporat,e Vice President, Government Relations

McDonalds Corporation

1 Kroc Drive

Oak Brook, Illinois 60523

FSIS Docket No. 04-021ANPR



http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/04/sep04/092104/04n-0264-c00140-vol22.pdf





2004N-0264 Federal Measures to Mitigate BSE Risks: Considerations for Further Action

C 136 National Cattlemen's Beef Assn (NCBA) Vol #: 22

C 137 Public Citizen Vol #: 22

C 138 Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) Vol #: 22

C 139 Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) Vol #: 22

C 140 McDonald's Corporation Vol #: 22

C 141 North American Natural Casing Assn (NANCA) Vol #: 22

C 142 National Renderers Assn Vol #: 22

C 143 G.A.O.B., Inc. Vol #: 22

C 144 Gelatin Manufacturers of Europe (GME) Vol #: 22

C 145 IBM Business Consulting Services Vol #: 22

C 146 L. Fischer Vol #: 22

C 147 C. Rothenfluch Vol #: 22

C 148 C. Addonizio Vol #: 22

C 149 M. Clifton Vol #: 22




http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/04/sep04/092104/092104.htm#04N0264





Dockets Entered on December 22, 2005
2005D-0330, Guidance for Industry and FDA Review Staff on Collection of Platelets
by Automated ... EC 203, McDonald's Restaurants Corporation, Vol #:, 34 ...


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/05/Dec05/122205/122205.htm



03-025IF 03-025IF-631 Linda A. Detwiler [PDF]
Page 1. 03-025IF 03-025IF-631 Linda A. Detwiler Page 2. Page 3. Page 4.
Page 5. Page 6. Page 7. Page 8. Page 9. Page 10. Page 11. Page 12.
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-631.pdf - Text Version

03-025IF 03-025IF-634 Linda A. Detwiler [PDF]
Page 1. 03-025IF 03-025IF-634 Linda A. Detwiler Page 2.
Page 3. Page 4. Page 5. Page 6. Page 7. Page 8.
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-634.pdf - Text Version
[ More results from www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/ ]

Page 1 of 17 9/13/2005 [PDF]
... 2005 6:17 PM To: [email protected]. Subject: [Docket No. 03-025IFA]
FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food ...
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf - Text Version

03-025IFA 03-025IFA-6 Jason Frost [PDF]
... Zealand Embassy COMMENTS ON FEDERAL REGISTER 9 CFR Parts 309 et al [Docket No. 03-
025IF] Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food and ...
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-6.pdf - Text Version



http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Search/Search_Results/Index.asp?q=03-025IF&mode=simple&num=10&as_occt=any&restrict=FSIS_DOCKET_COMMENTS



In its opinion of 7-8 December 2000 (EC 2000), the SSC ... [PDF]
Page 1. Linda A. Detwiler, DVM 225 Hwy 35 Red Bank, New Jersey 07701 Phone: 732-741-2290
Cell: 732-580-9391 Fax: 732-741-7751 June 22, 2005 FSIS Docket Clerk US ...
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-589.pdf



http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-589.pdf



Page 1 of 17 9/13/2005 [PDF]
... Page 1 of 17 From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [[email protected]] Sent: Thursday,
September 08, 2005 6:17 PM To: [email protected]. Subject ...
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf



http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf





03-025IF 03-025IF-618 Richard L. Crawford [PDF]
Page 1. 03-025IF 03-025IF-618 Richard L. Crawford
Page 2. Page 3. Page 4.
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-618.pdf -



http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-618.pdf



03-038IF 03-038IF-15 Richard L. Crawford [PDF]
Page 1. 03-038IF 03-038IF-15 Richard L. Crawford
Page 2. Page 3. Page 4.
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-038IF/03-038IF-15.pdf -



http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-038IF/03-038IF-15.pdf



http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-634.pdf



9 December 2005
Division of Dockets Management (RFA-305)
Food and Drug Administration
5630 Fishers Lane
Room 1061
Rockville, MD 20852
Re: Docket No: 2002N-0273 (formerly Docket No. 02N-0273)
Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food and Feed
Dear Sir or Madame:
Serologicals Corporation is a global provider of biological products to life science companies.
The Company's products are essential for the research, development and manufacturing of
biologically based diagnostic, pharmaceutical and biological products. customers include
many of the leading research institutions, diagnostic and pharmaceutical companies throughout
the world. The Company's products and technologies are used in a wide variety of applications
within the areas of neurobiology, cell signaling, oncology, angiogenesis, apoptosis,
developmental biology, cellular physiology, hematology, immunology, cardiology, infectious
diseases and molecular biology.
A number of our products are derived from bovine blood or other bovine tissues sourced in the
United States, hence the overall health of the national herd is extremely important to our
company as well as to our customers and their patients. Some of our bovine based products are
used in the manufacture of vaccines and drugs for humans, hence it is critical that all measures
are taken to assure these are safe and free from disease especially Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy (BSE). The most effective way to insure this is to create a system which
processes cattle that are BSE free. As a company there are a number of precautions that we can
take by our strict specifications but many of the needed precautions require the force of federal
regulation, hence we appreciate the opportunity to submit comments to this very important
proposed rule.
After the identification of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in indigenous North
American cattle, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) responded rapidly to implement
measures to protect public health in regard to food. Our company recognizes and supports the
importance of the current feed ban which went into effect in August 1997. However, given what
is known about the epidemiology and characteristically long incubation period of BSE, we urge
5655 Spalding Drive * Norcross, GA 30092
678-728-2000 * 800-842-9099 * Facsimile 678-728-2299
www.serologicais.com
Division of Dockets Management (HFA-305)
Page 2
9 December 2005
the FDA to act without further delay and implement additional measures which will reduce the
risk of BSE recycling in the US cattle herd.
We feel that for the FDA to provide a more comprehensive and protective feed ban, specified
risk materials (SRMs) and deadstock must be removed from all animal feed and that legal
exemptions which allow ruminant protein to be fed back to ruminants (with the exception of
milk) should be discontinued.
SRMs, as defined by the USDA, are tissues which, in a BSE infected animal, are known to either
harbor BSE infectivity or to be closely associated with infectivity. If SRMs are not removed,
they may introduce BSE infectivity and continue to provide a source of animal feed
contamination. Rendering will reduce infectivity but it will not totally eliminate it. This is
significant as research in the United Kingdom has shown that a calf may be infected with BSE
by the ingestion of as little as .OOl gram of untreated brain.
The current proposed rule falls short of this and would still leave a potential source of infectivity
in the system. In fact by the FDA's own statement the exempted tissues which are known to
have infectivity (such as distal ileum, DRGs, etc) would cumulatively amount to 10% of the
infectivity in an infected animal, This proposed rule would still allow for the possibility that
cattle could be exposed to BSE through:
1. Feeding of materials currently subject to legal exemptions from the ban (e.g., poultry
litter, plate waste)
2. Cross feeding (the feeding of non-ruminant rations to ruminants) on farms; and
3. Cross contamination of ruminant and non-ruminant feed
We are most concerned that the FDA has chosen to include a provision which would allow
tissues from deadstock into the feed chain. We do not support the provision to allow the removal
of brain and spinal cord from down and deadstock over 30 months of age for several reasons.
These are the animals with the highest level of infectivity in tissues which include more than
brain and spinal cord. We do not feel that there can be adequate removal and enforcement of this
regulation especially during warmer weather. In addition there is emerging information that at
end stage disease, infectivity may also be included in additionai tissues such as peripheral nerves
(Buschmann and Groschup, 2005).
Leaving the tissues from these cattle in the animal feed chain will effectively nullify the intent of
this regulation. This point is illustrated by the 2001 Harvard risk assessment model which
demonstrated that eliminating dead and downer, 4D cattle, from the feed stream was a
disproportionately effective means of reducing the risk of re-infection "The disposition of c&e
that die on the farm would also have a substantial influence on the spread of BSE if the disease
were in traduced. " The base case scenario showed that the mean total number ofID.50~ (i.e.,
dosage sufficient to infect SO percent of exposed cattte) from healthy animals at slaughter
presented to the food/feed system was 1500, The mean total number of ID.50.s from adult cattle
Division of Dockets Management (HFA-305)
Page 3
9 December 2005
deadstockpresented to the feed system was 3 7,000.
deadstock).
This illustrates the risk of "40 cattle" (i.e.,
From the Harvard Risk Assessment, 2001, Appendix 3A Base Case and Harvard Risk
Assessment, 200 1 Executive Summary
Serologicals and companies like ours which supply components of drugs and biologicals have a
responsibility to the manufacturers of these products, the medical community and their patients
as well as regulatory agencies throughout the world to provide the safest products as possible.
Since there is no test for BSE in live cattle or for product, the regulatory agencies throughout the
world expect us to reduce or eliminate risk via suurcing criteria, These parameters may include
but not be limited to country of origin, herd of origin, age of the animal, etc. The United States
is no longer a country with negligible risk, hence individual animal criteria has become more
important. In fact other Centers of the FDA have stated that more attention should be given to
sourcing from herds likely to be a source of BSE free animals. The exemptions in the current
ban as well as in the newly proposed rule make this difficult if not impossible as there are still
legal avenues for ruminants to consume potentially contaminated ruminant protein. In addition,
the USDA still has not implemented a system of identification and traceability.
Serologicals urges agencies of the US government to work with academia and industry on
research in the following areas:
e Methods to inactivate TSEs agents which then may allow a product to be used and even
fed to animals without risk
l Alternative uses for animal byproducts which would maintain value
Serologicals will continue to work with the FDA and other government agencies to implement a
strong BSE risk control program, Serologicals would like to reiterate our opinion that for the
FDA to provide a more comprehensive and protective feed ban, specified risk materials (SRMs)
and deadstock mu

