NOR98-LIKE STRAIN OF SCRAPIE FOUND IN WYOMING

[flounder]

Subject: NOR98-LIKE STRAIN OF SCRAPIE FOUND IN WYOMING
Date: April 11, 2007 at 12:47 pm PST

PRESS RELEASE

March 16, 2007

Wyoming Livestock Board

2020 Carey Avenue 4th Floor

Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002

For more information contact: Dr. Walter Cook at (307) 631-2974 [weekend] or (307) 777-6443 [weekday]

*****FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE*****

NOR98-LIKE STRAIN OF SCRAPIE FOUND IN WYOMING

CHEYENNE, Wyo. - On Friday, March 16, 2007, the Wyoming Livestock Board (WLSB) was notified by officials of the USDA Animal Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) that an adult female sheep had tested positive for a form of scrapie consistent with the Nor98 strain. The ewe was slaughtered in Michigan, where it was tested as part of USDA's regulatory scrapie slaughter surveillance program and traced back to a flock in Wyoming. The results of this case are distinctly different from those seen for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) or classical scrapie.

Scrapie is a transmissible spongiform encephalopathy and falls into the same category of diseases as chronic wasting disease, found in deer and elk, and bovine spongiform encephalopathy, found in cattle. The disease is limited to sheep and goats and takes years to affect an animal after it has been infected. Scrapie causes sheep to itch and scratch (scrape) wool off, change their behavior and lose body condition; it ultimately ends in death.

Nor98-like scrapie differs from classical scrapie in the distribution of brain lesions and in the course of disease progression and epidemiology. Some sheep that are genetically resistant to the classic form of the disease may be susceptible to the Nor98-like strain. Oddly, Nor98-like scrapie is usually diagnosed during surveillance in animals without clinical signs. There are no known human health risks associated with either form of scrapie.

This is the first time a Nor98-like strain of scrapie has been documented in the United States. It gets the "Nor98-like" name because it is similar to a case first diagnosed in Norway in 1998. This strain of scrapie is a rare disease even in Europe. Since 1998, fewer than 300 cases have been diagnosed in all of Europe. It is usually seen in single animals and does not tend to become widespread in a flock. In contrast, in flocks infected by classical scrapie typically more than 10 percent of the genetically susceptible animals test positive.

"This provides evidence that the surveillance program is working," said Bryce Reece, executive director of the Wyoming Wool Growers Association. "It also indicates that the program is on the cutting-edge of science to detect such a rare disease during standard surveillance."

The Wyoming Livestock Board does not expect the Nor98-like strain of scrapie to become a major disease problem for the sheep industry in Wyoming. Risk is limited because diagnosis of Nor98-like scrapie is usually an incidental event, with even highly-exposed flock mates of the positive animal normally unaffected.

The infected ewe lambed in it in what is considered a low-risk, range-lambing environment. Nonetheless, the WLSB, APHIS and the Wyoming Wool Growers Association plan to assertively pursue this case to make sure that this strain of scrapie is extinguished and does not establish itself in the U.S.

The agencies continue to encourage producers to monitor their sheep for signs of scrapie and other diseases, and to notify their veterinarian if they discover anything unusual.

The positive ewe was purchased as an adult within the last several years and moved to a Wyoming flock near the Black Hills. The producer was notified and his flock quarantined as a precautionary measure. An epidemiologic investigation is ongoing and the producer has been cooperative. The case fits the pattern found in Europe - a single, older sheep that was not exhibiting clinical signs of scrapie.

The regulatory scrapie slaughter surveillance program is a targeted slaughter surveillance program for sheep and goats designed to identify infected animals and flocks. USDA is conducting this surveillance as part of a program to eradicate scrapie from the United States by the end of 2010. Reece said that the sheep industry supports this program and is committed to eliminating scrapie from the United States.

###


http://wlsb.state.wy.us/NewReleases/07Mar16FINALNOR98LIKESCRAPIEPRESSRLS.pdf





FOIA REQUEST FOR ATYPICAL TSE INFORMATION ON VERMONT SHEEP
Re: FOIA REQUEST FOR ATYPICAL TSE INFORMATION ON VERMONT SHEEP (4843 lines)
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. <[log in to unmask]>
Date: Mon, 2 Apr 2007 14:43:32 -0500

http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0704&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=816





Published online before print October 20, 2005

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 10.1073/pnas.0502296102
Medical Sciences

A newly identified type of scrapie agent can naturally infect sheep with resistant PrP genotypes

( sheep prion | transgenic mice )

Annick Le Dur *, Vincent Béringue *, Olivier Andréoletti , Fabienne Reine *, Thanh Lan Laï *, Thierry Baron , Bjørn Bratberg ¶, Jean-Luc Vilotte ||, Pierre Sarradin **, Sylvie L. Benestad ¶, and Hubert Laude *
*Virologie Immunologie Moléculaires and ||Génétique Biochimique et Cytogénétique, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, 78350 Jouy-en-Josas, France; Unité Mixte de Recherche, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique-Ecole Nationale Vétérinaire de Toulouse, Interactions Hôte Agent Pathogène, 31066 Toulouse, France; Agence Française de Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments, Unité Agents Transmissibles Non Conventionnels, 69364 Lyon, France; **Pathologie Infectieuse et Immunologie, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, 37380 Nouzilly, France; and ¶Department of Pathology, National Veterinary Institute, 0033 Oslo, Norway


Edited by Stanley B. Prusiner, University of California, San Francisco, CA, and approved September 12, 2005 (received for review March 21, 2005)

Scrapie in small ruminants belongs to transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), or prion diseases, a family of fatal neurodegenerative disorders that affect humans and animals and can transmit within and between species by ingestion or inoculation. Conversion of the host-encoded prion protein (PrP), normal cellular PrP (PrPc), into a misfolded form, abnormal PrP (PrPSc), plays a key role in TSE transmission and pathogenesis. The intensified surveillance of scrapie in the European Union, together with the improvement of PrPSc detection techniques, has led to the discovery of a growing number of so-called atypical scrapie cases. These include clinical Nor98 cases first identified in Norwegian sheep on the basis of unusual pathological and PrPSc molecular features and "cases" that produced discordant responses in the rapid tests currently applied to the large-scale random screening of slaughtered or fallen animals. Worryingly, a substantial proportion of such cases involved sheep with PrP genotypes known until now to confer natural resistance to conventional scrapie. Here we report that both Nor98 and discordant cases, including three sheep homozygous for the resistant PrPARR allele (A136R154R171), efficiently transmitted the disease to transgenic mice expressing ovine PrP, and that they shared unique biological and biochemical features upon propagation in mice. These observations support the view that a truly infectious TSE agent, unrecognized until recently, infects sheep and goat flocks and may have important implications in terms of scrapie control and public health.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Author contributions: H.L. designed research; A.L.D., V.B., O.A., F.R., T.L.L., J.-L.V., and H.L. performed research; T.B., B.B., P.S., and S.L.B. contributed new reagents/analytic tools; V.B., O.A., and H.L. analyzed data; and H.L. wrote the paper.

A.L.D. and V.B. contributed equally to this work.

To whom correspondence should be addressed.

Hubert Laude, E-mail: [email protected]

www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0502296102


http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/0502296102v1




12/10/76
AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTE ON SCRAPIE
Office Note
CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR PETER WILDY

snip...

A The Present Position with respect to Scrapie
A] The Problem

Scrapie is a natural disease of sheep and goats. It is a slow
and inexorably progressive degenerative disorder of the nervous system
and it ia fatal. It is enzootic in the United Kingdom but not in all
countries.

The field problem has been reviewed by a MAFF working group
(ARC 35/77). It is difficult to assess the incidence in Britain for
a variety of reasons but the disease causes serious financial loss;
it is estimated that it cost Swaledale breeders alone $l.7 M during
the five years 1971-1975. A further inestimable loss arises from the
closure of certain export markets, in particular those of the United
States, to British sheep.

It is clear that scrapie in sheep is important commercially and
for that reason alone effective measures to control it should be
devised as quickly as possible.

Recently the question has again been brought up as to whether
scrapie is transmissible to man. This has followed reports that the
disease has been transmitted to primates. One particularly lurid
speculation (Gajdusek 1977) conjectures that the agents of scrapie,
kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and transmissible encephalopathy of
mink are varieties of a single "virus". The U.S. Department of
Agriculture concluded that it could "no longer justify or permit
scrapie-blood line and scrapie-exposed sheep and goats to be processed
for human or animal food at slaughter or rendering plants" (ARC 84/77)"
The problem is emphasised by the finding that some strains of scrapie
produce lesions identical to the once which characterise the human
dementias"

Whether true or not. the hypothesis that these agents might be
transmissible to man raises two considerations. First, the safety
of laboratory personnel requires prompt attention. Second, action
such as the "scorched meat" policy of USDA makes the solution of the
acrapie problem urgent if the sheep industry is not to suffer
grievously.

snip...

76/10.12/4.6

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1976/10/12004001.pdf


Like lambs to the slaughter
31 March 2001
Debora MacKenzie
Magazine issue 2284
What if you can catch old-fashioned CJD by eating meat from a sheep infected
with scrapie?
FOUR years ago, Terry Singeltary watched his mother die horribly from a
degenerative brain disease. Doctors told him it was Alzheimer's, but
Singeltary was suspicious. The diagnosis didn't fit her violent symptoms,
and he demanded an autopsy. It showed she had died of sporadic
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.

Most doctors believe that sCJD is caused by a prion protein deforming by
chance into a killer. But Singeltary thinks otherwise. He is one of a number
of campaigners who say that some sCJD, like the variant CJD related to BSE,
is caused by eating meat from infected animals. Their suspicions have
focused on sheep carrying scrapie, a BSE-like disease that is widespread in
flocks across Europe and North America.

Now scientists in France have stumbled across new evidence that adds weight
to the campaigners' fears. To their complete surprise, the researchers found
that one strain of scrapie causes the same brain damage in ...

The complete article is 889 words long.

full text;

http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=mg16922840.300


Neurobiology
Adaptation of the bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent to primates and
comparison with Creutzfeldt- Jakob disease: Implications for human health
Corinne Ida Lasmézas*,, Jean-Guy Fournier*, Virginie Nouvel*, Hermann Boe*,
Domíníque Marcé*, François Lamoury*, Nicolas Kopp, Jean-Jacques Hauw§, James
Ironside¶, Moira Bruce, Dominique Dormont*, and Jean-Philippe Deslys*
* Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique, Service de Neurovirologie, Direction
des Sciences du Vivant/Département de Recherche Medicale, Centre de
Recherches du Service de Santé des Armées 60-68, Avenue du Général Leclerc,
BP 6, 92 265 Fontenay-aux-Roses Cedex, France; Hôpital Neurologique Pierre
Wertheimer, 59, Boulevard Pinel, 69003 Lyon, France; § Laboratoire de
Neuropathologie, Hôpital de la Salpêtrière, 83, Boulevard de l'Hôpital,
75013 Paris, France; ¶ Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Surveillance Unit, Western
General Hospital, Crewe Road, Edinburgh EH4 2XU, United Kingdom; and
Institute for Animal Health, Neuropathogenesis Unit, West Mains Road,
Edinburgh EH9 3JF, United Kingdom

Edited by D. Carleton Gajdusek, Centre National de la Recherche
Scientifique, Gif-sur-Yvette, France, and approved December 7, 2000
(received for review October 16, 2000)


Abstract

There is substantial scientific evidence to support the notion that bovine
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) has contaminated human beings, causing
variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD). This disease has raised concerns
about the possibility of an iatrogenic secondary transmission to humans,
because the biological properties of the primate-adapted BSE agent are
unknown. We show that (i) BSE can be transmitted from primate to primate by
intravenous route in 25 months, and (ii) an iatrogenic transmission of vCJD
to humans could be readily recognized pathologically, whether it occurs by
the central or peripheral route. Strain typing in mice demonstrates that the
BSE agent adapts to macaques in the same way as it does to humans and
confirms that the BSE agent is responsible for vCJD not only in the United
Kingdom but also in France. The agent responsible for French iatrogenic
growth hormone-linked CJD taken as a control is very different from vCJD but
is similar to that found in one case of sporadic CJD and one sheep scrapie
isolate. These data will be key in identifying the origin of human cases of
prion disease, including accidental vCJD transmission, and could provide
bases for vCJD risk assessment.


http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/041490898v1


The EMBO Journal, Vol. 19, No. 17 pp. 4425-4430, 2000
© European Molecular Biology Organization

Evidence of a molecular barrier limiting
susceptibility of humans, cattle and sheep to
chronic wasting disease

G.J. Raymond1, A. Bossers2, L.D. Raymond1, K.I. O?Rourke3,
L.E. McHolland4, P.K. Bryant III4, M.W. Miller5, E.S. Williams6, M.
Smits2
and B. Caughey1,7

1NIAID/NIH Rocky Mountain Laboratories, Hamilton, MT 59840,
3USDA/ARS/ADRU, Pullman, WA 99164-7030, 4USDA/ARS/ABADRL,
Laramie, WY 82071, 5Colorado Division of Wildlife, Wildlife Research
Center, Fort Collins, CO 80526-2097, 6Department of Veterinary Sciences,
University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY 82070, USA and 2ID-Lelystad,
Institute for Animal Science and Health, Lelystad, The Netherlands
7Corresponding author e-mail: [email protected] Received June 7, 2000;
revised July 3, 2000; accepted July 5, 2000.

Abstract

Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is a transmissible
spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) of deer and elk,
and little is known about its transmissibility to other
species. An important factor controlling
interspecies TSE susceptibility is prion protein (PrP)
homology between the source and recipient
species/genotypes. Furthermore, the efficiency with which
the protease-resistant PrP (PrP-res) of one
species induces the in vitro conversion of the normal PrP
(PrP-sen) of another species to the
protease-resistant state correlates with the cross-species
transmissibility of TSE agents. Here we
show that the CWD-associated PrP-res (PrPCWD) of cervids
readily induces the conversion of recombinant cervid PrP-sen
molecules to the protease-resistant state in accordance
with the known transmissibility of CWD between cervids. In contrast,
PrPCWD-induced conversions of human and bovine PrP-sen were
much less efficient, and conversion of ovine PrP-sen was
intermediate. These results demonstrate a barrier at the
molecular level that should limit the susceptibility of these non-cervid
species to CWD.

snip...

Clearly, it is premature to draw firm conclusions about CWD
passing naturally into humans, cattle and sheep, but the present
results suggest that CWD transmissions to humans would be as
limited by PrP incompatibility as transmissions of BSE or sheep
scrapie to humans. Although there is no evidence that sheep
scrapie has affected humans, it is likely that BSE has caused variant
CJD in 74 people (definite and probable variant CJD cases to
date according to the UK CJD Surveillance Unit). Given the
presumably large number of people exposed to BSE infectivity,
the susceptibility of humans may still be very low compared with
cattle, which would be consistent with the relatively inefficient
conversion of human PrP-sen by PrPBSE. Nonetheless, since
humans have apparently been infected by BSE, it would seem prudent
to take reasonable measures to limit exposure of humans
(as well as sheep and cattle) to CWD infectivity as has been
recommended for other animal TSEs.

snip...

http://www.emboj.org/current.shtml


Oral transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie to
nonhuman primates.

Gibbs CJ Jr, Amyx HL, Bacote A, Masters CL, Gajdusek DC.

Kuru and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease of humans and scrapie disease of
sheep and goats were transmitted to squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) that
were exposed to the infectious agents only by their nonforced consumption of
known infectious tissues. The asymptomatic incubation period in the one
monkey exposed to the virus of kuru was 36 months; that in the two monkeys
exposed to the virus of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease was 23 and 27 months,
respectively; and that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of scrapie
was 25 and 32 months, respectively. Careful physical examination of the
buccal cavities of all of the monkeys failed to reveal signs or oral
lesions. One additional monkey similarly exposed to kuru has remained
asymptomatic during the 39 months that it has been under observation.


