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Continued Japanese Embargo on U.S. Beef Exports Unacceptable

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Well-known member
Feb 11, 2005
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South East Kansas
Continued Japanese Embargo on U.S. Beef Exports Unacceptable

U.S. cattle producers' patience wearing thin

Tanya Augustson, (202) 347-0228, [email protected]
Karen Batra, (202) 347-0228, [email protected]

Washington, D.C. (September 15, 2005) – Cattle producer members of the National Cattlemen's Beef Association (NCBA), the largest organization representing cattle producers, see next month as a significant milestone in the push for resumption of U.S. beef exports to Japan.

"We have been extremely patient, giving Japan a generous amount of time to work through its internal processes," explains Jim McAdams, NCBA president and Texas rancher. "But, as of October 2005, it will be a full year since Japanese officials heralded the completion of a framework agreement designed to resume U.S. beef exports to Japan. We've given Japan everything it has requested,and a year after this promise the ban on our products has not budged. Our patience is wearing thin."
Japan initially stopped beef trade with the United States on December 24, 2003 based upon the discovery of a BSE-positive cow in Washington that was imported from Canada. After almost a year of deliberations, on October 23, 2004, U.S. and Japanese officials announced a framework agreement to facilitate the resumption of U.S. beef trade. The agreement would be final following completion of regulatory processes in both countries. Ten months later, on August 1, 2005, Japan removed its domestic100 percent testing requirement and began testing cattle 21 months and older, considered to be a key step.

"The U.S. beef supply is the safest in the world, and Japanese consumers again deserve the right to enjoy U.S. beef," says Jay Truitt, NCBA vice president of government affairs. "Fifteen years ago, the United States was the first country without BSE within its borders to test cattle for the disease. Cattle producers have led the drive to aggressively build and maintain strict government firewalls against BSE, and we are proud to see these hard-line regulations have paid off."

Since 2004, USDA's Enhanced BSE Surveillance Program has tested 465,150 targeted animals at highest risk for BSE and has found only one confirmed case, evidence that U.S. firewalls are working and the prevalence of this disease in the U.S. is extremely low, now moving toward eradication. Testing 268,500 animals can detect BSE at a rate of 1 in 10 million adult cattle at a 99 percent confidence level.

"Consumers are extremely confident in the safety of U.S. beef thanks to the aggressive actions we have always taken to put safety first," says McAdams. "My family, along with nearly nine out of ten U.S. households, will eat beef at home in the next two weeks — that's 251 million people. Japanese consumers are also eager to enjoy U.S. beef products and America's cattle producers are anxious to export our, safe, top-quality beef to Japanese families."

Japan is the largest export market for food and agricultural products of the United States. In 2003, the U.S. exported $1.4 billion worth of beef and beef variety meats to Japan. Total trade in beef and beef products was valued at $1.7 billion.

On September 13, eighteen U.S. Senators sent a letter to Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, urging her to make the resumption of beef trade with Japan of highest economic priority in upcoming international talks. Over the past two years, members of Congress, top officials within the Bush Administration, NCBA leaders, and even President Bush have discussed the need to resume beef trade with senior Japanese officials.

"Re-opening this valuable market remains a top priority for NCBA, and we urge continued support from our government leaders at the highest levels," says Truitt.

"Despite the extensive efforts made by the United States, Japan remains closed to U.S. beef exports," says McAdams. "NCBA producer-members expect October 2005 to be considered a critical deadline for breaking down these trade barriers. It is simply unacceptable for this Japanese embargo to cause further economic damage to our industry. Let's cowboy up and get 'er done."

Hey Jim, did you forget that they requested us to test 100%? So when you say we have given them everything they have requested, that is a lie.
what a hoot. GWs BSE MRR policy is a policy to die for...TSS

Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION




Thanks Flounder, much easier to read. This sure makes you wonder where we are headed.
ALL we have to do is MATCH their REGS. to export to JAPAN.Now Korea is just one better as test results must be forwarded before beef shipment starts the last we heard from Panama for all countrys.

BSE report Korea


SH claims he has no tolerance for lies. Wonder why he didn't point McAdam's out?

Oooops, there I go being deceptive and pathetic again. :wink:
Maybe the Japs like oxtail soup as much as I do. It better not be BSE infected. Food safety is always paramount. Profits should never be allowed to trump food safety. It seems that we can not trust the USDA under Johannes on that one (Quite personally, I think it is the Ag. chair committee heads that get packer funding that are the problem; public policy being run by private interests). What other things can we not trust him on? SH, do you care to coment?
re-oxtail soup

>>> Maybe the Japs like oxtail soup as much as I do. It better not be BSE infected. Food safety is always paramount. Profits should never be allowed to trump food safety. It seems that we can not trust the USDA under Johannes on that one (Quite personally, I think it is the Ag. chair committee heads that get packer funding that are the problem; public policy being run by private interests). What other things can we not trust him on? SH, do you care to coment? <<<

well, your in luck;-) the federal Gov. says it is safe to eat. they guarantee it with the USDA stamp of approval$ don't you feel safe?

personally though, i would not write that in stone just yet, once these more sensitive testing come to market. accumulation, amplification, transmission, threshold to clinical disease?

What are Specified Risk Materials?
Specified Risk Materials (SRMs) include the brain, skull, eyes trigeminal ganglia, spinal cord, vertebral column (excluding the vertebrae of the tail, the transverse processes of the thoracic and lumbar vertebrae, and the wings of the sacrum) and dorsal root ganglia of cattle 30 months of age and older. SRMs also include the tonsils and distal ileum of all cattle. However, in order to ensure that the distal ileum is removed, the entire small intestine shall be removed.








following the submission of (1) a risk assessment by the German Federal Ministry of

Consumer Protection, food and Agriculture and (2) new scientific evidence

regarding BSE infectivity distribution in tonsils









##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################

From: TSS ()
Subject: PrPSc distribution of a natural case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy
Date: August 8, 2005 at 12:28 pm PST

PrPSc distribution of a natural case of bovine
spongiform encephalopathy

Yoshifumi Iwamaru, Yuka Okubo, Tamako Ikeda, Hiroko Hayashi, Mori-
kazu Imamura, Takashi Yokoyama and Morikazu Shinagawa

Priori Disease Research Center, National Institute of Animal Health, 3-1-5
Kannondai, Tsukuba 305-0856 Japan [email protected]


Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) is a disease of cattle that causes
progressive neurodegeneration of the central nervous system. Infectivity
of BSE agent is accompanied with an abnormal isoform of prion protein

The specified risk materials (SRM) are tissues potentially carrying BSE
infectivity. The following tissues are designated as SRM in Japan: the
skull including the brain and eyes but excluding the glossa and the masse-
ter muscle, the vertebral column excluding the vertebrae of the tail, spinal
cord, distal illeum. For a risk management step, the use of SRM in both
animal feed or human food has been prohibited. However, detailed
PrPSc distribution remains obscure in BSE cattle and it has caused con-
troversies about definitions of SRM. Therefore we have examined PrPSc
distribution in a BSE cattle by Western blotting to reassess definitions of

The 11th BSE case in Japan was detected in fallen stock surveillance.
The carcass was stocked in the refrigerator. For the detection of PrPSc,
200 mg of tissue samples were homogenized. Following collagenase
treatment, samples were digested with proteinase K. After digestion,
PrPSc was precipitated by sodium phosphotungstate (PTA). The pellets
were subjected to Western blotting using the standard procedure.
Anti-prion protein monoclonal antibody (mAb) T2 conjugated horseradish
peroxidase was used for the detection of PrPSc.

