The following statement should be attributed to R-CALF USA President Leo McDonnell, regarding Japan's ban on U.S. beef exports:
"Let's take away Japan's excuse by doing what scientists and experts – even those within the Administration – say the U.S. should do: require Canada to test more cattle and younger cattle, and enforce and strengthen the feed bans in both Canada and the United States. In addition, the Country-of-Origin Labeling (COOL) law already in place should be implemented at once so U.S. consumers can make informed decisions when purchasing beef
"We have called on USDA to meet with us to find solutions to the BSE problem in Canada. We have called for a solution that ensures the U.S. does not adopt BSE standards lower than international standards and lower than the rest of the world, as this would make the U.S. a dumping ground for products other countries won't accept.
"The United States has the safest beef in the world, and we want to keep it that way. Even with increased testing we have yet to find one single native case of BSE in U.S. born and raised cattle. For this reason, we are urging consumers to speak out: 'Keep U.S. Beef Safe!'" wrote Leo McDonnell, Jr., President of R-CALF USA, in a letter to every Member of Congress, Governor, the U.S. Conference of Mayors and the National League of Cities.
In its lawsuit, R-CALF USA argues that USDA has "ignored science." Recent scientific evidence has revealed that the agent responsible for BSE contamination has recently been found not just in nerve tissue, but in muscle tissue as well, raising concerns that standards should be raised, not lowered
"I'm hoping we will be successful in court again. If enough consumers knew even one or two of these facts, they would stop the decision to lift the ban cold in its track. Until people are able to make an informed decision about what meat to buy for their families, the ban should stay in place," said McDonnell
The Joint Resolution reads as: "Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That Congress disapproves the rule submitted by the Department of Agriculture relating to the establishment of minimal risk zones for introduction of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (published at 70 Fed. Reg. 460 (2005)), and such rule shave have no force or effect."
Neither U.S. cattle producers, nor U.S. consumers, should be excluded from protections afforded by the more rigorous science-based BSE standards recognized throughout the world as necessary to effectively manage the human health and animal health risks associated with BSE," emphasized McDonnell. "R-CALF is grateful that these senators have chosen to stand up for what their constituents want, and not cave in to the intense political pressure of the multi-national processor/packer lobbyists, who are overly eager to compromise U.S. health and safety standards in return for unrestricted access to lower-cost cattle and beef.
USDA's Final Rule, in the following ways, compromises science acknowledged throughout the rest of the world:
1. It adopts the Specified Risk Materials (SRM) removal practices recommended by the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) and practiced in the United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union (EU) for years – except that USDA only includes some high-risk tissues in its SRM removal plan (fewer tissues than included in the standard risk-reduction practices in the UK and the EU). USDA's Final Rule does not begin removal of SRMs at the age where OIE, the UK, and the EU consider it necessary. USDA's Final Rule requires SRM removal only from cattle over 30 months of age, while European countries require removal of SRMs in all cattle over 12 months of age. OIE recommends SRM removal from cattle over 6 months of age for countries with the same disease characteristics as Canada.
2. It adopts a BSE testing/surveillance program as recommended by OIE and as practiced by the UK and the EU for years, except that USDA's Final Rule fails to target cattle that enter the human food chain, as recommended by OIE and as practiced by the UK and the EU.
3. It adopts part of a meat-and-bone meal (MBM) feed ban, as has been recommended by OIE and as practiced by the UK and the EU for years, except that USDA fails to require Canada to have had its feed ban in place for the length of time recommended by OIE. USDA's Final Rule also fails to include the same products as the feed bans practiced by the UK and the EU, both of which ban blood and poultry litter from cattle feed
"The BSE standards being incorporated by USDA are inferior to international standards established by OIE, and far below the science-based practices of countries that have successfully reduced the incidence of BSE," Bullard said. "Canada does not meet the definition of a minimal-risk country, based on international guidelines, and this is why 33 countries still ban Canadian beef. It's not clear why USDA should force U.S. consumers to be exposed to risks that other countries protect their citizens from."