PMID: 6997404


http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgicmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=6997404&dopt=Abstract




Transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease by handling of dura mater.
The Lancet Volume 341(8837) January 9, 1993 pp
123-124
Weber, Thomas; Tumani, Hayrettin; Holdorff, Bernd; Collinge, John; Palmer,
Mark; Kretzschmar, Hans A.; Felgenhauer, Klaus


Sir,- Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) can be transmitted iatrogenically by
human pituitary growth hormone, corneal transplants, and dura mater grafts
(1). Possible accidental transmission has been reported in only four
people-a neurosurgeon (2), a pathologist (3), and two laboratory technicians
(4,5) . We have encountered an unusually rapid case of CJD probably acquired
through handling of sheep and human dura mater.
In May, 1992, a 55-year-old orthopaedic surgeon developed paraesthesia of
the left arm. A few days later he had spatial disorientation, apraxia, and
gait ataxia. In June he was admitted and a neurologist suspected CJD on the
basis of the clinical signs, typical electroencephalogram (EEG) pattern, and
history. An EEG in June revealed a typical pattern of periodic biphasic and
triphasic sharp wave complexes. We saw the patient in July, 1992. He was
awake and oriented, with dyscalculia, dysgraphia, disturbed vision, apraxia
mainly of the left side, rigidity of wrists, spasticity of all muscles,
myoclonus of the left arm, increased tendon reflexes, ataxia of limbs and
trunk, and incoordination of left arm. Within 3 weeks he had impaired
consciousness and attention, mildly impaired memory, and threatening visual
hallucinations with restless turning. He had periodic states with movements
of his head and eye-bulbs resembling tonic adversive seizures. During sleep
these motor disturbances stopped. 2 1/2 months later the patient died.

This patient had worked with sheep and human dura mater from 1968 to 1972.
He handled about 150 specimens of ovine origin and at least a dozen human
preparations for research. Handling involved opening skulls with a band saw,
removing dura, and testing them either fresh (usually), preserved, or
lyophilised for mechanical qualities. These specimens were sent to a company
that has sold dura mater preparations by which CJD was transmitted in six
instances. No information was available from the company about a possible
connection with this patient's disease and the earlier cases of transmitted
CJD. Brain biopsy was consistent with diagnosis of CJD. Cerebrospinal fluid
obtained in July showed neuron-specific enolase (NSE) at 82.0 ng/mL,
compared with 16.7 ng/mL in serum of other cases (6). Proton magnetic
resonance spectroscopy of parieto-occipital and temporal grey matter,
parietal white matter, and thalamus revealed a 20-30% reduction of
N-acetylaspartate, as described (7). DNA was genotyped with allele-specific
oligonucleotides (8) and was homozygous for methionine at the polymorphic
codon 129. Subsequent direct DNA sequencing for the PrP gene open-reading
frame demonstrated normal sequence on both alleles, excluding known or novel
pathogenic PrP mutations.

It is tempting to speculate that prions were transmitted to this patient
from sheep or human dura mater through small lacerations of his skin, but
the patient and his wife did not remember any significant injury during his
four years of working with these samples. It cannot be excluded that this
was a case of sporadic CJD although this assumption is unlikely in view of
the clinical course which was similar to iatrogenic CJD transmitted by
peripheral inoculation, such as with human pituitary growth hormone or
gonadotropin or to kuru (1). Iatrogenic cases resulting from intracerebral
inoculation with the transmissible agent, for instance following dura mater
grafts (2-5), present with a dementing picture, as is usual in sporadic CJD,
rather than with ataxia as in this case.


1. Brown P, Preece MA, Will RG. "Friendly fire" in medicine: hormones,
homografts, and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. Lancet 1992; 340: 24-27. [Medline
Link] [Context Link]

2. Schoene WC, Masters CL, Gibbs CJ Jr, et al. Transmissible spongiform
encephalopathy (Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease): atypical clinical and
pathological findings. Arch Neurol 1981; 38: 473-77. [Medline Link] [Context
Link]

3. Gorman DG, Benson DF, Vogel DG, Vinters HV. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in
a pathologist. Neurology 1992; 42: 463. [Medline Link] [Context Link]

4. Miller DC. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in histopathology technicians. N
Engl J Med 1988; 318: 853-54. [Medline Link] [Context Link]

5. Sitwell L, Lach B, Atack E, Atack D, Izukawa D. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
in histopathology technicians. N Engl J Med 1988; 318: 854. [Medline Link]
[Context Link]

6. Wakayama Y, Shibuya S, Kawase J, Sagawa F, Hashizume Y. High
neuron-specific enolase level of cerebrospinal fluid in the early stage of
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. Klin Wochenschr 1987; 65: 798-801. [Medline Link]
[Context Link]

7. Bruhn H, Weber T, Thorwirth V, Frahm J. In-vivo monitoring of neuronal
loss in Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease by proton magnetic resonance spectroscopy.
Lancet 1991; 337: 1610-11. [Medline Link] [Context Link]

8. Collinge J, Palmer MS, Dryden AJ. Genetic predisposition to iatrogenic
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. Lancet 1991; 337: 1444-42. [Medlin


http://www.mad-cow.org/jul99_late_news.html#ggg




USA MAD COW STRAIN MORE VIRULENT TO HUMANS THAN UK STRAIN


18 January 2007 - Draft minutes of the SEAC 95 meeting (426 KB) held on 7
December 2006 are now available.


snip...


64. A member noted that at the recent Neuroprion meeting, a study was
presented showing that in transgenic mice BSE passaged in sheep may be more
virulent and infectious to a wider range of species than bovine derived BSE.

Other work presented suggested that BSE and bovine amyloidotic spongiform
encephalopathy (BASE) MAY BE RELATED. A mutation had been identified in the
prion protein gene in an AMERICAN BASE CASE THAT WAS SIMILAR IN NATURE TO A
MUTATION FOUND IN CASES OF SPORADIC CJD.


snip...


http://www.seac.gov.uk/minutes/95.pdf





3:30 Transmission of the Italian Atypical BSE (BASE) in Humanized Mouse

Models Qingzhong Kong, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Pathology, Case Western Reserve
University

Bovine Amyloid Spongiform Encephalopathy (BASE) is an atypical BSE strain
discovered recently in Italy, and similar or different atypical BSE cases
were also reported in other countries. The infectivity and phenotypes of
these atypical BSE strains in humans are unknown. In collaboration with
Pierluigi Gambetti, as well as Maria Caramelli and her co-workers, we have
inoculated transgenic mice expressing human prion protein with brain
homogenates from BASE or BSE infected cattle. Our data shows that about half
of the BASE-inoculated mice became infected with an average incubation time
of about 19 months; in contrast, none of the BSE-inoculated mice appear to
be infected after more than 2 years.

***These results indicate that BASE is transmissible to humans and suggest that BASE is more virulent than
classical BSE in humans.***


6:30 Close of Day One


http://www.healthtech.com/2007/tse/day1.asp




SEE STEADY INCREASE IN SPORADIC CJD IN THE USA FROM
1997 TO 2006. SPORADIC CJD CASES TRIPLED, with phenotype
of 'UNKNOWN' strain growing. ...


http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/resources-casereport.html





There is a growing number of human CJD cases, and they were presented last
week in San Francisco by Luigi Gambatti(?) from his CJD surveillance
collection.

He estimates that it may be up to 14 or 15 persons which display selectively
SPRPSC and practically no detected RPRPSC proteins.


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/1006-4240t1.htm





http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/2006-4240t1.pdf





Full Text

Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734.


http://jama.ama-assn.org/http://www.neurology.org/cgi/eletters/60/2/176#535





BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL


BMJ


http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/319/7220/1312/b#EL2





BMJ


http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/320/7226/8/b#EL1





JOURNAL OF NEUROLOGY

MARCH 26, 2003


RE-Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob

disease in the United States


Email Terry S. Singeltary:


[email protected]


I lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain Variant CJD). I would like to

comment on the CDC's attempts to monitor the occurrence of emerging

forms of CJD. Asante, Collinge et al [1] have reported that BSE

transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate

phenotype that is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest

sporadic CJD. However, CJD and all human TSEs are not reportable

nationally. CJD and all human TSEs must be made reportable in every

state and internationally. I hope that the CDC does not continue to

expect us to still believe that the 85%+ of all CJD cases which are

sporadic are all spontaneous, without route/source. We have many TSEs in

the USA in both animal and man. CWD in deer/elk is spreading rapidly and

CWD does transmit to mink, ferret, cattle, and squirrel monkey by

intracerebral inoculation. With the known incubation periods in other

TSEs, oral transmission studies of CWD may take much longer. Every

victim/family of CJD/TSEs should be asked about route and source of this

agent. To prolong this will only spread the agent and needlessly expose

others. In light of the findings of Asante and Collinge et al, there

should be drastic measures to safeguard the medical and surgical arena

from sporadic CJDs and all human TSEs. I only ponder how many sporadic

CJDs in the USA are type 2 PrPSc?


http://www.neurology.org/cgi/eletters/60/2/176#535





TSS

 

[flounder]

Subject: Re: NOR98-LIKE STRAIN OF SCRAPIE FOUND IN WYOMING update
Date: April 18, 2007 at 2:31 pm PST

Wyo. flock to be killed, tested after scrapie found
By The Associated Press

CHEYENNE - Somewhere near Moorcroft, in an unincorporated area of
northeastern Wyoming, a livestock owner will hand over his entire flock of
sheep next week to the federal government for a mass execution. The rancher
knows what will happen: his herd of roughly 300 sheep will be transported
live out of state and taken to a slaughter plant where they will be
euthanized, their brains and lymph node tissue harvested for testing.

He'll lose his herd because he owned the first U.S. sheep to test positive
for a rare strain of scrapie _ a disease found in sheep and goats that's
similar to mad cow disease in cattle and chronic wasting disease in sheep
and elk.

Still, state statute prohibits officials from releasing the rancher's
identity, and attempts by The Associated Press to reach him were
unsuccessful.

Scrapie itself is rare in the United States. Out of more than 115,000
animals tested since 2003, only 300 have tested positive; federal officials
hope to eliminate scrapie from U.S. herds by the end of 2010.

But the Wyoming rancher's case is even more rare: Fewer than 300 cases
worldwide have been recorded of the "Nor98-like" strain of scrapie, so-named
because it was first diagnosed in Norway in 1998.

"This is very unusual," Larry Cooper, regional spokesman in Fort Collins,
Colo., for Animal Plant Health Inspection Service, or APHIS, said of the
first discovery of a Nor98-like strain of scrapie in the U.S.

"It doesn't indicate that we're going to have mass outbreaks of this
particular strain, it just indicates that one of these animals from Europe
ended up in our system."

There are no known human health risks associated with scrapie. Cooper and
Bryce Reece, executive vice president of the Wyoming Wool Growers
Association, say consumers and livestock owners have nothing to fear from
the diagnosis.

"From an industry standpoint, we're not at all concerned or alarmed by it,"
Reece said. "It's more of an interest to the researchers or the scientists
than it is to the industry. I'm sure they're all questioning themselves as
to how it got here."

Dr. Mark Hall, head of the special pathology section of the National
Veterinary Services Laboratories in Ames, Iowa, agreed.

"It is something of interest and something I think we want to continue to
look at," Hall said. "But this is certainly not a shocking revelation or
anything like that. At this point, I don't think there's any evidence that
there's any great need for concern."

Scrapie experts and Animal Plant Health Inspection Service officials say
it's discovery is actually something to brag about.

"It means our surveillance system is working," Dr. Diane Sutton, National
Scrapie Program coordinator, said. "We found it utilizing our current
technologies to find scrapie cases in the United States."

APHIS notified the state last month that the sheep rancher's ewe tested
positive for a form of scrapie consistent with the Nor98 strain. The ewe was
slaughtered in Michigan last fall as part of the USDA's regular scrapie
slaughter surveillance program and traced back to the Wyoming flock.

Dr. Walt Cook, acting state veterinarian, said the government would pay the
livestock owner an indemnity fee based on fair market value for the sheep,
before "depopulating" the herd.

"It's the best and the simplest thing to do," Cook said. "It's unfortunate
to put down all those sheep, but it will allow us to test them and make sure
no other animals are infected."

Cook and Sutton said the infected ewe's owner had one other option: to
quarantine his flock, during which time he couldn't sell breeding animals
for several years while the flock was monitored to ensure no other cases of
the disease appeared.

"Economically it doesn't make much difference one way or the other," Cook
said of the rancher's options. "Obviously, by depopulating, he has to go
through the loss of his animals, which can be distressful."

Reece said when traditional scrapie is found in a flock, typically up to 10
percent of the rest of that herd can be infected with the disease. But with
Nor98, when one case is found, to date it has been the only one found in the
flock.

"I would bet we're not gonna see another one of these in Wyoming, and maybe
not even in the United States, but who knows?" Reece said. "With 300 cases
worldwide, it's not something out there that's highly transmittable."

He said that if an animal becomes infected with scrapie, it will die from
it: "It's 100 percent fatal, and because it's 100 percent fatal it's a
self-limiting disease."

"From a practical standpoint, scrapie is nothing," Reece said. "Pneumonia
probably kills more sheep than anything else out there, but because of
scrapie's similarities to mad cow disease, from a marketing and consumer
standpoint it is important for the U.S. to eradicate the disease from the
U.S."

Cooper said the effects of Nor98 are basically the same as those seen in
classic scrapie _ the disease attacks the central nervous system of infected
animals, causing behavioral changes such as tremors of the head and neck.

Classical scrapie is believed to be primarily transmitted through exposure
to placenta and birth fluids from infected animals or from facilities in
which infected animals have lambed.

The lamb and wool production business is a $50 million-a-year industry in
Wyoming, according to Reece, and a $500 million-a-year industry nationally.
According to Cooper, many sheep-importing countries require that the U.S. be
free of scrapie for seven years before they'll import U.S. breeding sheep.


http://www.billingsgazette.net/articles/2007/04/18/news/wyoming/42-flock.txt



Dr. Walt Cook, acting state veterinarian, said the government would pay the
livestock owner an indemnity fee based on fair market value for the sheep,
before "depopulating" the herd.

"It's the best and the simplest thing to do," Cook said. "It's unfortunate
to put down all those sheep, but it will allow us to test them and make sure
no other animals are infected."

======


confusious is still confused, why did the USDA/FSIS/APHIS not take the same
action with the atypical BSE BASE cases in Texas and Alabama. as with this
NOR98 atypical scrapie, they have no idea if it will spread vertical or
horizontal i.e. spreading via birthing or the environment via salvia, urine,
feces, soil etc etc. ??? considering BASE is more virulent to humans, it
just might be more virulent in other ways i.e. vertical and horizontal ???
and the fact that the BASE is sporadic CJD in humans, rather than the nvCJD,
this makes absolutely no sense to me. ...tss


7. WHY is it that the Farm of the Mad Sheep of Mad River Valley were
quarantined for 5 years, but none of these

farms from Texas and Alabama with Atypical TSE in the Bovine, they have not
been quarantined for 5 years, why

not, with the real risk of BSE to sheep, whom is to say this was not BSE ?



http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf




From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. (216-119-130-102.ipset10.wt.net)
Subject: When a case of B.S.E. is found in the U.S/Response to Disease
outbreak...'redbook'
Date: March 13, 2000 at 10:13 am PST

BSE Red Book 2.1-26

5.0 Response to Disease Outbreak

5.1 Notifications

When the Deputy Administrator of VS and the Administrator of APHIS
concur with the diagnosis of a presumptive case of BSE, the Response and
Notification/ Briefing section of the BSE Response Plan will be
activated.
Because BSE is not known to be contagious or vector borne, a declaration
of national emergency is not automatically necessary but may be
requested if warranted by the particular circumstances of the outbreak.

5.1.1 Checklist of Notification Actions Upon Diagnosis of BSE
See Response and Notification/Briefing sections of BSE Response Plan.

5.2 Declaring an Emergency

Because BSE has an extremely long incubation period, is not a herd
disease, appears to be transmitted primarily by contaminated
ruminant-origin rendered feed ingredients, and is not known to be
contagious or vector borne, an outbreak of the disease is not an
epidemiologic emergency.
The declaration of an animal disease emergency need not be automatic. To
avoid undue public alarm, an emergency should not be declared unless
indicated by the particular circumstances of the BSE outbreak.
The Secretary of Agriculture has authority under the Federal Act of July
2, 1962 (Title 21 U.S. Code, 134-134 h) to declare an emergency when a
disease exists that constitutes a threat to the livestock or poultry
industries of the United States. Title 9, Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR), Part 76 contains regulations issued under this and other
authorities.
Declaration of an animal disease emergency authorizes the Federal
Government to control and eradicate the disease problem and allows the
Government to seek funds from the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) and
other sources, to expend funds, and to place Federal quarantines on the
interstam movement of animals and animal products.
When appropriate, the Secretary would issue a formal declaration of
emergency. All affected States would be notified and expected to
cooperate by signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the USDA
specifying actions and responsibilities for activities such as
surveillance, quarantine, indemnity, and seizure of animals. Both
Federal and State quarantines may be used simultaneously.
The most probable reason for declaring a BSE animal disease emergency
would be the inability to obtain funds for BSE-related activities in any
other manner, such as from the Secretary's contingency fund. Because BSE
outbreaks do not spread rapidly, adequate time to seek funding from the
usual sources or to prepare a budget request to Congress should be
available.

