Farm Bill Being Introduced NOW!
- Thread starter Tex
- Start date
Conner promises veto of Senate farm bill
Monday, November 5, 2007, 4:31 PM
by Peter Shinn
Just minutes into the U.S. Senate's debate on the next farm bill, acting U.S. Ag Secretary Chuck Conner held a press conference to blast the measure that emerged from the Senate Ag Committee on October 25th. And Conner made clear he can't advise President Bush to sign the Senate farm bill in its current form.
"The President's senior advisors will recommend a veto of the combined Senate Finance Committee and Senate Ag Committee and farm bill," Conner intoned.
The timing of Conner's announcement made for an odd justaposition of public farm bill events. At almost the exact same moment that Ag Committee Chairman Tom Harkin of Iowa was describing the Senate farm bill as a "kind of a grand compromise... so that the entire country benefits from this," Conner was chacterizing the Senate Farm bill as a measure that "continues a defective safety net, contains little real reform and uses tax increases and budget gimmicks that deserve to be funded in an honest fashion."
Farm bills almost always enjoy bi-partisan support, and Ranking Senate Agriculture Committee Republican Saxby Chambliss described the bill Tuesday as "a good legislative proposal." Harkin himself said he'd "never seen a partisan fight on a farm bill.
But the veto threat may change that. Lawmakers may have to choose between loyalty to the President and support of the current farm bill, which many mainline ag and commodity groups see as generally favorable. Still, Conner told Brownfield his goal isn't to scuttle the farm bill process, but to force Congress into essentially re-crafting the measure.
"I believe we do still have the opportunity, both in the Senate floor aind in conference, to change this bill to reflect good farm policy," Conner asserted. "The changes, I will tell you, do need to be significant changes, because these are major problems."
Specifically, Conner said the Senate farm bill had to address the issue of beneficial interest in commodity program payments, further tighten farm program payment limits and must not raise target prices or loan rates. And Conner reiterated several times his desire to work closely with Congress to produce a bill that President Bush could sign.
Harkin, in a statement issued after Conner's remarks, said he was "concerned" about Conner's remarks. Harkin added he hoped "the White House will work cooperatively with the House and the Senate to craft a farm bill the President will sign."
Monday, November 5, 2007, 4:31 PM
by Peter Shinn
Just minutes into the U.S. Senate's debate on the next farm bill, acting U.S. Ag Secretary Chuck Conner held a press conference to blast the measure that emerged from the Senate Ag Committee on October 25th. And Conner made clear he can't advise President Bush to sign the Senate farm bill in its current form.
"The President's senior advisors will recommend a veto of the combined Senate Finance Committee and Senate Ag Committee and farm bill," Conner intoned.
The timing of Conner's announcement made for an odd justaposition of public farm bill events. At almost the exact same moment that Ag Committee Chairman Tom Harkin of Iowa was describing the Senate farm bill as a "kind of a grand compromise... so that the entire country benefits from this," Conner was chacterizing the Senate Farm bill as a measure that "continues a defective safety net, contains little real reform and uses tax increases and budget gimmicks that deserve to be funded in an honest fashion."
Farm bills almost always enjoy bi-partisan support, and Ranking Senate Agriculture Committee Republican Saxby Chambliss described the bill Tuesday as "a good legislative proposal." Harkin himself said he'd "never seen a partisan fight on a farm bill.
But the veto threat may change that. Lawmakers may have to choose between loyalty to the President and support of the current farm bill, which many mainline ag and commodity groups see as generally favorable. Still, Conner told Brownfield his goal isn't to scuttle the farm bill process, but to force Congress into essentially re-crafting the measure.
"I believe we do still have the opportunity, both in the Senate floor aind in conference, to change this bill to reflect good farm policy," Conner asserted. "The changes, I will tell you, do need to be significant changes, because these are major problems."
Specifically, Conner said the Senate farm bill had to address the issue of beneficial interest in commodity program payments, further tighten farm program payment limits and must not raise target prices or loan rates. And Conner reiterated several times his desire to work closely with Congress to produce a bill that President Bush could sign.
Harkin, in a statement issued after Conner's remarks, said he was "concerned" about Conner's remarks. Harkin added he hoped "the White House will work cooperatively with the House and the Senate to craft a farm bill the President will sign."
It doesn't take long for the roaches to come out of the woodwork when the house starts catching on fire.
It will be interesting to see if the administration tries to hold the farm bill hostage like it does every other measure the House and Senate passes for the President to sign.
Johanns stepped away from the dirty he knew was going to be done.
How long has this man Conner been on the job?
It will be interesting to see if the administration tries to hold the farm bill hostage like it does every other measure the House and Senate passes for the President to sign.
Johanns stepped away from the dirty he knew was going to be done.
How long has this man Conner been on the job?
Mike
Well-known member
Was a little disappointed in Grassley's amendment offered to add $100 million to the budget to take care of black farmers supposedly turned down for loans by the USDA. aka "Pigford"
He claims there were 77,000 black farmers who missed the deadline in applying for their $50,000 in compensation due to the class action consent decree.
Just a few years back there were only 38,000 identified black farmers in the USA.
How could this be?
He claims there were 77,000 black farmers who missed the deadline in applying for their $50,000 in compensation due to the class action consent decree.
Just a few years back there were only 38,000 identified black farmers in the USA.
How could this be?
Mike said:
I saw that too. To the committee's credit, they did note that they didn't know the scope of the problem, and therefore couldn't put a price tag on it. I think Grassley just wanted the problem worked on, and fixed. Grassley has been much more attuned to court cases, and the issue gained prominence after a court case.
Saxby Chambliss just said he thought Johanns and Venemen (sp?) handled bse very well.
I guess he believes in the theory that if you don't look for it or let anyone else look for it (Creekstone), it won't be found and won't affect the industry.