PrPSc was detected in brain, spinal cord, dorsal root ganglia, trigeminal
ganglia, sublingual ganglion, retina. In addition, PrPSc was also detected
in the peripheral nerves (sciatic nerve, tibial nerve, vagus nerve).

Our results suggest that the currently accepted definitions of SRM in
BSE cattle may need to be reexamined.


T. Kitamoto (Ed.)
Food and Drug Safety

OXTAIL (rich in peripheral nerves).

i will try to keep this short;




I. Summary

In response to finding a cow in Washington State positive for Bovine Spongiform

Encephalopathy (BSE) on December 23, 2003, FSIS has taken emergency actions to

protect public health. These actions include: designating certain high-risk tissues as

specified risk materials (SRMs) and prohibiting the use of such materials for human food;

requiring the condemnation of non-ambulatory disabled cattle presented for slaughter and

use in human food applications; not awarding the mark of inspection on cattle tested for

BSE under the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) surveillance

program until the test results are received and the results are reported to be negative for

BSE; ensuring that advanced meat recovery (AMR) systems do not process SRMs and

that boneless "meat" does not contain central nervous system (CNS)–type tissues or

excess levels of bone solids and bone marrow; and prohibiting the use of certain stunning

methods. These actions are all science-based measures intended to further minimize

potential human exposure to the BSE agent through the consumption of beef and beef

food products.

The extent of the economic impact of the BSE finding on the livestock sector and

meat processing industry depends on domestic and foreign consumer attitudes toward the

safety of the U.S. beef supply and how beef consumption habits might change given this

new situation. Consumer attitudes may vary depending on 1) whether the single case of a

cow with BSE were imported or of domestic origin, 2) the extent of the disease, and 3)

how many cattle infected with BSE were taken out of the national beef herd. The finding


of a single cow with BSE originating from a shipment of imported cattle from Canada

has had a negative impact on the U.S. cattle sector, largely as a result of decreased export

demand. The measures prescribed by the SRM interim final rule provide greater

assurances to both domestic and foreign consumers that the U.S. beef supply is safe.

As will be shown in the analysis later in this document the total annual cost of the

FSIS actions related to the SRM and AMR interim final rules is estimated at $110.3 to

$149.1 million. The total cost of the SRM interim final rule is estimated at $99.9 to

$136.6 million. The primary impacts of the SRM interim final rule are the exclusion of

SRMs from use in the human food supply ($35.6 to $36.7 million); the prohibition on

non-ambulatory disabled cattle ($35.6 to $71.3 million); and modifications of HACCP

plan/procedures, sanitation SOPs, or other pre-requisite programs and record keeping

requirements ($27.6 million).

The annual total cost of the AMR interim final rule is estimated at $10.7 to $12.5

million. The primary impacts of the AMR interim final rule are restrictions on

incorporating certain non-meat components in AMR products ($4.4 to $5.6 million);

testing AMR product for iron, protein, and CNS-type tissues ($4.7 to $6.2 million); and

revisions to HACCP and other plans, and bookkeeping requirements ($1.0 to $1.3

million).1 Most values are reported as averages for the analysis. Some values however

are reported at the 5th and 95th percentiles of the distribution.

1 The cost impact analysis of the SRM and AMR Interim Final rules is based on a probabilistic model

developed by FSIS, excluding the prohibition on non-ambulatory disabled cattle from the food supply (p.

28) and HACCP plan development, record keeping, and verification (p.33). The cost impacts of these

regulatory measures are based on the deterministic values cited in the text of the analysis.


The annual cost of additional inspection, testing, and surveillance by FSIS is

estimated at $3 million2. This estimate does not include the impact of FSIS measures on

programs administered by other USDA agencies. Nor does it include the impacts of

changes in the programs of these agencies on FSIS program costs. These impacts are

difficult to estimate at this time due to uncertainty about the provisions of the programs

that may be implemented by other USDA agencies.3 The action related to the prohibition

on certain stunning devices is not expected to have any cost impacts as these devices are

no longer in use.

The aggregate beef price impacts of the measures contained in the SRM and

AMR interim final rules are not expected to be significant.4 The measures affecting the

removal of SRMs from the human food supply, excluding the condemnation of nonambulatory

cattle presented for slaughter, may have a minimal impact on consumer beef

prices. Price impacts are expected to be primarily limited to products derived from beef

small intestines such as sausages with natural casings and trepas for which substitutes are

limited. Substitutes are available for other by-products, largely from cattle less than 30

months of age, although prices will likely be somewhat higher. For example, the

prohibition on bone-in beef cuts from cattle 30 months of age and older will raise the

2 United States Department of Agriculture, 2005, Explanatory Notes for the Committee on Appropriations,

Volume 1, page 14-14.

3 The impacts of the test and hold provision depend on the level of surveillance testing for BSE that will be

conducted by the APHIS on cattle presented for slaughter at federally-and state-inspected establishments.

Because non-ambulatory disabled cattle are prohibited for use in human food, APHIS surveillance testing

for BSE may shift toward locations other than federally inspected establishments and thereby minimize the

impacts of the new FSIS test and hold policy on establishments that slaughter cattle. However, a more

extensive BSE surveillance program that focuses on all cattle 30 months of age and older may increase

testing at these establishments, and consequently the impact of the test and hold provisions.

4 FSIS is collecting additional information on cost impacts of the SRM and AMR interim final rules that

may not be fully reflected in the current analysis. When this information is available, it will be used with

existing information to estimate the beef price impacts, disaggregated by major market categories. This

analysis, conducted by RTI, International, along with information from public comment; will be

incorporated into the final regulatory impact analysis.


prices of these cuts from younger cattle. The removal of non-ambulatory cattle from the

food supply is not expected to have a significant impact on beef prices given the very

small share of beef supply affected (0.1 percent).

The costs associated with regulatory measures affecting the segregation and

disposal of SRMs, and changes in process control practices including plan development

and record keeping are not significant from an industry perspective. Consequently, the

resulting impacts on beef and beef products, and both beef and pork AMR products

are not expected to be significant.

Anecdotal information suggests that prices received for cattle 30 months of age

and older are being significantly discounted from prices for cattle of equivalent grade that

are less than 30 months. The amount of the discount may reflect a combination of costs

due to product loss, segregation, SRM removal and disposal, and other related processing

control costs. These impacts could be significant for cattle producers. The Agency

requests comment on the effect of the SRM interim final rule provisions on cattle

marketing practices and prices.