 

[flounder]

e Methods to inactivate TSEs agents which then may allow a product to be used and even
fed to animals without risk
l Alternative uses for animal byproducts which would maintain value
Serologicals will continue to work with the FDA and other government agencies to implement a
strong BSE risk control program, Serologicals would like to reiterate our opinion that for the
FDA to provide a more comprehensive and protective feed ban, specified risk materials (SRMs)
and deadstock must be removed from all animal feed and that legal exemptions which allow
ruminant protein to be fed back to ruminants (with the exception of milk) should be
discontinued. Thank you for the opportunity to submit these comments to the public record.
Respectfully,
SEROLOGICALS CORPORATION
James J. Kramer, Ph.D.
Vice President, Corporate Operations


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0273/02n-0273-c000383-01-vol35.pdf


C 435 Government of Japan Vol #: 36


snip...


The Food safety risk assessment related to the import of beef and beef offal from the U.S.A. and Canada by the Food Safety Commission of Japan (FSC) was completed on December 8, 2005. REGARDING the feed ban, the following was noted as an ADDENDUM TO THE CONCLUSION ON THE RISK ASSESSMENT REPORT OF FSC:


"To prevent BSE exposure and amplification in U.S.A. and Canada, the use of SRM must be prohibited COMPLETELY. The ban must be applied not only to cattle feed but ALSO TO ALL OTHER ANIMAL FOOD/FEED that may cause cross-contamination."

snip...


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0273/02n-0273-c000435-01-vol36.pdf



TSS


----- Original Message -----
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <[email protected]>
To: <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, January 10, 2006 9:26 AM
Subject: Report: Inspections of Canadian meat imports are lacking (so tell us something we don't know)


##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################

Subject: Report: Inspections of Canadian meat imports are lacking (so tell us something we don't know)
Date: January 10, 2006 at 7:05 am PST
Jan. 10, 2006, 6:36AM
Report: Inspections of Canadian meat imports are lacking


By LIBBY QUAID
Associated Press

WASHINGTON -- Two years ago, U.S. food safety officials warned that Canadian meat and poultry inspections were lacking, yet the Agriculture Department refused to stop the flow of imports from Canada, a department investigation found.

Since then, 4.4 billion pounds of processed meat made its way to U.S. supermarkets and restaurants, according to a report from the department's inspector general.
The Agriculture Department said Monday it had addressed problems at individual Canadian plants, some of which lost export privileges. "In no instance was public health placed at risk," said Richard Raymond, undersecretary for food safety.

Meanwhile, Canada has altered its system in an attempt to comply with U.S. rules. As the leading foreign supplier of fresh and frozen red meat to the U.S., Canada shipped more than $2 billion worth in 2004, according to department reports.

In a November 2003 memo to then-Secretary Ann Veneman, the department's Food Safety and Inspection Service warned that public health could be compromised if the agency didn't respond immediately to deficiencies in Canada's system.

Yet food safety officials postponed a review of Canada's system the following year. According to an internal e-mail, Veneman directed FSIS to work with Canadian inspection officials to resolve the differences.

"When FSIS officials returned to Canada in May 2005, they continued to find the same types of deficiencies they found in 2003," the report said.

The department halted shipments of beef and live cattle after the discovery of mad cow disease in Canada in 2003; those restrictions have since been lifted.

The report was obtained Monday by The Associated Press.

The inspector general identified three big concerns with Canadian inspections:

—Inspections were not done daily at Canadian food processing plants.

—Canada lacked adequate sanitation controls.

—Inspectors didn't sample ready-to-eat products for listeria, which can cause deadly food poisoning.

Daily inspections are required at U.S. processing plants, and the law requires foreign countries to have equivalent inspections.

U.S. officials halted imports from Australia in June 2004 and Belgium in 2003 because those countries didn't have daily inspections, the report noted.

A critic said the Agriculture Department seems to have a "make it up as we go" attitude in deciding which country's standards match U.S. standards.

"This undermines the integrity of American food safety standards and consumer confidence in our meat supply," said Iowa Sen. Tom Harkin, senior Democrat on the Senate Agriculture Committee.

Raymond noted that U.S. inspectors have doubled their testing for listeria at Canadian ports in the past two years.

Canada has made changes since last year, a Canadian Food Inspection Agency official said.

Daily inspections have been done at processing plants since late summer, said Bill Anderson, CFIA director of food of animal origin. Canada is still trying to get the Agriculture Department to accept its previous random inspection system, he said.

Canada's tests for listeria are internationally recognized, but inspectors there have switched to the U.S. approach of testing finished products, Anderson said. And all processing plants have been ordered to comply with sanitation controls similar to those in the U.S., he said.

The Agriculture Department said it will take until 2007 to make a final decision on whether Canada's system is equivalent to the U.S. system.


http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/business/3576944.html


Also Friday, Agriculture Secretary Ann Veneman said the USDA is
investigating whether the United States wrongly imported millions of
pounds of Canadian beef that were banned because of mad cow disease
concerns.

R-CALF United Stockgrowers of America, a U.S. cattle industry group,
this week accused the USDA of improperly allowing imports of 3.5 million
pounds of Canadian bone-in meat products between September 2003 and
February 2004.

The beef products have been banned in the United States as a safety
precaution since Canada discovered a domestic case of mad cow disease
one year ago.

Reuters News Service contributed to this report.

http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/business/2557679


Docket No. 03-080-1 -- USDA ISSUES PROPOSED RULE TO ALLOW LIVE ANIMAL
IMPORTS FROM CANADA


https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/BSEcom.nsf/0/b78ba677e2b0c12185256dd300649f9d?OpenDocument&AutoFramed



Date: 9/1/2004

GAIN Report Number: CA4063

CA4063

Canada

Livestock and Products

Annual

2004

http://www.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200409/146107419.pdf


BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENT CANADA


snip...


Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 2, 1-15 on the Assessment of the

Geographical BSE Risk of Canada

- 10 -

• However, SRM are rendered together with other slaughter waste and fallen stock.

However, according to the CD, MBM with SRM is not permitted to be fed to

ruminants.

Conclusion on the ability to avoid recycling

• Between 1980 and 1997 the Canadian system would not have been able to avoid

recycling of the BSE-agent to any measurable extent. If the BSE-agent was

introduced into the feed chain, it could have reached cattle.

• Since 1997 this ability gradually improved with the introduction of the ruminant

MBM ban and its implementation.

• Since cross-contamination cannot be excluded, and as SRM is still rendered by

processes unable to significantly reduce BSE-infectivity, the system is still unable to

avoid recycling of BSE-infectivity already present in the system or incoming.

3.2 Overall appreciation of the ability to identify BSE-cases and to

eliminate animals at risk of being infected before they are processed

Cattle population structure

• Cattle population: 12.15 Million in 1988 increasing to 14.6 Million in 2001;

• Of the total cattle population, 2.2 million are dairy cattle and 12.4 million are beef.

• The cattle population above 24 months of age: approx. 6.0 Million.

• Of the approximately 2.2 Million dairy cattle 2 Million are located in the two eastern

provinces Ontario and Quebec.

• Mixed farming (cattle and mono-gastric species) is usually not practiced; the

country expert estimated the proportion of mixed farming to be less than 1%.

• Individual regions traditionally have ID systems under provincial authorities. Brand

inspectors are present when cattle are assembled. It is estimated by the Canadians

that the level of a national, uniform ID for cattle is less than 10%; most of those

individual pedigree animals. Mandatory ID for the milk-fed veal sector was

implemented in Quebec in 1996, but does not contain information on the herd of

origin. An agreement of the relevant industries to develop a national cattle ID and

trace back strategy was reached on 1 May 1998 (starting in 2001).Since 2002, a

national identification program is existing. Al cattle leaving any farm premises must

be uniquely identified by ear tag.

BSE surveillance

• BSE was made notifiable in 1990.

• Every cow over one year of age exhibiting central nervous system signs suggestive

of BSE submitted to a laboratory or presented at an abattoir is subjected to a BSE

laboratory diagnostic test (histology and over the past years also PrPSc-based

laboratory tests).

• In addition, cattle submitted for rabies examination and found rabies negative are

examined for BSE. Samples are prepared immediately upon arrival to the federal

laboratory responsible for the rabies diagnostic for possible later BSE examination,

i.e. formalin fixation.