"I believe now is the time for NCBA and its affiliates, along with R-CALF USA and its affiliates, to set aside organizational differences and work together as a unified industry to cause USDA to withdraw its Final Rule," wrote McDonnell, who later said, "If the entire industry stands together, we can better protect our industry and our consumers from the risk of the introduction of BSE from Canada."
R-CALF USA asserts that USDA's Final Rule on bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) endangers public health with neither adequate scientific, legal, nor risk analysis justification; that it is an arbitrary and capricious use of Agency power; it is an abuse of discretion; and, it is not in accordance with law
R-CALF USA's Complaint states the Final Rule will expose U.S. consumers to an un-quantified increase in risk from imported beef products of contracting variant Creutzfeldt Jakob disease (vCJD), an invariably fatal disease associated with consumption of BSE-contaminated meat; that it will increase the risk of BSE infection in cattle in the United States by an un-quantified amount; and, that it will expose U.S. cattle producers to severe and unnecessary economic hardship
1. USDA assumed very low incidence of BSE in the Canadian herd, while available data collected since 2001 suggest a BSE incidence on the order of that of the most BSE-affected countries in the world.
2. USDA assumed virtually no risk that BSE-infected cattle or meat will enter the United States, yet it is statistically almost certain that BSE-infected animals or meat will in fact enter the United States under the Final Rule if recent data on Canadian BSE levels are representative of what the future is likely to hold.
3. USDA assumed the Canadian feed ban is effective. Yet, a 2004 Canadian Food Inspection Agency study showed that 71 percent of Canadian-manufactured feed labeled as vegetable-only contained undeclared animal protein. Canadian investigations have revealed that almost 2,000 head of Canadian cattle may have been exposed to BSE-contaminated feed because of the rendering of the BSE-infected animal discovered in Canada in May 2003. A U.S. Government Accounting Office study in 2002 showed inadequate enforcement and significant noncompliance among feed manufacturers in U.S. with a similar feed ban in the United States. The agency's own International Review Team that responded to the discovery of the BSE-infected cow in Washington state concluded that "…the partial ruminant to ruminant feed ban that is currently in place [in the U.S.] is insufficient to prevent exposure of cattle to the BSE agent."
4. USDA assumed Canada's feed ban will prevent BSE infection in animals born after its August 1997 implementation, based on experience in the United Kingdom (UK) and Europe. Yet, the UK documented over 45,698 cases of BSE (over one-quarter of all BSE cases detected in the UK) in cattle born during the 12 years following the implementation of its 1988 feed ban.
5. USDA assumed that neither the discovery of a BSE-infected Canadian-born cow in Washington state in December 2003, nor the subsequent discovery of an additional BSE-infected cow in Canada at the end of 2004 should cause USDA to revise or seriously reconsider its determination that opening the border to Canadian cattle and meat would present little risk to U.S. animals, human consumers, and the U.S. livestock industry. This amounts to a refusal to allow overwhelming statistical evidence of a continuing BSE problem to affect a policy that will result in a BSE problem being imported into the U.S.
6. USDA assumed that blood was not at risk even though the agency acknowledged the potential of transmission of BSE through blood when it decided to ban importation of fetal blood serum from Canada. And yet, USDA ignored the implications of this risk for importing meat and cattle from Canada.
7. USDA assumed that the potential contamination of meat with BSE at levels that are undetectable with current technology presents an unknown risk to consumers, and yet assumed this unknown risk is acceptably low.
8. USDA assumed that cattle under 30 months of age do not carry significant accumulations of BSE prions, and that most bovine carcass parts defined as Specified Risk Materials (SRMs) need only be removed from animals older than 30 months of age, despite more than 20 confirmed cases worldwide of BSE in cattle younger than 30 months of age, and despite requirements in the European Union that SRMs be removed from all cattle over 12 months of age.
9. USDA assumed the risk presented by the relaxation of preexisting safety standards by the Final Rule is low, without attempting a credible quantitative assessment of the risk – and without describing the level of risk that the agency considers to be "low," and without comparing it to what other countries mean by "low."