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-27

5.3 Declaring an Extraordinary Emergency

Under authority of the Act of July 2, 1962 (21 U.S. Code 134a, 134b,
134d, and 145f) the Secretary of Agriculture may declare an
extraordinary emergency when adequate measures to control a disease are
not being taken by thc State involved. These acts authorize the Federal
Government to quarantine portions of a State, to enter premises after
obtaining a warrant, and to seize and destroy animals if necessary to
control the disease. It would seldom be necessary to declare an
extraordinary emergency for an outbreak of BSE, except to obtain
funding.

5.4 Authority To Pay Indemnity

Under provisions of Title 9, CFR, Part 53, USDA has the authority to pay
the fair market value or up to 100 percent of the expenses to purchase
and dispose of animals and materials required to be destroyed due to an
FAD (BSE), depending on the availability of funds for that purpose.
Because BSE can be transmitted through rendered animal products,
CNS-suspect animals must not be sent to slaughter. In the event of a
confirmed diagnosis of BSE or a presumptive diagnosis, notify FDA, CVM
if carcasses have moved to rendering or animal feed manufacturing.
Funds at 100 percent of the slaughter value at the time the suspect
animal is surrendered to the Government may be paid for suspect animals,
providing that:

*The animals are surrendered voluntarily to USDA for euthanasia and
disposal, or for research, observation, and diagnostic purposes;

*The owner agrees to cooperate with all BSE epidemiologic
investigations, diagnostic procedures, and disease preventive measures
considered necessary by APHIS; and

*The Secretary of Agriculture or anthorized representative agrees to
accept
the animals.

At the beginning of a BSE outbreak, it is strongly recommended that
APHIS choose to purchase all animals in an infected herd for research,
observation, or depopulation.

5.5 Inspections and Seizures

Authority is provided under Section 5 of the Act of July 2, 1962 for
Federal and State inspectors (when specifically designated by the Deputy
Administrator of VS) to stop vehicles carrying bovids, make inspections,
and seize animals and other items to prevent the transmission and spread
of an FAD (BSE).
The applicable authority, 21 U.S. Code 134d, states that:

"Employees of the Department of Agriculture designated by the Secretary
for the purpose, when properly identified, shall have authority:

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-28

"To stop and inspect, without a warrant, any person or means of
conveyance, moving into the United States from a foreign country, to
determine whether such person or means of conveyance is carrying any
animal, carcass, product, or article regulated or subject to disposal
under any law or regulation administered by the Secretary for prevention
of the introduction or dissemination of any communicable animal disease;
"To stop and inspect, without a warrant, any means of conveyance moving
interstate upon probable cause to believe that such means of conveyance
is carrying any animal, carcass, product, or article regulated or
subject to disposal under any law or regulation administered by the
Secretary for the prevention of the introduction or dissemination of any
communicable animal disease; and
"To enter upon, with a warrant, any premises for the purpose of making
inspections and seizures necessary under such laws and regulations. Any
Federal judge, or any judge of a court of record in the United States,
or any United States commissioner, may within his jurisdiction, upon
proper oath or affirmation indicating probable cause to believe there is
on certain premises any animal, carcass, product, or article regulated
or subject to disposal under any law or regulation administered by the
Secretary for the prevention of the introduction or dissemination of any
communicable animal disease, issue warrants for the entry upon such
premises and for inspections and seizures necessary under such laws and
regulations. Such warrants may be executed by any authorized employee of
the Department of Agriculture."

Since BSE is infectious but not a contagious disease under normal
circumstances, it will rarely be necessary to stop vehicles or seize
animals and other related materials.

5.6 Other Authorities

Authorities for the control and eradication of diseases and pests of
livestock and poultry are changed from time to time. Consult the Office
of the General Counsel, USDA, and the Federal Register for authorities,
rules, and regulations.

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-29

6.0 Quarantine

6.1 Authority To Quarantine

State and Federal regulatory officials have authority to impose
quarantines or hold orders. Usually, State quarantines are imposed on
individual herds and premises when any foreign animal disease is
suspected. Control of intrastate movement is by application of State
authority. It is important to coordinate efforts with State officials. A
survey of all State Veterinarians in the United States was conducted,
and all agreed to use quarantine authority on a herd in their State in
the event that BSE was diagnosed.
In contrast, Federal quarantines control the interstate and
international movement of diseased livestock. Only a declaration by the
Secretary of Agricultare of an Extraordinary Emergency will provide
Federal authority to control livestock movements within a State. Federal
and State quarantines may be used simultaneously.

6.2 Suspected Premises Quarantine or Hold Order

When BSE or any foreign animal disease is suspected, the investigating
veterinarian or FAD diagnostician should decide the issuance of a State
quarantine or a hold order on the promises. The slow onset and
progression of clinical signs will often require that an individual
suspect animal be held and monitored for several weeks. Although BSE is
not a rapidly spreading disease, the suspect animal or any other
potentially infected carcasses must be kept out of the animal and human
food chains and rendering channels. The reason for the issuance of the
quarantine should be listed as a CNS suspect.

6.3 Affected Premises Quarantine

When there is presumptive diagnosis of BSE, movement of all bovine
animals on and off the promises should be restricted to allow time for a
thorough epidemiologic investigation. A hold order or quarantine
indicating the number, age, sex, breed, and identification of all bovine
embryos, ova. and semen supplies should be completed. No bovine animals,
embryos, ova or semen from the affected premises shoald be sold,
slaughtered, or rendered.
Although the role of maternal transmission in the spread of BSE has not
been fully determined and epidemiologic evidence suggests that maternal
transmission may not be significant, cow-to-calf transmission cannot be
ruled out. Hence, until more conclusive scientific evidence either
confirms or refutes maternal transmission, precautions (an extended
quarantine or other movement restrictions) to prevent disease spread via
this route are prudent. At this time, natural progeny of the
BSE-affected cows need to be traced and should be purchased. This
recommendation may be modified if scientific research data become more
definitive.

October 1998 2.1-30

BSE Red Book

It is strongly recommended that the Government (APHIS) purchase all
cattle in the herd. No cattle from this herd shall be rendered. Tissues
from cattle dying of neurologic or prolonged wasting condition should be
submitted to a diagnostic laboratory.
If the herd of birth and the herd of last residence of the infected
animal are different, an investigation should be done to determine if
husbandry practices in the herd of birth are the likely source of
infection. Under certain circumstances, a quarantine (or other movement
restrictions) of this herd may be warranted until the epidemiologic
investigation is completed.

6.3.1 Affected Premises Security
Record the number and permanent identification of bovine animals,
embryos, ova and semen at the time of the quarantine or hold order.
Animals should not be allowed to move unless permitted by a State or
Federal animal health official. Introduction of new bovine animals to
the premises should be discouraged.
Because BSE is not a highly contagious disease, the need to post police
or other monitoring personnel is not obligatory.
Restriction of movements of non-Bovidae animals and vehicles or
inanimate objects must be determined on a case-to-case basis. However,
normal biosecurity and sanitary precautions should be observed.

6.3.2 Procedures on Affected Premises
A detailed epidemiologic investigation (sec. 4) should be performed on
all premises where BSE-confirmed animals are found.
Evidence from the United Kingdom has shown that the clinical
manifestation of BSE in any given herd is usually confined to a single
animal or a small group of animals. Although another suspect is unlikely
to be found, all cattle should be examined.
If another suspect is identified, that animal should have tissues
collected and submitted for diagnostic purposes after clinical signs
have sufficiently progressed. Carcasses of BSE-confirmed or suspect
animals should be incinerated.
Because BSE is not known to be highly contagious or vector borne, herds
found to contain a confirmed BSE case may or may not be depopulated.
Depending on circumstances, the government may purchase all animals
(suspect and exposed animals) for destruction or research purposes.
Embryos, ova, and semen from herds with confirmed BSE animals should be
held until an epidemiologic investigation is completed and the hold
order or quarantine is removed.
Milk from healthy animals in herds that have had BSE-confirmed animals
may be used for consumption, but milk from BSE suspects should be
withheld and disposed of in an environmentally acceptable method. Public
health authorities should be informed of the herd's BSE status. Litter,
bedding, feces, and urine from herds that have had BSE-confirmed animals
is not likely to be infectious. However, materials should be disposed of
according to good husbandry practices.
Feeds or feeding ingredients do not need to be destroyed simply because
they were near (or in contact with) suspect or confirmed animals.
However, if it is determined that feeds or feed ingredients contain
rendered animal protein originating from suspect or confirmed animals,
or that the feed or feed ingredient has

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-31

been epidemiologically linked to known BSE outbreaks, then the feeds or
feeding ingredients should he destroyed and disposed of by incineration.
Other steps that should be adhered to are the following:

*Federal, State and local policies concerning the feeding of rendered
ruminant or other mammalian protein to ruminants should be closely
followed.

*In light of recent preliminary research findings concerning maternal
transmission, farmers should be advised to promptly remove and
incinerate or bury placentas from calving pens. Calving pens should be
cleaned and disinfected. The disinfectants of choice are 4-percent
sodium hydroxide or 2-percent available chlorine.

6.4 Establishment of Quarantine Zone or Buffer Zone

Epidemiologic evidence indicates that the primary route of BSE
transmission is via infected meat and bone meal that is used in the
rations. Thus there is no need to establish a quarantine or buffer Zone
surrounding the affected premises.

6.5 Quarantine of Public Livestock Concentration Points

Livestock concentration points should be notified and employees should
be educated concerning the clinical signs of BSE. Any animal exhibiting
signs indicative of the disease should be reported. All bovids showing
evidence of neurological disease should be placed in an observation
facility within the premises. If the clinical signs are sufficiently
advanced, the animal should be euthanized and its tissues should be
submitted for examination. The carcass should be incinerated or buried
and must not be rendered. Due to the modes of disease transmission,
there is no need to quarantine livestock at concentration points.

6.6 Quarantine at Slaughter Plants

BSE is not known to be contagious or vector berne. Therefore, it is not
necessary to quarantine slaughter plants. Food Safety and Inspection
Service and slaughter-plant employees should be notified and educated
concerning BSE. Any animal exhibiting signs suggestive of the disease
should be reported. All CNS suspects should be isolated in a facility
where the animals can he adequately observed. The animal should be
euthanized and tissues submitted for examination. The carcass should not
permitted to enter the human or animal food chain. If laboratory
diagnostic tests have ruled out BSE the carcass may be rendered. In the
event of a presumptive diagnosis or a confirmed diagnosis of BSE, notify
FDA, CVM if carcasses have moved to rendering or animal feed
manufacturing plants.

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-32

6.7 Moratorium on Animal Movements

No moratorium on the movement of animals (except as required by the
provision of the quarantine on affected herds) is necessary. However, if
animals from the same herd are presented for slaughter, those carcasses
should be held. Consult VS, Emergency Programs staff.

6.8 Veterinary Practitioners Operating in a Quarantine or Buffer Zone

A quarantine zone or buffer zone is not necessary in case of a BSE
outbreak, but the area must be geographically identified if the BSE
cases were domestic cases; similar feeding practices in the area may be
a risk factor. Veterinary practitioners throughout the United States
should be alerted and encouraged to report all animals with suspicious
signs. The Regional Emergency Animal Disease Eradication Organization
(READEO) director and the local AVIC or designated personnel should have
the responsibility for notifying all private practitioners in the
outbreak area after consultation with Emergency Programs staff.
Guidelines for working with a CNS-suspect animal or a BSE-affected herd:

*Practitioners should immediately report to regulatory authorities any
animal showing signs suggestive of ESE.

*Practitioners should wear clean coveralls and boots on each premises
visited.

*If performing a caesarian section, assisting with the calving of a BSE
suspect, or performing this work on an infected farm, the practitioner
should wear gloves and eye protection.

*If no FAD deagnostician or pathologists are available and the
veterinary practitioner must remove the brain of a CNS suspect for
diagnostic submission, every precaution should be taken to prevent
exposure of the skin or mucous membranes because rabies cannot be ruled
out. Practitioners should record all clinical signs and their
progression.
Veterinarians who need to visit premises under quarantine for BSE should
be allowed to do so and should observe normal disease control
precautions. They should wear clean overalls or similar apparel and
rubber hoots. Boots should be cleaned with an approved and registered
disinfectant before entering and when leaving a premise. Thermometers,
restraint devices (tongs), and other equipment should be disinfected
between premises as other contagious diseases cannot be ruled out.

6.9 Artificial Insemination, Germ Plasm Collection, and Embryo Transfer

The role that germ plasm plays in the transmission of the spongiform
encephalopathies, especially BSE, is still unclear. Studies involving
bovine semen and embryos are in progress and to date have revealed no
evidence of playing a role in the transmission of BSE. Due to recent
experimental evidence that scraple

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-33

may be transmitted by embryos, precautions against BSE transmission by
ova and embryos are reasonable (Foster et al. 1992 and 1996). All semen,
ova, and embryos produced by BSE--confirmed animals should be located,
inventoried and destroyed if the owner is agreeable. If an owner of
semen, ova, and embryos from a BSE-confirmed animal is not willing to
have these materials destroyed, guidance must be sought from VS,
Emergency Programs staff at once. Field personnel should not offer
indemnity for semen, ova, or embryos unless authorized by Emergency
Programs.
Normal reproductive activities, including semen and ova collection,
natural and artificial insemination, and embryo transfer, may be allowed
to continue during the quarantine period on premises that have had
BSE-confirmed animals. However, movements of semen, ova, or other germ
plasm collected on the premises with confirmed cases of BSE should be
restricted until the quarantine is released.

6.10 Animal Protein Preservation

The carcasses from BSE-affected animals must not be used for human or
animal consumption. Dispose of carcasses by environmentally acceptable
methods, preferably incineration or deep burial. Consult VS, Emergency
Programs and public health authorities if necessary.

6.11 Controlled Slaughter of Potentially Exposed But Clinically
Unaffected Bovines

Cattle from premises under quarantine for BSE should not be slaughtered
or rendered until the epidemiologic investigation has been completed and
the quarantine has been lifted. Depending on the findings, the herd may
be purchased for research or depopulation.

6.11.1 Control of Animal Products From Affected Premises
Even if public health regulations allow, utilization of products of
clinically healthy animals from quarantined premises should not be
transported and processed for human consumption (except milk) during the
quarantine period.

6.11.2 Meat Products
Meat from BSE-suspect animals must not be used for human or animal
consumption or enter the rendering chain.

6.11.3 Offal
Federal, State, and national rendering policies and FDA regulations
concerning the use of viscera and rendered proteins in animal feeds and
human food must be followed. Cooperation from other Government agencies
involved, as well as the rendering industry, is very important.

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-34

6.11.4 Skins or Hides
Skins or hides from healthy or exposed animals are not a risk for
spreading BSE. Normal processing precautions should be observed.

6.11.5 Milk
Milk from BSE-suspect animals should not be used for human consumption.
Milk from clinically healthy animals may be pasteurized and used without
further restriction. Public health officials should be informed.

6.12 Adjacent Premises

Area spread of BSE by vectors or other methods is not known to occur.
Therefore, quarantine of adjacent premises is not necessary.

6.13 Guidelines for Zoologic Parks and Exhibitions

Zoologic parks where transmissible spongiform encephalopathies have been
confirmed should be handled in a manner similar to that of beef or dairy
farms. Confirmed operation of the park and public access may be
continued. Affected animals should be isolated and observed for the
progression of the clinical signs before a final disposition is made.

6.14 Quarantine Release

After the epidemiologic investigation has been completed and decisions
are made concerning the disposition of the herd, the quarantine may be
released. At the beginning of an outbreak, it is strongly recommended
that the Government purchase affected herds for research and
observation.


October 1998 TSS





From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. (216-119-138-129.ipset18.wt.net)
Subject: Emergency Operations...BSE Red Book
Date: March 13, 2000 at 1:30 pm PST

BSE Red Book 2.1-35

7.0 Emergency Operations

The section below would be implemented only after a first case of BSE is
confirmed in the United States.