• Since the 1940's, a rabies control program has been in place, where farmers,

veterinarians and the general public are well educated about this neurological

Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 2, 1-15 on the Assessment of the

Geographical BSE Risk of Canada

- 11 -

disease. In 1990, when BSE was made notifiable, this awareness was extended to

suspicions of BSE.

• Since 1993 the number of brains examined per year did exceed the number

recommended by OIE (300 - 336 for countries with a cattle population over 24

months of age of 5.0 to 7.0 Million) in all years, except in 1995 (table 4).

year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

samples 225 645 426 269 454 759 940 895 1´020 1´581 3´377 3´361

Table 4: Number of bovine brains annually examined for CNS diseases, including BSE.

• According to the CD approx. 98% of the examined cattle were older than 24 months

and approx. 90% exhibited neurological symptoms. Although the identification

system of Canada does not document the birth date or age of the animals, according

to the CD, examination of the dentition is used to ascertain the maturity of the

animals.

• The list of neurological differential diagnoses for the 754 brains examined in 1997

included encephalitis (70 cases), encephalomalacia (19), hemophilus (7),

hemorrhage (2), listeriosis (38), meningoencephalitis (36), rabies (22), tumors (2),

other conditions (135) and no significant findings (423).

• Compensation is paid for suspect BSE cases as well as for animals ordered to be

destroyed (90-95% of market value with a maximum of 2,500 Can$ per cow).

• Diagnostic criteria developed in the United Kingdom are followed at ADRI,

Nepean. According to the very detailed protocol for the collection, fixation and

submission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) specimens at abattoirs

under inspection by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, the specimen shall be

shipped to National Center for Foreign Animal Disease, Winnipeg, Manitoba.

• In 2003, around 3000 animals from risk populations have been tested.

• According to the CD, it is aimed to test a minimum of 8000 risk animals (animals

with clinical signs consistent with BSE, downer cows, animals died on farm animals

diseased or euthanized because of serious illness) in 2004 and then continue to

progressively increase the level of testing to 30,000.

• In May 2003, Canada reported its first case of domestic BSE. A second case was

detected in the US on 23 December 2003 and traced back to Canadian origin. Both

were born before the feed ban and originated from Western Canada.

3.3 Overall assessment of the stability

For the overall assessment of the stability, the impact of the three main stability factors

(i.e. feeding, rendering and SRM-removal) and of the additional stability factor,

surveillance, has to be estimated. Again, the guidance provided by the SSC in its

opinion on the GBR of July 2000 (as updated January 2002) is applied.

Feeding

Until 1997, it was legally possible to feed ruminant MBM to cattle and a certain fraction of

cattle feed (for calves and dairy cattle) is assumed to have contained MBM. Therefore

feeding was "Not OK". In August 1997 a ruminant MBM ban was introduced but feeding

of non-ruminant MBM to cattle remained legal as well as feeding of ruminant MBM to

non-ruminant animals. This makes control of the feed ban very difficult because laboratory

differentiation between ruminant and non ruminant MBM is difficult if not impossible.

Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 2, 1-15 on the Assessment of the

Geographical BSE Risk of Canada

Due to the highly specialised production system in Canada, various mammalian MBM

streams can be separated. Such a feed ban would therefore be assessed as "reasonably

OK", for all regions where this highly specialised system exists. However, several areas

in Canada do have mixed farming and mixed feed mills, and in such regions, an RMBM

ban would not suffice. Additionally, official controls for cattle feeds to control for the

compliance with the ban were not started until the end of 2003. Thus, for the whole

country, the assessment of the feeding after 1997 remains "Not OK".

Rendering

The rendering industry is operating with processes that are not known to reduce infectivity.

It is therefore concluded that the rendering was and is "Not OK".

SRM-removal

SRM and fallen stock were and are rendered for feed. Therefore SRM-removal is assessed

as "Not OK"


snip...


4.2 Risk that BSE infectivity entered processing

A certain risk that BSE-infected cattle entered processing in Canada, and were at least

partly rendered for feed, occurred in the early 1990s when cattle imported from UK in

the mid 80s could have been slaughtered. This risk continued to exist, and grew

significantly in the mid 90's when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached

processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with

continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.

4.3 Risk that BSE infectivity was recycled and propagated

A risk that BSE-infectivity was recycled and propagated exists since a processing risk

first appeared; i.e. in the early 90s. Until today this risk persists and increases fast

because of the extremely unstable BSE/cattle system in Canada.

5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK

5.1 The current GBR as function of the past stability and challenge

The current geographical BSE-risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is confirmed at a lower level

that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent.

This assessment deviates from the previous assessment (SSC opinion, 2000) because at

that time several exporting countries were not considered a potential risk.

snip...

full text;



http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/efsa_scientific_reports/gbr_assessments/scr_annexes/563/sr02_biohaz02_canada_report_annex_en1.pdf



-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Statement by Agriculture Secretary Ann M. Veneman Regarding Canada's Announcement of BSE Investigation May 20, 2003
Date: Tue, 20 May 2003 12:53:17 -0500
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
To: [email protected]


######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########

Release No. 0166.03

Statement by Agriculture Secretary Ann M. Veneman
Regarding Canada's Announcement of BSE Investigation
May 20, 2003


"I have spoken with Canada's Agriculture and Agri-Food Minister Lyle Vanclief a short time ago about Canada's investigation and feel that all appropriate measures are being taken in what appears to be an isolated case of bovine spongiform encephalophathy. Information suggests that risk to human health and the possibility of transmission to animals in the United States is very low.

"USDA is placing Canada under its BSE restriction guidelines and will not accept any ruminants or ruminant products from Canada pending further investigation. We are dispatching a technical team to Canada to assist in the investigation and will provide more detailed information as it becomes available."

"The United States remains diligent in its BSE surveillance and prevention efforts. In 1997, the Food and Drug Administration prohibited the use of most mammalian protein in the manufacture of animal feed intended for cows and other ruminants to stop the way the disease is thought to spread.

"Since 1989, the U.S. government has taken a series of preventive actions to protect against this animal disease. This includes USDA prohibitions on the import of live ruminants, such as cattle, sheep, goats and most ruminant products from countries that have or are considered to be at risk for having BSE.
"In fiscal year 2002, USDA tested 19,990 cattle for BSE using a targeted surveillance approach designed to test the highest risk animals, including downer animals (animals that are non-ambulatory at slaughter), animals that die on the farm, older animals and animals exhibiting signs of neurological distress."


#TSS

USDA News
[email protected].
202 720-9035

########### http://mailhost.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html ############

FDA
Statement on BSE Cow in Alberta, Canada
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has
learned from the government of Canada that
the brain of an eight-year old cow in a remote
area of Alberta has tested positive for bovine
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, also known as "Mad Cow Disease").
According to Canadian officials, meat from the cow did not enter the food supply. The animal had been on the farm in Alberta for three years. Although BSE has not been shown to be transmitted among cows in a herd, as a precaution the herd in Alberta is being destroyed.


http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2003/NEW00908.html


######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########


Greetings BSE-L,


i believe i sent this through before, but thought under the circumstances,

i would pass through again. i did not read over all of it, maybe be more?


TSS


1994 UK EXPORTS BEEF VEAL USA , MEXICO $ CANADA ONLY

other Countries list in PDF file)


USA -------- TOTALS ''8'' TONS

CANADA -- TOTALS ''29'' TONS


1995 UK EXPORT BEEF AND VEAL TO USA AND CANADA


USA ------- TOTALS ''358'' TONS


CANADA --TOTALS ''24'' TONS


BONE-IN BEEF AND VEAL


USA-------- TOTALS ''10'' TONS (i think this is part of the 358 tons

above?)


UK EXPORT OF LIKE CATTLE TO USA AND CANADA


1986 TO 1996 USA TOTAL = 1297


1986 TO 1996 CAN TOTAL = 299


http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11f/tab10.pdf


UK EXPORT MEAT OR OFFAL OF BOVINE ANIMALS DEC 1987


CANADA -- 64,526 KG


UK EXPORT OFFALS OF BOVINE ANIMALS FRESH CHILLED

OR FROZEN OTHER THAN LIVER DEC 1987 YTD


USA -- 45,943 KG


UK EXPORT MEAT OF BOVINE ANIMAL WITH BONE IN 1988


CANADA -- 4,163 KG


PREP OR PRES MEAT OR OFFAL OF BOVINE ANIMALS CUMULATIVE

TO DEC 1988


USA -------- 28,609 KG

CANADA -- 22,044 KG


MEAT OF BOVINE ANIMALS WITH BONE IN CUMULATIVE TO ANUAL 1989


USA -------- 17,880 KG

MEXICO---- 33,444 KG


BONELESS MEAT OF BOVINE 1989


USA --------111,953 KG

CANADA---1,800 KG

MEXICO --- 1,143,387 KG


EDIBLE OFFAL OF BOVINE ANIMALS 1989


USA -------- 19,980 KG

MEXICO--- 31,244 KG


MORE........