The following is a preliminary analysis of the major impacts of the measures

contained in the SRM and AMR interim final rules. The Agency is seeking comment

from the public on the types and magnitude of the impacts resulting from the SRM and

AMR interim final rule measures to ensure that the final regulatory impact analysis is


II. Cattle and Meat Processing Industry.

The United States has the largest fed-cattle industry in the world, and is the

world's largest producer of beef, primarily high-quality grain-fed beef, for domestic and


export markets. Beef production in 2003 is estimated at 26.3 billion pounds from an

annual slaughter of about 36 million cattle. Gross farm income from cattle and calf

production totaled $44.1 billion in 20035. U.S. exports of beef, veal, and beef variety

meats in 2003 were 2.6 billion pounds valued at $3.8 billion according to the most recent


In 2003, 98.7 percent of all cattle were slaughtered for food and processed in

federally-inspected establishments.6 About 80 percent of the cattle slaughtered at

federally- inspected establishments are estimated to be less than 30 months of age. The

remaining 20 percent are cows, bulls, or stags and some steers and heifers that are

estimated to be 30 months of age and older7. FSIS seeks comments on the age

distribution of cattle sent to slaughter and, in particular, reliable information on the age

distribution of cattle slaughtered at establishments that specialize in market or fed cattle.

In 2003, cattle were processed for dress or further processing in an estimated

4,033 establishments that are federally- and State-inspected. Of the 4,033 establishments,

FSIS estimates that about 84 percent or 3,388 were establishments that typically dealt

with SRMs during carcass dressing, meat-cut fabrication, or further processing of

carcasses or parts of carcasses. The remaining 16 percent, or 645, were establishments

that did not receive SRMs of any type, or only received parts of beef carcasses derived

5 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, released on February 6, 2004 at ERS

website: http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/farmincome/ See the following for more detailed information:


6 U. S. Department of Agriculture, Food Safety and Inspection Service. Animal Disposition and Reporting

System, 2003.

7 FSIS has found that some first-calf cows, and some juvenile (not mature) and mature bulls that go to

slaughter may be less than 30 months of age. Furthermore, FSIS has found that some steers and heifers that

go to slaughter may be 30 months of age and older. These steers and heifers have been fed primarily grass

pasture or forage crops while growing and then finished for grading on grain. Also, heifers that have failed

to conceive in the breeding season, or have lost their calves, have been removed from cattle herds. These

older heifers, that have already matured, have been placed in feedlots where the heifers have been finished

for grading on grain. These practices affect the share of meat slaughter and processing establishments

which may have to modify their practices in response to the proposed measures.


from cattle 30 months of age and older that did not include the vertebrae (e.g. boxed

boneless trimmings for further processing). Furthermore, of the 3,388 establishment that

typically dealt with SRMs, approximately 888 (26 percent) are State-inspected

establishments and about 2,500 (74 percent) are federally-inspected establishments. Of

these 3,388 establishments, about 2,128 (62.8 percent) were establishments that are

classified by FSIS as "very small." About 1,203 (35.5 percent) of the establishments

were classified as "small." The remaining 57 establishments (1.7 percent) were classified

as "large." 8 These 57 large establishments slaughter or further process more than 94

percent of the cattle. All of the large establishments are federally-inspected. The 1,203

small establishments slaughter and process about 5 percent of the cattle. The 200 largest

establishments slaughter or process about 98 percent of the cattle9.

In 2003, about 56 establishments used AMR systems to produce beef and pork

AMR products. AMR products derived from beef vertebrae were produced in about 30

establishments. Pork AMR products derived from pork vertebrae were produced in about

22 establishments. One establishment produced both beef and pork AMR products

derived from vertebrae. At least four establishments produced beef or pork AMR

products derived from non-vertebral bones. About 17 AMR establishments were small

establishments, and the remaining were large. At least one establishment processed beef

vertebrae from its operations and the operations of another establishment. About three

AMR establishments only fabricated cuts or processed carcasses or parts of carcasses.

8 The size classifications used by FSIS for very small, small, and large establishments are defined as

establishments with fewer than 10, between 10 and 499, and 500 or more employees, respectively.

9 U.S. Department of Agriculture. Animal Disposition and Reporting System, FSIS. 2003.

III. Scientific Findings

In April 1998, USDA commissioned the Harvard School of Public Health, Center

for Risk Analysis, to conduct an analysis and evaluation of the current measures

implemented by the U.S. government to prevent the introduction and spread of BSE in

the United States and to reduce the potential human exposure to the BSE agent. The

Harvard risk assessment reviewed available scientific information related to BSE and

other Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSEs), assessed pathways by which

BSE could potentially occur in the United States, and identified measures that could be

taken to protect human and animal health.10

The Harvard BSE risk assessment concluded that if introduced, BSE is extremely

unlikely to become established in the United States and that should BSE enter the United

States, only a small amount of potentially infective tissue would likely reach the human

food supply and be available for human consumption. The Harvard study identified three

pathways or practices that could contribute most to either increased human exposure to

the BSE agent or to the spread of BSE should it be introduced. The three pathways are:

• Noncompliance with FDA regulations prohibiting the use of certain proteins in

feed for cattle and other ruminants;

• Rendering of animals that die on the farm and use (through illegal diversion or

cross-contamination) of the rendered product in ruminant feed;

• Inclusion of high-risk tissue from cattle, such as brain and spinal cord, in edible


The Harvard study concluded that, ... (more on the Harvard BSe risk assessment later, no need to go further here...TSS)


Under the measures announced by FSIS on January 12, 2004, the spinal cord is

required to be removed from the vertebral column of cattle 30 months of age and older.

In addition, the vertebral column from cattle 30 months of age and older cannot be used

for AMR systems. Thus, unless there is inadvertent use of this material in AMR systems

or if cattle are not properly aged, components of the vertebral column may become

incorporated into edible food, including steaks, meat from AMR systems, and edible

rendered products. FSIS does not believe that the oxtail, used primarily for soups, is a

source of potential infectivity because neither the spinal cord nor the DRG are present in

the portion of the vertebral process that defines the tail area.


THIS document is worth reading if you have not read it.

THE federal Gov. uses the Harvard BSE risk assessment as the 'GOLD STANDARD'
to dispute every scientist in the world that disputes anything they say.

MIND you the Harvard BSE risk ass. was partially funded by the very
industry it was assessing. this is the assessment of that study by TSE scientist.