7.1 READEO Activation

READEO activation will rarely be necessary for BSE outbreaks. Different
from most other foreign animal diseases and infectious diseases, BSE is
not a rapidly spreading, acute epizootic; is not thought to be
transmitted horizontally between animals within a herd, has an extremely
long incubation period, and usually affects only isolated single animals
or, at most, a few animals within herds. Because BSE does not spread
rapidly, the workload to investigate and manage most outbreaks should
not normally exceed the capability of existing local field personnel.
READEO activation should be considered only if the particular
circumstances of a BSE outbreak warrant. If field personnel feel they
are unable to manage a BSE outbreak, they should communicate this to
their Regional Director and VS, Emergency Program staff, who will
evaluate the need for READEO activation.

7.2 READEO Organization

If READEO is activated, a reference should be made to the revised READEO
Manual for further guidance on READEO organization and operations.

7.2.1 Office of the Director
When an animal disease emergency exists, the Task Force Directors are
responsible for the READEO activities. The directors immediately move to
the location of the outbreak and setup the READEO headquarters. Work is
coordinated with State officials of the States involved in the outbreak.
7.2.1.1 State Director--(Note: This is the new designation for the
Assistant Director.) Each READEO may have one or more State Directors
since each State where the disease outbreak is found will be represented
in the READEO by State officials designated by the State Veterinarian.
7.2.1.2 Emergency Program Officer--This individual, designated by the
Chief Staff Veterinarian of VS, Emergency Programs, provides liaison
between the READEO and the Emergency Programs at APHIS headquarters.
7.2.1.3 Public Affairs Officer--The Public Affairs Officer plans,
develops, supervises, and maintains information activities for the
READEO.
7.2.1.4 Legal--The Legal Advisor provides counsel and assistance to the
READEO.
7.2.1.5 Military--The U.S. Armed Forces Command will designate a senior
line officer to be the Military Support Officer on the staff of the
READEO Task Force Directon The individual is assigned to be the liaison
between the Depart-

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-36

ment of Defense and VS, Emergency Programs,and to coordinate needed
military assistance during eradication of an FAD outbreak.
7.2.1.6 Meat and Poultry Inspection Operations--The Meat and Poultry
Inspection Operations, Food Safety and Inspection Service, will
designate personnel to report to the READEO Task Director and to provide
liaison between the Task Force and the Meat and Poultry Inspection
Operations.
7.2.1.7 Laboratory Coordination--The Laboratory Coordination Officer
will advise the READE(3 Director concerning laboratory capabilities and
appropriate laboratory examinations to be conducted to provide needed
results as rapidly as possible. This individual will assist with
interpretation of results.

7.2.2 Administration
The Administrative Officer assigned to the READEO will direct and
coordinate all facets of general administrative functions. Refer to the
revised READEO Manual for a detailed description of the organization and
responsibilities.

7.2.3 Field Operations
The Field Operations Officer will direct line operations and supervise
field personnel in a READEO. Disease investigation, field epidemiology,
disease security and personnel security, animal movement control and
quarantine enforcement, appraisals of animals and materials,
depopulation and disposal, and cleaning and disinfection are among this
person's responsibilities.

7.2.4 Technical Support
Staff support consists of a technically competent staff designed to act
as a resource for the READEO Task Force. Personnel may include but are
not limited to individuals who have expertise in the following areas:
animal welfare, data systems, disease reporting, economics,
environmental impact, epidemiology, evaluation, orientation and
training, risk analysis, and wildlife. The staff communicates the needs
of the Field Epidemiology Delivery System (FEDS) to the READEO Director
as required to maintain an efficient, accurate, up-to-date FEDS.
7.2.4.1 Animal Welfare---Animal Welfare Officers must be knowledgeable
about current Federal and State animal welfare regulations, humane
methods of animal depopulation, and socioeconomic concerns related to
animal welfare issues. They advise the technical support staff and field
operations concerning current procedures and accepted methods for use in
the humane depopulation of livestock and poultry.
7.2.4.2 Wildlife-- Wildlife Officers participate with the Director and
other officials of the READEO to establish and carry out wildlife
policies and objectives for the emergency animal disease operation.
Through familiarity with the topography, wildlife density, susceptible
wildlife species, and movements of susceptible wildlife, the Wildlife
Officers can review maps and make recommendations concerning areas to be
included in the quarantined high-risk and buffer zones. These officers
maintain contact with local, State, and Federal wildlife enforcement
officers and wildlife biologists. They develop strategies for conducting
surveys of susceptible wi!dlife in the outbreak

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-37

area to determine the incidence of the disease. They direct and
coordinate the vaccination and depopulation of wild animals as necessary
to eliminate the disease.

7.3 Supplies and Equipment

During an outbreak of BSE, supplies and equipment should be obtained
through normal procurement procedures. If a READEO is activated,
supplies and equipment should be ordered through the READEO Procurement
and Supply Officer.

7.3.1 General Field Supplies Guidelines
Refer to APHIS Directive 326.1, 10/10/77 and 221.1, 1/29/74.

7.4 Personnel Responsibilities

During a BSE outbreak, field personnel should follow instructions issued
through the normal chain of command. If a READEO is activated, personnel
should refer to the revised READEO Manual for detailed descriptions of
individual responsibilities.

7.4.1 Personnel
Personnel assigned to the READEO Task Force are individually accountable
for equipment and supplies checked out to them. They should order
replacement equipment and supplies or return equipment for repairs
through the READEO Procurement and Supply Officer. All damages or losses
to equipment or vehicles should be reported immediately to the READEO
Administrative Officer, and the required forms should be completed and
submitted promptly.

7.4.2 Travel
Employees of the READEO Task Force are responsible for recording and
preparing all travel-related documents. Claims for travel, lodging, per
diem, and incidental expenses should be submitted to the READEO
Administrative Officer for processing.

7.4.3 Vehicles
Employees of the READEO Task Force are responsible for operating,
cleaning, and performing routine maintenance of assigned vehicles. They
also are responsible for recording mileage, expenses, and services.
Required reports are to be submitted to the READEO Vehicle Officer.

7.4. 4 Clothing
Employees of the READEO Task Force are issued protective clothing to
wear when entering a premises where BSE has been diagnosed or is
suspected. Clean clothing should be worn on each premises. Employees are
responsible for laundering the clothing before reusing it.

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-38

In a large task-foree operation, arrangements may be made for a
commercial laundry service to handle the clothing. If it is possible and
practical, all clothing should be labeled to identify the employees to
whom it is assigned.

7.4.5 Miscellaneous Responsibilities
Employees are responsible for conducting their assigned tasks in a
professional manner. Complaints concerning task force employees should
be directed to the READEO Director for resolution or appropriate action.

All animals, products, and materials to be destroyed because of BSE
should be appraised according to 9 CFR 53.3 and appropriate State
regulations.

7.5.1 Appraisal Teams
Appraisals must represent the interests of the owner, the State, and the
Federal Government and be consistent with fair market values. If State
authorities approve, State and Federal interests may be represented by a
VS employee alone. Owners may, at their discretion and expense, employ a
professional appraiser to advise them or to act as their agent. Either
the owner or the owner's agent must be present at appraisals.
No animals may be destroyed until after the appraisal forms are signed
by the owner or the owner's agent. Appraisers should be certain that the
owner or the owner's agent is aware of the indemnity form's clause
concerning liens and mortgages.
When the number of animals to be destroyed is small, and the total value
of animals, products, and materiais is low, APHIS field personnel may
negotiate the appraised value with the animal's owner without assistance
from a professional appraiser. The appraised value of a BSE suspect
should be the slaughter value of the animal, taking into account any
existing defects or diseases that would affect the slaughter value but
ignoring those signs that caused the animal to be classified as a BSE
suspect. If field personnel are in doubt concerning the need to use a
professional appraiser, they should consult their supervisor or VS,
Emergency Programs staff.
If a determination is made that healthy progeny, ova, semen, or embryos
must be destroyed, they should be appraised at 100 percent of
replacement value.
Feeds or feed ingredients located on suspect farms will rarely need to
be destroyed. If a determination is made that feeds or feed ingredients
must be destroyed (for example, to comply with a policy decision to
remove all rendered products from animal feeds), then these materials
should be appraised and indemn'ff~ed according to 9 CFR 53.3.

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-39

7.6 Depopulation Procedures

7.6.1 Factors and Considerations
If the owner is agreeable, a humane method of euthanasia of BSE suspects
will be necessary to facilitate the accurate diagnosis of the disease
problem, to ensure that the suspect animal is not slaughtered or
rendered, and to terminate the animal's suffering. Under no
circumstances may BSE suspects be sent fo slaughhter or rendering.
Notify FDA, CVM if you suspect that the carcass of a BSE-confirmed
animal has moved to rendering or animal feed manufacturing. The VS,
Emergency Programs staff, Riverdale, MD, must authorize the use of
euthanasia, depopulation, and indemnity payments for READEO operations.

7.6.2 Humane Euthanasia Methods
Only experienced veterinarians should perform euthanasia because there
are inherent dangers. Precautions should be taken to prevent accidents.
Owners should be given a complete explanation of what to expect, and
only humane euthanasia methods should be used. Euthanasia should be
performed away from public view, and, if possible, the owner should not
be present. Euthanized animals must be checked to confirm death. (See VS
Memo 583.1, 1992.)
7.6.2.1 Mechanical (Firearms)--Because the only acceptable method for
euthanizing an animal by using firearms is to shoot it in the head, and
because the animal's brain must be preserved to diagnose BSE, firearms
are not an acceptable euthanasia method.
7.6.2.2 Chemicals(Toxic Gas or Lethal Injection)--Follow guidelines
established by the American Veterinary Medical Association. When using a
regulated controlled substance (e.g., barbiturates), control and
administration of the euthanasia agent must be given by a veterinarian
having a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) number issued by the U.S.
Treasury. Control and administration of chemical substances for
euthanasia must be authorized by the AVIC unless directed by the VS
Deputy Administrator. (See VS Memorandum 583.1, 1992.)

7.6.3 Supervision of Depopulation
Field personnel should never perform depopulation or euthanasia without
explicit permission from their supervisor or, if appropriate, the READEO
Humane and Disposal Officer. (Refer to the revised READEC) Manual.)

7. 6.4 Permits for Movement
All BSE suspects may be moved under permit to facilitate medical
treatment, euthanasia, necropsy examination, or carcass disposal.
Permitted movement will be according to the quarantine restrictions and
will be administered by the State or Federal officials.

7. 6. 5 Security
Because BSE is neither contagious nor vector borne, strict disease
security measures are not necessary. Personnel should observe normal
disease security measures that are standard procedure for all farm
visits. The READEO's Security and Disease Prevention Officer has the
responsibility for establishing biosecurity measures.

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-40

7.7 Disposal
Under no circumstances may BSE suspects be sent to slaughter or
rendering. Notify FDA, CVM if you suspect that the carcass of a
BSE-confirmed animal has moved to rendering or animal feed
manufacturing. Field personel should arrange for the carcass to be
transported to and examined by a qualified veterinary pathologist or
field veterinary medical officer. After the pathologic examination has
been completed and the necessary diagnostic specimens have been
obtained, field personnel should arrange for disposal of the carcass.
Before a method of disposal is selected, there are many factors that
must be considered, and often other State and Federal agencies must be
consulted. The environmental and legal impacts of the operation must be
considered. Upon recommendation of the State or Federal agencies, VS may
consider other disposal methods.

7.7.1 Incineration
Incineration, although more expensive than burial, is the preferred
disposal method for BSE-suspect carcasses. Federal, State, and local
environmental regulations may restrict the use of this method and
permits may be necessary. As soon as BSE suspects are reported to APHIS,
field personnel should investigate the location and availability of
incinerators of sufficient size to process a bovine carcass.
Institutions likely to have incinerators include State and university
diagnostic laboratories, waste contractors, large municipalities, and
private industries. Ideally, the diagnostic laboratory where the
pathologic examination was done will have incineration facilities.
The BSE-suspect carcass disposal is APHIS' responsibility (not the
diagnostic laboratory's). Field personnel should arrange for
transportation and final disposal of the suspect carcass and should
inform their supervisors and/or the READEO Humane and Disposal Officer
of these arrangements.
Personnel should be aware that some laboratories dispose of carcasses by
rendering and should specifically inquire if this is the case. CNS
suspects should be incinerated or held from rendering until a diagnosis
of BSE can be ruled out. Under no circumstances may BSE susuects be sent
to slaughter or rendering. Notify FDA, CVM if you suspect that the
carcass of a BSE-confirmed animal has moved to rendering or animal feed
manufacturing.
Field personnel should be prepared to accompany the carcass from the
farm of origin to the diagnostic laboratory and then to the disposal
site if any doubt exists concerning the final disposal method.

7.7.2 Burial
If there are no other avenues for carcass disposal, burial of
BSE-suspect carcasses may be an acceptable disposal method. APHIS field
personnel should inquire with environmental authorities concerning
Federal, State, and local regulations that may impose restrictions on
this method.
The burial site may be on the affected farm, at the diagnostic
laboratory where the carcass is examined, or in a local landfill. The
site should be inaccessible to animals, removed from populated areas,
not used for agricultural purposes, clearly marked, and properly
protected.

October 1998


BSE Red Book 2.1-41

Burial sites should also be located a sufficient distance from
underground utility lines, septic systems, water wells, and surface
water. Local environmental or public works officers may be helpful in
locating a satisfactory site.
Field personnel should consult with their supervisors and/or the READEO
Environmental Impact Officer before digging. Burial trenches are
normally at least 9 feet deep with floor dimensions of 7 by 2 feet per
adult bovine carcass. Carcasses should be covered with at least 6 feet
of soil. This soil should not be tightly packed because gas formation
may cause a tightly packed trench to crack and leak.

7.7.3 Rendering
Because BSE is spread by rendered animal protein, BSE-suspect and
confirmed carcasses must not be rendered, unless the rendered material
is incinerated. Notify FDA, CVM if you suspect that dead BSE animals or
carcasses have moved to rendering or animal feed manufacturing.

7.7.4 Other Disposal Methods
The AVIC, the State animal health officials, and the READEO Director may
recommend other methods of disposal to the Deputy Administer, VS, for
approval (9 CFR 53.4). Options for disposal must be discussed and
approved by VS, Emergency Programs staff and must comply with all State
and local Environmental Protection Agency regulations.

7.8 Cleaning and Disinfecting (C&D)

Although BSE is neither contagious nor vector borne, appropriate C&D is
required to prevent farm-to-farm transmission of most other infectious
diseases. Field personnel must remember, however, that at the time they
are requested to euthanize a BSE-suspect animal, a confirmed diagnosis
of BSE will not be available. Signs compatible with BSE may be caused by
numerous infectious diseases and many BSE-suspect animals will, in fact,
have some other disease. Although the C&D of items such as manure,
bedding, feed, stalls, halters, milking machines, and other supplies and
equipment that have been in contact with BSE suspects is not
specifically necessary to control BSE, C&D is still advisable to control
other diseases that may be present.

7.8.1 Procedures for Cleaning and Disinfecting
7.8.1.1 Premises and Items--Field personnel are not responsible for C&D
of premises such as barns, stalls, and animal pens unless invasive
diagnostic procedures (such as a necropsy examination or the removal of
the suspect animal's brain) were performed on the premises. If possible,
field personnel should avoid doing such procedures on the farm. If
circumstances require that such procedures must be done on the farm,
personnel should clean and disinfect the immediate area after completing
the work.
7.8.1.2 Vehicles--Vehicles used to transport personnel to affected
premises should be kept clean, and normal precautions against the
farm-to-farm spread of any disease should be observed.

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-42

7,8.1.3 Carriers--Thoroughly clean trucks and trailers transporting BSE
suspects. Manure and bedding may be disposed of by any environmentally
accepted method such as spreading on fields or composting. After
conveyances have been thoroughly cleaned, disinfectant should be sprayed
on the sides and floor of the truck bed.
7.8.1.4 Livestock Markets--The risk of BSE transmission at livestock
markets is negligible. If a BSE suspect is found at a livestock market,
it should be managed the same as if it were found at a farm. Because of
the high risk of transmission of diseases other than BSE, invasive
diagnostic procedures, such as a necropsy examination or removal of the
suspect animal's head, should not be performed at livestock markets. Due
to the recent research findings concerning maternal transmission, any
pens or areas in which calving occurs should be thoroughly cleaned and
disinfected.
Cleaning and disinfection is not necessary to prevent the spread of BSE.
However, the C&D procedures are recommended to prevent the spread of
other diseases from pens or buildings where BSE suspects were held.
7.8.1.5 Slaughter Plants--Becanse BSE is spread by rendered animal
protein in cattle feeds, BSE suspects must not be slaughtered nor
rendered. If a BSE suspect is found at a slaughter plant, it should be
managed similarly to finding a suspect at a farm.