MEAT OF BOVINE ANIMALS BONELESS 1990


USA 146,443


http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11g/tab05.pdf



Other US BSE risks: the imported products picture


http://www.mad-cow.org/00/jul00_dont_eat_sheep.html#hhh


GLOBAL EXPORTS OF UK SHEEP/GOATS (BSE?)...TSS



http://www.vegsource.com/talk/madco...es/9912070.html


Terry


Meat and bonemeal is not specifically classified for overseas trade

purposes. The nearest equivalent is listed as "flours and meals of meat

or offals (including tankage), unfit for human consumption; greaves". UK

exports of this to the US are listed below:


Country Tonnes

1980

1981 12

1982

1983

1984 10

1985 2

1986

1987

1988

1989 20

1990


Data for exports between 1975 and 1979 are not readily available. These

can be obtained (at a charge) from data retailers appointed by HM

Customs and Excise: BTSL (Tel: 01372 463121) or Abacus (01245 252222).


Best wishes

Simon Pearsall

Overseas trade statistics Stats (C&F)C


Simon

as discussed

thanks

Julie

-----


snip...end...no url...TSS


FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
July 29, 2004


Statement of Senator Tom Daschle on USDA's Recall of Canadian Beef

WASHINGTON, DC - The Bush Administration announced today that 41,000
pounds of additional Canadian ground beef were allowed into the U.S.,
despite a current ban resulting from a Canadian Mad Cow Case.

Officials at the U.S. Department of Agriculture issued a recall notice
for 170,000 pounds of beef products that included the 41,000 pounds of
illegally imported Canadian ground beef. Senator Daschle issued the
following statement on USDA's actions:

"I am troubled that additional Canadian ground beef has been allowed
into the United States - despite a ban on such products. The Bush
Administration has wrestled with multiple issues related to the Canadian
border since the discovery of Mad Cow disease in Canada in May of 2003.
That's why I am glad the USDA's Inspector General agreed to my request
for an investigation into the regulatory policy and enforcement lapses
that undermined producers' and consumers' confidence in the agency.

"The Bush Administration should take this opportunity to announce they
will not re-open our border to additional Canadian beef products until
the Inspector General has completed her investigation and the necessary
policy reforms are put in place.

"Many of my colleagues on the Senate Agriculture Committee have joined
me in calling for an oversight hearing. Producers in South Dakota and
across the country deserve answers, and this latest recall announcement
only underscores the need for USDA to appear before Congress and provide
them."

------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://daschle.senate.gov/~daschle/pressroom/releases/04/07/2004729403.html


HARKIN SEEKS ANSWERS ABOUT USDA'S BSE TESTING APPROACH

WEDNESDAY, JULY 21, 2004
WASHINGTON, D.C. – Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) today sent a letter to
Comptroller General David Walker requesting the Government
Accountability Office (formerly the General Accounting Office) look into
questions regarding the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) handling of
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) surveillance. Since the discovery
of the disease in a cow in Washington state, a number incidents and
statements by USDA officials have raised concern about the department's
approach to handling this issue.

"USDA is still stumbling to pull together a coherent strategy and
program of BSE testing and other measures to protect U.S. consumers and
our beef industry against the risks of BSE," Harkin said. "While I
believe these risks are pretty small, we cannot be complacent until USDA
collects the information. Without information, we are only speculating
and whistling in the dark."

Specifically, Harkin cited questions as to the downer status of the
Washington state cow, failure to take samples from a suspicious cow at a
Texas slaughter facility, and concerns about the scientific and
statistical basis for USDA's revised testing system.

Last week, USDA's Office of Inspector General issued a scathing report
citing many shortcomings in USDA's approach. Harkin is calling on GAO to
review additional concerns, including:

Has USDA identified the most scientifically valid sub-populations and
the proper statistical number of cattle to determine effectively the
prevalence of BSE in the United States?

Has USDA made provisions to obtain all the samples necessary to
determine accurately the existence and prevalence of BSE in the United
States?

Has USDA implemented effective procedures to assure that all parties
collecting samples for BSE testing are properly trained?

Is the voluntary sample submission protocol effective for obtaining a
sample population representative of the at-risk cattle population?

Has USDA identified proper incentives to assure suspect cattle on farms
will be reported?

Has USDA made provisions to assure the federal and state actions in the
surveillance plan are well coordinated?

Are there effective procedures and policies in place to ensure effective
coordination and co-regulation of BSE surveillance by APHIS and FSIS? A
copy of the letter is available upon request.


