A
Anonymous
Guest
Gunslinger,
For your research, here is a copy of Judge Strom's ruling on Pickett vs. IBP.
As you can see gunslinger, the facts are quite different than the phony Conman 101 on this site would lead you to believe.
This decision was upheld by the 11th circuit court of appeals.
What greater proof of how phony this whole case was than the fact that Taylor estimated damages at $2.1 "BILLION" and the jury came up with damages of $1.3 "BILLION" and nobody could explain how those damage figures were derived. Talk about getting your pants pulled down. Worse yet, both damage figures were in excess of ibp's total beef profits. How could the plaintiffs be entitled to more money for their cattle than ibp's total beef profits? WHERE'S THE LOGIC???? This whole case was a three ring circus act. Typical of the "factually void" packer blamers that carried it forward.
I have to wonder how many hard earned producer dollars were spent on this market manipulation conspiracy theory case. What a joke! Keep donating those calves boys, R-CULT's lawyers sure appreciate it.
~SH~
For your research, here is a copy of Judge Strom's ruling on Pickett vs. IBP.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
HENRY LEE PICKETT, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, ) Civil No. 96-A-1103-N
)
v. )
)
TYSON FRESH MEATS, INC., ) MEMORANDUM OPINION
)
Defendant. )
______________________________)
This matter is before the Court on defendant Tyson
Fresh Meats, Inc.'s motion for judgment as a matter of law, or
for new trial (Filing No. 664), filed with the Court on February
25, 2004.
I. Background
Trial of this case began on January 12, 2004. On
January 30, 2004, plaintiffs rested and defendant moved for
judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court took defendant's motion
under advisement. Defendant then presented its evidence and
plaintiff presented rebuttal evidence. All parties rested on
February 5, 2004. Defendant renewed its motion for judgment as a
matter of law, and the plaintiff also moved for judgment as a
matter of law. These motions were taken under advisement. The
Court submitted the case to the jury on February 10, 2004.
On February 17, 2004, the jury returned a verdict. The
jury answered five interrogatories affirmatively on the verdict
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form, finding that plaintiffs established, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that (1) there is a nationwide market for fed
cattle; (2) defendant's use of captive supply had an
anticompetitive effect on the cash market for fed cattle; (3)
defendant lacked a legitimate business reason or competitive
justification for using captive supply; (4) defendant's use of
captive supply proximately caused the cash market price to be
lower than it otherwise would have been; and (5) defendant's use
of captive supply injured each and every member of plaintiffs'
class. In addition, the jury found that defendant's use of
captive supply damaged the cash market price of fed cattle sold
to defendant during the class period by One Billion, Two Hundred
Eighty One Million, Six Hundred Ninety Thousand Dollars
($1,281,690,000.00).
Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion for judgment
as a matter of law or for new trial with a supporting brief.
Plaintiffs filed a brief in response and defendant filed a reply
brief. The Court has reviewed the briefs as well as pertinent
parts of the trial record and now concludes that plaintiffs'
motion for judgment as a matter of law should be denied, and
defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law should be
granted on the grounds discussed herein and for the following
reasons.
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II. Discussion
1. Standard of Review
In reviewing defendant's motion for judgment as a
matter of law, pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Court considers whether sufficient conflict exists
in the evidence to necessitate allowing the jury verdict to
stand, or whether the evidence is so weighted in favor of the
defendant that the defendant must prevail as a matter of law.
Thosteson v. United States, 331 F.3d 1294, 1298 (11th Cir. 2003)
(citing Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1244 (11th Cir.
1999) (en banc)). Although the Court reviews the evidence in the
light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and draws all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs "must put
forth more than a mere scintilla of evidence suggesting that
'reasonable and fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial
judgment might reach different conclusions.'" Thosteson, 331
F.3d at 1298 (citing Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1244) (quoting Walker
v. NationsBank of Florida, N.A., 53 F.3d 1548, 1555 (11th Cir.
1995)). The existence of a genuine issue of material fact
precludes judgment as a matter of law, but the presence of "a
mere scintilla of evidence" does not create a genuine issue of
material fact. Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1244. The Court is mindful
of this standard as it analyzes the issues presented in
defendant's motion.
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2. Analysis
Defendant sets forth numerous arguments for why the
Court should grant its motion for judgment as a matter of law.