7.8.2 Approved Disinfectants
Field personnel should use professional judgment in the choice of a
disinfectant. Preferred disinfectants to inactivate the BSE agent
include 1N sodium hydroxide solution or sodium hypochlorite solution
containing 2 percent chlorine (1 hour exposure at 20 %C [68 %F]). This
should be used whenever there is reason to strongly suspect that BSE is
in fact the cause of the suspect animal's disease. Such reasons include
previously confirmed BSE in the geographic area or signs more compatible
with BSE than with any other neurologic disease.
If the suspect animal's signs are more compatible with diseases such as
rabies or listeriosis, then a phenolic disinfectant such as "One Stroke"
may be preferable. (Refer to appendix A Survival of BSE Agent and sec.
1.4.4.)

7. 8. 3 Precautions
All disinfectants are hazardous to human beings, animals, and the
environment. Label directions should be carefully read and followed.
Many disinfectants, including sodium hypochlorite solution, are also
corrosive and should be used with caution on metal and other corrodible
materials. Thorough rinsing is necessary if corrosive disinfectants are
used on metallic items.
Disinfectants, especially in concentrated form, may irritate skin, eyes,
and respiratory systems. Protective equipment such as appropriate
clothing, rubber boots, rubber gloves, mask and goggles should be worn
during mixing and application of disinfectants. If areas of the body are
exposed to a disinfectant, they should be washed thoroughly with water.
Employees should notify their supervisor and their Health and Safety
Officer if excessive human or animal exposure to disinfectants occurs or
if there is accidental release into the environment.

October l998

BSE Red Book 2.1-43

Field personnel should use normal hygienic procedures (such as washing
and disinfecting boots and removing the outer layer of clothing) when
leaving the farm. Unless the disease problem is noncontagious, personnel
should not travel to other livestock premises for the duration of that
day.

7.9 Vector Control

Current scientific data indicate that BSE is not spread by vectors.

7.10 Disease Prevention and Philosophy

The goal of disease prevention and control is to confine the occurrence
of BSE to as few herds as possible and to prevent recycling of the BSE
agent in the ruminant food supply. If undiagnosed cases are rendered and
included in ruminant rations, the long incubation period may allow many
animals to be exposed.
Action should be taken immediately after the detection and confirmation
of BSE to initiate an extensive epidemiologic investigation to determine
the source and extent of the disease, to stop the spread, and to
eradicate the disease.
7.10.1 Philosophy--Immediate action should be taken to prevent
contamination of the animal food supply by prohibiting rendering of any
infected or suspect bovine carcasses. In addition, care should be taken
to monitor those animals born and raised in affected herds and to
prevent their becoming a source of infection to other herds.
7.10.2 Agent Spread--Epidemiologic evidence indicates that the primary
route of BSE transmission is through the feeding of contaminated meat
and bone meal that has been manufactured using scrapie infected sheep
carcasses or BSE infected bovine carcasses. Recent research findings
suggest that maternal transmission may occur at a rate of approximately
1 percent in some species. It is believed that this route of
transmission is not significant enough to maintain an epidemic. Cases of
apparent maternal transmission have also been identified in captive
exotic ruminants.
7.10.3 Control of Products and Conveyances--Carcasses of BSE suspects
should be incinerated. Carcasses must not be rendered and incorporated
in animal feed. If carcasses are transported for disposal, conveyances
should be cleaned and disinfected after use with either a sodium
hypochlorite solution (2 percent available chlorine) or 1 N lye (sodium
hydroxide solution).
7.10.4 Control of Biologics and Drugs--Although no documented cases of
BSE have resulted from the use of biologics derived from bovines,
tissues from suspect or exposed animals must not be used for the
production of biologics and drugs.
The agents responsible for causing the transmissible spongiform
encephalopathies are highly resistant to normal inactivation processes.
Careful selection of source materials is the best way to secure maximum
safety of ingredients or reagents of bovine origin used in the
manufacture of biologics or other medicinals. Factors that should be
considered are the age of the animals, exposure to the agent, and the
tissue or organ from which the product is derived.

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-44

7.10.5 Wild Birds, Wind and Insects---Wild birds, wind and insects are
not known factors in the spread of BSE.
7.10.6 Rodents--Rodents are not known factors in the spread of BSE.
7.10.7 Hunting--Restrictions on the hunting of wild animals are not
necessary to prevent BSE.
7.10.8 Exhibitions--Cancelling scheduled exhibitions is not necessary.
7.10.9 Rendering Trucks and Drivers--The carcasses from BSE suspects
must not be rendered. If any rendering truck is used to transport a
suspect, it should be cleaned, washed, and disinfected as above. (Refer
to appendix A--Agent Survival and sec. 7.8.2--Disinfectants.)
7.10.10 Treatment--Currently there is no known treatment for BSE.
7.10.11 Prevention--Suspects and animals confirmed to have BSE must not
be rendered. Producers, feed mills, and rendering establishments should
adhere to U.S. State and local rendering policies and FDA regulations
concerning the feeding of rendered animal protein to ruminants. Because
of the possibility that some transmissible spongiform encephalopathies
may be transmitted at the time of parturition, precautions should be
taken to prevent exposure of healthy animal to placenta and reproductive
fluids. Importation of live animals and animal products from countries
with BSE or having high risk factors for BSE should be restricted based
upon scientific risk assessment.
7.10.11.1 Immunization--The agent that causes BSE elicits no detectable
immune response in the host. Therefore, vaccination is not a viable
option. There is no vaccine currently developed for BSE or other TSE's.
7.10.11.2 Sanitation--Although it is unknown whether a contaminated
environment plays any role in the spread of BSE, it is suggested that
pens having contained BSE-infected animals be cleaned and disinfected.
The disinfectants o choice are sodium hydroxide (lye) and sodium
hypochlorite, in infected herds it is also advisable that all placentas
be removed promptly and buried or incinerated. The calving pens also
should be cleaned and disinfected.
7.10.113 Producer Defense---The most effective way to prevent an
intruduction of BSE into a herd is not to feed ruminant byproducts to
ruminants. As of August 4, 1997, the FDA has a ban in place which
prohibits the feeding of most mammlian proteins to ruminants.

7.11 Records Maintenance in a Foreign Animal Disease Outbreak

The APHIS FEDS will be used by the READEO to record information. FEDS a
computerized network designed to transmit accurate information rapidly
during any emergency disease outbreak. The use of FEDS will allow the
READEO to direct its attention to the minute-to-minute business of
containing and eradicating the disease.
For an accurate record of the activities, all field supervisors in a
READEO task force should maintain a diary. Activities and observations
should be recorded in the diary when they occur. Date all documents and
enter events by time and date to show a correct chronology.
Enter events as they occur in the diary as well. An accurate history is
of considerable value in developing policies and plans for future
disease-eradication

October 1998

BSE Red book 2.1-45

programs, and it may be important if there is litigation. A diary will
be helpful for day-to-day administration of funds, personnel, and
equipment. It is also useful as a later reference in preparing reports
and summaries of activities.

7.11.1 Daily Reporls
Submit daily reports of significant activities to the READEO Director
and the VS, Emergency Programs staff Riverdale, MD. (Refer to appendix F
for current telephone listings.)
Include the following as part of the historical file of an outbreak:

*Maps showing premises where BSE-infected animals were found;
*Inventory of feeds and feed sources;
*Origin of BSE-suspeet and confirmed animals;
*Public information material distributed, newspaper clippings; and,
Administrative reports to support the expenditure of funds, utilization
of personnel and equipment, and disposition of excess materials and
equip­ment at the end of the program.



Re: Emergency Operations (part 2)...BSE Red Book Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
3/13/00 (0)





In Reply to: Emergency Operations...BSE Red Book posted by Terry S.
Singeltary Sr. on March 13, 2000 at 1:30 pm:

will inform all APHIS headquarters units through normal reporting
channels. Emergency Programs also will immediately report any
significant events to the Deputy Administrator, VS, who will immediately
advise the APHIS Administrator, especially of legal or politically
important events. A weekly summary report of control and eradication
activities will be provided to the APHIS Administrator and the Deputy
Administrator, VS. See BSE Response Plan, communications section.

7.11.3 Disposition
Records should be maintained until a historical account of the program
has been prepared and all pertinent information has been gleaned from
the records.
Furthermore, all records should be maintained if there may be legal
action pending as a result of the program activities. Usually,
administrative records are maintained a minimum of 3 years for audit
purposes..........TSS

 

[flounder]

Subject: Re: NOR98-LIKE STRAIN OF SCRAPIE FOUND IN WYOMING update
Date: April 18, 2007 at 2:31 pm PST

Wyo. flock to be killed, tested after scrapie found
By The Associated Press

CHEYENNE - Somewhere near Moorcroft, in an unincorporated area of
northeastern Wyoming, a livestock owner will hand over his entire flock of
sheep next week to the federal government for a mass execution. The rancher
knows what will happen: his herd of roughly 300 sheep will be transported
live out of state and taken to a slaughter plant where they will be
euthanized, their brains and lymph node tissue harvested for testing.

He'll lose his herd because he owned the first U.S. sheep to test positive
for a rare strain of scrapie _ a disease found in sheep and goats that's
similar to mad cow disease in cattle and chronic wasting disease in sheep
and elk.

Still, state statute prohibits officials from releasing the rancher's
identity, and attempts by The Associated Press to reach him were
unsuccessful.

Scrapie itself is rare in the United States. Out of more than 115,000
animals tested since 2003, only 300 have tested positive; federal officials
hope to eliminate scrapie from U.S. herds by the end of 2010.

But the Wyoming rancher's case is even more rare: Fewer than 300 cases
worldwide have been recorded of the "Nor98-like" strain of scrapie, so-named
because it was first diagnosed in Norway in 1998.

"This is very unusual," Larry Cooper, regional spokesman in Fort Collins,
Colo., for Animal Plant Health Inspection Service, or APHIS, said of the
first discovery of a Nor98-like strain of scrapie in the U.S.

"It doesn't indicate that we're going to have mass outbreaks of this
particular strain, it just indicates that one of these animals from Europe
ended up in our system."

There are no known human health risks associated with scrapie. Cooper and
Bryce Reece, executive vice president of the Wyoming Wool Growers
Association, say consumers and livestock owners have nothing to fear from
the diagnosis.

"From an industry standpoint, we're not at all concerned or alarmed by it,"
Reece said. "It's more of an interest to the researchers or the scientists
than it is to the industry. I'm sure they're all questioning themselves as
to how it got here."

Dr. Mark Hall, head of the special pathology section of the National
Veterinary Services Laboratories in Ames, Iowa, agreed.

"It is something of interest and something I think we want to continue to
look at," Hall said. "But this is certainly not a shocking revelation or
anything like that. At this point, I don't think there's any evidence that
there's any great need for concern."

Scrapie experts and Animal Plant Health Inspection Service officials say
it's discovery is actually something to brag about.

"It means our surveillance system is working," Dr. Diane Sutton, National
Scrapie Program coordinator, said. "We found it utilizing our current
technologies to find scrapie cases in the United States."

APHIS notified the state last month that the sheep rancher's ewe tested
positive for a form of scrapie consistent with the Nor98 strain. The ewe was
slaughtered in Michigan last fall as part of the USDA's regular scrapie
slaughter surveillance program and traced back to the Wyoming flock.

Dr. Walt Cook, acting state veterinarian, said the government would pay the
livestock owner an indemnity fee based on fair market value for the sheep,
before "depopulating" the herd.

"It's the best and the simplest thing to do," Cook said. "It's unfortunate
to put down all those sheep, but it will allow us to test them and make sure
no other animals are infected."

Cook and Sutton said the infected ewe's owner had one other option: to
quarantine his flock, during which time he couldn't sell breeding animals
for several years while the flock was monitored to ensure no other cases of
the disease appeared.

"Economically it doesn't make much difference one way or the other," Cook
said of the rancher's options. "Obviously, by depopulating, he has to go
through the loss of his animals, which can be distressful."

Reece said when traditional scrapie is found in a flock, typically up to 10
percent of the rest of that herd can be infected with the disease. But with
Nor98, when one case is found, to date it has been the only one found in the
flock.

"I would bet we're not gonna see another one of these in Wyoming, and maybe
not even in the United States, but who knows?" Reece said. "With 300 cases
worldwide, it's not something out there that's highly transmittable."

He said that if an animal becomes infected with scrapie, it will die from
it: "It's 100 percent fatal, and because it's 100 percent fatal it's a
self-limiting disease."

"From a practical standpoint, scrapie is nothing," Reece said. "Pneumonia
probably kills more sheep than anything else out there, but because of
scrapie's similarities to mad cow disease, from a marketing and consumer
standpoint it is important for the U.S. to eradicate the disease from the
U.S."

Cooper said the effects of Nor98 are basically the same as those seen in
classic scrapie _ the disease attacks the central nervous system of infected
animals, causing behavioral changes such as tremors of the head and neck.

Classical scrapie is believed to be primarily transmitted through exposure
to placenta and birth fluids from infected animals or from facilities in
which infected animals have lambed.

The lamb and wool production business is a $50 million-a-year industry in
Wyoming, according to Reece, and a $500 million-a-year industry nationally.
According to Cooper, many sheep-importing countries require that the U.S. be
free of scrapie for seven years before they'll import U.S. breeding sheep.


http://www.billingsgazette.net/articles/2007/04/18/news/wyoming/42-flock.txt



Dr. Walt Cook, acting state veterinarian, said the government would pay the
livestock owner an indemnity fee based on fair market value for the sheep,
before "depopulating" the herd.

"It's the best and the simplest thing to do," Cook said. "It's unfortunate
to put down all those sheep, but it will allow us to test them and make sure
no other animals are infected."

======


confusious is still confused, why did the USDA/FSIS/APHIS not take the same
action with the atypical BSE BASE cases in Texas and Alabama. as with this
NOR98 atypical scrapie, they have no idea if it will spread vertical or
horizontal i.e. spreading via birthing or the environment via salvia, urine,
feces, soil etc etc. ??? considering BASE is more virulent to humans, it
just might be more virulent in other ways i.e. vertical and horizontal ???
and the fact that the BASE is sporadic CJD in humans, rather than the nvCJD,
this makes absolutely no sense to me. ...tss


7. WHY is it that the Farm of the Mad Sheep of Mad River Valley were
quarantined for 5 years, but none of these

farms from Texas and Alabama with Atypical TSE in the Bovine, they have not
been quarantined for 5 years, why

not, with the real risk of BSE to sheep, whom is to say this was not BSE ?



http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf




From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. (216-119-130-102.ipset10.wt.net)
Subject: When a case of B.S.E. is found in the U.S/Response to Disease
outbreak...'redbook'
Date: March 13, 2000 at 10:13 am PST

BSE Red Book 2.1-26

5.0 Response to Disease Outbreak

5.1 Notifications

When the Deputy Administrator of VS and the Administrator of APHIS
concur with the diagnosis of a presumptive case of BSE, the Response and
Notification/ Briefing section of the BSE Response Plan will be
activated.
Because BSE is not known to be contagious or vector borne, a declaration
of national emergency is not automatically necessary but may be
requested if warranted by the particular circumstances of the outbreak.

5.1.1 Checklist of Notification Actions Upon Diagnosis of BSE
See Response and Notification/Briefing sections of BSE Response Plan.

5.2 Declaring an Emergency

Because BSE has an extremely long incubation period, is not a herd
disease, appears to be transmitted primarily by contaminated
ruminant-origin rendered feed ingredients, and is not known to be
contagious or vector borne, an outbreak of the disease is not an
epidemiologic emergency.
The declaration of an animal disease emergency need not be automatic. To
avoid undue public alarm, an emergency should not be declared unless
indicated by the particular circumstances of the BSE outbreak.
The Secretary of Agriculture has authority under the Federal Act of July
2, 1962 (Title 21 U.S. Code, 134-134 h) to declare an emergency when a
disease exists that constitutes a threat to the livestock or poultry
industries of the United States. Title 9, Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR), Part 76 contains regulations issued under this and other
authorities.
Declaration of an animal disease emergency authorizes the Federal
Government to control and eradicate the disease problem and allows the
Government to seek funds from the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) and
other sources, to expend funds, and to place Federal quarantines on the
interstam movement of animals and animal products.
When appropriate, the Secretary would issue a formal declaration of
emergency. All affected States would be notified and expected to
cooperate by signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the USDA
specifying actions and responsibilities for activities such as
surveillance, quarantine, indemnity, and seizure of animals. Both
Federal and State quarantines may be used simultaneously.
The most probable reason for declaring a BSE animal disease emergency
would be the inability to obtain funds for BSE-related activities in any
other manner, such as from the Secretary's contingency fund. Because BSE
outbreaks do not spread rapidly, adequate time to seek funding from the
usual sources or to prepare a budget request to Congress should be
available.