We have leaders who believe in holding their head in the sand and making everyone else do the same!!! What does this say for homeland security (a phrase I hate to use because it stirs of the nationalism that Hitler used --"fatherland"-- in order to take his nation where he wanted)?
PORKER
Well-known member
COOL labeling - Government labeling or commoditity labeling
Do Food Labels Make a Difference? . . . Sometimes etc. edited
The economics behind food labeling provides insight into the dynamics of voluntary and mandatory food labeling and the influence labeling has on consumers' food choices.
There is a lot to know about the food we eat. The ingredients in a jar of spaghetti sauce, a box of cereal, or a cup of coffee could come from around the corner or around the world; they could be processed by children or by high-tech machines; they could be grown on huge corporate farms or on small family-run farms; or they could be mostly artificial or 100-percent natural.
While a description of a food product could include information on a multitude of attributes, not all of them are important to consumers or regulators. Information on some attributes could affect the health and welfare of consumers by influencing their food choices. Information on other attributes might have no effect at all.
Consumers, food companies, third-party entities, and governments play a role in determining which attributes are described on the label. The interaction of these groups influences which information is labeled voluntarily, which is mandated, and which is not labeled at all. It shapes the way information is presented and the accuracy and credibility of that information. The economics behind food labeling provides insight into the dynamics of voluntary food labeling and the types of market failures best addressed through mandatory labeling requirements.
Companies Will Voluntarily Label If Their Benefits Outweigh Their Costs
Voluntary labeling is one of a food company's many advertising options. Assuming that companies attempt to maximize profits, they will add information about an attribute to the label as long as each additional message eventually generates more benefits than costs. The primary benefits of labeling for a company come from either increasing profits or maintaining profits in the face of new competition. Either outcome is more likely if consumers use the information to differentiate the labeled product from similar products and then buy it.
The probability that consumers will value and react to labeled information is improved if the label successfully persuades consumers that it conveys information about a meaningful distinction between labeled and unlabeled products. If consumers decide that the information's significance or accuracy is questionable, they will not use it to modify their purchase decisions. Researchers from the University of California and ERS found, for example, that the geographic branding of Washington State apples is losing its impact because it does not convincingly differentiate the State's apples from those grown in other areas.
To bolster the meaningfulness of their message, firms often rely on advertising and other types of outreach. In 2005, the U.S. food industry spent $32 billion on advertising and $66.5 billion on packaging to differentiate their products from the competition (see "Food Product Introductions Continue To Set Records").
Firms may also try to convince consumers of the validity of their labeling claims by using third-party labeling services. By offering an "unbiased" assessment of a labeling claim, these services help strengthen the credibility of voluntary labeling (see box, "Third-Party Labeling Services Can Improve Market Efficiency"). A number of entities, including consumer groups, producer associations, private companies, national governments, and international organizations, provide third-party services. The Good Housekeeping Institute, for example, founded for the purpose of consumer education and product evaluation, sets product standards and provides consumer guarantees for a multitude of goods, including foods. Two private companies, Société Générale de Surveillance (SGS) and AIB International (originally the American Institute of Baking), verify and certify food safety for a wide range of food products. USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) has developed official grade standards for meats, eggs, poultry, dairy products, fresh fruits, vegetables, tree nuts, peanuts, and other commodities. ISO, a worldwide federation of national standards institutes, promotes the development of international standards for a variety of products and production processes.
The value of the labeling service generally depends on the credibility and reputation of the providing entity. In some cases, national governments or associations of national governments may be the most widely recognized and reputable third-party providers of labeling services. But this is not always true. For example, although U.S. consumers tend to have confidence in USDA and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to regulate food safety, Europeans rank national bodies far below international, environmental, consumer, and farm organizations in terms of trustworthiness.
Private and government labeling services have helped support an explosion of voluntary food labeling. American grocery store shelves have become veritable encyclopedias of labeling claims. A single carton of eggs sold in a national grocery store chain, for instance, is labeled with a "cage free" claim, the grocery store "quality and satisfaction money-back guarantee" logo, the Orthodox Union symbol of kosher certification, and a long list of nutrient claims, including "25% of the daily value of vitamin E; 185 mcg of lutein per egg; and 100 mg of omega-3 polyunsaturated fatty acids per egg."
A byproduct of the explosion of labeled attributes is that consumers learn to "read between the labels" and make deductions about unlabeled products. For example, confronted with one can of tuna labeled "dolphin friendly" and one with no such claim, consumers would likely assume that the unlabeled tuna was caught with dolphin-endangering practices. In a competitive marketplace, the presence of a label is a signal of quality, and the lack of a label on competing brands implies the absence of the quality attribute.
Consumers' ability to make inferences about quality further spurs the proliferation of labels. Companies in a competitive marketplace are motivated to make explicit claims for all positive "sellable" product attributes since they know that consumers may interpret the lack of labeling as a lack of the attribute. It is almost impossible, for example, to find a can of tuna in the United States without a dolphin-friendly label.
Ultimately, the company's bottom line sets limits on product differentiation and labeling. Not all attributes are worth the cost. "Predator-friendly" labeling, a campaign to promote wolf-friendly cattle ranching, has not had the success of the dolphin-friendly label. Likewise, "Made in America" or similar country-of-origin labeling is not always a valuable marketing attribute. Only if consumers believe that food produced in the United States is tastier, safer, or has some other distinctive attribute will the label be worthwhile to manufacturers or retailers. A company's benefit-cost criterion for deciding which information to include on the label helps ensure labeling efficiency. Only information valuable enough to consumers to justify the cost is included on the label.
Voluntary Labeling May Leave Information Gaps
Economic theory predicts that voluntary labeling is not always sufficient for disclosing information on all attributes consumers value or for guaranteeing information accuracy like COOL. One limitation to voluntary labeling may arise when an entire product category has an undesirable characteristic. In these cases, manufacturers do not compete on the attribute and therefore do not provide labeled or otherwise advertised information to consumers. For example, there was little information on the sodium content of processed foods before manufacturers were required to disclose it. The competitive process did not work well to reveal high-sodium products; few manufacturers competed to offer reduced-sodium products because less of this "health negative" attribute also tends to reduce taste.