10. USDA assumed the Final Rule will not affect the resumption of exports of beef from the U.S., when the Final Rule allows co-mingling of U.S. meat with meat from a country with a demonstrated BSE problem. The Final Rule also departs from OIE recommendations without any indication that other countries will accept these departures
"Let's take away Japan's excuse by doing what scientists and experts – even those within the Administration – say the U.S. should do: require Canada to test more cattle and younger cattle, and enforce and strengthen the feed bans in both Canada and the United States. In addition, the Country-of-Origin Labeling (COOL) law already in place should be implemented at once so U.S. consumers can make informed decisions when purchasing beef
"We have called on USDA to meet with us to find solutions to the BSE problem in Canada. We have called for a solution that ensures the U.S. does not adopt BSE standards lower than international standards and lower than the rest of the world, as this would make the U.S. a dumping ground for products other countries won't accept.
"The United States has the safest beef in the world, and we want to keep it that way. Even with increased testing we have yet to find one single native case of BSE in U.S. born and raised cattle. For this reason, we are urging consumers to speak out: 'Keep U.S. Beef Safe!'" wrote Leo McDonnell, Jr., President of R-CALF USA, in a letter to every Member of Congress, Governor, the U.S. Conference of Mayors and the National League of Cities.
In its lawsuit, R-CALF USA argues that USDA has "ignored science." Recent scientific evidence has revealed that the agent responsible for BSE contamination has recently been found not just in nerve tissue, but in muscle tissue as well, raising concerns that standards should be raised, not lowered
"I'm hoping we will be successful in court again. If enough consumers knew even one or two of these facts, they would stop the decision to lift the ban cold in its track. Until people are able to make an informed decision about what meat to buy for their families, the ban should stay in place," said McDonnell
The Joint Resolution reads as: "Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That Congress disapproves the rule submitted by the Department of Agriculture relating to the establishment of minimal risk zones for introduction of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (published at 70 Fed. Reg. 460 (2005)), and such rule shave have no force or effect."
Neither U.S. cattle producers, nor U.S. consumers, should be excluded from protections afforded by the more rigorous science-based BSE standards recognized throughout the world as necessary to effectively manage the human health and animal health risks associated with BSE," emphasized McDonnell. "R-CALF is grateful that these senators have chosen to stand up for what their constituents want, and not cave in to the intense political pressure of the multi-national processor/packer lobbyists, who are overly eager to compromise U.S. health and safety standards in return for unrestricted access to lower-cost cattle and beef.
USDA's Final Rule, in the following ways, compromises science acknowledged throughout the rest of the world:
1. It adopts the Specified Risk Materials (SRM) removal practices recommended by the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) and practiced in the United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union (EU) for years – except that USDA only includes some high-risk tissues in its SRM removal plan (fewer tissues than included in the standard risk-reduction practices in the UK and the EU). USDA's Final Rule does not begin removal of SRMs at the age where OIE, the UK, and the EU consider it necessary. USDA's Final Rule requires SRM removal only from cattle over 30 months of age, while European countries require removal of SRMs in all cattle over 12 months of age. OIE recommends SRM removal from cattle over 6 months of age for countries with the same disease characteristics as Canada.
2. It adopts a BSE testing/surveillance program as recommended by OIE and as practiced by the UK and the EU for years, except that USDA's Final Rule fails to target cattle that enter the human food chain, as recommended by OIE and as practiced by the UK and the EU.
3. It adopts part of a meat-and-bone meal (MBM) feed ban, as has been recommended by OIE and as practiced by the UK and the EU for years, except that USDA fails to require Canada to have had its feed ban in place for the length of time recommended by OIE. USDA's Final Rule also fails to include the same products as the feed bans practiced by the UK and the EU, both of which ban blood and poultry litter from cattle feed
"The BSE standards being incorporated by USDA are inferior to international standards established by OIE, and far below the science-based practices of countries that have successfully reduced the incidence of BSE," Bullard said. "Canada does not meet the definition of a minimal-risk country, based on international guidelines, and this is why 33 countries still ban Canadian beef. It's not clear why USDA should force U.S. consumers to be exposed to risks that other countries protect their citizens from."
"I believe now is the time for NCBA and its affiliates, along with R-CALF USA and its affiliates, to set aside organizational differences and work together as a unified industry to cause USDA to withdraw its Final Rule," wrote McDonnell, who later said, "If the entire industry stands together, we can better protect our industry and our consumers from the risk of the introduction of BSE from Canada."
