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THE VOCAL POINT: Sanity, insanity cloud latest BSE developments
by Dan Murphy on 1/27/2006 for Meatingplace.com
As the U.S. beef industry faces yet another a wave of bad news on BSE, they really have no one to blame but — No, actually they have the Department of Agriculture to blame.
In large measure, the knee-jerk closure of the U.S.-Canadian border in May 2003 after Canada confirmed the first indigenous BSE case is still generating fallout in the form of similar inappropriate reactions overseas.
Like Japan.
Even as that once and future beef export market confirmed the country's 22nd domestic case of BSE, Ministry of Agriculture officials admitted that five-year-old BSE cow was born prior to the 2001 imposition of Japanese regulations prohibiting ruminant-to-ruminant feeding.
Anyone who has followed the global spread of BSE knows that Japan dragged its collective feet for years after the United States and virtually every other beef-producing country had imposed feed bans in their respective industries. Japan's delay proved devastating, since — unlike the States — the country was importing significant quantities of suspect meat and bone meal from Great Britain that was likely being re-labeled via the quasi-black market in Eastern Europe.
In one sense, a country's twenty-second BSE case shouldn't by itself cause much of a public stir. When the number of confirmed cases in a country with a beef herd as small as Japan approaches two dozen, you know you have a problem.
But coverage of Japan's newest BSE case was quickly overwhelmed by news just days later that U.S. beef imports were being suspended because a shipment of U.S. veal had arrived containing prohibited spinal column bones. This just weeks after Japan had finally resumed imports of U.S. beef after tortuous negotiations rivaling the international debate over global warming.
After the closure was imposed, USDA Secretary Mike Johanns met with beef exporters and trade group representatives and dispatched USDA Undersecretary J.B. Penn to meet with Japanese officials in an effort to explain the presence of banned SRMs in three boxes of veal shipped by Brooklyn, N.Y.-based Atlantic Veal & Lamb.
USDA also quickly de-listed the plant for export and ordered an investigation. The firm's president, Philip Peerless, said in a statement that the company misinterpreted the export requirements in its first shipment to Japan.
Nobody one can blame the company for what was accurately termed "an honest mistake." It was simply that: An honest mistake.
But the ramifications are huge, and impact much more widespread than Atlantic Veal & Lamb's future exporting prospects.
Worst of all, the Japanese overreaction took place against the backdrop of more BSE bad news, this time closer to home, as the Canadian Food Inspection Agency announced confirmation of another BSE case in a six-year-old cow in Alberta.
Brian Evans, Canada's chief veterinary officer, called the case "unwelcome but not unexpected" and downplayed potential consumer concerns by noting that the cow's "age and geographic location are consistent with Canada's three previous BSE cases."
Although accurate, that kind of a statement is a little like a military briefing when soldiers get killed, where the officers assert that, "the casualties were consistent with previous attacks in the area."
Evans also reminded the media that the affected animal did not enter the food or feed supply and suggested that OIE guidelines regard this additional case as having no impact on Canada's beef trade status.
Despite USDA Secretary Mike Johanns' parallel assertion that the case would not result in any changes regarding Canadian beef or live cattle imports, there was immediate – and sharply critical – reaction here and abroad.
South Korea "indefinitely postponed" plans to negotiate a resumption of Canadian beef imports, which had been banned since May 2003.
The National Farmers Union demanded that USDA impose an immediate ban on cattle and beef trade with Canada "until more answers about the case emerge."
And predictably, Chuck Kiker, the newly elected president of R-CALF, urged that the border be closed.
"It is extremely unfortunate that the Canadian government continues to discover cases of BSE," Kiker stated. "Science points to the need to increase testing for BSE and improve other surveillance and mitigation measures so the problem can be defined and the situation contained. Only then should the U.S. consider allowing imports of Canadian cattle and beef."
The reality is that it is not uncommon for countries to report BSE cases arising even after a feed ban was instituted. Scotland is recent example.