Another limitation to voluntary labeling arises because manufacturers may provide only relative information. For example, a sausage label may boast "30 percent less fat than the leading brand" or a bacon label may brag "half the sodium." Although this type of information is valuable for deciding among competing brands of the same item, it is not complete. Lower fat sausage may still be a high-fat food. In many cases, consumers need information on absolute, not just relative, values to make fully informed consumption decisions.
Market forces may also be unable to eliminate partial disclosure and innuendo. For example, in early 2000, a manufacturer began marketing a wheat-flake cereal with a label proclaiming no "genetically engineered ingredients." A consumer advocacy group asked the FDA to take enforcement action against the manufacturer (and six others) on the grounds that the labels were misleading because they implied that the absence of genetically engineered ingredients distinguished the product from competing brands, when actually, no genetically engineered wheat is present in any food. The manufacturer removed the label.
Mandatory Labeling Has Targeted Information Gaps and Social Objectives
U.S. Government intervention in labeling began in 1906 with the Federal Pure Food and Drugs Act and the Federal Meat Inspection Act, which authorized Federal regulation of the safety and quality of food and prohibited sales of misbranded or adulterated foods. Lawmakers' primary objective in passing the acts' labeling regulations was to enhance fair competition by cracking down on deceptive marketing practices.
Enhancing fair competition and market efficiency has remained a primary motivation behind food labeling regulation for the past 100 years. Regulations ranging from the 1966 Fair Packaging and Labeling Act (requiring all consumer products in interstate commerce to contain accurate information to facilitate value comparisons) to the Organic Foods Production Act 1990 have sought to create a level playing field for producers by providing consumers with accurate information for comparing products and making choices. These regulations seek to increase informed consumption, not to alter consumption behavior. USDA's National Organic Program (the result of the Organic Foods Production Act) is designed to improve the comparability of organic labeling claims, not persuade more consumers to choose organic products.
Recently, government intervention in labeling has begun to target environmental or other spillovers associated with food production and consumption COOL. Individual food consumption decisions can have social welfare consequences, including effects on the environment, health and productivity, labor conditions, and farm and industry structure. For example, consumers who eat tuna caught with encircling nets may inadvertently endanger dolphins. Economists describe these kinds of situations, in which the action of one economic agent affects the well-being or production possibilities of another in a way that is not reflected in market prices, as externalities.
When private consumption decisions result in externalities, social welfare may be maximized by a labeling choice that differs from one generated by private firms. In the tuna example, the potential benefits of providing information on labels include fewer dolphin deaths. For society as a whole, these potential benefits may outweigh the increase in profits that compose a private firm's labeling benefits. As a result, the social benefits of labeling may outweigh the social costs even though the private benefits do not outweigh private costs. The opposite could also be true. For example, the increased consumption of red wine resulting from labeling red wine with the information that moderate consumption may lower the risk of heart disease could result in higher costs from more birth defects, car accidents, and alcohol-related health costs. These social costs may outweigh the benefits of reduced heart disease. On the other hand, the firm's net benefits may be positive: the costs of redesigning labels could be lower than the benefits of increased sales triggered by the health claim.
In externality cases where private firms do not supply relevant information, the government may decide to intervene in labeling decisions to try to maximize net social benefits. Government-mandated labeling can be a useful tool for achieving social objectives because of the potential power of information to influence consumption decisions. However, economic theory suggests that labels may be a poor means of addressing problems of externalities and advancing social objectives, such as protecting consumer health or the environment. Even if some consumers alter their behavior to account for externality costs, others do not, which means that the objective will probably not be met. For example, while some may purchase only free-range chickens, their goal of ending chicken cooping will not be achieved as long as most consumers continue to buy chickens raised in coops.
Economic theory identifies a number of policy tools that may be more suited to redressing externalities than information remedies. Bans, quotas, production regulations or standards, and Pigouvian taxes (which impose the externality cost of an activity on its producer) may be more successful than mandatory labels in adjusting consumption and production to better match socially optimum levels.
Empirical studies have found mixed results on the efficacy of labels in educating consumers and changing consumption behavior. These studies highlight the observation that consumers often make hasty food choices in grocery stores and usually do not scrutinize food labels. Researchers from Purdue University and the Ecole Nationale Superieure de Genie Industriel in France found that most participants in a marketing experiment did not notice the "GMO" (genetically modified organism) label on a food product until the label had been projected in large letters on a big screen.
Research also shows that a large number of warnings or a list of detailed product information may cause many consumers to disregard the label completely. And, even if consumers do consider each piece of information on a label, they may find it difficult to rank the information according to importance. For example, out of 10 warnings on a label, consumers may have difficulty picking out the most important. As a result, consumers may underreact to important information or overreact to less important information.
Labels May Influence Producers More Than Consumers
The primary impact of mandatory labeling regulations may stem from their effect on product reformulation and innovation, not on consumers' food choices. Changes in labeling regulations can open up areas of competition by allowing producers to compete on a new set of attributes, like health claims. To compete in these new areas, manufacturers may introduce new or reformulated products. Economists at the Federal Trade Commission found that regulation allowing health claims on cereal boxes resulted in significant product innovation and a plethora of cereals claiming to help reduce the risk of cancer. New labeling requirements can also spur product introductions or reformulations. Firms that are forced to disclose the negative characteristics of their products may choose to reformulate rather than risk losing sales from disclosure.
Manufacturers' reactions to labeling policy could be quite swift. In an effort to be the first to label—and capture first-mover profits—manufacturers may reformulate before consumer demand kicks in. FDA researchers found that leading up to mandatory trans fat labeling, most consumers did not know whether trans fats were good or bad. Nevertheless, in anticipation of mandatory labeling, manufacturers quickly jumped on the "no trans fat" bandwagon. From January 2005 through the first 9 months of 2007, manufacturers introduced 5,459 products with labeling touting low or zero trans fat content.
