>>>Can anyone show me where Kindergarten Econ. pointed out the difference between the BSE precautionary measures taken in Canada and the BSE precautionary measures taken in the U.S. to justify R-CULT's position? <<<
>>>Anyone? <<<
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EFSA Scientific Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of the United States of America (USA)
Publication date: 20 August 2004
Adopted July 2004 (Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083)
Report
Summary
Summary of the Scientific Report
The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.
The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge in the early nineties.
A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90's when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.
EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.
http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/efsa_scientific_reports/gbr_assessments/573_en.html
SUMMARY
Summary of Scientific Report
http://www.efsa.eu.int
1 of 1
Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority
on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of
United States of America (USA)
Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083
Adopted July 2004
Summary of scientific report
The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the
Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR)
were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on
the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more
cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific
report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period
1980-2003.
The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic cattle in
the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered
in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible
that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to
an internal challenge in the early nineties.
A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk
countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some
imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90's when
domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of
the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from
BSE risk countries.
EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed
that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as
there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very
unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the
BSE-agent persistently increases.
Key words: BSE, geographical risk assessment, GBR, USA, third countries
http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/efsa_scientific_reports/gbr_assessments/573/sr03_biohaz02_usa_report_summary_en1.pdf
REPORT (6 PAGES)
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EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 3, 1-6 on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk of
Conclusions
The European Food Safety Authority concludes:
1. The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic
cattle in the middle of the eighties. This cattle imported in the mid eighties could have
been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early
nineties. It is possible that meat and bone meal (MBM) imported into the USA
reached domestic cattle and lead to an internal challenge in the early nineties.
2. A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE
risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together
with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the
mid 90's when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing.
Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued
imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.
3. The current geographical BSE risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed
that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent.
4. This assessment deviates from the previous assessment (SSC opinion, 2000) because
at that time several exporting countries were not considered a potential risk.
5. It is also worth noting that the current GBR conclusions are not dependent on the large
exchange of imports between USA and Canada. External challenge due to exports to
the USA from European countries varied from moderate to high. These challenges
indicate that it was likely that BSE infectivity was introduced into the North American
continent.
6. EFSA and its Scientific Expert Working group on GBR are concerned that the
available information was not confirmed by inspection missions as performed by the
Food and Veterinary office (FVO – DG SANCO) in Member States and other third
countries. They recommend including, as far as feasible, BSE-related aspects in
future inspection missions.
Expected development of the GBR
As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains
extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically)
infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.
A table summarising the reasons for the current assessment is given in the table below
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http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/efsa_scientific_reports/gbr_assessments/573/sr03_biohaz02_usa_report_v2_en1.pdf
Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 2, 1-14 on the Assessment of the
Geographical BSE Risk of Canada
European Food Safety Authority
Scientific Expert Working Group on GBR
Working Group Report on
the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of
CANADA
2004
Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 2, 1-14 on the Assessment of the
Geographical BSE Risk of Canada
- 2 -
1. DATA
• The available information was sufficient to carry out the qualitative assessment of
the GBR.
• Reasonable worst case assumptions have been used in cases were the available
information was not fully adequate.
Sources of data
• Country dossier (CD) consisting of information provided from the country's
authorities in 1998-2004, including the study entitled "Risk assessment on BSE in
cattle in Canada" of December 2002.
Other sources:
• EUROSTAT data on export of "live bovine animals" and on "flour, meal and pellets
of meat or offal, unfit for human consumption; greaves" (customs code 230110),
covering the period 1980 to 2003.
• UK-export data (UK) on "live bovine animals", and on "Mammalian Flours, Meals
and Pellets" MBM1, 1980-1996.
• Available export data from other BSE-risk countries.
2. EXTERNAL CHALLENGES
2.1 Import of cattle from BSE-Risk2 countries
An overview of the data on live cattle imports is presented in table 1 and is based on
data as provided in the country dossier (CD) and corresponding data on relevant exports
as available from BSE risk countries that exported to Canada. Only data from risk
periods are indicated, i.e. those periods when exports from a BSE risk country already
represented an external challenge, according to the SSC opinion on the GBR (SSC July
2000 and updated January 2002).