ABOUT 132 pages;

October 31, 2002
Review of the Evaluation of the
Potential for Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy in the United States
Conducted by the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis,
Harvard School of Public Health and Center for
Computational Epidemiology, College of Veterinary
Medicine, Tuskegee University
Final Report
Prepared for
U.S. Department of Agriculture
Food Safety and Inspection Service
Office of Public Health and Science
Prepared by
Health, Social, and Economics Research
Research Triangle Park, NC 27709
RTI Project Number 07182.024


1) The H-T BSE study authors have done their best to
incorporate the existing data in their estimates of the parameters
selected for inclusion in the model. Not much hard data exist that
could be used directly for setting parameter values. Therefore, the
authors used indirect data to justify logical arguments for setting a
parameter to a particular range of values. The authors may have
included some factors in their model simply because some indirect
data could be found.
The reviewers had concerns that the importance of some parameters
has been overestimated and others underestimated.
2) A rather optimistic choice was made in case of doubt or
insufficient hard evidence or data. These concerns relate to overall
model weaknesses in the general comments section. In the
summary section, on Pages 98 and 99, several of the main issues
that involve assumptions that cannot be verified with confidence are
discussed, and several of them could serve as perfect examples of
what has been argued here, that optimistic choices for favorable
Section 3 Identification of Data and Critical Evaluation of Evidence
outcome or reassuring nuances are presented (e.g., the
implementation rates, the remote chance that an infected animal
had been imported from the UK).
Reviewers commented on the import of MBM.
3) The UK export statistics mention a shipment of 20 tons to
the U.S. in 1989. Such a quantity was enough to spark the Swiss
epidemic. This part of import risk was considered negligible
probably because the U.S. authorities could not corroborate this
figure. The statement (Page 22, second paragraph, last sentence)
that overseas shipping of MBM was economically noncompetitive
seems questionable because at least for the period when MBM was
almost available for free in the UK, it did get all the way to South-
East Asia in large quantities. Figures from Southern State
Cooperative of recent years are moot in this respect.
A reviewer also commented on the import of live cattle from the
4) Because the USDA reported that about half of the animals
imported in the risk period did not really enter the food chain, these
were considered to carry no risk (Section 3.4.3). The report does
not provide details or evidence to support this statement. Other
arguments regarding the potential risk of import of live cattle from
the UK, such as animals not being from a BSE-infected farm, and
BSE not being a recognized disease (Page iii, last paragraph), are
questionable. Admittedly, not many were imported at the peak of
the risk period.
5) With respect to rendering (Table 3-3, Page 61), two log
reduction for atmospheric continuous rendering with added fat is
optimistic. Also there is a doubt about the statement on Page 25
(Appendix 1, second paragraph, last sentence) that addition of fat
increases the inactivation.
6) In Section on stunning, it is assumed for the base
case that air-injected stunning is not used in the U.S., based on
conversations with involved persons (Page 55, first paragraph,
seventh line). However, it seems that the model is based on
unlikely events such as air-injected stunning. Therefore, the model
may be limited and may become obsolete. In Section (Page
56, second paragraph, last sentence), the assumption that stunners
Review of the Evaluation of the Potential for Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy in the United States Final Report
not using air injection never cause contamination of the blood
(during exsanguination) with brain material needs to be modified.
7) The remark in Section 4.5 in the last line on Page 99 does
not sound very scientific: exposure could not have been
substantial because we did not see many cases, having in mind the
German experience. About the level of achieved surveillance, more
will follow.
8) In Section on plate waste, it is said to mainly contain
vegetable material (third paragraph, second sentence), and
vegetable protein must be added to give it the correct nutritional
value. The major question is why one would not add mammalian
protein here instead of vegetable?
9) A reviewer commented on ProbPassAM (Section 2.1.1,
Appendix 1, Page 9). If it is their intent, the authors should specify
that ProbPassAM is the probability that a BSE-infected animal, not
just an animal, passes AM inspection. The authors state that the
probability of an animal passing AM inspection is age dependent.
They provide the references that were used to derive these
estimates. Because BSE evolves slowly, their argument that BSE in
older animals is more likely to be detected makes sense, but the
age-dependent variation is for animals without clinical signs. Thus,
the probabilities really represent the age-dependant chance
occurrence that an infected animal passes. Variations in
probabilities for the three age categories are minute (to third
decimal, Appendix 1, Section 3.1.1, Page 38). The authors do not
specify variation in ProbPassAM in animals with clinical signs by
the actual clinical signs, where variation in the probability among
animals is likely to be higher than variation among age categories.
Therefore, it appears that in one instance the parameter is
overestimated and in the other underestimated.
What is important from an inspection point of view is to pay greater
attention to early signs of disease. The probabilities also do not
reflect improvements in detection over the 20-year time span. If the
0.10 probability chosen by the authors is an average probability of
passing infected animals with early signs and animals with late
signs, perhaps it is appropriate. If it represents the probability of
passing an infected animal in the later stages of disease, then the
Section 3 Identification of Data and Critical Evaluation of Evidence
Figure 3-1. Forrester
(rate/state) Diagram to
Depict Relationships
between Population
estimate is probably high, because the neurological signs would be
obvious to an inspector.
10) Reviewers commented on the cattle population parameters
(Appendix 3A). The output tables list epidemic statistics such as the
numbers of cattle infected and the numbers infected exhibiting
clinical signs. It appears that cattle population parameters were
included in the model to simulate epidemic statistics, which is also
suggested in Figure 3-1 of the H-T BSE study report. Cattle
population parameters specified in the H-T BSE study report are
ProbBirth, ProbDeath, and InitSize. From an epidemiological point
of view, these variables can be used to estimate the size of the
national herd, which can define cattle at risk, and transmission of
prions, for instance between cow and calf, which can define spread.
However, the authors do not define clearly how the population
parameters affect the output. That is, the mathematical
relationships, if there are any, among the population parameters.
Figure 3-1 in the H-T BSE report is not sufficient in describing the
relationships. The authors do not report the density-dependent
process used. They might consider using Forrester (rate/state)
diagrams to depict the relationships in an easy to understand figure.
For instance, a simple way to convey to the reader the factors that
affect the size of the cattle population might be as shown in
Figure 3-1.
Population Birth
at Time t
A rate that increases the population and a rate that decreases the
population determine the size of the herd at a point in time. Then
the authors can elaborate. For instance, the rate of increase is
affected by the current age-specific size of the population at time t-1
and the birth rate. The rate at which the population decreases is
affected by the death/slaughter rate. The number culled for slaughter
(and other factors) affects the death rate.
Review of the Evaluation of the Potential for Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy in the United States Final Report
In Table 3.4.1, the natural death rate is age-specific (Appendix 1,
Page 45). It should be reported that the unit for age is months, and
that the values tabulated are for beef cattle. Overall, the units of
measurement should be included in all tables. Throughout the
report, the stage of production is not considered. For instance, the
death rate is different for stocker cattle on pasture than for feedlot
cattle and varies seasonally and geographically and certainly by
producer. When should details such as these be included in the
model and when should they be excluded? More rationale should
be given for the variables selected and for those omitted.
Population parameters were important in the Great Britain outbreak
because destroying infected animals served to reduce the incidence
rate and disease spread. It is unclear how the population
parameters are used in this model.
11) About maternal transmission, one reviewer noted the
following. The parameters beginCalving and endCalving, the
beginning and ending age when cows give birth, are defined in
Appendix 1, Pages 10 and 11. They are included presumably to
estimate maternal transmission of prions to offspring or perhaps to
determine the period at which transmission could occur. However,
the actual relationship among the variables is not described.
Therefore, one would have to examine the computer code to
understand the relationships. Again, the authors might consider
depicting the relationship as shown in Figure 3-2.
ProbTrans is a probability that a new born calf becomes infected
if the mother is infected and the mother has lived through at least a
fixed fraction of her incubation period and its value is 0.1
(Appendix 1, Section 2.2.2, Page 10). The fixed fraction is specified
by parameter and its value is 0.833
(Appendix 1, Section, Page 76). Therefore, it appears that
probTrans is a conditional probability that can take on one of the
two values, which might be depicted by a Warnier-Orr diagram that
the authors could use as a means of making the relationship easier
for the reader to understand:
Section 3 Identification of Data and Critical Evaluation of Evidence