Chart: Products claiming to have zero (or low) trans fat took off in 2003
Manufacturers may label and reformulate even though most consumers are not particularly interested in the new attribute. Sometimes a small niche group of consumers is enough to warrant the expense of reformulation and product innovation, particularly when the new ingredient or attribute does not affect taste or price and therefore does not alienate core groups of consumers. The more attributes manufacturers can stack in their products—eco-friendly, low-sugar, fair-trade, high-fiber—the more niche consumers they may be able to attract.
As a result of product reformulation, labeling regulation can affect consumer food choices more than would have been accomplished simply via consumers' reactions to labels. Even consumers who remain indifferent to or unaware of a new attribute may consume more of it if their usual food choices have been reformulated. For example, some consumers of popular snack foods may not know that their favorite nibbles are now made without trans fats. They are reaping the benefits of a potentially more healthful diet without changing their food choices. However, if the price of their favorite snack rises because of reformulation, consumers who do not want the new attribute are made worse off.
The benefits and costs of labeling regulation could be far reaching when manufacturers respond by reformulating. A shift to "zero trans fat" has triggered changes all along the processed food chain, including investments in new processing technologies and the development of soy and canola crop varieties with different oil characteristics. Other reformulations could have ramifications for the environment, animal welfare, and consumers' health and budgets.
These cases stand in stark contrast to those in which labels go unread and unnoticed. They also underscore the potential of labeling policy that works with industry incentives to affect the content and quality of American diets like COOL.
Source: ers.usda.gov
Publication date: 11/6/2007
Do Food Labels Make a Difference? . . . Sometimes etc. edited
The economics behind food labeling provides insight into the dynamics of voluntary and mandatory food labeling and the influence labeling has on consumers' food choices.
There is a lot to know about the food we eat. The ingredients in a jar of spaghetti sauce, a box of cereal, or a cup of coffee could come from around the corner or around the world; they could be processed by children or by high-tech machines; they could be grown on huge corporate farms or on small family-run farms; or they could be mostly artificial or 100-percent natural.
While a description of a food product could include information on a multitude of attributes, not all of them are important to consumers or regulators. Information on some attributes could affect the health and welfare of consumers by influencing their food choices. Information on other attributes might have no effect at all.
Consumers, food companies, third-party entities, and governments play a role in determining which attributes are described on the label. The interaction of these groups influences which information is labeled voluntarily, which is mandated, and which is not labeled at all. It shapes the way information is presented and the accuracy and credibility of that information. The economics behind food labeling provides insight into the dynamics of voluntary food labeling and the types of market failures best addressed through mandatory labeling requirements.
Companies Will Voluntarily Label If Their Benefits Outweigh Their Costs
Voluntary labeling is one of a food company's many advertising options. Assuming that companies attempt to maximize profits, they will add information about an attribute to the label as long as each additional message eventually generates more benefits than costs. The primary benefits of labeling for a company come from either increasing profits or maintaining profits in the face of new competition. Either outcome is more likely if consumers use the information to differentiate the labeled product from similar products and then buy it.
The probability that consumers will value and react to labeled information is improved if the label successfully persuades consumers that it conveys information about a meaningful distinction between labeled and unlabeled products. If consumers decide that the information's significance or accuracy is questionable, they will not use it to modify their purchase decisions. Researchers from the University of California and ERS found, for example, that the geographic branding of Washington State apples is losing its impact because it does not convincingly differentiate the State's apples from those grown in other areas.
To bolster the meaningfulness of their message, firms often rely on advertising and other types of outreach. In 2005, the U.S. food industry spent $32 billion on advertising and $66.5 billion on packaging to differentiate their products from the competition (see "Food Product Introductions Continue To Set Records").
Firms may also try to convince consumers of the validity of their labeling claims by using third-party labeling services. By offering an "unbiased" assessment of a labeling claim, these services help strengthen the credibility of voluntary labeling (see box, "Third-Party Labeling Services Can Improve Market Efficiency"). A number of entities, including consumer groups, producer associations, private companies, national governments, and international organizations, provide third-party services. The Good Housekeeping Institute, for example, founded for the purpose of consumer education and product evaluation, sets product standards and provides consumer guarantees for a multitude of goods, including foods. Two private companies, Société Générale de Surveillance (SGS) and AIB International (originally the American Institute of Baking), verify and certify food safety for a wide range of food products. USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) has developed official grade standards for meats, eggs, poultry, dairy products, fresh fruits, vegetables, tree nuts, peanuts, and other commodities. ISO, a worldwide federation of national standards institutes, promotes the development of international standards for a variety of products and production processes.
The value of the labeling service generally depends on the credibility and reputation of the providing entity. In some cases, national governments or associations of national governments may be the most widely recognized and reputable third-party providers of labeling services. But this is not always true. For example, although U.S. consumers tend to have confidence in USDA and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to regulate food safety, Europeans rank national bodies far below international, environmental, consumer, and farm organizations in terms of trustworthiness.
Private and government labeling services have helped support an explosion of voluntary food labeling. American grocery store shelves have become veritable encyclopedias of labeling claims. A single carton of eggs sold in a national grocery store chain, for instance, is labeled with a "cage free" claim, the grocery store "quality and satisfaction money-back guarantee" logo, the Orthodox Union symbol of kosher certification, and a long list of nutrient claims, including "25% of the daily value of vitamin E; 185 mcg of lutein per egg; and 100 mg of omega-3 polyunsaturated fatty acids per egg."
A byproduct of the explosion of labeled attributes is that consumers learn to "read between the labels" and make deductions about unlabeled products. For example, confronted with one can of tuna labeled "dolphin friendly" and one with no such claim, consumers would likely assume that the unlabeled tuna was caught with dolphin-endangering practices. In a competitive marketplace, the presence of a label is a signal of quality, and the lack of a label on competing brands implies the absence of the quality attribute.