http://harkin.senate.gov/news.cfm?id=224521



> Terry S. Singeltary Sr. wrote:
>
>> ######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
>> #########
>>
>> Prosecutors eyeing possible criminal violations in cattle futures
>> market
>>
>>
>> By MARCY GORDON AP Business Writer
>> The Associated Press - Thursday, May 13, 2004
>>
>>
>> WASHINGTON
>>
>> Federal prosecutors are looking into possible criminal violations by
>> commodities traders who may have received advance knowledge about the
>> first U.S. case of mad cow disease and used it to reap profits in the
>> cattle futures market.
>>
>> The disclosure of an investigation by criminal authorities, being
>> conducted in tandem with a previously known civil probe by the Commodity
>> Futures Trading Commission, was made by agency chairman James Newsome on
>> Thursday in testimony before the Senate Agriculture Committee.
>>
>> "We take very seriously allegations of leaked information or people
>> trading upon leaked information. That is something we are looking at,"
>> Newsome said in response to a question from Sen. Kent Conrad, D-N.D. He
>> said the CFTC is cooperating in a probe with the U.S. attorney's office
>> in Washington, which is expected to be completed this summer.
>>
>> Newsome told reporters after the hearing, "There are potential
>> violations of both civil and criminal laws here."
>>
>> Justice Department spokesmen didn't immediately return a telephone call
>> seeking comment.
>>
>> In a months-long investigation, the CFTC has examined cattle-futures
>> trading data on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange as far back as Dec. 9,
>> 2003 - the day a diseased Canadian Holstein was slaughtered in
>> Washington state and two weeks before the Agriculture Department
>> confirmed it as the country's first case of mad cow disease.
>>
>> The CFTC investigators have focused on traders who bet that cattle
>> prices would decline prior to the Dec. 23 announcement by Agriculture
>> Secretary Ann Veneman. The investigators have been trying to determine
>> whether information about the infected cow had been leaked, and by whom,
>> before Dec. 23.
>>
>> The source of any information leak also could be charged.
>>
>> Lawmakers have questioned Veneman about whether the department waited
>> too long before announcing that the diseased Holstein contracted the
>> disease in Canada, thereby fueling market uncertainty and unusual
>> volatility in prices of cattle futures traded on the mercantile
>> exchange.
>>
>> Veneman has said the USDA informed the public as quickly as it could -
>> initially that a Holstein in Washington state had mad cow, and later
>> that it was born in Canada and apparently became infected there.
>>
>> Prior to the announcement of the diagnosis on Dec. 23, the front-month
>> cattle futures contract settled for the day at 90.675 cents per pound on
>> the exchange. Within a week, the price had fallen below 74 cents per
>> pound, potentially yielding huge profits for investors who bet that the
>> price would fall by taking so-called short positions.
>>
>> Price movements "were clearly unusual," Conrad noted at the hearing. If
>> trading on advance information did occur, he said, "That is really
>> something that cannot be tolerated. That is something that throws the
>> credibility of the markets in question."
>>
>> Investors who take short positions borrow the securities or commodities
>> in question from a broker in hopes of replacing them later with cheaper
>> ones, thereby reaping a profit.
>>
>> The Chicago Mercantile Exchange has cooperated with the investigation,
>> CFTC officials have said.
>>
>> In cases of alleged illegal insider trading, the government doesn't
>> always bring criminal charges. It depends partly on the severity of the
>> alleged violations and how much money the person made from the
>> transactions.
>>
>> __
>>
>> On the Net:
>>
>> Commodity Futures Trading Commission: http://www.cftc.gov
>>
>> http://www.in-forum.com/ap/index.cfm?page=view&id=D82HSS500
>>
>> Statement of the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
>> Issued: January 28, 2004
>>
>> U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION PURSUES "MAD COW" AND NATURAL
>> GAS INVESTIGATIONS
>>
>> Washington, D.C. - The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
>> announced today that it is investigating two matters of broad public
>> interest. The first investigation, which began in late December 2003, is
>> looking at the possibility that certain commodity traders had advance
>> knowledge of an announcement last month that "mad cow" disease had been
>> found in a cattle herd in the northwestern U.S. A CFTC spokesman says
>> the investigation seeks to determine whether news of the announcement
>> was leaked in advance from government or other sources.
>>
>> snip...
>>
>> http://www.cftc.gov/opa/press04/opa0000-04.htm
>>
>> From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
>> (216-119-138-126.ipset18.wt.net)
>> Subject: U.S. Emergency Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Response Plan
>> Summary
>> Date: Tue, 4 May 1999 18:25:12 -0500
>> TO BSE-L
>>
>>
>> The mission of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is to enhance
>> the quality of life for the American people by supporting production
>> agriculture; ensuring a safe, affordable, nutritious, and accessible
>> food supply; caring for agricultural, forest, and range lands;
>> supporting sound development of rural communities; providing economic
>> opportunities for farm and rural residents; expanding global markets for
>> agricultural and forest products and services; and working to reduce
>> hunger in America and throughout the world.
>>
>> USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is responsible
>> for ensuring the health and care of animals and plants. APHIS improves
>> agricultural productivity and competitiveness and contributes to the
>> national economy and the public health. USDA's Food Safety and
>> Inspection Service (FSIS) is responsible for protecting the Nation's
>> meat and poultry supply--making sure it is safe, wholesome,
>> unadulterated, and properly labeled and packaged. These two agencies
>> have come together to lead USDA's actions in the prevention, monitoring,
>> and control of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in the U.S.
>> livestock and food supply.
>> The public knows BSE as "MAD COW DISEASE", a disease linked to human
>> cases of new-variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (nvCJD). USDA knows BSE
>> as the disease that devastated the livestock industry in the United
>> Kingdom and shattered consumer confidence in Europe. BSE has affected
>> international trade and all aspects of the animal and public health
>> communities. It has called even greater attention to the U.S.
>> Government's accountability for a safe food supply.
>> No case of BSE has ever been found in the United States. Since 1989,
>> USDA has had a number of stringent safeguards in place to prevent BSE
>> from entering the country. USDA conducts an ongoing, comprehensive
>> interagency surveillance program for BSE. This surveillance program
>> allows USDA to monitor actively for BSE to ensure immediate detection in
>> the event that BSE were to be introduced into the United States.
>> Immediate detection allows for swift response. As an emergency
>> preparedness measure, USDA has developed this BSE Response Plan to be
>> initiated in the event that a case of BSE is diagnosed in the United
>> States. The Plan details comprehensive instructions for USDA staff as to
>> who is to do what, when, where, and how in the event that BSE were to be
>> diagnosed in the United States.
>>
>> BACKGROUND
>>
>> APHIS is responsible for being prepared for potential FOREIGN animal
>> disease outbreaks. The purpose of such preparation is to provide a
>> step-by-step plan of action in the event that a FOREIGN animal disease,
>> such as BSE, is detected in the United States. These plans, often
>> referred to as "RED BOOKS", provide guidance by outlining certain
>> actions that should take place, such as identification of a suspect
>> animal, laboratory confirmation, epidemiologic investigation, and animal
>> and herd disposition activities. Copies of Red Books for specific
>> FOREIGN animal diseases are distributed to agency headquarters and each
>> regional and field office to have in preparation for a disease outbreak.
>>
>> In 1990, APHIS developed a plan to respond to a confirmation of BSE in
>> the United States. In August 1996, a joint APHIS-FSIS working group
>> updated the BSE Red Book in accordance with current science and research
>> surrounding BSE and the related family of disease called transmissible
>> spongiform encephalopathies (TSE's). The BSE Red Book is officially
>> entitled BSE EMERGENCY DISEASE GUIDELINES.
>> The APHIS-FSIS working group determined that the BSE Red Book, which
>> detailed laboratory and field activities to be carried out in an
>> emergency, needed another component. After the March 1996 announcement
>> by the United Kingdom that BSE was linked to nvCJD, it became apparent
>> to the working group that the Plan needed to address communication
>> issues, both internally within USDA and the Federal Government and
>> externally to the public at large. A confirmed case of BSE would affect
>> such a vast array of stakeholders-consumers, cattle producers, the food
>> animal industry, international trading partners, animal and public
>> health communities, media, and others. Having clear, accurate
>> information readily available would build trust and credibility and
>> facilitate any response measures needed. There needed to be a
>> notification plan. Who was responsible for notifying who, what, when,
>> and how? The plan needed to identify clear channels of communication as
>> to ensure immediate collection and dissemination of accurate
>> information.
>> The joint APHIS--FSIS working group became formally known as the BSE
>> Response Team and is responsible for the development of this BSE
>> Response Response Plan. BSE Response Team members represent a mix of
>> backgrounds and expertise, including veterinary medicine, food safety,
>> public health, epidemiology, pathology, international trade, and public
>> affairs. The Team is coordinatied by two Team Leaders, one each from
>> APHIS and FSIS, who serve as liaisons and technical advisors to their
>> respective agencies on regulations and policies regarding BSE.
>> Over the past 2 years, the BSE Response Plan has been reviewed, edited,
>> revised, and approved by officials at all levels of APHIS, FSIS, and
>> USDA. The Plan has also been shared with other Government agencies, such
>> as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Centers for Disease
>> Control and Prevention (CDC), and the National Institutes of Health
>> (NIH), and other stakeholders, such as the Animal Ag Coalition.
>> The BSE Response Team monitors and assesses all ongoing events and
>> research findings regarding TSE's. The Team leaders are responsible for
>> ensuring that prevention and diagnostic measures are continually revised
>> and adjusted as new information and knowledge become available.
>>
>> NOTIFICATION: Roles and Responsibilities
>>
>> Surveillance
>>
>> As part of USDA's surveillance program for BSE in the United States,
>> veterinary pathologists and field investigators from APHIS and FSIS have
>> received training from British counterparts in diagnosing BSE. FSIS
>> inspects cattle before they go to slaughter; these inspection procedures
>> include identifying animals with central nervous system conditions.
>> Animals with such conditions are considered suspect for BSE, prohibited
>> from slaughter, and referred to APHIS for examination as explained
>> below.
>> Pathologists at APHIS National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL)
>> histopathologically examine the brains from these condemned animals. In
>> addition, samples are tested using a technique called
>> immunohistochemistry, which tests for the presence of the
>> protease-resistant prion protein (a marker for BSE). NVSL also examines
>> samples from neurologically ill cattle and nonambulatory ("DOWNER")
>> cattle identified on the farm or at slaughter and from rabies-negative
>> cattle submitted to veterinary diagnostic laboratories and teaching
>> hospitals.
>>
>> NOTIFICATION
>>
>> Because of their responsibility for examining condemned or BSE-suspect
>> animals, NVSL is the organization responsible for activating the
>> notification and BSE response process. It is NVSL that will begin the
>> activation of the BSE Response Plan. From the time a sample is
>> submitted, it takes 14 to 18 days to confirm a diagnosis of BSE In the
>> first 10 to 13 days, pathologists at NVSL have enough information to
>> either rule out BSE or determine the need for additional tests. If it is
>> determined that there is no evidence of BSE, the results are added to
>> the more than 7,500 others that have also been negative. NVSL maintains
>> these data.
>> If additional tests do suggest a presumptive diagnosis of BSE, an NVSL
>> pathologist will hand carry the sample to the United Kingdom for
>> confirmation. It is at this critical point, when NVSL suggests a
>> diagnosis of BSE and is preparing to send the sample to the United
>> Kingdom, that this BSE Response Plan is initiated. The Plan begins the
>> preliminary notification from NVSL to APHIS.
>>
>> Prelimanary Notification
>>
>> The director of NVSL is responsible for immediately notifying the APHIS,
>> Veterinary Services (VS) deputy administrator when tests suggest a
>> presumptive diagnosis of BSE.
>> Once NVSL has made a presumptive diagnosis of BSE, APHIS and FSIS field
>> activities will also be initiated. APHIS will receive notification
>> (either confirming or not confirming NVSL's diagnosis) from the United
>> Kingdom anywhere between 24 and 96 hours. (The international animal
>> health community has recognized the United Kingdom's Central Veterinary
>> Laboratory {CVL} as the world's reference laboratory for diagnosing BSE.
>> Other countries, including Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the
>> Netherlands, Portugal, and Switzerland, have all sent samples to this
>> lab to confirm their first case of BSE).
>>
>> NVSL
>>
>> NVSL will provide all laboratory support in carrying out this BSE
>> Response Plan and serve as the liaison with CVL. NVSL will prepare its
>> facility to receive and process additional samples from the suspect
>> animal's progeny or herdmates or other suspects. NVSL will also
>> coordinate any other assistance from State or university diagnostic
>> laboratories if necessary.
>>
>> APHIS, VS DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR
>>
>> Veterinary Services is the animal health arm of APHIS and the program
>> responsible for carrying out field actions in response to BSE. Upon
>> notifiction of a presumptive diagnosis from NVSL, the APHIS, VS deputy
>> administrator immediately notifies the FSIS, Office of Public Health and
>> Science (OPHS) deputy administrator. APHIS and FSIS deputy
>> administrators will alert the BSE Response Team and activate the
>> Response Plan. The VS deputy administrator serves as the liaison between
>> the BSE Response Team and the APHIS administrator.
>> The APHIS, VS deputy administrator notifies the APHIS administrator and
>> the VS regional director of the State from which the suspect animal
>> originated.
>>
>> APHIS Administrator
>>
>> The APHIS Administrator immediately notifies the USDA Assistant
>> Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs. This immediate
>> notification will be followed by an official informational memorandum
>> from the APHIS Administrator, through the Assistant Secretary for
>> Marketing and Regulatory Programs, to the Secretary of Agriculture. This
>> memorandum will be prepared by the BSE Response Team; a draft is
>> maintained by the Team leaders in the reserved section of their plans.
>> The APHIS Administrator is responsible for securing indemnity funds for
>> depopulation of the herd if CVL confirms NVSL's diagnosis.
>>
>> Assistant Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs
>>
>> The Assistant Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs, in
>> conjuction with the Undersecretary for Food Safety, is responsible for
>> notifying the Secretary. The Assistant Secretary serves as the liaison
>> between APHIS and Department-level officials.
>>
>> Secretary of Agriculture
>>
>> The Secretary has the authority to declare a Federal EMERGENCY if
>> appropriate and approve funding as necessary. Information will be
>> provided to the Secretary up the chain of command from the BSE Response
>> Team.
>>
>> FSIS, OPHS Deputy Administrator
>>
>> The OPHS Deputy Administrator, together with the APHIS, VS Deputy
>> Administrator, alert the BSE Response Team leaders and instruct them to
>> assemble the BSE Response Team and activate the Plan. The OPHS Deputy
>> Administrator serves as the liaison between the BSE Response Team and
>> the FSIS Administrator.
>> The OPHS Deputy Administrator is responsible for notifying the FSIS
>> regional director in charge of the State from which the suspect animal
>> originated.
>>
>> FSIS Deputy Administrator
>>
>> The FSIS Deputy Administrator is responsible for notifying the
>> Undersecretary for Food Safety.
>>
>> Undersecretary for Food Safety
>>
>> The Undersecretary for Food Safety, in conjuction with the Assistant
>> Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs, notifies the Secretary
>> of Agriculture.
>>
>> APHIS, VS, Regional Director
>>
>> The APHIS, VS regional director in charge of the State from which the
>> suspect animal originated notifies the VS Area Veterinarian-in-Charge
>> (AVIC) for that State. The regional director is the liaison between VS
>> field staff and the VS Deputy Administrator at headquarters. In
>> addition, the regional director shares all information with the BSE
>> Response Team.
>>
>> APHIS, VS, AVIC
>>
>> The VS AVIC, in cooperation with State animal health authorities, is
>> responsible for coordination the field activities surrounding the
>> emergency response to BSE. The AVIC assembles the local VS staff to
>> initiate activities outlined in the BSE Red Book including tracing the
>> progeny and herdmates of the suspect animal and beginning an
>> epidemiologic investigation. The VS AVIC coordinates with the State
>> Veterinarian to quarantine the suspect animal's herd of origin. The
>> State has the authority to order a routine quarantine for a neurological
>> disease. The BSE Response Team surveyed every State to determine if they
>> would utilize this authority in the event that NVSL identifies a
>> presumptive diagnosis of BSE. All States responded that they would issue
>> a quarantine.
>>
>> BSE Response Team
>>
>> The BSE Response Team leaders will notify each team member and instruct
>> them to assemble in the Situation Room at APHIS headquarters in
>> Riverdale, MD. The Team leaders are responsible for ensuring that all of
>> the Team's duties are fulfilled. It is their responsibility to ensure
>> that the technical information and expert recommendations reach the
>> decisionmakers in a timely fashion. Together with VS Emergency Programs
>> staff, the Team leaders will obtain APHIS, VS administrative support
>> staff in Riverdale, MD, to ready the room for use as BSE headquarters.
>> The Team will begin gathering and assembling information from APHIS and
>> FSIS region and field staff. The Team will pull the draft documents from
>> the third section in the Team leaders manuals and begin filling in
>> current information as it becomes available.
>>
>> Public Notification
>>
>> Should NVSL receive notice from CVL confirming a case of BSE, the next
>> level of notification is activated. Each player will follow the same
>> notification protocol as described above for preliminary notification to
>> confirm the diagnosis of a case of BSE.
>>
>> BSE Response Team
>>
>> The BSE Response Team will complete the informational memorandum for the
>> Secretary. The Team will prepare the letter to the Office of
>> International Epizootics (OIE), the international animal health
>> organization, for signature by the APHIS, VS Deputy Administrator. OIE
>> requires that all countries submit official notification within 24 hours
>> of confirming a diagnosis of BSE.
>> The BSE Response Team and the office of the APHIS, VS Deputy
>> Administrator would coordinate a teleconference to inform all APHIS
>> regional directors and AVIC'S.
>> The BSE Response Team and the office of the FSIS, OPHS Deputy
>> Administrator would coordinate a teleconference to inform all regional
>> and field FSIS offices.
>> The BSE Response Team would coordinate a teleconference to notify other
>> Federal agencies.
>> The BSE Response Team would coordinate a teleconference to notify key
>> industry/consumer representatives.
>> The BSE Response Team and APHIS International Services would notify
>> foreign embassies.
>> The BSE Response Team would establish a toll-free 800 telephone line for
>> industry representatives, reporters, and the public.
>> The BSE Response Team would coordinate with APHIS Legislative and Public
>> Affairs and USDA office of Communications to issue a press release the
>> day the diagnosis is confirmed. The press release would announce a press
>> conference to be held the morning after the diagnosis is confirmed......
>>
>> THE END
>>
>> POSTED TO BSE-L by me on;
>>
>> Date: Tue, 4 May 1999 18:25:12 -0500