Figure 3-2. Forrester
Diagram to Depict
Relationships for
Begincalving and
[Fraction of incubation period > 0.833] {ProbTrans = 10%
[Fraction of incubation period < 0.833] {ProbTrans = 0%
If the condition within the square brackets [ ] is true, then the
assignment to the right of the curly brace { is made. Also, the
authors need to specify if the fraction is >0.833 or ?0.833.
12) Apparently, the incubation period for BSE is assigned a value
between 0 and >130 months according to the probability
distribution ClinicalDate (Appendix 1, Pages 73-76). It is
assumed that although the table indicates >130 months, the highest
value actually used was 130.
13) A few assumptions are based on data extrapolated from
dairy cattle and beef cattle or other animals. Do the results sum
over all types of cattle?
14) The number of cattle among which blood meal from a single
slaughtered animal is divided is estimated as described in Section
2.3.1 (Appendix 1, Page 11). Apparently, the blood collected from
individual animals at slaughter establishments is pooled. The
authors calculate the expected amount of blood meal consumed by
a dairy cow to determine the number of animals (88) fed by a single
4,000 lb batch of blood meal. It is not clear how this number is
used along with estimates of blood meal consumption (Table 3.3.3,
Appendix 1, Page 39) by each bovine type, gender, and age
combination to estimate the number of cattle infected by blood.
Also, the value for the number of animals fed by a single batch of
Review of the Evaluation of the Potential for Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy in the United States Final Report
blood meal is reported as 88 in Appendix 1, on Pages 11 and 23,
but 89 in Appendix I, Page 66. Which of these two numbers is
correct? Because the units in the output tables (Appendix 3A) are
not given, it can only be a guess that the value for blood (in mode of
infection) represents cattle numbers infected by blood.
15) One reviewer commented on the lack of emphasis on
exposure routes. It is generally accepted that the highest risk for BSE
is from
Z import of live cattle or MBM from a country with BSE;
Z an internal processing system that is incapable of reducing
infectivity below a certain threshold level (mainly the
rendering system); and
Z exposure of ruminants to the end products of the second
way (be it purposely or accidental, by cross-contamination).
Although it is commendable that all possible routes and potential
risks are addressed, the emphasis could have been placed more on
the above limited number of priority routes, instead of dwelling on
sometimes highly theoretical routes. In other words, some of the
reported unlikely infection routes are easily dismissed by the model
with a simple statement, whereas others are investigated to a
surprisingly deep level. This comment is also related to the general
comment on complexity and level of detail.
The study apparently treats the scrapie transmission (Section 2.3.3,
Page 23) and the spontaneous BSE case (Section 2.3.1, Page 21) at
the same level as the above listed priority routes. Below we provide
an example of this inconsistency with what is considered major
It is stated that from 750,000 up to 2.5 million animals are imported
annually from Mexico and Canada (Section, Page 22).
However, the H-T BSE study report does not address what happens
in Mexico in terms of MBM exposure. In general, the report says it
was extremely unlikely that those animals posed a risk of
introducing BSE in the U.S. Perhaps the imported animals do not
pose any risk, but what if they had been fed contaminated starter
ratios as calves in Mexico? Even if such animals would not live
until patent clinical stages, they can introduce infectivity into the
system. The Scientific Study Committee (SCC) concluded that this
was an area for consideration (or concern) in the case of the U.S.
Section 3 Identification of Data and Critical Evaluation of Evidence
16) The third paragraph on Page iii discusses the risk presented
by the 334 animals brought into the U.S. from the UK between
1980 and 1989. The text states: These animals were imported as
breeding stock, not as beef or dairy breeding animals. This fact is
likely to have reduced their potential for exposure to BSE before
their export from the UK (fifth line). There is a misunderstanding
here as discussed below.
The cattle exported from the UK have carried a greater risk of being
infected by BSE than the other members of their natal cohorts that
were not exported. An assessment based solely on the incidence in
the home-based remnant of the cohort can therefore be misleading.
The reason for this elevated risk is because the exported animals are
more likely to have received commercial concentrate feed,
especially beef breeds that had a much lower exposure to feedstuffs
containing MBM. One reason for this was to ensure that they were
in the best physical condition. Examples of this apparent differential
risk for exported animals are the animals of the Saler breed, which
was exported to Canada, and animals exported to Denmark and
Germany. More generally, at the beginning of the clinical
epidemic, pedigree dairy herds were disproportionally represented.
Their exposure to MBM was relatively greater than for other
commercial herds, because of showing animals and general
traditions of managing such herds. Unfortunately a proportion of
the early affected pedigree herds was the source of Friesian heifers
for export to Portugal to restock after the Contagious Bovine
Pleuropneumonia (CBPP) outbreak there.
17) The second paragraph in Section 2.1.1 on Page 6 describes
transmission of TSE disease in the case of sheep-borne scrapie. It is
stated that TSE transmission has been inked to the use of vaccines.
There is not much evidence that a relatively crudely prepared
louping ill vaccine has been associated with transmission. The
evidence from the Italian outbreak is far from conclusive.
18) It would have been more correct if at least experimentally
was inserted after transmitted in the second sentence of the
second paragraph of Section 2.1.2.
19) With reference to Anderson et al. (1996), it is stated in
Section 2.1.3, third paragraph, that the susceptibility of animals
peaks at 1.31 years of age and then decreases based on back
Review of the Evaluation of the Potential for Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy in the United States Final Report
calculation of the BSE model. There not only is a slight
misunderstanding of the Anderson paper, but also an error in this
paper that unfortunately has never been amended.
The peak susceptibility quoted is not derived by a back calculation.
However, it is derived from a research institutes cattle herd that had
a very unusual feeding profile and this is the error. In Great
Britain, exposure to feedstuffs containing MBM is relatively rare
between 6 months of age and approximately 2 years when heifers
start to calve. This error is perpetuated in the Woolhouse and
Anderson (1997) paper, which is not a separate investigation (i.e.,
both papers are part of the same investigation). Moreover, it has not
been possible to determine the profile of age-dependent
susceptibility and whether it does occur. This would require a
laboratory-based study because the natural feeding pattern
throughout the first 2 years of the life of cattle in Great Britain
precludes the necessary epidemiological analysis of this putative
age-dependent susceptibility.
The synthesis of the current evidence on this aspect is important to
the risk assessment. If there is an age-dependent susceptibility it is
not absolute. That is, all ages are susceptible. The age at which
cattle are exposed orally and parentally to the BSE agent in
experimental challenges in Great Britain has been 4 months. This is
the age at which calves would have achieved their maximum intake
of commercial concentrate feedstuffs under Great Britain conditions.
The results from the British attack rate study, involving oral exposure
to varying amounts of brain tissue from terminal cases of BSE, has
resulted in an incubation period/age at clinical onset distribution
similar to that observed in naturally occurring cases. The
epidemiological evidence from the epidemic in Great Britain is that
age at exposure does not influence the incubation period.
In the ninth line of the third paragraph, it is hypothesized that agerelated
susceptibility is associated with permeability of the intestine
to large protein. A reference to the hypothesis is required because
the change in permeability of the bovine intestine with age does not
explain the apparent age-dependent susceptibility. The quoted
changes occur too early after birth.
In the second paragraph on Page 12, findings from the attack rate
experiments are discussed for the dose of BSE agent. The
Section 3 Identification of Data and Critical Evaluation of Evidence
researchers should have made themselves aware of the attack rate
study conducted in Great Britain. The lowest dose in the original
study (a follow-up study using lower doses is in progress) was 1g.
The results of this study should have been included here. There
appears to be some confusion here and therefore a concern that the
researchers may not have made the best use of the research results
available, which is a trap generally advised against in terms of
interpretation and use of the results of the bovine pathogenesis
study. Essentially, the researchers have assumed that all of the
animals in the pathogenesis study, exposed to 100g brain orally,
had an incubation period of 36 months. This is not true and
probably arises from a lack of synthesis of the results from these two
studies; the attack rate study, although initiated at the same time as
the pathogenesis study, was the scoping study for the latter. The
problem is that in the attack rate study the 10 animals were exposed
to 100g brain orally. However, the same exposure dose used in the
pathogenesis study had incubation periods that ranged from 33 to
61 months. It is not correct to assume that all of the pathogenesis
study animals had the same relatively short incubation period.
Therefore, the proportional calculation described in Section 2.10.1,
Appendix 1 will produce conservative estimates of infectivity and
underestimate this value.
20) Section 2.2.1 describes scrapie in sheep as one of the
possible causes of the BSE epidemic in the UK. The section is a
little muddled in that it starts discussing transmission of sheep