Consumers' ability to make inferences about quality further spurs the proliferation of labels. Companies in a competitive marketplace are motivated to make explicit claims for all positive "sellable" product attributes since they know that consumers may interpret the lack of labeling as a lack of the attribute. It is almost impossible, for example, to find a can of tuna in the United States without a dolphin-friendly label.
Ultimately, the company's bottom line sets limits on product differentiation and labeling. Not all attributes are worth the cost. "Predator-friendly" labeling, a campaign to promote wolf-friendly cattle ranching, has not had the success of the dolphin-friendly label. Likewise, "Made in America" or similar country-of-origin labeling is not always a valuable marketing attribute. Only if consumers believe that food produced in the United States is tastier, safer, or has some other distinctive attribute will the label be worthwhile to manufacturers or retailers. A company's benefit-cost criterion for deciding which information to include on the label helps ensure labeling efficiency. Only information valuable enough to consumers to justify the cost is included on the label.
Voluntary Labeling May Leave Information Gaps
Economic theory predicts that voluntary labeling is not always sufficient for disclosing information on all attributes consumers value or for guaranteeing information accuracy like COOL. One limitation to voluntary labeling may arise when an entire product category has an undesirable characteristic. In these cases, manufacturers do not compete on the attribute and therefore do not provide labeled or otherwise advertised information to consumers. For example, there was little information on the sodium content of processed foods before manufacturers were required to disclose it. The competitive process did not work well to reveal high-sodium products; few manufacturers competed to offer reduced-sodium products because less of this "health negative" attribute also tends to reduce taste.
Another limitation to voluntary labeling arises because manufacturers may provide only relative information. For example, a sausage label may boast "30 percent less fat than the leading brand" or a bacon label may brag "half the sodium." Although this type of information is valuable for deciding among competing brands of the same item, it is not complete. Lower fat sausage may still be a high-fat food. In many cases, consumers need information on absolute, not just relative, values to make fully informed consumption decisions.
Market forces may also be unable to eliminate partial disclosure and innuendo. For example, in early 2000, a manufacturer began marketing a wheat-flake cereal with a label proclaiming no "genetically engineered ingredients." A consumer advocacy group asked the FDA to take enforcement action against the manufacturer (and six others) on the grounds that the labels were misleading because they implied that the absence of genetically engineered ingredients distinguished the product from competing brands, when actually, no genetically engineered wheat is present in any food. The manufacturer removed the label.
Mandatory Labeling Has Targeted Information Gaps and Social Objectives
U.S. Government intervention in labeling began in 1906 with the Federal Pure Food and Drugs Act and the Federal Meat Inspection Act, which authorized Federal regulation of the safety and quality of food and prohibited sales of misbranded or adulterated foods. Lawmakers' primary objective in passing the acts' labeling regulations was to enhance fair competition by cracking down on deceptive marketing practices.
Enhancing fair competition and market efficiency has remained a primary motivation behind food labeling regulation for the past 100 years. Regulations ranging from the 1966 Fair Packaging and Labeling Act (requiring all consumer products in interstate commerce to contain accurate information to facilitate value comparisons) to the Organic Foods Production Act 1990 have sought to create a level playing field for producers by providing consumers with accurate information for comparing products and making choices. These regulations seek to increase informed consumption, not to alter consumption behavior. USDA's National Organic Program (the result of the Organic Foods Production Act) is designed to improve the comparability of organic labeling claims, not persuade more consumers to choose organic products.
Recently, government intervention in labeling has begun to target environmental or other spillovers associated with food production and consumption COOL. Individual food consumption decisions can have social welfare consequences, including effects on the environment, health and productivity, labor conditions, and farm and industry structure. For example, consumers who eat tuna caught with encircling nets may inadvertently endanger dolphins. Economists describe these kinds of situations, in which the action of one economic agent affects the well-being or production possibilities of another in a way that is not reflected in market prices, as externalities.
When private consumption decisions result in externalities, social welfare may be maximized by a labeling choice that differs from one generated by private firms. In the tuna example, the potential benefits of providing information on labels include fewer dolphin deaths. For society as a whole, these potential benefits may outweigh the increase in profits that compose a private firm's labeling benefits. As a result, the social benefits of labeling may outweigh the social costs even though the private benefits do not outweigh private costs. The opposite could also be true. For example, the increased consumption of red wine resulting from labeling red wine with the information that moderate consumption may lower the risk of heart disease could result in higher costs from more birth defects, car accidents, and alcohol-related health costs. These social costs may outweigh the benefits of reduced heart disease. On the other hand, the firm's net benefits may be positive: the costs of redesigning labels could be lower than the benefits of increased sales triggered by the health claim.
In externality cases where private firms do not supply relevant information, the government may decide to intervene in labeling decisions to try to maximize net social benefits. Government-mandated labeling can be a useful tool for achieving social objectives because of the potential power of information to influence consumption decisions. However, economic theory suggests that labels may be a poor means of addressing problems of externalities and advancing social objectives, such as protecting consumer health or the environment. Even if some consumers alter their behavior to account for externality costs, others do not, which means that the objective will probably not be met. For example, while some may purchase only free-range chickens, their goal of ending chicken cooping will not be achieved as long as most consumers continue to buy chickens raised in coops.
Economic theory identifies a number of policy tools that may be more suited to redressing externalities than information remedies. Bans, quotas, production regulations or standards, and Pigouvian taxes (which impose the externality cost of an activity on its producer) may be more successful than mandatory labels in adjusting consumption and production to better match socially optimum levels.
Empirical studies have found mixed results on the efficacy of labels in educating consumers and changing consumption behavior. These studies highlight the observation that consumers often make hasty food choices in grocery stores and usually do not scrutinize food labels. Researchers from Purdue University and the Ecole Nationale Superieure de Genie Industriel in France found that most participants in a marketing experiment did not notice the "GMO" (genetically modified organism) label on a food product until the label had been projected in large letters on a big screen.