Such cases don't necessarily mean that a country's firewalls are ineffective, however. No ban is airtight at the beginning, and few farmers or feeders are in a position to destroy feed stocks without compensation. Thus, some "tainted" ingredients are likely to leak into the feed chain in the early years following imposition of a feeding ban on ruminant proteins.
That explains seemingly "rogue" incidents of BSE — such as this week's case in Canada — but such explanations do not placate activists, reassure consumers or satisfy protectionists in foreign governments where U.S. beef exports comprise a significant share of the market.
In a way, the industry (and government) response to this latest BSE crises acts as a double-edged sword.
All the messaging on firewalls and surveillance and SRM removals have teed up BSE for the media as a disease that can — and will — be eliminated. That's technically correct, but hardly something that can be accomplished in a matter of weeks or months. By de-emphasizing the lengthy incubation of the disease in cattle and ignoring the reality that sweeping changes cannot be imposed across entire industries without massive government intervention — read, "funding" — industry's leadership has inadvertently set the stage for hugely unrealistic expectations among reporters and consumers.
It would be no different if industry messaging on the threat posed by E. coli O1576:H7 were to imply that the problem is about to be solved, once all the intervention technologies now in place "eliminate the problem."
Nobody would advocate such tactics with microbial pathogens, yet that is pretty much the message media have received regarding BSE.
The single BSE case in Canada in 2003 results in an instant and total border closure, and then we expect the public to accept that science says there's negligible risk to consumers eating beef?
We pound away on the theme that our BSE protection systems are secure and our firewalls robust, yet when additional cases occur, "Oh, we expected that" is the response from both industry and government?
We repeat ad nauseum that U.S. beef packers don't need to institute universal BSE testing because we have rock-solid rules on removal of SRMs, and then we ship banned spinal columns to our most sensitive overseas marketplace?
It may seem crazy to hear R-CALF and other activists rehashing unfounded fears many assumed were put to bed. But viewed in the larger perspective of government reaction and industry response, maybe it's not the activists who are the crazy ones.
Dan Murphy is a freelance writer and former editor of MMT magazine based in the Pacific Northwest .
by Dan Murphy on 1/27/2006 for Meatingplace.com
As the U.S. beef industry faces yet another a wave of bad news on BSE, they really have no one to blame but — No, actually they have the Department of Agriculture to blame.
In large measure, the knee-jerk closure of the U.S.-Canadian border in May 2003 after Canada confirmed the first indigenous BSE case is still generating fallout in the form of similar inappropriate reactions overseas.
Like Japan.
Even as that once and future beef export market confirmed the country's 22nd domestic case of BSE, Ministry of Agriculture officials admitted that five-year-old BSE cow was born prior to the 2001 imposition of Japanese regulations prohibiting ruminant-to-ruminant feeding.
Anyone who has followed the global spread of BSE knows that Japan dragged its collective feet for years after the United States and virtually every other beef-producing country had imposed feed bans in their respective industries. Japan's delay proved devastating, since — unlike the States — the country was importing significant quantities of suspect meat and bone meal from Great Britain that was likely being re-labeled via the quasi-black market in Eastern Europe.
In one sense, a country's twenty-second BSE case shouldn't by itself cause much of a public stir. When the number of confirmed cases in a country with a beef herd as small as Japan approaches two dozen, you know you have a problem.
But coverage of Japan's newest BSE case was quickly overwhelmed by news just days later that U.S. beef imports were being suspended because a shipment of U.S. veal had arrived containing prohibited spinal column bones. This just weeks after Japan had finally resumed imports of U.S. beef after tortuous negotiations rivaling the international debate over global warming.
After the closure was imposed, USDA Secretary Mike Johanns met with beef exporters and trade group representatives and dispatched USDA Undersecretary J.B. Penn to meet with Japanese officials in an effort to explain the presence of banned SRMs in three boxes of veal shipped by Brooklyn, N.Y.-based Atlantic Veal & Lamb.
USDA also quickly de-listed the plant for export and ordered an investigation. The firm's president, Philip Peerless, said in a statement that the company misinterpreted the export requirements in its first shipment to Japan.