• According to the CD, 231 cattle were imported from UK during the years 1980 to
1990 and no cattle imports from UK were recorded after 1990.
• According to Eurostat, altogether 198 cattle have been imported from the UK during
the years 1980 to 1990, Additionally 500 were recorded in 1993; this import is
1 For the purpose of the GBR assessment the abbreviation "MBM" refers to rendering products, in particular
the commodities Meat and Bone Meal as such; Meat Meal; Bone Meal; and Greaves. With regard to imports
it refers to the customs code 230110 "flours, meals and pellets, made from meat or offal, not fit for human
consumption; greaves".
2 BSE-Risk countries are all countries already assessed as GBR III or IV or with at least one confirmed
domestic BSE case.
Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 2, 1-14 on the Assessment of the
Geographical BSE Risk of Canada
- 3 -
mentioned in Eurostat and the updated UK export statistic as male calves, but not
mentioned in the original UK export statistics. According to the CD, detailed
investigations were carried out and it is very unlikely that the 500 calves have been
imported. Therefore, they were not taken into account.
• According to the CD, in 1990 all cattle imported from UK and Ireland since 1982
were placed in a monitoring program.
• Following the occurrence of the BSE index case in 1993 (imported from UK in 1987
at the age of 6 months), an attempt was made to trace all other cattle imported from
UK between 1982 and 1990.
• Of the 231 cattle imported from the UK between 1980 and 1990, 108 animals had
been slaughtered and 9 had died. From the remaining, 37 were exported, 76 were
sent to incineration and one was buried; these were not entering the rendering system
and therefore not taken into account.
• According to the CD, 16 cattle were imported from Ireland (according to Eurostat
20), of which 9 were slaughtered, 3 died. The remaining 4 were incinerated and did
therefore not enter the rendering system. According to the CD, the 6 animals which
were imported in 1990 according to Eurostat, were never imported.
• Moreover 22 cattle have been imported from Japan (through USA), of which 4 were
exported (excluded from the table) and 14 were destroyed and therefore not entering
the rendering system, 4 were slaughtered.
• Of 28 imported bovines from Denmark, 1 was destroyed and 1 was exported. Of the
19 buffalos imported in 2000, 1 was incinerated and the others were ordered to be
destroyed.
• Additionally in total 264 cattle according to the CD (276 according to other sources)
were imported from Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, The Netherlands and
Switzerland.
• The numbers imported according to the CD and Eurostat are very similar. Some
discrepancies in the year of import can be explained by an extended quarantine;
therefore it is likely that imports according to Eurostat in 1980 and imports
according to the CD in 1981 are referring to the same animals.
• Additionally, between 16.000 and 340.000 bovines have annually been imported
from US, almost all are steers and heifers. In total, between 1981 and 2003,
according to the CD more than 2.3 million, according to other sources 1.5 million
cattle have been imported.
• According to the CD, feeder/slaughter cattle represent typically more than 90% of
the imported cattle from the USA; therefore, only 10% of the imported cattle have
been taken into account.
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Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 2, 1-15 on the Assessment of the
Geographical BSE Risk of Canada
- 13 -
On the basis of the available information, it has to be concluded that the country's
BSE/cattle system was extremely unstable until today, i.e., it would have recycled and
amplified BSE-infectivity very fast, should it have entered the system. The stability of the
BSE/cattle system in Canada overtime is as given in table 5 above.
4. CONCLUSION ON THE RESULTING RISKS
4.1 Interaction of stability and challenges
In conclusion, the stability of the Canada BSE/cattle system in the past and the external
challenges the system has coped with are summarised in the table 6.
INTERACTION OF STABILITY AND EXTERNAL CHALLENGE IN CANADA
Period Stability External Challenge Internal challenge
1980 to 1990 Low Unlikely but not excluded
1991 to 1995 High
1996 to 2000 Extremely high
Likely and rapidly growing
2001 to 2003
Extremely
unstable
Very high Confirmed at a lower level
Table 6: Internal challenge resulting from the interaction of the external challenge and stability. The
internal challenge level is determined according to guidance given in the SSC-opinion on the GBR of
July 2000 (as updated in 2002).