Research also shows that a large number of warnings or a list of detailed product information may cause many consumers to disregard the label completely. And, even if consumers do consider each piece of information on a label, they may find it difficult to rank the information according to importance. For example, out of 10 warnings on a label, consumers may have difficulty picking out the most important. As a result, consumers may underreact to important information or overreact to less important information.
Labels May Influence Producers More Than Consumers
The primary impact of mandatory labeling regulations may stem from their effect on product reformulation and innovation, not on consumers' food choices. Changes in labeling regulations can open up areas of competition by allowing producers to compete on a new set of attributes, like health claims. To compete in these new areas, manufacturers may introduce new or reformulated products. Economists at the Federal Trade Commission found that regulation allowing health claims on cereal boxes resulted in significant product innovation and a plethora of cereals claiming to help reduce the risk of cancer. New labeling requirements can also spur product introductions or reformulations. Firms that are forced to disclose the negative characteristics of their products may choose to reformulate rather than risk losing sales from disclosure.
Manufacturers' reactions to labeling policy could be quite swift. In an effort to be the first to label—and capture first-mover profits—manufacturers may reformulate before consumer demand kicks in. FDA researchers found that leading up to mandatory trans fat labeling, most consumers did not know whether trans fats were good or bad. Nevertheless, in anticipation of mandatory labeling, manufacturers quickly jumped on the "no trans fat" bandwagon. From January 2005 through the first 9 months of 2007, manufacturers introduced 5,459 products with labeling touting low or zero trans fat content.
Chart: Products claiming to have zero (or low) trans fat took off in 2003
Manufacturers may label and reformulate even though most consumers are not particularly interested in the new attribute. Sometimes a small niche group of consumers is enough to warrant the expense of reformulation and product innovation, particularly when the new ingredient or attribute does not affect taste or price and therefore does not alienate core groups of consumers. The more attributes manufacturers can stack in their products—eco-friendly, low-sugar, fair-trade, high-fiber—the more niche consumers they may be able to attract.
As a result of product reformulation, labeling regulation can affect consumer food choices more than would have been accomplished simply via consumers' reactions to labels. Even consumers who remain indifferent to or unaware of a new attribute may consume more of it if their usual food choices have been reformulated. For example, some consumers of popular snack foods may not know that their favorite nibbles are now made without trans fats. They are reaping the benefits of a potentially more healthful diet without changing their food choices. However, if the price of their favorite snack rises because of reformulation, consumers who do not want the new attribute are made worse off.
The benefits and costs of labeling regulation could be far reaching when manufacturers respond by reformulating. A shift to "zero trans fat" has triggered changes all along the processed food chain, including investments in new processing technologies and the development of soy and canola crop varieties with different oil characteristics. Other reformulations could have ramifications for the environment, animal welfare, and consumers' health and budgets.
These cases stand in stark contrast to those in which labels go unread and unnoticed. They also underscore the potential of labeling policy that works with industry incentives to affect the content and quality of American diets like COOL.
Source: ers.usda.gov
Publication date: 11/6/2007
PORKER
Well-known member
USDA has historically opposed COOL,
PORKER
Well-known member
New York Dairy Farmer Turns the Tables When the Ag Inspectors Arrive for a Visit
Over the last two weeks, Andrea Elliott has been writing emails to farm associations, her Congressman, and members of the U.S. House and Senate agriculture committees—all urging that the upcoming farm bill not include funding for the National Animal Identification System (NAIS). She and her husband, Jim, own a dairy farm in the Catskill Mountains of New York, and she made it plain in her notes that she is adamantly opposed to registering the farm's 80 cows under the federal program.
On [Monday, October 29] she received a call from an inspector with the New York Department of Food and Markets in Albany that he planned to come by the farm for a special inspection, based on "a complaint" made to the department's Division of Milk Control and Dairy Services.
Andrea couldn't imagine who might have complained, and what the complaint might have been about. Her farm, Crystal Brook Farms, sells nearly all its milk to a local creamery for pasteurization. She sells a few gallons of raw milk occasionally to individuals who stop in with their own containers, under New York rules that allow sale of 25 gallons a month without a permit.
[Tuesday, October 30] the inspector, Bradley Lyle Houck, arrived from Albany, two hours away, together with her regular local dairy inspector, and Andrea was prepared. As soon as they arrived, "I turned on my video camera. I think that made them a little uncomfortable."
Then, she says, "I asked the state inspector to fill out my form." Her form is a three-page "public service questionnaire" that asks for the inspector's identity, his principal reason for doing the inspection, how the information he gathers will be used, and other such data. "He shook his head and refused," says Andrea. "He said, 'I have to be authorized by Albany.'" He tried to make a call on his cell phone, but couldn't complete the call because the farm area has no cell reception.
Andrea persisted. "I said, 'This is our property and I can require you to fill it out.'" He offered his state ID and badge.
Andrea moved on. "I asked him why he was here and he said a complaint was received in Albany."
What was the complaint? "He said he couldn't tell me."
Who filed the complaint? "He wouldn't tell me. He just wouldn't go any further. He said all complaints that come into Albany are treated as confidential. "
"I asked him what statute allows a complaint to be treated as confidential. He said he couldn't quote a statute."
At that point, the inspector asked if they could talk off-camera. Andrea declined.
"He said, 'I guess the best thing would be for us to come back another time.'" The two got back into their car and took off.
Andrea adds, "At no time did I deny him the inspection. I didn't ask him to leave. All I did was ask him for specific reasons for the inspection. I have a right to know who my accuser is."
Andrea seems to have added an entirely new dimension to the agricultural inspection.