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-27

5.3 Declaring an Extraordinary Emergency

Under authority of the Act of July 2, 1962 (21 U.S. Code 134a, 134b,
134d, and 145f) the Secretary of Agriculture may declare an
extraordinary emergency when adequate measures to control a disease are
not being taken by thc State involved. These acts authorize the Federal
Government to quarantine portions of a State, to enter premises after
obtaining a warrant, and to seize and destroy animals if necessary to
control the disease. It would seldom be necessary to declare an
extraordinary emergency for an outbreak of BSE, except to obtain
funding.

5.4 Authority To Pay Indemnity

Under provisions of Title 9, CFR, Part 53, USDA has the authority to pay
the fair market value or up to 100 percent of the expenses to purchase
and dispose of animals and materials required to be destroyed due to an
FAD (BSE), depending on the availability of funds for that purpose.
Because BSE can be transmitted through rendered animal products,
CNS-suspect animals must not be sent to slaughter. In the event of a
confirmed diagnosis of BSE or a presumptive diagnosis, notify FDA, CVM
if carcasses have moved to rendering or animal feed manufacturing.
Funds at 100 percent of the slaughter value at the time the suspect
animal is surrendered to the Government may be paid for suspect animals,
providing that:

*The animals are surrendered voluntarily to USDA for euthanasia and
disposal, or for research, observation, and diagnostic purposes;

*The owner agrees to cooperate with all BSE epidemiologic
investigations, diagnostic procedures, and disease preventive measures
considered necessary by APHIS; and

*The Secretary of Agriculture or anthorized representative agrees to
accept
the animals.

At the beginning of a BSE outbreak, it is strongly recommended that
APHIS choose to purchase all animals in an infected herd for research,
observation, or depopulation.

5.5 Inspections and Seizures

Authority is provided under Section 5 of the Act of July 2, 1962 for
Federal and State inspectors (when specifically designated by the Deputy
Administrator of VS) to stop vehicles carrying bovids, make inspections,
and seize animals and other items to prevent the transmission and spread
of an FAD (BSE).
The applicable authority, 21 U.S. Code 134d, states that:

"Employees of the Department of Agriculture designated by the Secretary
for the purpose, when properly identified, shall have authority:

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-28

"To stop and inspect, without a warrant, any person or means of
conveyance, moving into the United States from a foreign country, to
determine whether such person or means of conveyance is carrying any
animal, carcass, product, or article regulated or subject to disposal
under any law or regulation administered by the Secretary for prevention
of the introduction or dissemination of any communicable animal disease;
"To stop and inspect, without a warrant, any means of conveyance moving
interstate upon probable cause to believe that such means of conveyance
is carrying any animal, carcass, product, or article regulated or
subject to disposal under any law or regulation administered by the
Secretary for the prevention of the introduction or dissemination of any
communicable animal disease; and
"To enter upon, with a warrant, any premises for the purpose of making
inspections and seizures necessary under such laws and regulations. Any
Federal judge, or any judge of a court of record in the United States,
or any United States commissioner, may within his jurisdiction, upon
proper oath or affirmation indicating probable cause to believe there is
on certain premises any animal, carcass, product, or article regulated
or subject to disposal under any law or regulation administered by the
Secretary for the prevention of the introduction or dissemination of any
communicable animal disease, issue warrants for the entry upon such
premises and for inspections and seizures necessary under such laws and
regulations. Such warrants may be executed by any authorized employee of
the Department of Agriculture."

Since BSE is infectious but not a contagious disease under normal
circumstances, it will rarely be necessary to stop vehicles or seize
animals and other related materials.

5.6 Other Authorities

Authorities for the control and eradication of diseases and pests of
livestock and poultry are changed from time to time. Consult the Office
of the General Counsel, USDA, and the Federal Register for authorities,
rules, and regulations.

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-29

6.0 Quarantine

6.1 Authority To Quarantine

State and Federal regulatory officials have authority to impose
quarantines or hold orders. Usually, State quarantines are imposed on
individual herds and premises when any foreign animal disease is
suspected. Control of intrastate movement is by application of State
authority. It is important to coordinate efforts with State officials. A
survey of all State Veterinarians in the United States was conducted,
and all agreed to use quarantine authority on a herd in their State in
the event that BSE was diagnosed.
In contrast, Federal quarantines control the interstate and
international movement of diseased livestock. Only a declaration by the
Secretary of Agricultare of an Extraordinary Emergency will provide
Federal authority to control livestock movements within a State. Federal
and State quarantines may be used simultaneously.

6.2 Suspected Premises Quarantine or Hold Order

When BSE or any foreign animal disease is suspected, the investigating
veterinarian or FAD diagnostician should decide the issuance of a State
quarantine or a hold order on the promises. The slow onset and
progression of clinical signs will often require that an individual
suspect animal be held and monitored for several weeks. Although BSE is
not a rapidly spreading disease, the suspect animal or any other
potentially infected carcasses must be kept out of the animal and human
food chains and rendering channels. The reason for the issuance of the
quarantine should be listed as a CNS suspect.

6.3 Affected Premises Quarantine

When there is presumptive diagnosis of BSE, movement of all bovine
animals on and off the promises should be restricted to allow time for a
thorough epidemiologic investigation. A hold order or quarantine
indicating the number, age, sex, breed, and identification of all bovine
embryos, ova. and semen supplies should be completed. No bovine animals,
embryos, ova or semen from the affected premises shoald be sold,
slaughtered, or rendered.
Although the role of maternal transmission in the spread of BSE has not
been fully determined and epidemiologic evidence suggests that maternal
transmission may not be significant, cow-to-calf transmission cannot be
ruled out. Hence, until more conclusive scientific evidence either
confirms or refutes maternal transmission, precautions (an extended
quarantine or other movement restrictions) to prevent disease spread via
this route are prudent. At this time, natural progeny of the
BSE-affected cows need to be traced and should be purchased. This
recommendation may be modified if scientific research data become more
definitive.

October 1998 2.1-30

BSE Red Book

It is strongly recommended that the Government (APHIS) purchase all
cattle in the herd. No cattle from this herd shall be rendered. Tissues
from cattle dying of neurologic or prolonged wasting condition should be
submitted to a diagnostic laboratory.
If the herd of birth and the herd of last residence of the infected
animal are different, an investigation should be done to determine if
husbandry practices in the herd of birth are the likely source of
infection. Under certain circumstances, a quarantine (or other movement
restrictions) of this herd may be warranted until the epidemiologic
investigation is completed.

6.3.1 Affected Premises Security
Record the number and permanent identification of bovine animals,
embryos, ova and semen at the time of the quarantine or hold order.
Animals should not be allowed to move unless permitted by a State or
Federal animal health official. Introduction of new bovine animals to
the premises should be discouraged.
Because BSE is not a highly contagious disease, the need to post police
or other monitoring personnel is not obligatory.
Restriction of movements of non-Bovidae animals and vehicles or
inanimate objects must be determined on a case-to-case basis. However,
normal biosecurity and sanitary precautions should be observed.

6.3.2 Procedures on Affected Premises
A detailed epidemiologic investigation (sec. 4) should be performed on
all premises where BSE-confirmed animals are found.
Evidence from the United Kingdom has shown that the clinical
manifestation of BSE in any given herd is usually confined to a single
animal or a small group of animals. Although another suspect is unlikely
to be found, all cattle should be examined.
If another suspect is identified, that animal should have tissues
collected and submitted for diagnostic purposes after clinical signs
have sufficiently progressed. Carcasses of BSE-confirmed or suspect
animals should be incinerated.
Because BSE is not known to be highly contagious or vector borne, herds
found to contain a confirmed BSE case may or may not be depopulated.
Depending on circumstances, the government may purchase all animals
(suspect and exposed animals) for destruction or research purposes.
Embryos, ova, and semen from herds with confirmed BSE animals should be
held until an epidemiologic investigation is completed and the hold
order or quarantine is removed.
Milk from healthy animals in herds that have had BSE-confirmed animals
may be used for consumption, but milk from BSE suspects should be
withheld and disposed of in an environmentally acceptable method. Public
health authorities should be informed of the herd's BSE status. Litter,
bedding, feces, and urine from herds that have had BSE-confirmed animals
is not likely to be infectious. However, materials should be disposed of
according to good husbandry practices.
Feeds or feeding ingredients do not need to be destroyed simply because
they were near (or in contact with) suspect or confirmed animals.
However, if it is determined that feeds or feed ingredients contain
rendered animal protein originating from suspect or confirmed animals,
or that the feed or feed ingredient has

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-31

been epidemiologically linked to known BSE outbreaks, then the feeds or
feeding ingredients should he destroyed and disposed of by incineration.
Other steps that should be adhered to are the following:

*Federal, State and local policies concerning the feeding of rendered
ruminant or other mammalian protein to ruminants should be closely
followed.

*In light of recent preliminary research findings concerning maternal
transmission, farmers should be advised to promptly remove and
incinerate or bury placentas from calving pens. Calving pens should be
cleaned and disinfected. The disinfectants of choice are 4-percent
sodium hydroxide or 2-percent available chlorine.

6.4 Establishment of Quarantine Zone or Buffer Zone

Epidemiologic evidence indicates that the primary route of BSE
transmission is via infected meat and bone meal that is used in the
rations. Thus there is no need to establish a quarantine or buffer Zone
surrounding the affected premises.

6.5 Quarantine of Public Livestock Concentration Points

Livestock concentration points should be notified and employees should
be educated concerning the clinical signs of BSE. Any animal exhibiting
signs indicative of the disease should be reported. All bovids showing
evidence of neurological disease should be placed in an observation
facility within the premises. If the clinical signs are sufficiently
advanced, the animal should be euthanized and its tissues should be
submitted for examination. The carcass should be incinerated or buried
and must not be rendered. Due to the modes of disease transmission,
there is no need to quarantine livestock at concentration points.

6.6 Quarantine at Slaughter Plants

BSE is not known to be contagious or vector berne. Therefore, it is not
necessary to quarantine slaughter plants. Food Safety and Inspection
Service and slaughter-plant employees should be notified and educated
concerning BSE. Any animal exhibiting signs suggestive of the disease
should be reported. All CNS suspects should be isolated in a facility
where the animals can he adequately observed. The animal should be
euthanized and tissues submitted for examination. The carcass should not
permitted to enter the human or animal food chain. If laboratory
diagnostic tests have ruled out BSE the carcass may be rendered. In the
event of a presumptive diagnosis or a confirmed diagnosis of BSE, notify
FDA, CVM if carcasses have moved to rendering or animal feed
manufacturing plants.

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-32

6.7 Moratorium on Animal Movements

No moratorium on the movement of animals (except as required by the
provision of the quarantine on affected herds) is necessary. However, if
animals from the same herd are presented for slaughter, those carcasses
should be held. Consult VS, Emergency Programs staff.

6.8 Veterinary Practitioners Operating in a Quarantine or Buffer Zone

A quarantine zone or buffer zone is not necessary in case of a BSE
outbreak, but the area must be geographically identified if the BSE
cases were domestic cases; similar feeding practices in the area may be
a risk factor. Veterinary practitioners throughout the United States
should be alerted and encouraged to report all animals with suspicious
signs. The Regional Emergency Animal Disease Eradication Organization
(READEO) director and the local AVIC or designated personnel should have
the responsibility for notifying all private practitioners in the
outbreak area after consultation with Emergency Programs staff.
Guidelines for working with a CNS-suspect animal or a BSE-affected herd:

*Practitioners should immediately report to regulatory authorities any
animal showing signs suggestive of ESE.

*Practitioners should wear clean coveralls and boots on each premises
visited.

*If performing a caesarian section, assisting with the calving of a BSE
suspect, or performing this work on an infected farm, the practitioner
should wear gloves and eye protection.

*If no FAD deagnostician or pathologists are available and the
veterinary practitioner must remove the brain of a CNS suspect for
diagnostic submission, every precaution should be taken to prevent
exposure of the skin or mucous membranes because rabies cannot be ruled
out. Practitioners should record all clinical signs and their
progression.
Veterinarians who need to visit premises under quarantine for BSE should
be allowed to do so and should observe normal disease control
precautions. They should wear clean overalls or similar apparel and
rubber hoots. Boots should be cleaned with an approved and registered
disinfectant before entering and when leaving a premise. Thermometers,
restraint devices (tongs), and other equipment should be disinfected
between premises as other contagious diseases cannot be ruled out.

6.9 Artificial Insemination, Germ Plasm Collection, and Embryo Transfer

The role that germ plasm plays in the transmission of the spongiform
encephalopathies, especially BSE, is still unclear. Studies involving
bovine semen and embryos are in progress and to date have revealed no
evidence of playing a role in the transmission of BSE. Due to recent
experimental evidence that scraple

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-33

may be transmitted by embryos, precautions against BSE transmission by
ova and embryos are reasonable (Foster et al. 1992 and 1996). All semen,
ova, and embryos produced by BSE--confirmed animals should be located,
inventoried and destroyed if the owner is agreeable. If an owner of
semen, ova, and embryos from a BSE-confirmed animal is not willing to
have these materials destroyed, guidance must be sought from VS,
Emergency Programs staff at once. Field personnel should not offer
indemnity for semen, ova, or embryos unless authorized by Emergency
Programs.
Normal reproductive activities, including semen and ova collection,
natural and artificial insemination, and embryo transfer, may be allowed
to continue during the quarantine period on premises that have had
BSE-confirmed animals. However, movements of semen, ova, or other germ
plasm collected on the premises with confirmed cases of BSE should be
restricted until the quarantine is released.

6.10 Animal Protein Preservation

The carcasses from BSE-affected animals must not be used for human or
animal consumption. Dispose of carcasses by environmentally acceptable
methods, preferably incineration or deep burial. Consult VS, Emergency
Programs and public health authorities if necessary.

6.11 Controlled Slaughter of Potentially Exposed But Clinically
Unaffected Bovines

Cattle from premises under quarantine for BSE should not be slaughtered
or rendered until the epidemiologic investigation has been completed and
the quarantine has been lifted. Depending on the findings, the herd may
be purchased for research or depopulation.

6.11.1 Control of Animal Products From Affected Premises
Even if public health regulations allow, utilization of products of
clinically healthy animals from quarantined premises should not be
transported and processed for human consumption (except milk) during the
quarantine period.

6.11.2 Meat Products
Meat from BSE-suspect animals must not be used for human or animal
consumption or enter the rendering chain.

6.11.3 Offal
Federal, State, and national rendering policies and FDA regulations
concerning the use of viscera and rendered proteins in animal feeds and
human food must be followed. Cooperation from other Government agencies
involved, as well as the rendering industry, is very important.

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-34

6.11.4 Skins or Hides
Skins or hides from healthy or exposed animals are not a risk for
spreading BSE. Normal processing precautions should be observed.

6.11.5 Milk
Milk from BSE-suspect animals should not be used for human consumption.
Milk from clinically healthy animals may be pasteurized and used without
further restriction. Public health officials should be informed.

6.12 Adjacent Premises

Area spread of BSE by vectors or other methods is not known to occur.
Therefore, quarantine of adjacent premises is not necessary.

6.13 Guidelines for Zoologic Parks and Exhibitions

Zoologic parks where transmissible spongiform encephalopathies have been
confirmed should be handled in a manner similar to that of beef or dairy
farms. Confirmed operation of the park and public access may be
continued. Affected animals should be isolated and observed for the
progression of the clinical signs before a final disposition is made.

6.14 Quarantine Release

After the epidemiologic investigation has been completed and decisions
are made concerning the disposition of the herd, the quarantine may be
released. At the beginning of an outbreak, it is strongly recommended
that the Government purchase affected herds for research and
observation.