snip...


MAD COW MARKET TIMING



Office of Inspector General OIG

Semiannual Report to Congress FY - 2005 - First Half

snip...


Stopping BSE at the Border—USDA Needs To

Strengthen Controls Over Canadian Beef Imports

Following the detection of a Canadian cow with bovine

spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or "mad cow disease")

in May 2003, we examined the Animal and Plant Health

Inspection Service's (APHIS) oversight of the importation

of beef products from Canada. Following requests from

four U.S. Senators, we began several reviews in June

2004 to explore whether USDA did not follow appropriate

safety measures, beginning sometime in the fall of 2003,

in allowing expanded Canadian beef imports into the

United States.

After the initial halt of imports, in August 2003 the

Secretary announced a list of low-risk products that would

be allowed from Canada. APHIS also allowed an

expansion in the type of Canadian facilities that could

produce items for export to the United States. The

gradual expansion occurred because agency employees

included products similar to those on the published lowrisk

list, but APHIS did not communicate this broadly.

As a result, from August 2003 to April 2004, APHIS issued

permits for products with questionable eligibility. Contrary

to publicly stated policy, the agency allowed the import of

products from Canadian facilities that produced both

eligible and ineligible products, increasing the possibility

that higher-risk product could be inadvertently imported.

APHIS also issued permits to allow the import of more

than 63,000 pounds of beef cheek meat with questionable

eligibility because the agency did not establish a clear

definition for "boneless beef." Further, we found that

FSIS did not always communicate effectively about the

eligibility status of beef cheek meat, specifically to import

inspectors. In addition, APHIS issued 1,155 permits for

the importation of ruminant (e.g., cow, goat) products

from Canada without ensuring that the agency had an

appropriate system of internal controls to manage the

process for a suddenly overwhelming volume of requests.

From May through September 2004, we identified more

than 42,000 pounds of product with questionable

eligibility.

APHIS generally agreed to institute procedures for

communicating changes in policy and monitoring the

consistency between agency practice and publicly stated

policy, as well as to strengthen controls and finalize

procedures to issue and monitor permits. FSIS generally

agreed to implement controls to communicate the specific

eligibility of product when its eligibility status changes and

to implement an edit check in its import information

system to identify ineligible product. (Audit Report No.

33601-1-Hy, APHIS Oversight of the Importation of Beef

Products from Canada)


snip...


Restaurant Owner Sentenced for Smuggling Beef

from Japan, Importation of Which Is Prohibited Due

to Disease Concerns

In January 2005, a Los Angeles restaurant owner was

placed on probation for 60 months, to include 800 hours

of community service, after he pled guilty to smuggling

beef from Japan. Under 9 Code of Federal Regulations

(C.F.R.) § 94, beef from Japan is a prohibited product

for United States importation due to disease. On two

occasions in 2001 and 2002, inspectors in Anchorage,

Alaska, intercepted shipments sent from Japan that

were manifested as "book," but upon inspection by

USDA and the United States Customs Service, were

found to contain approximately 25 kilograms of beef

inside a Styrofoam ice chest. Both shipments were

addressed to the restaurant owner. Shipping records

showed that the restaurant owner had received 13

shipments manifested as "book" from the same sender

in Japan in 2001 and 2002. All but one of the shipments

were in the same weight range as the two intercepted

shipments. The shipper and the restaurant owner were

subsequently indicted for various charges including

conspiracy and smuggling. An arrest warrant was

issued for the shipper, who is still in Japan.


http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/SarcFirstHalf05.pdf



MAD COW MARKET TIMING, if waiting 7+ months to confirm a case of mad cow
disease in TEXAS is not market
timing (that's after succeeding in covering up another mad cow with
absolutely no test at all), i don't know what is $$$


Subject: Releasing mad-cow test results debated Susan Combs Texas Ag Comm
wants to cover-up Texas mad cows
Date: July 27, 2005 at 6:51 am PST

July 27, 2005, 12:11AM

Releasing mad-cow test results debated
Do regulators protect market or consumers?
By PURVA PATEL
Copyright 2005 Houston Chronicle
RESOURCES

AP file
U.S. Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns tours a Utah beef processing plant
in May.