Over the last two weeks, Andrea Elliott has been writing emails to farm associations, her Congressman, and members of the U.S. House and Senate agriculture committees—all urging that the upcoming farm bill not include funding for the National Animal Identification System (NAIS). She and her husband, Jim, own a dairy farm in the Catskill Mountains of New York, and she made it plain in her notes that she is adamantly opposed to registering the farm's 80 cows under the federal program.
On [Monday, October 29] she received a call from an inspector with the New York Department of Food and Markets in Albany that he planned to come by the farm for a special inspection, based on "a complaint" made to the department's Division of Milk Control and Dairy Services.
Andrea couldn't imagine who might have complained, and what the complaint might have been about. Her farm, Crystal Brook Farms, sells nearly all its milk to a local creamery for pasteurization. She sells a few gallons of raw milk occasionally to individuals who stop in with their own containers, under New York rules that allow sale of 25 gallons a month without a permit.
[Tuesday, October 30] the inspector, Bradley Lyle Houck, arrived from Albany, two hours away, together with her regular local dairy inspector, and Andrea was prepared. As soon as they arrived, "I turned on my video camera. I think that made them a little uncomfortable."
Then, she says, "I asked the state inspector to fill out my form." Her form is a three-page "public service questionnaire" that asks for the inspector's identity, his principal reason for doing the inspection, how the information he gathers will be used, and other such data. "He shook his head and refused," says Andrea. "He said, 'I have to be authorized by Albany.'" He tried to make a call on his cell phone, but couldn't complete the call because the farm area has no cell reception.
Andrea persisted. "I said, 'This is our property and I can require you to fill it out.'" He offered his state ID and badge.
Andrea moved on. "I asked him why he was here and he said a complaint was received in Albany."
What was the complaint? "He said he couldn't tell me."
Who filed the complaint? "He wouldn't tell me. He just wouldn't go any further. He said all complaints that come into Albany are treated as confidential. "
"I asked him what statute allows a complaint to be treated as confidential. He said he couldn't quote a statute."
At that point, the inspector asked if they could talk off-camera. Andrea declined.
"He said, 'I guess the best thing would be for us to come back another time.'" The two got back into their car and took off.
Andrea adds, "At no time did I deny him the inspection. I didn't ask him to leave. All I did was ask him for specific reasons for the inspection. I have a right to know who my accuser is."
Andrea seems to have added an entirely new dimension to the agricultural inspection.
PORKER
Well-known member
NAIS Exemption Under Fire
By News Editor
Posted: November 9, 2007
The Farm Bill debate continues in the Senate, and now government watchdog groups are questioning exempting National Animal Identification from the Freedom of Information Act (FIOA).
The Society of Professional Journalists, the American Civil Liberties Union and others say an attempt to ban the disclosure of information from a national animal tracking system could exempt some Agriculture Department documents from freedom of information laws.
Cattle groups say such disclosure could harm their business. The National Cattlemen's Beef Association, which represents ranchers, has lobbied on behalf of the plan. Colin Woodall, director of legislative affairs for the group, said much of the tracking information is sensitive and unrelated to food safety.
"If it gets in the wrong hands it could be very problematic for our members," he said. "It's like Coca Cola having to disclose its secret formula to everyone who wants to file a FOIA request," he added, referring to the Freedom of Information Act.
The chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee, Democratic Sen. Tom Harkin of Iowa, included the language in the bill and is now "further examining its implications," committee spokeswoman Kate Cyrul. Cyrul said Thursday that the provision was included because ranchers were concerned that meatpackers, retailers or the government could misuse their information.
Ranchers now may choose to participate in the tracking program, which assigns numbers to individual animals or groups of animals. That way, the government could easily find animals related to those deemed to be infected with mad cow or other animal diseases. But many ranchers have declined to sign up, partly because of the disclosure concerns.
The Senate bill would allow the department to share some of the information with states and other government agencies under certain conditions, including threats of disease or threats to homeland security. But it would be against the law in most cases for the general public to access the information.
By News Editor
Posted: November 9, 2007
The Farm Bill debate continues in the Senate, and now government watchdog groups are questioning exempting National Animal Identification from the Freedom of Information Act (FIOA).
The Society of Professional Journalists, the American Civil Liberties Union and others say an attempt to ban the disclosure of information from a national animal tracking system could exempt some Agriculture Department documents from freedom of information laws.
Cattle groups say such disclosure could harm their business. The National Cattlemen's Beef Association, which represents ranchers, has lobbied on behalf of the plan. Colin Woodall, director of legislative affairs for the group, said much of the tracking information is sensitive and unrelated to food safety.
"If it gets in the wrong hands it could be very problematic for our members," he said. "It's like Coca Cola having to disclose its secret formula to everyone who wants to file a FOIA request," he added, referring to the Freedom of Information Act.
The chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee, Democratic Sen. Tom Harkin of Iowa, included the language in the bill and is now "further examining its implications," committee spokeswoman Kate Cyrul. Cyrul said Thursday that the provision was included because ranchers were concerned that meatpackers, retailers or the government could misuse their information.
Ranchers now may choose to participate in the tracking program, which assigns numbers to individual animals or groups of animals. That way, the government could easily find animals related to those deemed to be infected with mad cow or other animal diseases. But many ranchers have declined to sign up, partly because of the disclosure concerns.
The Senate bill would allow the department to share some of the information with states and other government agencies under certain conditions, including threats of disease or threats to homeland security. But it would be against the law in most cases for the general public to access the information.
Solve the problem, kill the NAIS.
Diseases have been eradicated in the past without it, and they can be in the future.
Make the big heads in the USDA who made the decision to spent our taxpayer dollars on it before implementing COOL to reimburse the USDA with their retirement funds.
There has to be some accountability for the USDA.
Diseases have been eradicated in the past without it, and they can be in the future.
Make the big heads in the USDA who made the decision to spent our taxpayer dollars on it before implementing COOL to reimburse the USDA with their retirement funds.