October 1998 TSS





From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. (216-119-138-129.ipset18.wt.net)
Subject: Emergency Operations...BSE Red Book
Date: March 13, 2000 at 1:30 pm PST

BSE Red Book 2.1-35

7.0 Emergency Operations

The section below would be implemented only after a first case of BSE is
confirmed in the United States.

7.1 READEO Activation

READEO activation will rarely be necessary for BSE outbreaks. Different
from most other foreign animal diseases and infectious diseases, BSE is
not a rapidly spreading, acute epizootic; is not thought to be
transmitted horizontally between animals within a herd, has an extremely
long incubation period, and usually affects only isolated single animals
or, at most, a few animals within herds. Because BSE does not spread
rapidly, the workload to investigate and manage most outbreaks should
not normally exceed the capability of existing local field personnel.
READEO activation should be considered only if the particular
circumstances of a BSE outbreak warrant. If field personnel feel they
are unable to manage a BSE outbreak, they should communicate this to
their Regional Director and VS, Emergency Program staff, who will
evaluate the need for READEO activation.

7.2 READEO Organization

If READEO is activated, a reference should be made to the revised READEO
Manual for further guidance on READEO organization and operations.

7.2.1 Office of the Director
When an animal disease emergency exists, the Task Force Directors are
responsible for the READEO activities. The directors immediately move to
the location of the outbreak and setup the READEO headquarters. Work is
coordinated with State officials of the States involved in the outbreak.
7.2.1.1 State Director--(Note: This is the new designation for the
Assistant Director.) Each READEO may have one or more State Directors
since each State where the disease outbreak is found will be represented
in the READEO by State officials designated by the State Veterinarian.
7.2.1.2 Emergency Program Officer--This individual, designated by the
Chief Staff Veterinarian of VS, Emergency Programs, provides liaison
between the READEO and the Emergency Programs at APHIS headquarters.
7.2.1.3 Public Affairs Officer--The Public Affairs Officer plans,
develops, supervises, and maintains information activities for the
READEO.
7.2.1.4 Legal--The Legal Advisor provides counsel and assistance to the
READEO.
7.2.1.5 Military--The U.S. Armed Forces Command will designate a senior
line officer to be the Military Support Officer on the staff of the
READEO Task Force Directon The individual is assigned to be the liaison
between the Depart-

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-36

ment of Defense and VS, Emergency Programs,and to coordinate needed
military assistance during eradication of an FAD outbreak.
7.2.1.6 Meat and Poultry Inspection Operations--The Meat and Poultry
Inspection Operations, Food Safety and Inspection Service, will
designate personnel to report to the READEO Task Director and to provide
liaison between the Task Force and the Meat and Poultry Inspection
Operations.
7.2.1.7 Laboratory Coordination--The Laboratory Coordination Officer
will advise the READE(3 Director concerning laboratory capabilities and
appropriate laboratory examinations to be conducted to provide needed
results as rapidly as possible. This individual will assist with
interpretation of results.

7.2.2 Administration
The Administrative Officer assigned to the READEO will direct and
coordinate all facets of general administrative functions. Refer to the
revised READEO Manual for a detailed description of the organization and
responsibilities.

7.2.3 Field Operations
The Field Operations Officer will direct line operations and supervise
field personnel in a READEO. Disease investigation, field epidemiology,
disease security and personnel security, animal movement control and
quarantine enforcement, appraisals of animals and materials,
depopulation and disposal, and cleaning and disinfection are among this
person's responsibilities.

7.2.4 Technical Support
Staff support consists of a technically competent staff designed to act
as a resource for the READEO Task Force. Personnel may include but are
not limited to individuals who have expertise in the following areas:
animal welfare, data systems, disease reporting, economics,
environmental impact, epidemiology, evaluation, orientation and
training, risk analysis, and wildlife. The staff communicates the needs
of the Field Epidemiology Delivery System (FEDS) to the READEO Director
as required to maintain an efficient, accurate, up-to-date FEDS.
7.2.4.1 Animal Welfare---Animal Welfare Officers must be knowledgeable
about current Federal and State animal welfare regulations, humane
methods of animal depopulation, and socioeconomic concerns related to
animal welfare issues. They advise the technical support staff and field
operations concerning current procedures and accepted methods for use in
the humane depopulation of livestock and poultry.
7.2.4.2 Wildlife-- Wildlife Officers participate with the Director and
other officials of the READEO to establish and carry out wildlife
policies and objectives for the emergency animal disease operation.
Through familiarity with the topography, wildlife density, susceptible
wildlife species, and movements of susceptible wildlife, the Wildlife
Officers can review maps and make recommendations concerning areas to be
included in the quarantined high-risk and buffer zones. These officers
maintain contact with local, State, and Federal wildlife enforcement
officers and wildlife biologists. They develop strategies for conducting
surveys of susceptible wi!dlife in the outbreak

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-37

area to determine the incidence of the disease. They direct and
coordinate the vaccination and depopulation of wild animals as necessary
to eliminate the disease.

7.3 Supplies and Equipment

During an outbreak of BSE, supplies and equipment should be obtained
through normal procurement procedures. If a READEO is activated,
supplies and equipment should be ordered through the READEO Procurement
and Supply Officer.

7.3.1 General Field Supplies Guidelines
Refer to APHIS Directive 326.1, 10/10/77 and 221.1, 1/29/74.

7.4 Personnel Responsibilities

During a BSE outbreak, field personnel should follow instructions issued
through the normal chain of command. If a READEO is activated, personnel
should refer to the revised READEO Manual for detailed descriptions of
individual responsibilities.

7.4.1 Personnel
Personnel assigned to the READEO Task Force are individually accountable
for equipment and supplies checked out to them. They should order
replacement equipment and supplies or return equipment for repairs
through the READEO Procurement and Supply Officer. All damages or losses
to equipment or vehicles should be reported immediately to the READEO
Administrative Officer, and the required forms should be completed and
submitted promptly.

7.4.2 Travel
Employees of the READEO Task Force are responsible for recording and
preparing all travel-related documents. Claims for travel, lodging, per
diem, and incidental expenses should be submitted to the READEO
Administrative Officer for processing.

7.4.3 Vehicles
Employees of the READEO Task Force are responsible for operating,
cleaning, and performing routine maintenance of assigned vehicles. They
also are responsible for recording mileage, expenses, and services.
Required reports are to be submitted to the READEO Vehicle Officer.

7.4. 4 Clothing
Employees of the READEO Task Force are issued protective clothing to
wear when entering a premises where BSE has been diagnosed or is
suspected. Clean clothing should be worn on each premises. Employees are
responsible for laundering the clothing before reusing it.

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-38

In a large task-foree operation, arrangements may be made for a
commercial laundry service to handle the clothing. If it is possible and
practical, all clothing should be labeled to identify the employees to
whom it is assigned.

7.4.5 Miscellaneous Responsibilities
Employees are responsible for conducting their assigned tasks in a
professional manner. Complaints concerning task force employees should
be directed to the READEO Director for resolution or appropriate action.

All animals, products, and materials to be destroyed because of BSE
should be appraised according to 9 CFR 53.3 and appropriate State
regulations.

7.5.1 Appraisal Teams
Appraisals must represent the interests of the owner, the State, and the
Federal Government and be consistent with fair market values. If State
authorities approve, State and Federal interests may be represented by a
VS employee alone. Owners may, at their discretion and expense, employ a
professional appraiser to advise them or to act as their agent. Either
the owner or the owner's agent must be present at appraisals.
No animals may be destroyed until after the appraisal forms are signed
by the owner or the owner's agent. Appraisers should be certain that the
owner or the owner's agent is aware of the indemnity form's clause
concerning liens and mortgages.
When the number of animals to be destroyed is small, and the total value
of animals, products, and materiais is low, APHIS field personnel may
negotiate the appraised value with the animal's owner without assistance
from a professional appraiser. The appraised value of a BSE suspect
should be the slaughter value of the animal, taking into account any
existing defects or diseases that would affect the slaughter value but
ignoring those signs that caused the animal to be classified as a BSE
suspect. If field personnel are in doubt concerning the need to use a
professional appraiser, they should consult their supervisor or VS,
Emergency Programs staff.
If a determination is made that healthy progeny, ova, semen, or embryos
must be destroyed, they should be appraised at 100 percent of
replacement value.
Feeds or feed ingredients located on suspect farms will rarely need to
be destroyed. If a determination is made that feeds or feed ingredients
must be destroyed (for example, to comply with a policy decision to
remove all rendered products from animal feeds), then these materials
should be appraised and indemn'ff~ed according to 9 CFR 53.3.

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-39

7.6 Depopulation Procedures

7.6.1 Factors and Considerations
If the owner is agreeable, a humane method of euthanasia of BSE suspects
will be necessary to facilitate the accurate diagnosis of the disease
problem, to ensure that the suspect animal is not slaughtered or
rendered, and to terminate the animal's suffering. Under no
circumstances may BSE suspects be sent fo slaughhter or rendering.
Notify FDA, CVM if you suspect that the carcass of a BSE-confirmed
animal has moved to rendering or animal feed manufacturing. The VS,
Emergency Programs staff, Riverdale, MD, must authorize the use of
euthanasia, depopulation, and indemnity payments for READEO operations.

7.6.2 Humane Euthanasia Methods
Only experienced veterinarians should perform euthanasia because there
are inherent dangers. Precautions should be taken to prevent accidents.
Owners should be given a complete explanation of what to expect, and
only humane euthanasia methods should be used. Euthanasia should be
performed away from public view, and, if possible, the owner should not
be present. Euthanized animals must be checked to confirm death. (See VS
Memo 583.1, 1992.)
7.6.2.1 Mechanical (Firearms)--Because the only acceptable method for
euthanizing an animal by using firearms is to shoot it in the head, and
because the animal's brain must be preserved to diagnose BSE, firearms
are not an acceptable euthanasia method.
7.6.2.2 Chemicals(Toxic Gas or Lethal Injection)--Follow guidelines
established by the American Veterinary Medical Association. When using a
regulated controlled substance (e.g., barbiturates), control and
administration of the euthanasia agent must be given by a veterinarian
having a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) number issued by the U.S.
Treasury. Control and administration of chemical substances for
euthanasia must be authorized by the AVIC unless directed by the VS
Deputy Administrator. (See VS Memorandum 583.1, 1992.)

7.6.3 Supervision of Depopulation
Field personnel should never perform depopulation or euthanasia without
explicit permission from their supervisor or, if appropriate, the READEO
Humane and Disposal Officer. (Refer to the revised READEC) Manual.)

7. 6.4 Permits for Movement
All BSE suspects may be moved under permit to facilitate medical
treatment, euthanasia, necropsy examination, or carcass disposal.
Permitted movement will be according to the quarantine restrictions and
will be administered by the State or Federal officials.

7. 6. 5 Security
Because BSE is neither contagious nor vector borne, strict disease
security measures are not necessary. Personnel should observe normal
disease security measures that are standard procedure for all farm
visits. The READEO's Security and Disease Prevention Officer has the
responsibility for establishing biosecurity measures.

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-40

7.7 Disposal
Under no circumstances may BSE suspects be sent to slaughter or
rendering. Notify FDA, CVM if you suspect that the carcass of a
BSE-confirmed animal has moved to rendering or animal feed
manufacturing. Field personel should arrange for the carcass to be
transported to and examined by a qualified veterinary pathologist or
field veterinary medical officer. After the pathologic examination has
been completed and the necessary diagnostic specimens have been
obtained, field personnel should arrange for disposal of the carcass.
Before a method of disposal is selected, there are many factors that
must be considered, and often other State and Federal agencies must be
consulted. The environmental and legal impacts of the operation must be
considered. Upon recommendation of the State or Federal agencies, VS may
consider other disposal methods.

7.7.1 Incineration
Incineration, although more expensive than burial, is the preferred
disposal method for BSE-suspect carcasses. Federal, State, and local
environmental regulations may restrict the use of this method and
permits may be necessary. As soon as BSE suspects are reported to APHIS,
field personnel should investigate the location and availability of
incinerators of sufficient size to process a bovine carcass.
Institutions likely to have incinerators include State and university
diagnostic laboratories, waste contractors, large municipalities, and
private industries. Ideally, the diagnostic laboratory where the
pathologic examination was done will have incineration facilities.
The BSE-suspect carcass disposal is APHIS' responsibility (not the
diagnostic laboratory's). Field personnel should arrange for
transportation and final disposal of the suspect carcass and should
inform their supervisors and/or the READEO Humane and Disposal Officer
of these arrangements.
Personnel should be aware that some laboratories dispose of carcasses by
rendering and should specifically inquire if this is the case. CNS
suspects should be incinerated or held from rendering until a diagnosis
of BSE can be ruled out. Under no circumstances may BSE susuects be sent
to slaughter or rendering. Notify FDA, CVM if you suspect that the
carcass of a BSE-confirmed animal has moved to rendering or animal feed
manufacturing.
Field personnel should be prepared to accompany the carcass from the
farm of origin to the diagnostic laboratory and then to the disposal
site if any doubt exists concerning the final disposal method.

7.7.2 Burial
If there are no other avenues for carcass disposal, burial of
BSE-suspect carcasses may be an acceptable disposal method. APHIS field
personnel should inquire with environmental authorities concerning
Federal, State, and local regulations that may impose restrictions on
this method.
The burial site may be on the affected farm, at the diagnostic
laboratory where the carcass is examined, or in a local landfill. The
site should be inaccessible to animals, removed from populated areas,
not used for agricultural purposes, clearly marked, and properly
protected.

October 1998


BSE Red Book 2.1-41

Burial sites should also be located a sufficient distance from
underground utility lines, septic systems, water wells, and surface
water. Local environmental or public works officers may be helpful in
locating a satisfactory site.
Field personnel should consult with their supervisors and/or the READEO
Environmental Impact Officer before digging. Burial trenches are
normally at least 9 feet deep with floor dimensions of 7 by 2 feet per
adult bovine carcass. Carcasses should be covered with at least 6 feet
of soil. This soil should not be tightly packed because gas formation
may cause a tightly packed trench to crack and leak.

7.7.3 Rendering
Because BSE is spread by rendered animal protein, BSE-suspect and
confirmed carcasses must not be rendered, unless the rendered material
is incinerated. Notify FDA, CVM if you suspect that dead BSE animals or
carcasses have moved to rendering or animal feed manufacturing.

7.7.4 Other Disposal Methods
The AVIC, the State animal health officials, and the READEO Director may
recommend other methods of disposal to the Deputy Administer, VS, for
approval (9 CFR 53.4). Options for disposal must be discussed and
approved by VS, Emergency Programs staff and must comply with all State
and local Environmental Protection Agency regulations.

7.8 Cleaning and Disinfecting (C&D)

Although BSE is neither contagious nor vector borne, appropriate C&D is
required to prevent farm-to-farm transmission of most other infectious
diseases. Field personnel must remember, however, that at the time they
are requested to euthanize a BSE-suspect animal, a confirmed diagnosis
of BSE will not be available. Signs compatible with BSE may be caused by
numerous infectious diseases and many BSE-suspect animals will, in fact,
have some other disease. Although the C&D of items such as manure,
bedding, feed, stalls, halters, milking machines, and other supplies and
equipment that have been in contact with BSE suspects is not
specifically necessary to control BSE, C&D is still advisable to control
other diseases that may be present.

7.8.1 Procedures for Cleaning and Disinfecting
7.8.1.1 Premises and Items--Field personnel are not responsible for C&D
of premises such as barns, stalls, and animal pens unless invasive
diagnostic procedures (such as a necropsy examination or the removal of
the suspect animal's brain) were performed on the premises. If possible,
field personnel should avoid doing such procedures on the farm. If
circumstances require that such procedures must be done on the farm,
personnel should clean and disinfect the immediate area after completing
the work.
7.8.1.2 Vehicles--Vehicles used to transport personnel to affected
premises should be kept clean, and normal precautions against the
farm-to-farm spread of any disease should be observed.

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-42

7,8.1.3 Carriers--Thoroughly clean trucks and trailers transporting BSE
suspects. Manure and bedding may be disposed of by any environmentally
accepted method such as spreading on fields or composting. After
conveyances have been thoroughly cleaned, disinfectant should be sprayed
on the sides and floor of the truck bed.
7.8.1.4 Livestock Markets--The risk of BSE transmission at livestock
markets is negligible. If a BSE suspect is found at a livestock market,
it should be managed the same as if it were found at a farm. Because of
the high risk of transmission of diseases other than BSE, invasive
diagnostic procedures, such as a necropsy examination or removal of the
suspect animal's head, should not be performed at livestock markets. Due
to the recent research findings concerning maternal transmission, any
pens or areas in which calving occurs should be thoroughly cleaned and
disinfected.
Cleaning and disinfection is not necessary to prevent the spread of BSE.
However, the C&D procedures are recommended to prevent the spread of
other diseases from pens or buildings where BSE suspects were held.
7.8.1.5 Slaughter Plants--Becanse BSE is spread by rendered animal
protein in cattle feeds, BSE suspects must not be slaughtered nor
rendered. If a BSE suspect is found at a slaughter plant, it should be
managed similarly to finding a suspect at a farm.