R-CALF USA asserts that USDA's Final Rule on bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) endangers public health with neither adequate scientific, legal, nor risk analysis justification; that it is an arbitrary and capricious use of Agency power; it is an abuse of discretion; and, it is not in accordance with law
R-CALF USA's Complaint states the Final Rule will expose U.S. consumers to an un-quantified increase in risk from imported beef products of contracting variant Creutzfeldt Jakob disease (vCJD), an invariably fatal disease associated with consumption of BSE-contaminated meat; that it will increase the risk of BSE infection in cattle in the United States by an un-quantified amount; and, that it will expose U.S. cattle producers to severe and unnecessary economic hardship
1. USDA assumed very low incidence of BSE in the Canadian herd, while available data collected since 2001 suggest a BSE incidence on the order of that of the most BSE-affected countries in the world.
2. USDA assumed virtually no risk that BSE-infected cattle or meat will enter the United States, yet it is statistically almost certain that BSE-infected animals or meat will in fact enter the United States under the Final Rule if recent data on Canadian BSE levels are representative of what the future is likely to hold.
3. USDA assumed the Canadian feed ban is effective. Yet, a 2004 Canadian Food Inspection Agency study showed that 71 percent of Canadian-manufactured feed labeled as vegetable-only contained undeclared animal protein. Canadian investigations have revealed that almost 2,000 head of Canadian cattle may have been exposed to BSE-contaminated feed because of the rendering of the BSE-infected animal discovered in Canada in May 2003. A U.S. Government Accounting Office study in 2002 showed inadequate enforcement and significant noncompliance among feed manufacturers in U.S. with a similar feed ban in the United States. The agency's own International Review Team that responded to the discovery of the BSE-infected cow in Washington state concluded that "…the partial ruminant to ruminant feed ban that is currently in place [in the U.S.] is insufficient to prevent exposure of cattle to the BSE agent."
4. USDA assumed Canada's feed ban will prevent BSE infection in animals born after its August 1997 implementation, based on experience in the United Kingdom (UK) and Europe. Yet, the UK documented over 45,698 cases of BSE (over one-quarter of all BSE cases detected in the UK) in cattle born during the 12 years following the implementation of its 1988 feed ban.
5. USDA assumed that neither the discovery of a BSE-infected Canadian-born cow in Washington state in December 2003, nor the subsequent discovery of an additional BSE-infected cow in Canada at the end of 2004 should cause USDA to revise or seriously reconsider its determination that opening the border to Canadian cattle and meat would present little risk to U.S. animals, human consumers, and the U.S. livestock industry. This amounts to a refusal to allow overwhelming statistical evidence of a continuing BSE problem to affect a policy that will result in a BSE problem being imported into the U.S.
6. USDA assumed that blood was not at risk even though the agency acknowledged the potential of transmission of BSE through blood when it decided to ban importation of fetal blood serum from Canada. And yet, USDA ignored the implications of this risk for importing meat and cattle from Canada.
7. USDA assumed that the potential contamination of meat with BSE at levels that are undetectable with current technology presents an unknown risk to consumers, and yet assumed this unknown risk is acceptably low.
8. USDA assumed that cattle under 30 months of age do not carry significant accumulations of BSE prions, and that most bovine carcass parts defined as Specified Risk Materials (SRMs) need only be removed from animals older than 30 months of age, despite more than 20 confirmed cases worldwide of BSE in cattle younger than 30 months of age, and despite requirements in the European Union that SRMs be removed from all cattle over 12 months of age.
9. USDA assumed the risk presented by the relaxation of preexisting safety standards by the Final Rule is low, without attempting a credible quantitative assessment of the risk – and without describing the level of risk that the agency considers to be "low," and without comparing it to what other countries mean by "low."
10. USDA assumed the Final Rule will not affect the resumption of exports of beef from the U.S., when the Final Rule allows co-mingling of U.S. meat with meat from a country with a demonstrated BSE problem. The Final Rule also departs from OIE recommendations without any indication that other countries will accept these departures