Video:
Mad cow found in U.S. cow from Texas 6/24

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----
Multimedia:
• The connection between mad cow disease and humans
(Requires Flash plug-in)

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----
Phone hot lines:
• USDA meat and poultry hot line: 1-888-674-6854
• Regular updates at 1-866-4USDACO.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----
Other:
• USDA news release on BSE finding 6/24
• Active USDA meat recalls
• Overview of the disease

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----
Video courtesy Associated Press. (Free Real Player required.)

News of mad cow disease alone can move markets, stall trade negotiations and
prompt nations to grow more skeptical of American beef.


The most recent case in Texas proved to be no different.

Although beef markets reacted mildly in late June to the confirmation of the
nation's first home-grown case, damage was done. Nations such as Taiwan and
Indonesia quickly restricted beef purchases from the U.S.

The bottom line, industry observers say: The type and timing of the
information released by regulators can make all the financial difference in
the world to ranchers, meat packers or anyone whose livelihood is tied to
the price of beef.

But trying to find consensus among state and federal agencies can be
difficult, as two recently obtained letters from Texas regulators to the
U.S. Department of Agriculture show.

In December 2004, a month after a U.S. animal tested inconclusive for the
brain-wasting disease, the heads of the Texas Agriculture Department and
Texas Animal Health Commission expressed concerns with how the USDA handles
such cases.

Texas Agriculture Commissioner Susan Combs suggested federal regulators wait
until animals are confirmed positive or negative before disclosing results
to the public.

"While markets may bounce back, enormous amounts of money can be lost in the
interim," Combs wrote. "In fact, during the last inconclusive announcement,
it is estimated that the market dropped $25 per head on cattle, resulting in
hundreds of millions of dollars in losses to our cattle industry."


Outside market hours
The heads of the Texas Animal Health Commission, however, said the USDA
should continue to announce inconclusive test results immediately upon
receiving them, outside of market hours.

"Experience has shown it is impossible to prevent rumors from any number of
sources," wrote Bob Hillman, executive director of the Animal Health
Commission, and Richard Taylor, chairman. "Uncertainties and rumors are far
more damaging to the market than known facts."

Ideally, Hillman said in an interview, the government wouldn't release any
results until all confirmatory testing is done. But he'd rather the
announcements be made to preempt inevitable leaks.

"If you can't protect the data, put it out there," he said.

USDA spokeswoman Amy Spillman said the department makes announcements after
markets close whenever an animal tests inconclusive as part of its efforts
to be as transparent as possible.

Both state agencies did agree, however, on keeping a lid on information that
could hurt markets.

Both said the USDA should work with market regulators, the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission, to "identify
and encourage implementation of penalties that will strongly discourage
comments" by labs, test manufacturers, and others that could fuel volatility
or damage the market.

The USDA already has safeguards in place because an internal watchdog that
investigates illegal leaks turns over information to the Justice Department,
a spokeswoman said.

But the suggestion by state officials smacks of the Texas food-disparagement
law that gave rise to Texas ranchers' $10.3 million lawsuit against TV talk
show host Oprah Winfrey, said Michael Hansen, a senior research associate
with Consumers Union.

He questioned if state officials are too concerned about protecting the
industry from the effects of negative news.


A split mission
The Texas Agriculture Department's comments aren't surprising, given its
primary goal is to promote Texas agriculture. But the Texas Animal Health
Commission also lists on its Web site that part of its mission is "to
protect human health from animal diseases and conditions that are
transmissible to people."

Humans who eat infected meat can contract a variant of the brain-wasting
ailment, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.

The Texas Animal Health Commission, much like the USDA, is split between its
obligations to the public and to the cattle industry, Hansen said.

"It seems as though they're more concerned about trade and economic interest
of the cattle industry then either human public health or animal public
health," he said, adding that the disclosure of tests that come back
inconclusive are in the public's interest. "I would think that the debacle
over the November cow perfectly shows why you have to have a more open and
transparent system."

Hillman declined to comment on Hansen's remarks.

Initial screening last year on the 12-year-old Texas Brahman crossbreed that
was confirmed as infected came back inconclusive, but results from a
different test were negative, so the USDA cleared the animal of the disease.

Last month, the agency's internal watchdog ordered a third type of test that
came back positive. Pressure from consumers for more testing helped spur the
USDA to retest the animal, consumer groups say.

"If the inconclusive wasn't announced, we may have never known if it was
positive," Hansen said.

Cattle ranchers also want to shield the markets, and some say releasing the
cow's origins could help.

Shane Sklar, director of the Independent Cattlemen's Association of Texas,
said secrecy encourages ranchers to turn in suspect cattle for testing
because they can avoid stigma associated with the disease, but it also fuels
uncertainty in the markets.

"As a rancher, the only reason I would like to know is to put an end to the
volatility in the marketplace, because it will either have a disruption and
then we can go back to normal, or we don't have anything at all," he said.
"But speculation adds to volatility in the market. From that point, I would
like to know, but for other reasons I'm not as anxious."


Should public know?
Consumer groups have insisted the public should know the cow's origins,
despite government officials' concerns for the privacy of the rancher.

If they knew which ranch the animal came from, ranchers could determine if
they have a cow from the same ranch or purchased similar feed as the rancher
involved.

"If we don't know where an infected cow comes from, we will always view
these as isolated incidents when they may be connected and may be a sign of
a larger problem in the U.S. industry," said Craig Culp, spokesman for the
Washington-based Center for Food Safety.

[email protected].


http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/business/3283743


Greetings,


>>>Texas Agriculture Commissioner Susan Combs suggested federal regulators
wait until animals are confirmed positive or negative before disclosing
results to the public.

"While markets may bounce back, enormous amounts of money can be lost in the
interim," Combs wrote. "In fact, during the last inconclusive announcement,
it is estimated that the market dropped $25 per head on cattle, resulting in
hundreds of millions of dollars in losses to our cattle industry."<<<


Susan Combs by no means has public and consumer health at heart while she is
protecting the cattle industry. She is oblivious to mad cow disease. Her
soul purpose is to protect the cattle industry at all cost, including my
mothers life (DOD 12/14/97), or maybe one of your family members from any
strain of mad cow disease in TEXAS. SHE helped cover-up mad cow disease in
TEXAS both on that inconclusive that was positive so many times it will make
your head spin. PLUS, the other mad cow in TEXAS they rendered without
testing at all, that came from the top out of Austin. THEY should be tried
for murder. corporate homicide is what i call it. they knew for years, but
kept on keeping on.

IF, that positive, positive, positive, inconclusive, negative, and then 8
months later POSITIVE BY WEYBRIDGE mad cow in TEXAS would not have been made
public back in November, people like myself that KNEW that cow was positive
and that the USDA/COMBs et al were covering it up due to lack of proper
testing, IF that news would not have been brought fourth to the public, that
cow would have NEVER tested positive for mad cow disease. it was the fact
that the data that was put forth in the public domain, that the public came
forth and demanded that the testing be done properly and retested. THIS is
what the industry and Susan Combs does not want to happen. They wish to keep
it private and to manipulate the markets to there benefit, and not release
the mad cow data to the public. I wrote Susan Combs on many occasions about
this positive, positive, positive, incl. neg., and finally POSITIVE TEXAS
MAD COW and about the one that got away, but the only thing that Susan Combs
does is send me back a bought and paid for rubber stamped letter from the
USDA/Industry;


----- Original Message -----
From: SusanCombs
To: Terry S. Singeltary Sr

 

[flounder]

----- Original Message -----
From: SusanCombs
To: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Sent: Monday, July 18, 2005 11:56 AM
Subject: RE: no mad cow cover up in TEXAS???


Dear Mr. Singeltary:


Thank you for contacting the Texas Department of Agriculture about the
isolated case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy found in a Texas cow. I
can assure you there has been no cover up by the state's cattle industry or
the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which has kept the public informed at
every step in the process.


First and foremost, it is important to remember that the safety procedures
worked. This animal was banned from the food or feed supply, and
long-standing safeguards have been in place to protect public health.
Because the animal was unable to walk, it was removed from the food supply
and was processed at a facility that handles animals unsuitable for human
consumption. The carcass was incinerated.


Texas and American cattle producers are committed to producing and ensuring
a safe food product – the same safe product their families are consuming. As
far back as the late 1980s, the cattle industry began working with the U.S.
government to take precautions and establish firewalls to protect public and
animal health from BSE.


The United States has had an active surveillance program for BSE since 1990
to test a representative sample of the adult cattle population in the United
States. With the discovery of a Canadian cow in Washington state in 2003,
USDA expanded the surveillance program to test hundreds of thousands of high
risk animals The surveillance program is designed to specifically determine
whether BSE exists in the U.S. cattle population and if so, at what level.