Defendant contends that there is no legally sufficient
evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to have found (1) a
nationwide market for fed cattle; (2) that defendant's use of
marketing agreements and forward contracts had an anticompetitive
effect; (3) that defendant lacked a legitimate business reason or
competitive justification for using captive supply; (4) that
defendant's use of captive supply caused the cash market price to
be lower; (5) that each member of the class suffered impact or
injury; and (6) that there were damages sustained from the
alleged violations of the Packers and Stockyards Act. See Filing
No. 665. Plaintiffs, however, argue that the record contains
evidence such that a reasonable jury could find in favor of
plaintiffs on each essential element of their claim.
a. Legitimate Business Justifications for Using
Captive Supplies
The Court finds that the evidence is insufficient to
support a finding that defendant lacked a legitimate business
1 Although the marketing arrangements have been generally
referred to in this case as "captive supply," that label is
somewhat of a misnomer. As an initial matter, these marketing
arrangements were initiated by cattle producers starting back in
the early 1980's. The evidence is undisputed that, at least with
respect to some of the marketing agreements, the producer had no
obligation to deliver the cattle to the packer until such cattle
were designated by the producer for delivery. The defendant's
obligation to purchase the cattle did not attach until such
delivery designation occurred, which usually was not until two
weeks before delivery.
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justification for its use of captive supplies.1 Plaintiff
attempts to counter this argument by arguing that (1) there is a
less restrictive manner in which defendant could achieve the same
benefits (i.e., through the cash market); and (2) defendant's
justification of "meeting the competition" is invalid because
defendant cannot justify its unlawful behavior by competing with
other unlawful behavior. The Court will consider each of these
two arguments.
First, plaintiffs argue that they were entitled to show
that there was a less restrictive way of achieving the same
business justifications. Plaintiffs contend that they
established at trial that defendant could achieve all of its
claimed justifications through purchases on the cash market,
which would constitute a less restrictive manner of achieving the
justifications.
In response to defendant's motion for judgment as a
matter of law, plaintiffs attempt to rebut several of defendant's
claimed business justifications by arguing that those
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justifications could be achieved on the cash market. During the
conference on jury instructions in this case, plaintiffs
requested that the Court instruct the jury that, if defendant
could achieve its claimed justifications in the cash market, then
such justifications were not "legitimate" business
justifications. See Trial Transcript 2/9/04 at 3107:10 -
3108:10; 3111:12 - 3112:8; 3119:18-24. After reviewing the
issue, the Court rejected that argument. See Jury Instruction
No. 16. The Court adheres to its earlier position and finds that
the "less restrictive alternative" argument offered by plaintiffs
is without merit. The Court's position is supported by an
abundance of case law. See generally Armour & Co. v. United
States, 402 F.2d 712, 725 (7th Cir. 1968); Griffin v. Smithfield
Foods, Inc., 183 F.Supp.2d 824, 827-28 (E.D.Va. 2002); Jackson v.
Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 836 F.Supp. 1447 (W.D.Ark. 1993), aff'd, 53
F.3d 1452 (8th Cir. 1995).Absent the "less restrictive alternative" argument, the
trial record is barren of any evidence which would permit the
jury to conclude that defendant lacked a legitimate business
justification for its use of captive supply. The evidence
reveals that captive supply transactions permit defendant to
achieve a reliable and consistent supply of fed cattle, allowing
it to operate its plants in an efficient manner. Numerous
witnesses, called by both the plaintiffs and defendant, confirmed
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that the use of captive supply helps defendant ensure a reliable
and consistent supply of fed cattle.
Plaintiffs claim that such
justification is not a "legitimate" justification because
defendant could achieve those same results on the cash market.
Filing No. 678 at 34-35, ¶¶ 80-81. Plaintiffs apparently do not
contest the fact, however, that the use of captive supply does
indeed lead to a consistent and reliable supply of fed cattle. A
packer does not violate the Packers and Stockyards Act when its
conduct is undertaken "in order to have a more reliable and
efficient method of obtaining a supply of cattle." IBP, Inc. v.
Glickman, 187 F.3d 974, 978 (8th Cir. 1999).
Defendant also produced evidence at trial that it was
justified in acquiring cattle through captive supply transactions
because it needed to do so to "meet the competition." Defendant
argues that the evidence is undisputed that it would lose sources
of cattle if it did not offer arrangements with cattle producers
that its competitors such as Swift and Excel were offering.
Plaintiffs, however, argue that this cannot qualify as a
legitimate business justification because the defendant cannot
"engage in illegal activity to compete with another who is
breaking the law. One wrong is not set right by more wrongs."