scrapie between sheep and then goes on to the sheep scrapie origin.
The latter is a little simplistic and half-hearted. Again, this section is
a little short on primary references and reviews of considerations of
the origin, for example Kimberlin (1997). The comment on the
feeding of concentrates to calves not taking place other than in
Great Britain except Australia (Page 14, last sentence) is not true.
The EU-sponsored Great Britain exercise clearly indicated that the
feeding of concentrates containing MBM to calves was not restricted
to Great Britain/UK. Thus, there is a misquotation regarding the
feeding of concentrates to calves, which needs to be corrected to
make accurate international comparisons. Finally, the last sentence
of Section 2.2.1 could be misinterpreted by the uninformed to mean
that cattle are not susceptible to oral exposure to sheep scrapie.
This is not true.
Review of the Evaluation of the Potential for Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy in the United States Final Report
21) Section 2.2.2 discusses sporadic BSE as one of the possible
causes for the UK epidemic. The first sentence of this section is
rather vague and conflicting. Is this referring to relativity to all other
countries or just to the U.S.? The evidence suggests that this is only
true for the U.S. Occurrence of sporadic BSE according to age of
cattle is discussed in the second paragraph. The age distributions of
the UK animals are specifically mentioned. However, other
European countries certainly have dairy cow populations with
similar age distributions, which needs to be considered here.
22) As discussed in Section 2.2.3, toxic agents and other
hypotheses as a possible cause of the BSE epidemic in the UK are
discussed here. The other hypotheses may not deserve any great
attention in such a risk assessment. They could have been
dismissed either by reference to reviews by others such as the
Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC) in Great
Britain or by the EUs SSC. As it stands, it is misleading. For
example, the Organophosphate Pesticides hypothesis has not
been a singular hypothesis. It has changed significantly throughout
the epidemic by its protagonist. Also, in the last sentence in the first
paragraph of Section, it is stated that resulting conditions
from copper deficiency had signs and pathological changes similar
to those of BSE, which is not true. Section discusses
pituitary hormones, but the fact that transmission via hormones
derived from bovine pituitaries was considered in the original
epidemiological study has been ignored.
23) As discussed in Section, there is a theoretical risk
that cattle could be exposed to a TSE from porcine-derived protein.
One of the two potential sources of this exposure can be a natural
TSE that infects pigs. Section discusses infectivity in pigs
due to TSE infection. BSE in pigs, as a clinical disease or subclinical
infection, has been a concern worldwide. They were clearly of
potential importance in Great Britain because of the inclusion rate
of MBM. In simple terms pigs could represent an effective sump
for the BSE agent, in which the BSE agent is effectively removed
from the feed system, or at the other extreme they could represent a
means of amplification.
The evidence from Great Britain could have perhaps been used to
strengthen this section. This is so specifically for the last part of the
second paragraph and the third paragraph on Page 29. Some
Section 3 Identification of Data and Critical Evaluation of Evidence
evidence indicates that subclinical infection is not a problem in
pigs, and this is not presented. Also, some evidence shows that
clinical disease in pigs has not occurred in the pig population in
Great Britain. This has probably got lost in various reports.
However, if one assumes that the incubation period in pigs is the
same as that for BSE in cattle and the surveillance for neurological
disease in pigs in Great Britain is equally effective for such disease
in cattle, then the number of expected cases in the pig population in
Great Britain can be tens of thousands. On the first assumption
there is no evidence to dismiss it. On the second assumption,
evidence indicates that the surveillance of disease, including
neurological disease, in pigs is more effective than in cattle in Great
BSE in pigs was detected by a neuropathologist whose specialism
was neurological disease in pigs. Also, during the BSE epidemic
outbreaks of neurological disease in pigs in Great Britain were
detected, brought to the attention of MAFF scientists, and
investigated. The main point is that the third paragraph on Page 29
has a touch of innumeracy. The percentage of pigs slaughtered at
less than 6 months of age is not an important statistic compared to
the number of pigs that reach a potentially susceptible age (~5
years), and this is what the analysis of the pig population referred to
above was concerned with. There is really no evidence that pigs
are important in the epidemiology of BSE, but quoting percentages
rather than absolute numbers is not helpful in such an important risk
24) Actions taken in the UK to check BSE are described in
Section 2.4.2, Page 37. The fifth sentence (line 7) indicates that the
ban on specific bovine offal (SBO) as ingredients in feed stuff helps
to identify tissues with the highest infectivity. It should be indicated
that these high risk tissues were identified as a result of research on
sheep scrapie. This sentence also could be more fully referenced.
The last sentence of the paragraph is more accurate if it is moved to
be the penultimate sentence. Because by 1997 the additional ban
on the use of mammalian-derived protein in 1996 could not
possibly have had any effect on the clinical incidence.
To make the second paragraph more realistic, it may be noted that
the SBO ban, with respect to the human food supply, was
introduced in 1989 because of the knowledge that when the
Review of the Evaluation of the Potential for Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy in the United States Final Report
scrapie agent successfully crosses to another species, it can have
altered transmission characteristics with respect to other species.
Also, the tissues listed as the SBOs, such as brain and spinal cord
from cattle older than 6 months, are incomplete.
The chronology of events that is suggested in the third paragraph is
not correct. The national surveillance for Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
(CJD) was formally instigated in May 1990, which is clear from the
CJD Surveillance Units website. In Table 2-2, the chronology of
BSE-regulated actions in the UK contains errors. For example, there
was no selective culling in 1990, and spinal cord in animals older
than 6 months was included in the original SBO ban. There are
perhaps some other important exclusions even though this is a
summary table. For a detailed chronology, refer to the six monthly
progress report on the BSE epidemic published by the Ministry of
Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food (MAFF) (now the Department for
Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs or DEFRA), which is available
on their web site.
The two measures to prevent the BSE epidemic described in the last
two paragraphs of this section are confused as different bans. The
reality was that in March 1996, the SEACs recommendation was for
the deboning of carcasses of animals older than 30 months of age
together with the removal of all obvious lymphatic and nervous
tissues. This was not possible because of an insufficient number of
deboning plants. The political decision was therefore made, at the
Prime Ministerial level, to remove all animals over 30 months old
from the human chain. The ban on bone-in-beef was introduced as
a precautionary measure as a result of the later results from the BSE
pathogenesis study (in cattle) conducted in Great Britain that
suggested that infectivity may be present in dorsal root ganglia.
25) In Section 2.4.5, BSE surveillance in the U.S. was evaluated.
The section reads as if there is a little complacency about the
surveillance for BSE, and CJD/vCJD in the U.S. A more critical
evaluation appears to be appropriate. There have clearly been a
number of problems with surveillance for clinical BSE. The first is
the general level of surveillance in the U.S. and other countries.
The second is the fact that at low incidence BSE is clearly a difficult
disease to identify because of its more behavioral, rather than
neurological, clinical presentation in at least the early clinical phase
and the rather variable clinical signs. Thirdly, a concentration on
Section 3 Identification of Data and Critical Evaluation of Evidence
suspect rabies cases has not proved to be very effective within
continental Europe; this is mainly because rabies is endemic in the
less cattle-dense areas and such surveillance (on its own) can
therefore exclude a significant proportion of the cattle population.
Fourthly, downer cows are probably not the best targets for BSE
The time frame of the BSE risk assessment work is not clear. The
executive summary indicates a starting year of 1998 and the
scientific references section contains some papers published in May
2001. An improved awareness of the extent and magnitude of the
incidence of BSE in EU member states in continental Europe
emerged towards the end of 2000. Any comment on the omission
of what has been learned or stressed from this additional
surveillance in Europe, arising from the use of the more rapid and
economical tests described in Section 2.4.1, may be misplaced.
However, two related aspects emerge. The first is that testing
animals at slaughter improves quite dramatically our knowledge on
the incidence of BSE in countries with a low incidence of clinical
BSE and therefore a relatively poor awareness of the intricacies of
the clinical picture. Secondly, targeting surveillance to the more
general category of fallen stock/casualty slaughter animals, rather
than just downer cows is a much more effective method.
A comparison of surveillance for CJD/vCJD in the U.S. with that in
the UK and the more widely based EU funded surveillance project
would have been helpful because there do seem to be some
differences. A lack of change in the observed incidence of CJD in
the U.S. could be interpreted as providing evidence of no increased
intensity in surveillance. This comment is made in light of the
findings from those countries that have participated in the
international project on CJD surveillance.