The number of tests under the surveillance program far exceeds the level
recommend by the World Animal Health Organization. With the original goal of
testing 268,000 animals in a year, USDA would be able to find the disease if
it occurred in as few as 1 in 10 million adult cattle with a 99 percent
confidence level. Since the beginning of the program in June 2004, USDA has
tested more than 400,000 animals and found only this one case, which
confirms estimates that the prevalence of this disease in the U.S. cattle
population is extremely low.


In regards to this particular animal, the laboratory in Weybridge, England
found a very low level of abnormal prion protein in the brain. In addition,
the abnormalities were isolated and not consistent throughout the brain –
making it possible for one sample to test negative while another sample
might test positive, which was the reason for the varying results.


Our cattle producers are working hard to produce the safest beef product in
the world, and their strong vigilance is a solid commitment to American
consumers.


Sincerely,


Susan Combs

Commissioner


----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Wednesday, July 13, 2005 12:11 PM
To: SusanCombs
Subject: no mad cow cover up in TEXAS???


Greetings Honorable Susan Combs,

no cover-up of mad cow disease in Texas ???

if not, then maybe you can explain the 7+ month delay in the announcement of
the secret postive test on that postive, positive, inconclusive, negative,
postive, cow that WAS going to be slaughtered for human consumption, but
THEN went down and was sent to the champion pet food plant.

OR maybe you can explain to me the mad cow that got away. the one MAD COW
TEXAS rendered without testing at all.

please explain these things to me if there is no cover up of TEXAS MAD COW
disease???

thank you,
with kindest regards,

I am sincerely,

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
===================

FDA Statement
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Statement
May 4, 2004
Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242
Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA


Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms
On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow
with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a
processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.

FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began
an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators
inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the
animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the
slaughterhouse.

FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been
rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the
weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That
material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.

Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest
because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as
"mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way
now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule
would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals
(e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison).

FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing
the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed
only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs
have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the
material for swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way
through the supply chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the
feed is properly monitored and used only as feed for pigs.

To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian protein
out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA established
its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K. showed that
the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to cattle.

Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not
allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action
specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will
not be fed to poultry.

FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely
with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed
rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only
one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed
rule, to make this strong system even stronger.

####


http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/NEW01061.html


IN TEXAS, we feed our cattle ruminant protein, and lots of it. but remember
(the fda cannot seem to get this right)

.1 gram is lethal;


THE TEXAS GONZALES/PURINA INCIDENT SHOWED THAT 5.5 GRAMS OF
RUMINANT PROTEIN WAS FED TO CATTLE ;

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
P01-05
January 30, 2001
Print Media:
301-827-6242
Broadcast Media:
301-827-3434
Consumer Inquiries:
888-INFO-FDA

FDA ANNOUNCES TEST RESULTS FROM TEXAS FEED LOT

Today the Food and Drug Administration announced the results of tests
taken on feed used at a Texas feedlot
that was suspected of containing meat and bone meal from other domestic
cattle -- a violation of FDA's 1997
prohibition on using ruminant material in feed for other ruminants.
Results indicate that a very low level of
prohibited material was found in the feed fed to cattle.

FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in
total, five-and-one-half grams -
approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited material. These animals
weigh approximately 600 pounds.

It is important to note that the prohibited material was domestic in
origin (therefore not likely to contain infected
material because there is no evidence of BSE in U.S. cattle), fed at a
very low level, and fed only once. The
potential risk of BSE to such cattle is therefore exceedingly low, even
if the feed were contaminated.

According to Dr. Bernard Schwetz, FDA's Acting Principal Deputy
Commissioner, "The challenge to regulators
and industry is to keep this disease out of the United States. One
important defense is to prohibit the use of any
ruminant animal materials in feed for other ruminant animals. Combined
with other steps, like U.S. Department
of Agriculture's (USDA) ban on the importation of live ruminant animals
from affected countries, these steps
represent a series of protections, to keep American cattle free of BSE."

Despite this negligible risk, Purina Mills, Inc., is nonetheless
announcing that it is voluntarily purchasing all 1,222
of the animals held in Texas and mistakenly fed the animal feed
containing the prohibited material. Therefore,
meat from those animals will not enter the human food supply. FDA
believes any cattle that did not consume
feed containing the prohibited material are unaffected by this incident,
and should be handled in the beef supply
clearance process as usual.

FDA believes that Purina Mills has behaved responsibly by first
reporting the human error that resulted in the
misformulation of the animal feed supplement and then by working closely
with State and Federal authorities.

This episode indicates that the multi-layered safeguard system put into
place is essential for protecting the food
supply and that continued vigilance needs to be taken, by all concerned,
to ensure these rules are followed
routinely.

FDA will continue working with USDA as well as State and local officials
to ensure that companies and
individuals comply with all laws and regulations designed to protect the
U.S. food supply.

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2001/NEW00752.html


MOST people have known that less than one gram is lethal.

THIS has been known for a decade or more.

Evidendly the FDA did not know. ...




TSS

#################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html ####################

 

[flounder]

NOW remember, old stan has NEVER, EVER, spontaneously produced a TSE that looks like any natural field TSE to date. he is pushing his patent CDI testing for 100% testing, due to the fact that IF the theory/myth that
a TSE does spontaneously develop, NO majic number would be sufficient in testing, it would HAVE to be 100%. BUT, like i said, this is only a myth to date. ...TSS


US SENATOR AND STAN THE MAN SLAM USDA ''DAMNING TESTIMONY''

Senator Michael Machado from California

''USDA does not know what's going on''.
''USDA is protecting the industry''.
''SHOULD the state of California step in''

Stanley Prusiner

''nobody has ever ask us to comment''

''they don't want us to comment''

''they never ask''

i tried to see Venemon, after Candian cow was discovered with BSE.
went to see lyle. after talking with him... absolute ignorance... then
thought i
should see Venemon... it was clear his entire policy was to get cattle
bonless beef prods
across the border... nothing else mattered...
his aids confirmed this... 5 times i tried to see Venemon, never worked...
eventually met with carl rove the political... he is the one that
arranged meeting
with Venemon... just trying to give you a sense of the distance... healh
public safety...
was never contacted...
yes i believe that prions are bad to eat and you can die from them...END

Dr. Stan bashing Ann Veneman - 3 minutes

http://maddeer.org/video/embedded/08snip.ram

Recall Authority and Mad Cow Disease: Is the Current System Good for
Californians?

Tuesday, February 24, 2004
JOINT HEARING

AGRICULTURE AND WATER RESOURCES HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND SELECT
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT - MACHADO, ORTIZ, and SPEIER, Chairs

Choose a RealPlayer video --->

Selected excerpts:

Opening Statement by Senator Michael Machado


http://maddeer.org/video/embedded/machado.html

Elisa Odibashian - Consumers Union


http://maddeer.org/video/embedded/odibashian.html

Anthony Iton - Alemeda County Health


http://maddeer.org/video/embedded/iton.html

USDA's "memorandum of understanding"


http://maddeer.org/video/embedded/usda.html

Dave Louthan - Killed the Mad Cow


http://maddeer.org/video/embedded/louthan.html

Dennis Laycraft - Canadian Cattlemen's Association


http://maddeer.org/video/embedded/laycraft.html

Stanley Prusiner - Discoverer of Prions


http://maddeer.org/video/embedded/prusiner.html

Steven DeArmond - Professor of Neuropathology


http://maddeer.org/video/embedded/dearmond.html


TSS

 

[Anonymous]

Flounder,

Your point was?

Could you summarize?


~SH~

 

[Econ101]

Flounder,

Your point was?

Could you summarize?


~SH~

No, Don't do it flounder.

SH needs practice in reading comprehension.

 

[Anonymous]

Conman,

You haven't corrected me on a single issue yet. Not once! All you have in your bag is empty statements and the need to blame.



~SH~

 

[Econ101]

Conman,

You haven't corrected me on a single issue yet. Not once! All you have in your bag is empty statements and the need to blame.



~SH~

SH, I like you just the way you are. Missed you while you were gone.

 

[Angus Breeder]

Question for anyone participating in this thread. Can you tell me exactly why the R-calf crew gets such a bad rap. And before anyone jumps me, I am not a member. I am the president of a cattlemen's association, who has never taken the time to read the thousands of pages to get an answer. What are the pro's and the con's?

 

[Sandhusker]

Question for anyone participating in this thread. Can you tell me exactly why the R-calf crew gets such a bad rap. And before anyone jumps me, I am not a member. I am the president of a cattlemen's association, who has never taken the time to read the thousands of pages to get an answer. What are the pro's and the con's?

They get a bad rap from Canadians and NCBA members. The Canadians because they need a scapegoat for their problems instead of admitting their own government has created their quandry by selling them out to US interests and the NCBA doesn't like them because R-CALF's very existence is proof they weren't representing the producers of this country. A telling test, if it could be done, would be to find how many R-CALF members are former NCBA members and visa versa.

I am a R-CALF member and proud of it.