Filing No. 678 at 35, ¶ 82.
Plaintiffs' argument on this issue is flawed. The
evidence at trial was undisputed that if defendant was unable to
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offer captive supply arrangements to producers, it would have a
much smaller pool of producers from which to buy cattle because
those producers wishing to sell cattle via marketing agreements,
formula sales, or forward contracts would sell their cattle to
defendant's competitors. This would pose problems for the
defendant, as it would have fewer cattle to choose from, and the
quality and reliability of its cattle supply would likely suffer.
Thus, defendant needed to use these sources of supply to be able
to compete effectively with Excel, Swift, and other packers.
Defendant's use of captive supply arrangements is
supported by the legitimate business justification of competing
in the industry. Plaintiffs did not offer any evidence at trial
suggesting that the defendant would be able to compete if the
competitors were allowed to continue to use captive supply, but
defendant was forced to discontinue such procurement methods.
See Swift & Co. v. Wallace, 105 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1939) (setting
aside a finding of "unreasonable preference" where the packer had
extended allegedly preferential credit terms in bona fide
response to its competition offering the same terms).
Although the record indicates that defendant's
competitors do utilize marketing agreements, forward contracts,
and other forms of captive supply transactions, it is significant
that there is no evidence before the Court to suggest that such
conduct is illegal. The use of marketing agreements, joint
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ventures and forward contracts is not, per se, violative of the
Packers and Stockyards Act. Generally, such conduct only amounts
to a violation of the Act if it constitutes an "unfair practice,"
involves price manipulation, or violates some other specific
provision of the Act. There is no evidence that defendant's
competitors' use of these supply arrangements violated the Act,
nor is there any evidence that the use of such arrangements is
per se illegal.
b. Damages to All Class Members
The Court finds that the evidence does not support a
finding that each member of plaintiffs' class was injured.
In Instruction No. 19, the Court instructed the jury:
To establish that IBP's use of
captive supply caused an injury to
each and every member of the
plaintiff class, plaintiffs need
not prove such injury with
exactitude, but must establish that
the members of the class were
injured in some measurable amount.
Remember, throughout your
deliberations, you must not engage
in any speculation, guess, or
conjecture. Instruction No. 19.
Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Robert Taylor, testified that
defendant's use of captive supply did not have a statistically
significant impact on the cash market price for fed cattle during
the years 1999 and 2000. See Trial Transcript 2/5/04 at 3040:3-
13; 3051:22 - 3052:17. Presumably, there are class members whose
cash market sales of fed cattle to defendant are limited to the
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years of 1999 and 2000; if so, the evidence does not establish
that those class members suffered any adverse impact or injury.In this case, the fact-finder is left to speculate as to whether
any such class members suffered an adverse impact or injury
during these two years, and the jury verdict cannot be based on
such speculation or conjecture. Plaintiff's problems of proof on
this issue are further compounded by their inability to identify
the current members of the class, or even the number of class
members. The Court is mindful that plaintiffs were not required
to prove damages with exactitude, but the Court is satisfied that
plaintiffs have not met their burden on this issue.c. Class-wide Damages
Plaintiffs' evidence at trial failed to establish
damages or, in the alternative, a formula from which damages
could be calculated at a later claims procedure. Defendant
argues that plaintiffs had the burden at trial "of either proving
damages to the class or of establishing a formula that could be
used to establish damages in a later proceeding." Filing No.
665. Defendant correctly points out that plaintiffs did not
prove, at trial, the extent of class-wide damages or the volume
of class members' sales on the cash market. Because plaintiffs'
evidence of damages included damages caused to the entire cash
market, including damages suffered by non-class members,
defendant argues that plaintiffs' damages evidence at trial is
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"completely irrelevant." Defendant contends that the jury did
not adopt a formula for calculating damages in a claims process,
and that the absence of such formula precludes any claims
proceeding in the future.On July 16, 2003, the Court proposed bifurcating the
trial. See Filing No. 511. Under the Court's proposal, the
parties would have first tried this case to a jury solely on the
issue of liability. If the jury returned a verdict in favor of
plaintiffs, the Court proposed that a trial on damages would
immediately commence before the same jury. Upon proposing that
procedure, the Court ordered the parties to show cause why such
procedure would not be an appropriate manner in which to proceed
with trial.
Plaintiffs opposed the Court's proposal. See Filing
No. 520. Plaintiffs noted that "bifurcation must be undertaken
in such a way that the second phase of a trial, governing
damages, becomes little more than an application of the formula
found by the jury in the first phase." Filing No. 520 at 1-2.