Harvard SUPPRESSED PEER review assessment October 31, 2002


RB $ Oxtail removal


45.4 I sought advice from Dr Kimberlin on the inclusion of pancreas, rennet and oxtail in the

proposed offal ban [YB 89/4.5/1.1]. I responded to MAFF having spoken to Dr Kimberlin

and other experts at the recent research committee [YB 89/4.13/2.1-2.3]. I advised that the

offal prohibited for use should include brains, spinal cord, thymus and intestines but not

rennet. I did not recommend that pancreas, oxtail or liver should be included although I

pointed out that the level of suspicion about their infection was somewhat higher than with,

say, steak.




26. On 3rd November, 1995 Mr Strang received a minute from Mr Render which briefed me

on a number of key points that I needed for a meeting that I was to have with Dr Calman

on 7th November, 1995 (exhibit 17). (YB 95/11.03/2.1-2.7) The minute recorded Dr

Calman's main concerns which were: enforcement of the SBO controls; the incidence of

BABs; and the incidence of CJD in cattle farmers.

27. On 7th November, 1995 I met with Dr Calman, Dr Metters (the Deputy Chief Medical

Officer) and other colleagues. The meeting is recorded in a minute from Mr Strang of 9th

November, 1995 (exhibit 18). (YB 95/11.09/1.1-1.3) At the meeting, I stressed that

MAFF were taking BSE very seriously, and that I welcomed the opportunity to discuss

the issue with the DoH. Dr Calman said that he was concerned, because he thought that

we did not understand the origins of BSE well enough. He said that he was less confident

now than he had been a year ago that things were moving in the right direction. Having

expressed these concerns, he said that much of the science itself was reassuring, and that

work done by Dr Collinge with mouse assays had so far suggested that BSE might not be

transmissible to humans, although this was as yet unconfirmed. He felt, however, that

other developments were less encouraging. We discussed the results of the CJD

surveillance unit, based on much more sophisticated data than in other countries, which

Dr Calman said were worrying, since four cases of CJD in farmers had all occurred in

producers with dairy herds which had had BSE. He was also concerned about the

increased incidence of CJD in young people.



45. On 20th November, 1995 Mr Meldrum sent a minute to Mr Strang (exhibit 24). (YB

95/11.20/12.1-12.6) The minute was to update me in relation to some BSE research

results. I was invited to note these latest research findings and it was suggested that I

should announce them by means of a Parliamentary Question. Mr Meldrum

recommended that no new action needed to be taken in response to these results. In the

minute he said that we had, for a number of years, been carrying out experiments to see

which tissues from cattle clinically affected with BSE could transmit that infectivity. A

large number of different tissues had been tested, most proving negative. However, recent

results had shown that the retina and the terminal spinal cord could transmit BSE

infectivity. Mr Meldrum said that neither result was surprising as both tissues were part

of the central nervous system, which we already knew was the main source of infectivity.