From the interaction of the two parameters "stability" and "external challenge" a
conclusion is drawn on the level of "internal challenge" that emerged and had to be met
by the system, in addition to external challenges that occurred.
An external challenge resulting from cattle import could only lead to an internal
challenge once imported infected cattle were rendered for feed and this contaminated
feed reached domestic cattle. Cattle imported for slaughter would normally be
slaughtered at an age too young to harbour plenty of BSE infectivity or to show signs,
even if infected prior to import. Breeding cattle, however, would normally live much
longer and only animals having problems would be slaughtered younger. If being 4-6
years old when slaughtered, they could suffer from early signs of BSE, being
approaching the end of the BSE-incubation period. In that case, they would harbour,
while being pre-clinical, as much infectivity as a clinical BSE case. Hence cattle imports
could have led to an internal challenge about 3 years after the import of breeding cattle
(that are normally imported at 20-24 months of age) that could have been infected prior
to import. In case of Canada this implies that cattle imported in the mid eighties could
have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the
early 90s.
On the other hand imports of contaminated MBM would lead to an internal challenge in
the year of import, if fed to cattle. The feeding system is of utmost importance in this
context. If it could be excluded that imported, potentially contaminated feed stuffs
reached cattle, such imports might not lead to an internal challenge at all. In case of
Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 2, 1-15 on the Assessment of the
Geographical BSE Risk of Canada
- 14 -
Canada this implies that it was possible that imported MBM reached domestic cattle and
lead to an internal challenge in the early 90s.
4.2 Risk that BSE infectivity entered processing
A certain risk that BSE-infected cattle entered processing in Canada, and were at least
partly rendered for feed, occurred in the early 1990s when cattle imported from UK in
the mid 80s could have been slaughtered. This risk continued to exist, and grew
significantly in the mid 90's when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached
processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with
continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.
4.3 Risk that BSE infectivity was recycled and propagated
A risk that BSE-infectivity was recycled and propagated exists since a processing risk
first appeared; i.e. in the early 90s. Until today this risk persists and increases fast
because of the extremely unstable BSE/cattle system in Canada.
5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK
5.1 The current GBR as function of the past stability and challenge
The current geographical BSE-risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is confirmed at a lower level
that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent.
This assessment deviates from the previous assessment (SSC opinion, 2000) because at
that time several exporting countries were not considered a potential risk.
5.2 The expected development of the GBR as a function of the past and
present stability and challenge
• As long as the system remains unstable, it is expected that the GBR continues to
grow, even if no additional external challenges occur.
• Since recent improvements in the safety of MBM production in many countries or
significant recent reductions in the incidence of BSE are not taken into account for
the assessment of the external challenge, the external challenge assessed after 2001
could be overestimated and is the worst case assumption. However all current GBR
conclusions are not dependent on these assumptions in any of the countries assessed.
For future assessments and when the impact of the production, surveillance and true
incidence changes has been fully quantified, these developments should be taken
into account.
5.3 Recommendations for influencing the future GBR
• Enhancing the stability of the system, in particular by ensuring that cattle have no
access to mammalian MBM in combination with appropriate rendering and exclusion of
SRM and fallen stock from any feed chain could lead, over time, to a reduction of the
GBR.
• Improved passive and active surveillance, i.e. sampling of animals not showing
signs compatible with BSE from "at-risk" cattle populations, such as adult cattle in
Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 2, 1-15 on the Assessment of the
Geographical BSE Risk of Canada
fallen stock and emergency slaughter, by means of rapid screening, would allow
monitoring the efficiency of stability enhancing measures.
country.
Acknowledgment.........
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CANADA
http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/efsa_scientific_reports/gbr_assessments/scr_annexes/563/sr02_biohaz02_canada_report_annex_en1.pdf
TSS