Plaintiffs argued that the "interwoven nature" of the evidence in
this case "makes bifurcation of liability from damages
unworkable," and further noted that "proof of liability and
damages are largely inseparable." Filing No. 520 at 3, ¶¶ 7-8.
2 The Court has previously declined to enter judgment on the
jury's finding of damages to the market in the amount of
$1,281,690,000. See Filing No. 675.
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At that time, plaintiffs argued that "the initial phase of the
trial, including the determination of liability and class-wide
damages should not be bifurcated." Id. at 5, ¶ 17.
The Court subsequently decided not to bifurcate the
trial. As such, plaintiffs were required to prove, at the
initial trial of this case, the existence and amount of damages
to the class, or a formula from which individual damages could
later be calculated. Plaintiffs failed to make such a showing at
trial. Absent a finding from the jury on the class-wide damages,
plaintiffs now seek to determine individual damages in a
subsequent claims procedure, the formula for which has not been
established by plaintiffs, and none can be developed from the
jury's verdict.
Dr. Taylor testified that in his opinion, the damages
to the cash market as a whole was an amount slightly in excess of
$2.1 billion. He had prepared an exhibit (Exhibit 1221),
reflecting how he arrived at that figure. However, that exhibit
is of no help in devising a formula by which damage to individual
class members can be calculated. The jury obviously disagreed
with his calculations, returning a verdict of $1,281,690.00.2
The manner in which the jury derived that dollar amount is
currently unknown, and it would be impermissible for the Court to
3 The Court notes that IBP's average cattle cost is
virtually identical to the USDA average market price, indicating
that the defendant paid the same amount for its cattle as the
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speculate as to the basis upon which the jury found that amount
to be the correct calculation of damages. The jury also found
that the defendant's use of captive supply did not have an equal
percentage effect on the cash market price for fed cattle for
each year during the class period. This finding, too, is
problematic for plaintiffs, as they essentially failed to
establish a viable formula for computing damages for individual
members of the class. As such, the Court is left without any
formula or method from which a magistrate judge or special master
could calculate damages on an individual basis in a future claims
procedure.The Court recognizes that the jury was never asked to
quantify damages suffered solely by class members. Rather, the
Court framed a question on the verdict form such that the jury
was asked to determine damages to the entire cash market during
the class period. Such question was posed to the jury primarily
because plaintiffs' evidence did not permit a finding of any
other sort. Had the jury been asked to quantify the damages
suffered solely by class members, there is no doubt that the
evidence adduced at trial would have been insufficient to support
any such finding, as plaintiffs' experts failed to develop a
model from which such conclusion could be drawn.3 The plaintiffs
other market participants during the class period. See Filing
No. 1213A. Plaintiffs contended that IBP was the price leader,
but the evidence of both parties is inconsistent with a finding
of such price leadership.
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have failed to carry their burden on the issue of damages to
members of the class.
For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that
plaintiffs failed to present evidence at trial to sustain their
burden with respect to both liability and damages. For the
foregoing reasons, the Court will grant defendant's motion for
judgment as a matter of law.
Also before the Court is a motion for pro hac vice
admission filed by Roger A. McEowen (Filing No. 679); and a
motion to submit an amici brief (Filing No. 680) which was
included with the motion and affidavit. After review, the Court
finds said motions should be denied. A separate order will be
entered in accordance with this memorandum opinion.
DATED this 23rd day of April, 2004.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Lyle E. Strom
_______________________________
LYLE E. STROM, Senior Judge
United States District Court
As you can see gunslinger, the facts are quite different than the phony Conman 101 on this site would lead you to believe.
This decision was upheld by the 11th circuit court of appeals.
What greater proof of how phony this whole case was than the fact that Taylor estimated damages at $2.1 "BILLION" and the jury came up with damages of $1.3 "BILLION" and nobody could explain how those damage figures were derived. Talk about getting your pants pulled down. Worse yet, both damage figures were in excess of ibp's total beef profits. How could the plaintiffs be entitled to more money for their cattle than ibp's total beef profits? WHERE'S THE LOGIC???? This whole case was a three ring circus act. Typical of the "factually void" packer blamers that carried it forward.
I have to wonder how many hard earned producer dollars were spent on this market manipulation conspiracy theory case. What a joke! Keep donating those calves boys, R-CULT's lawyers sure appreciate it.
~SH~