Mr Meldrum said that, as the entire spinal cord, including the terminal region, had been

an SBO since the 1989 Regulations, there was no need to take any further action.

Although the results on the terminal spinal cord could prompt questions about the safety

of oxtails, Mr Meldrum said there was in fact no problem, as the spinal cord does not

extend into the tail. There was also now available four results from animals killed at or

before 14 months old after being experimentally exposed to BSE. These results showed

that infectivity was present in the distal ileum of calves from six months old post

exposure onwards. No other tissue had shown any infectivity up to 14 months old,

including the brain and spinal cord, which were known to harbour infectivity in clinically

affected animals. These results supported the six month age rule for most SBOs.


Oxtail Sales

Lord Tebbit asked Her Majesty's Government:

Why it is illegal to sell oxtails for the making of soup but legal to sell soup made from oxtails.[HL1596]

The Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Lord Donoughue): The Beef Bones Regulations 1997 prohibit the sale of oxtails to consumers for the making of soup because of the possible risk of BSE infectivity from bone marrow reported by the Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC) in December 1997. However, the commercial manufacture of oxtail soup may continue, provided the oxtail meat which it utilises is removed from the tail by a process which leaves the bones intact, thus preventing the release of bone marrow into the soup. The bones must then be discarded and disposed of in accordance with the regulations.

6 May 1998 : Column WA73


TSS :???:
the problem for the american cattleman is that you've got a lame duck administration that is almost as unpopular domestically as it is internationally. this being the case, the united states doesn't have near the influence it used to. old europe led the way in breaking with the usa and the rest of the world sees it can be done with little adverse effect. japan will open the border when it's ready regardless of what the ncba, j. b. penn or anybody else has to say.
It was said months ago that the US would loose the credibility they had with the Asian markets if they didn't start proving they believed the science their were trying to sell to Japan. It was also said it took decades of hard work to get the crediblity they were going to loose. As long as the Japanese see a part of the US beef industry taking the USDA to court over "safety standards" they aren't going to do anything about pushing to open their borders. Why should they? The US has BSE in their native herd and is trying to sell their beef as the safest beef in the world. Meanwhile an industry that is also in the minimal risk catagory is not allowed to export UTM live cattle to the US because their beef is a genuine risk of death. The second country's standards are higher than those of the US so what makes the US beef the SAFEST BEEF IN THE WORLD. . Either the science proves all the beef is safe or it proves none of the beef is safe which is it? You can't sell one thing to Japan and stand at home claiming another. Your CREDIBILITY that took decades to achieve is at stake.
Tam-Murgen-- How much beef is Canada shipping to Japan :???: :wink: :lol: :lol:
That would be a little hypocritical on the Japaneses's part to import beef from one "infected" country and not another wouldn't it OT?
Murgen said:
That would be a little hypocritical on the Japaneses's part to import beef from one "infected" country and not another wouldn't it OT?

Not if like Tam says, your system has so much higher standards than the US's....Why doesn't Canada just start testing and see if the Asian market will buy it?
Or is your government all just dangling on the puppet strings of what the multinational corporations tell them? We know USDA inc. sold out to the corporate world- has CFIA and the Canadian government too?

Good old NAFTA- the multinationals just get more and more powerful...Someday it will be World Government dictated by Tyson :???:

I do know for a fact that a Japanese delagation is contracting age verified with ccia electronic tag and birthdates for feeding for the Japanese market. They are offering a fair premium for these calves. They are interested in contracting around 200,000 head.
Oldtimer said:
Murgen said:
That would be a little hypocritical on the Japaneses's part to import beef from one "infected" country and not another wouldn't it OT?

Not if like Tam says, your system has so much higher standards than the US's....Why doesn't Canada just start testing and see if the Asian market will buy it?
Or is your government all just dangling on the puppet strings of what the multinational corporations tell them? We know USDA inc. sold out to the corporate world- has CFIA and the Canadian government too?

Good old NAFTA- the multinationals just get more and more powerful...Someday it will be World Government dictated by Tyson :???:

Gee Oldtimer you seem to be facinated tonight on what I say. :wink: Have you looked at the standards in the US and those in Canada? Just whos do you think are higher? Hint wasn't it you that claimed the US couldn't afford to import Canadian cattle as they may spread BSE to the US herd? Hint we don't feed chicken **** to our cattle Oldtimer. Hint we inspect our feed mills every year. Hint we have records to prove compliance claims. Hint it was the CFIA that looked through a microscope to find the rodents and bird feathers. Hint it was our slaughter plants that couldn't slaughter OTM and UTM cattle in the same plant. Do we need to go further with this? If we do I could add the fact the Canadian ranchers turned over 23,500 head of the 4D catagory of cattle when all we needed to test by OIE recommendations was 8000 in 2004. And what was the USDA testing Oldtimer, according to them it was animals from Slaughter plants after they ban downers from their slaughter plants. But you go right on believing the US has Higher Standards Oldtimer as that is what R-CALF wants consumers to bellieve, to bad they are taking the USDA to court to prove otherwise.

And does testing capacity ever come to mind when you guys think all cattle should be tested for market access? Oldtimer you seem to be so worried about the cost of the M"ID" program. what do you think it would cost for enough labs to test every animal slaughtered in the US? and who do you think will be paying for those labs? As for Canada the CFIA have said they don't have the capacity to test everything, even if they wanted to. And as the new slaughter capacity comes on line the further the CFIA will be in being able to test everything.
Tam said:
Gee Oldtimer you seem to be facinated tonight on what I say. :wink:

Sorry to seem to be picking on you Canadian Tam, but your obsession with Bill and Leo and the R-CALF boys is quite comical to me... You are just too easy to get your hackles up...... :lol: :lol:
Oldtimer said:
Tam said:
Gee Oldtimer you seem to be facinated tonight on what I say. :wink:

Sorry to seem to be picking on you Canadian Tam, but your obsession with Bill and Leo and the R-CALF boys is quite comical to me... You are just too easy to get your hackles up...... :lol: :lol:

This tells us all what kind of person you really are Oldtimer. You think it is funny that everytime a person turns around he/she is hit in the face with another of a long line of lies told by your heros. What is happening to the North American beef industry because of BSE is not funny and is nothing to laugh about. Thousands have lost their livelyhoods, some have lost their homes and yes some have even lost their lives. All while R-CALF's mouth pieces stand throwing salt in the wounds. R-CALF leadership doesn't believe in lending a helpping hand in times of disaster they just like to see what happens when you kick a person that is already down again and again. Only thing lower on the food chain than the R-CALF leadership are those that finance them. Because they are the ones that are not holding the leadership accountable for the lies they have made up to further the R-CALF agenda. Be Proud Oldtimer you are nothing better than a cheerleader in a school yard bullying. :roll:

By the way Oldtimer you never answered a single question I asked. Nice diversion it almost worked. Now go back and answer the questions

Dont you know that in order to become a R-sulk member you have to divert around specific questions. The way OT is going he jsut may be the next leader of R-calf

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