7.8.2 Approved Disinfectants
Field personnel should use professional judgment in the choice of a
disinfectant. Preferred disinfectants to inactivate the BSE agent
include 1N sodium hydroxide solution or sodium hypochlorite solution
containing 2 percent chlorine (1 hour exposure at 20 %C [68 %F]). This
should be used whenever there is reason to strongly suspect that BSE is
in fact the cause of the suspect animal's disease. Such reasons include
previously confirmed BSE in the geographic area or signs more compatible
with BSE than with any other neurologic disease.
If the suspect animal's signs are more compatible with diseases such as
rabies or listeriosis, then a phenolic disinfectant such as "One Stroke"
may be preferable. (Refer to appendix A Survival of BSE Agent and sec.
1.4.4.)

7. 8. 3 Precautions
All disinfectants are hazardous to human beings, animals, and the
environment. Label directions should be carefully read and followed.
Many disinfectants, including sodium hypochlorite solution, are also
corrosive and should be used with caution on metal and other corrodible
materials. Thorough rinsing is necessary if corrosive disinfectants are
used on metallic items.
Disinfectants, especially in concentrated form, may irritate skin, eyes,
and respiratory systems. Protective equipment such as appropriate
clothing, rubber boots, rubber gloves, mask and goggles should be worn
during mixing and application of disinfectants. If areas of the body are
exposed to a disinfectant, they should be washed thoroughly with water.
Employees should notify their supervisor and their Health and Safety
Officer if excessive human or animal exposure to disinfectants occurs or
if there is accidental release into the environment.

October l998

BSE Red Book 2.1-43

Field personnel should use normal hygienic procedures (such as washing
and disinfecting boots and removing the outer layer of clothing) when
leaving the farm. Unless the disease problem is noncontagious, personnel
should not travel to other livestock premises for the duration of that
day.

7.9 Vector Control

Current scientific data indicate that BSE is not spread by vectors.

7.10 Disease Prevention and Philosophy

The goal of disease prevention and control is to confine the occurrence
of BSE to as few herds as possible and to prevent recycling of the BSE
agent in the ruminant food supply. If undiagnosed cases are rendered and
included in ruminant rations, the long incubation period may allow many
animals to be exposed.
Action should be taken immediately after the detection and confirmation
of BSE to initiate an extensive epidemiologic investigation to determine
the source and extent of the disease, to stop the spread, and to
eradicate the disease.
7.10.1 Philosophy--Immediate action should be taken to prevent
contamination of the animal food supply by prohibiting rendering of any
infected or suspect bovine carcasses. In addition, care should be taken
to monitor those animals born and raised in affected herds and to
prevent their becoming a source of infection to other herds.
7.10.2 Agent Spread--Epidemiologic evidence indicates that the primary
route of BSE transmission is through the feeding of contaminated meat
and bone meal that has been manufactured using scrapie infected sheep
carcasses or BSE infected bovine carcasses. Recent research findings
suggest that maternal transmission may occur at a rate of approximately
1 percent in some species. It is believed that this route of
transmission is not significant enough to maintain an epidemic. Cases of
apparent maternal transmission have also been identified in captive
exotic ruminants.
7.10.3 Control of Products and Conveyances--Carcasses of BSE suspects
should be incinerated. Carcasses must not be rendered and incorporated
in animal feed. If carcasses are transported for disposal, conveyances
should be cleaned and disinfected after use with either a sodium
hypochlorite solution (2 percent available chlorine) or 1 N lye (sodium
hydroxide solution).
7.10.4 Control of Biologics and Drugs--Although no documented cases of
BSE have resulted from the use of biologics derived from bovines,
tissues from suspect or exposed animals must not be used for the
production of biologics and drugs.
The agents responsible for causing the transmissible spongiform
encephalopathies are highly resistant to normal inactivation processes.
Careful selection of source materials is the best way to secure maximum
safety of ingredients or reagents of bovine origin used in the
manufacture of biologics or other medicinals. Factors that should be
considered are the age of the animals, exposure to the agent, and the
tissue or organ from which the product is derived.

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-44

7.10.5 Wild Birds, Wind and Insects---Wild birds, wind and insects are
not known factors in the spread of BSE.
7.10.6 Rodents--Rodents are not known factors in the spread of BSE.
7.10.7 Hunting--Restrictions on the hunting of wild animals are not
necessary to prevent BSE.
7.10.8 Exhibitions--Cancelling scheduled exhibitions is not necessary.
7.10.9 Rendering Trucks and Drivers--The carcasses from BSE suspects
must not be rendered. If any rendering truck is used to transport a
suspect, it should be cleaned, washed, and disinfected as above. (Refer
to appendix A--Agent Survival and sec. 7.8.2--Disinfectants.)
7.10.10 Treatment--Currently there is no known treatment for BSE.
7.10.11 Prevention--Suspects and animals confirmed to have BSE must not
be rendered. Producers, feed mills, and rendering establishments should
adhere to U.S. State and local rendering policies and FDA regulations
concerning the feeding of rendered animal protein to ruminants. Because
of the possibility that some transmissible spongiform encephalopathies
may be transmitted at the time of parturition, precautions should be
taken to prevent exposure of healthy animal to placenta and reproductive
fluids. Importation of live animals and animal products from countries
with BSE or having high risk factors for BSE should be restricted based
upon scientific risk assessment.
7.10.11.1 Immunization--The agent that causes BSE elicits no detectable
immune response in the host. Therefore, vaccination is not a viable
option. There is no vaccine currently developed for BSE or other TSE's.
7.10.11.2 Sanitation--Although it is unknown whether a contaminated
environment plays any role in the spread of BSE, it is suggested that
pens having contained BSE-infected animals be cleaned and disinfected.
The disinfectants o choice are sodium hydroxide (lye) and sodium
hypochlorite, in infected herds it is also advisable that all placentas
be removed promptly and buried or incinerated. The calving pens also
should be cleaned and disinfected.
7.10.113 Producer Defense---The most effective way to prevent an
intruduction of BSE into a herd is not to feed ruminant byproducts to
ruminants. As of August 4, 1997, the FDA has a ban in place which
prohibits the feeding of most mammlian proteins to ruminants.

7.11 Records Maintenance in a Foreign Animal Disease Outbreak

The APHIS FEDS will be used by the READEO to record information. FEDS a
computerized network designed to transmit accurate information rapidly
during any emergency disease outbreak. The use of FEDS will allow the
READEO to direct its attention to the minute-to-minute business of
containing and eradicating the disease.
For an accurate record of the activities, all field supervisors in a
READEO task force should maintain a diary. Activities and observations
should be recorded in the diary when they occur. Date all documents and
enter events by time and date to show a correct chronology.
Enter events as they occur in the diary as well. An accurate history is
of considerable value in developing policies and plans for future
disease-eradication

October 1998

BSE Red book 2.1-45

programs, and it may be important if there is litigation. A diary will
be helpful for day-to-day administration of funds, personnel, and
equipment. It is also useful as a later reference in preparing reports
and summaries of activities.

7.11.1 Daily Reporls
Submit daily reports of significant activities to the READEO Director
and the VS, Emergency Programs staff Riverdale, MD. (Refer to appendix F
for current telephone listings.)
Include the following as part of the historical file of an outbreak:

*Maps showing premises where BSE-infected animals were found;
*Inventory of feeds and feed sources;
*Origin of BSE-suspeet and confirmed animals;
*Public information material distributed, newspaper clippings; and,
Administrative reports to support the expenditure of funds, utilization
of personnel and equipment, and disposition of excess materials and
equip­ment at the end of the program.



Re: Emergency Operations (part 2)...BSE Red Book Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
3/13/00 (0)





In Reply to: Emergency Operations...BSE Red Book posted by Terry S.
Singeltary Sr. on March 13, 2000 at 1:30 pm:

will inform all APHIS headquarters units through normal reporting
channels. Emergency Programs also will immediately report any
significant events to the Deputy Administrator, VS, who will immediately
advise the APHIS Administrator, especially of legal or politically
important events. A weekly summary report of control and eradication
activities will be provided to the APHIS Administrator and the Deputy
Administrator, VS. See BSE Response Plan, communications section.

7.11.3 Disposition
Records should be maintained until a historical account of the program
has been prepared and all pertinent information has been gleaned from
the records.
Furthermore, all records should be maintained if there may be legal
action pending as a result of the program activities. Usually,
administrative records are maintained a minimum of 3 years for audit
purposes..........TSS

 

[flounder]

Subject: Re: NOR98-LIKE STRAIN OF SCRAPIE FOUND IN WYOMING update
Date: April 18, 2007 at 2:31 pm PST

Wyo. flock to be killed, tested after scrapie found
By The Associated Press

CHEYENNE - Somewhere near Moorcroft, in an unincorporated area of
northeastern Wyoming, a livestock owner will hand over his entire flock of
sheep next week to the federal government for a mass execution. The rancher
knows what will happen: his herd of roughly 300 sheep will be transported
live out of state and taken to a slaughter plant where they will be
euthanized, their brains and lymph node tissue harvested for testing.

He'll lose his herd because he owned the first U.S. sheep to test positive
for a rare strain of scrapie _ a disease found in sheep and goats that's
similar to mad cow disease in cattle and chronic wasting disease in sheep
and elk.

Still, state statute prohibits officials from releasing the rancher's
identity, and attempts by The Associated Press to reach him were
unsuccessful.

Scrapie itself is rare in the United States. Out of more than 115,000
animals tested since 2003, only 300 have tested positive; federal officials
hope to eliminate scrapie from U.S. herds by the end of 2010.

But the Wyoming rancher's case is even more rare: Fewer than 300 cases
worldwide have been recorded of the "Nor98-like" strain of scrapie, so-named
because it was first diagnosed in Norway in 1998.

"This is very unusual," Larry Cooper, regional spokesman in Fort Collins,
Colo., for Animal Plant Health Inspection Service, or APHIS, said of the
first discovery of a Nor98-like strain of scrapie in the U.S.

"It doesn't indicate that we're going to have mass outbreaks of this
particular strain, it just indicates that one of these animals from Europe
ended up in our system."

There are no known human health risks associated with scrapie. Cooper and
Bryce Reece, executive vice president of the Wyoming Wool Growers
Association, say consumers and livestock owners have nothing to fear from
the diagnosis.

"From an industry standpoint, we're not at all concerned or alarmed by it,"
Reece said. "It's more of an interest to the researchers or the scientists
than it is to the industry. I'm sure they're all questioning themselves as
to how it got here."

Dr. Mark Hall, head of the special pathology section of the National
Veterinary Services Laboratories in Ames, Iowa, agreed.

"It is something of interest and something I think we want to continue to
look at," Hall said. "But this is certainly not a shocking revelation or
anything like that. At this point, I don't think there's any evidence that
there's any great need for concern."

snip.....

famous last words ;


Subject: Re: NOR98-LIKE STRAIN OF SCRAPIE FOUND IN WYOMING update
Date: April 18, 2007 at 6:22 pm PST

A newly identified type of scrapie agent can naturally
infect sheep with resistant PrP genotypes

Annick Le Dur*?, Vincent Be´ ringue*?, Olivier Andre´ oletti?, Fabienne
Reine*, Thanh Lan Laý¨*, Thierry Baron§,
Bjørn Bratberg¶, Jean-Luc Vilotte, Pierre Sarradin**, Sylvie L. Benestad¶,
and Hubert Laude*??
*Virologie Immunologie Mole´ culaires and Ge´ne´ tique Biochimique et
Cytoge´ne´ tique, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, 78350
Jouy-en-Josas,
France; ?Unite´ Mixte de Recherche, Institut National de la Recherche
Agronomique?Ecole Nationale Ve´ te´ rinaire de Toulouse, Interactions Ho? te
Agent
Pathoge` ne, 31066 Toulouse, France; §Agence Franc¸aise de Se´ curite´
Sanitaire des Aliments, Unite´ Agents Transmissibles Non Conventionnels,
69364 Lyon,
France; **Pathologie Infectieuse et Immunologie, Institut National de la
Recherche Agronomique, 37380 Nouzilly, France; and ¶Department of Pathology,
National Veterinary Institute, 0033 Oslo, Norway

Edited by Stanley B. Prusiner, University of California, San Francisco, CA,
and approved September 12, 2005 (received for review
March 21, 2005)

Scrapie in small ruminants belongs to transmissible spongiform
encephalopathies (TSEs), or prion diseases, a family of fatal
neurodegenerative
disorders that affect humans and animals and can
transmit within and between species by ingestion or inoculation.
Conversion of the host-encoded prion protein (PrP), normal cellular
PrP (PrPc), into a misfolded form, abnormal PrP (PrPSc), plays a key
role in TSE transmission and pathogenesis. The intensified surveillance
of scrapie in the European Union, together with the improvement
of PrPSc detection techniques, has led to the discovery of a
growing number of so-called atypical scrapie cases. These include
clinical Nor98 cases first identified in Norwegian sheep on the basis
of unusual pathological and PrPSc molecular features and ??cases??
that produced discordant responses in the rapid tests currently
applied to the large-scale random screening of slaughtered or
fallen animals. Worryingly, a substantial proportion of such cases
involved sheep with PrP genotypes known until now to confer
natural resistance to conventional scrapie. Here we report that
both Nor98 and discordant cases, including three sheep homozygous
for the resistant PrPARR allele (A136R154R171), efficiently transmitted
the disease to transgenic mice expressing ovine PrP, and
that they shared unique biological and biochemical features upon
propagation in mice. These observations support the view that a
truly infectious TSE agent, unrecognized until recently, infects
sheep and goat flocks and may have important implications in
terms of scrapie control and public health.


snip...


Discussion

Atypical Scrapie and Discordant Cases in Small Ruminants Involve a
Truly Infectious Agent. Whether a transmissible agent is actually
involved in the so-called ??atypical?? or ??unclassified?? scrapie
cases recurrently detected in sheep, notably in individuals with
resistant PrP genotypes, has become a growing concern during
the last few years. Here we show that inoculation to transgenic
mice of 12 isolates of such types consistently led to a distinctive
fatal TSE disease. These isolates originated from two Nor98
clinically affected sheep and from nine sheep and one goat that
produced a discordant response upon rapid test screening. This
result demonstrates that PrPSc deposition in the brain of such
animals, hardly evidenced through conventional scrapie diagnosis
techniques, is associated with the multiplication of a bona fide
infectious agent. Hence, such atypical scrapie forms or cases
must now be considered as true TSE, involving a prion rather
than simply arising from a PrP protein disorder, whatever their
origin might be, acquired or spontaneous.

snip...


Conclusion


Our study demonstrates that an authentic TSE infectious agent
is responsible in sheep and goats of sporadic atypical infections
that remained unnoticed until recently. This raises important
issues with regard to control of scrapie infection in small
ruminants. Of major concern, ARRARR sheep can no longer
be regarded as free of natural TSE infection. This finding
challenges, at least to some extent, the foundation of the selective
breeding programs engaged in several European Union member
states (47, 48) and may call for a reappraisal of possible
consequences of this strategy in the long term. Finally, more
information about this newly discovered type of TSE agent, its
prevalence in countries free of scrapie or BSE disease, and its
potential to across-species transmission would be needed for a
comprehensive evaluation of its implications in terms of public
health.

We thank S. Hawke (Imperial College School of Medicine, London), and
J. Grassi (Commissariat a` l?Energie Atomique, Saclay, France) for kindly
providing antibodies ICSM18 and 12F10, respectively; the staff of
the Animalerier Rongeurs (Institut National de la Recherche
Agronomique) for mouse care; our colleagues of the French scrapie
strain-typing network (chaired by M. Eloit) for discussions; and Anne-
Lise Haenni for carefully reading the manuscript. This study was
supported by national grants from the Ministries of Research (Groupement
d?Inte´re?t Scientifique Infections a` Prion) and Agriculture (Direction
Ge´ne´rale de l?Alimentation).
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