Nobody one can blame the company for what was accurately termed "an honest mistake." It was simply that: An honest mistake.
But the ramifications are huge, and impact much more widespread than Atlantic Veal & Lamb's future exporting prospects.
Worst of all, the Japanese overreaction took place against the backdrop of more BSE bad news, this time closer to home, as the Canadian Food Inspection Agency announced confirmation of another BSE case in a six-year-old cow in Alberta.
Brian Evans, Canada's chief veterinary officer, called the case "unwelcome but not unexpected" and downplayed potential consumer concerns by noting that the cow's "age and geographic location are consistent with Canada's three previous BSE cases."
Although accurate, that kind of a statement is a little like a military briefing when soldiers get killed, where the officers assert that, "the casualties were consistent with previous attacks in the area."
Evans also reminded the media that the affected animal did not enter the food or feed supply and suggested that OIE guidelines regard this additional case as having no impact on Canada's beef trade status.
Despite USDA Secretary Mike Johanns' parallel assertion that the case would not result in any changes regarding Canadian beef or live cattle imports, there was immediate – and sharply critical – reaction here and abroad.
South Korea "indefinitely postponed" plans to negotiate a resumption of Canadian beef imports, which had been banned since May 2003.
The National Farmers Union demanded that USDA impose an immediate ban on cattle and beef trade with Canada "until more answers about the case emerge."
And predictably, Chuck Kiker, the newly elected president of R-CALF, urged that the border be closed.
"It is extremely unfortunate that the Canadian government continues to discover cases of BSE," Kiker stated. "Science points to the need to increase testing for BSE and improve other surveillance and mitigation measures so the problem can be defined and the situation contained. Only then should the U.S. consider allowing imports of Canadian cattle and beef."
The reality is that it is not uncommon for countries to report BSE cases arising even after a feed ban was instituted. Scotland is recent example.
Such cases don't necessarily mean that a country's firewalls are ineffective, however. No ban is airtight at the beginning, and few farmers or feeders are in a position to destroy feed stocks without compensation. Thus, some "tainted" ingredients are likely to leak into the feed chain in the early years following imposition of a feeding ban on ruminant proteins.
That explains seemingly "rogue" incidents of BSE — such as this week's case in Canada — but such explanations do not placate activists, reassure consumers or satisfy protectionists in foreign governments where U.S. beef exports comprise a significant share of the market.
In a way, the industry (and government) response to this latest BSE crises acts as a double-edged sword.
All the messaging on firewalls and surveillance and SRM removals have teed up BSE for the media as a disease that can — and will — be eliminated. That's technically correct, but hardly something that can be accomplished in a matter of weeks or months. By de-emphasizing the lengthy incubation of the disease in cattle and ignoring the reality that sweeping changes cannot be imposed across entire industries without massive government intervention — read, "funding" — industry's leadership has inadvertently set the stage for hugely unrealistic expectations among reporters and consumers.
It would be no different if industry messaging on the threat posed by E. coli O1576:H7 were to imply that the problem is about to be solved, once all the intervention technologies now in place "eliminate the problem."
Nobody would advocate such tactics with microbial pathogens, yet that is pretty much the message media have received regarding BSE.
The single BSE case in Canada in 2003 results in an instant and total border closure, and then we expect the public to accept that science says there's negligible risk to consumers eating beef?
We pound away on the theme that our BSE protection systems are secure and our firewalls robust, yet when additional cases occur, "Oh, we expected that" is the response from both industry and government?
We repeat ad nauseum that U.S. beef packers don't need to institute universal BSE testing because we have rock-solid rules on removal of SRMs, and then we ship banned spinal columns to our most sensitive overseas marketplace?
It may seem crazy to hear R-CALF and other activists rehashing unfounded fears many assumed were put to bed. But viewed in the larger perspective of government reaction and industry response, maybe it's not the activists who are the crazy ones.
Dan Murphy is a freelance writer and former editor of MMT magazine based in the Pacific Northwest .