There has to be some accountability for the USDA.
PORKER
Well-known member
Those who want disclosure of information figure that anything the gov does or uses have a god given right to know, they are the prying eyes. If gov. used ScoringAg the press and every prying eye would never get anywhere as its a private company and the Freedom of Information Act has no juristicition in private information.Second ,the way the ScoringAg database is set up only the product or animal purchaser can see just that one item,not the whole enterprise. Much safer and data, it's encrypted.
The Senate bill would allow the department to share some of the information with states and other government agencies under certain conditions, including threats of disease or threats to homeland security.
*****With that bill the packers would be able to see in the future all livestock handling and amounts before they ever hit market..
But it would be against the law in most cases for the general public to access the information.
*****Only the ones that would want the information is the ones that would profit from it.
The Senate bill would allow the department to share some of the information with states and other government agencies under certain conditions, including threats of disease or threats to homeland security.
*****With that bill the packers would be able to see in the future all livestock handling and amounts before they ever hit market..
But it would be against the law in most cases for the general public to access the information.
*****Only the ones that would want the information is the ones that would profit from it.
Other than F&M what diseases have been eradicated in the US Tex ? :roll:
Maybe your pres. has more pressing issues to worry about like getting the US economy going :roll:
So will COOL be implemented when the farm bill is vetoed ?
:cry2: :wink:
:lol: :lol: :lol: :lol:
Maybe your pres. has more pressing issues to worry about like getting the US economy going :roll:
So will COOL be implemented when the farm bill is vetoed ?
:cry2: :wink:
:lol: :lol: :lol: :lol:QUESTION said:Other than F&M what diseases have been eradicated in the US Tex ? :roll:
Maybe your pres. has more pressing issues to worry about like getting the US economy going :roll:
So will COOL be implemented when the farm bill is vetoed ?
:cry2: :wink:
Well, question, we have ridden our county and state of bangs. Yes, it is still there as a possibility. We had a govt. program that tested all, sent to slaughter, and vaccinated the rest.
Disease control can be handled on a geographic basis, as you well know.
We are facing some serious risks with our economy. The fed is having to make available a lot of liquidity to ease the credit problems with sub prime. The financial system is going through a credibility shock with the sub prime mess. The financial instruments used to back the mortgages ended up being riskier than the investors thought (sub prime mkt). It was a result of the govt. allowing mtg. backed securities to not be tied to their true risk. Merrill Lynch and a lot of other big bankers have lost billions on the deals.
We also have a problem with too much debt outstanding in foreigner's hands--which means, with a strengthening dollar, that source of debt is less attractive. Yes, this does have parallels with the fall in our dollar and your cattle market troubles. Oil is hitting $100/barrel and gold is way up there along with commodities.
When I wrote earlier about the exchange rate risks for Canadian producers selling into only one market, I never meant to say that we didn't have our own problems with those same things. The rest of the world will judge the US's irresponsibility in the form of higher interest rates and an unwillingness to keep lending us money. The good thing, for us, is that exports will pick up because it costs less in other currencies with the falling dollar.
It is the problem with a global economy.
You better believe George Soros has positioned himself, but what about the average Joe?
I don't think NAIS will ever solve our disease problems completely, as it hasn't seemed to solve your bse problems. It may only give those who wish to cover up a problem better tools.
Disease will always be with us. It isn't something to be scared of, it is something to be dealt with.
Currently I don't think our govts. are doing a very good job at it.
Cover ups are always worse than dealing with the truth.
Sometimes I think we are handed tough things to deal with. We shouldn't worry over the fact that they are, we show who we are by dealing with it appropriately.
I really hope Canada gets other foreign markets than just the U.S. if Canada wants to develop the natural resources they have in producing beef. I hope Canadian producers can have a much better policy so packers don't take advantage of them.----But that is what I wish in the U.S. too.
So that is a i don't know on the diseases eracicated from the US. The reason for NAIS is is to track back with a disease outbreak,and stop it's spread. And no answer on what will happen to COOL when the veto is used on the US farm bill.
PORKER
Well-known member
COOL is not on the table to veto, but subsidies sure are for cotton corn wheat, and beans.
The Senate agreed to stop the amendment process on the Farm Bill.
It was way out of control. There were Over 100 amendments to it!!!
A lot of them came from Senator Greg, R-New Hampshire, and it was an obvious effort by the bought off republican majority to kill the farm bill.
Many of them had NOTHING to do with the Farm Bill.
Even Saxby Chambliss, ranking member of the Ag. Committee, allowed this process to continue saying to Tom Harkin that he had "no authority" to negotiate the Farm Bill's advance through Congress.
They put him on as ranking member and then take away his negotiating authority for the republicans.
This is how the republicans try to talk out of both sides of their mouth at the same time. Pass it through committee unanimously and then kill it on the floor, saying that their ranking guy on the committee was "just playing around".
WHAT WERE YOU DOING THE LAST THREE YEARS ON THE COMMITTEE SAXBY CHAMBLISS???
edited
It was way out of control. There were Over 100 amendments to it!!!
A lot of them came from Senator Greg, R-New Hampshire, and it was an obvious effort by the bought off republican majority to kill the farm bill.
Many of them had NOTHING to do with the Farm Bill.
Even Saxby Chambliss, ranking member of the Ag. Committee, allowed this process to continue saying to Tom Harkin that he had "no authority" to negotiate the Farm Bill's advance through Congress.
They put him on as ranking member and then take away his negotiating authority for the republicans.
This is how the republicans try to talk out of both sides of their mouth at the same time. Pass it through committee unanimously and then kill it on the floor, saying that their ranking guy on the committee was "just playing around".
WHAT WERE YOU DOING THE LAST THREE YEARS ON THE COMMITTEE SAXBY CHAMBLISS???
edited
PORKER
Well-known member
SAXY was making sure that COTTON and PEANUTS held their own and PEANUTS DIDN"T have MCOOL .
