G Weber wrote:
Well, I heard that I was once again in the news on the net...and sure enough, the folks as www.vegsource.com have been busy forwarding my 2001 critique of some European "experts" view that the U.S. BSE situation was "just like Europe's" so we needed to test everything.
Keep in mind that vegsource.com's motto is "Friendly support 25 hours a day 8 days a week for your healthy vegitarian lifestyle." Yes folks...25 hours a day..8 days a week and as my kids would say, "Whats up with that?
Anyway, that may give you some indication of the motivation to distribute my criticism of any "expert" who tried to damage reputation of the U.S. beef industry while promoting a test he may have had a financial interest in.
So how about some facts since that 2001 article?
TSS wrote;
FACT IS GARY, not to elude the fact that YOU SAID IT!
vegsource did not say it did they??? simply not about vegsource...tss
G Weber wrote:
Well, since 2001 the development of rapid tests has advanced to the point that many are licensed by the USDA and 2 are used in the BSE screening program.
These tests are for screening use only and the IHC test, coupled with Western Blot testing when there are questions about differences between a screening test and the IHC. This is the recommendation of the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). We fully support following OIE guidelines.
TSS WROTE;
THEN why did it take 7+ months, and literally an act of Congress to get the other TEXAS mad cow confirmed, the one they did not render before testing, tell us why???
this on top of the fact it had tested positive, well, they like to call the positives inconclusive ;-) ..........they had to test the damn thing with the least likely test to finally get it negative, then refuse to use WB, when WB is what they should have used by the proper BSE testing protocol. they even had a 'secret' test that showed positive;
experimental IHC test results, because the test was
not a validated procedure, and because the two
approved IHC tests came back negative, the results
were not considered to be of regulatory significance
and therefore were not reported beyond the
laboratory.
• A Western blot test conducted the week of
June 5, 2005, returned positive for BSE.
http://www.usda.gov/documents/vs_bse_ihctestvar.pdf
QUESTION: "Hi. Thanks very much. I was wondering if you could tell us, what is the expected rate of false positives with the rapid screening testing used right now? And also of the five that you mentioned earlier, if you could identify the one that's being used?"
DR. CLIFFORD: "Yes. We can identify the one that's being used. The one that's being used is the biorad test, the ELISA, the ELISA test. With regards to statistics, we prefer to not put any type of statistics on that. You can look at some of these tests and their use internationally, but I think we need to have that experience here with the U.S. and the population of animals that we're testing before we would prefer to give any type of statistical numbers."
http://www.usda.gov/Newsroom/0273.04.html
THE ONLY REASON THE USDA WERE USING ONLY BIO-RAD AND ONLY IHC, is because they were the least likely to find a TSE/BSE, simple as that. look what some of the top TSE scientists said;
Dr. Detwiler former top USDA prion god on IHC only testing 2003 ;
USDA 2003
We have to be careful that we don't get so set in the way we do things that
we
forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We've gotten
away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We're using the brain
stem and we're looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a
project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did
not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the
cerebellum and the cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had to go
back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA,
we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got
away from it. They've recently gone back.
Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an
'official' test result as recognized by APHIS
.
Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't
they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking
only at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine
ourselves to one area.
snip.............
Dr. Detwiler: It seems a good idea, but I'm not aware of it.
Another important thing to get across to the public is that the negatives
do not guarantee absence of infectivity. The animal could be early in the
disease and the incubation period. Even sample collection is so important.
If you're not collecting the right area of the brain in sheep, or if
collecting lymphoreticular tissue, and you don't get a good biopsy, you
could miss the area with the PRP in it and come up with a negative test.
There's a new, unusual form of Scrapie that's been detected in Norway. We
have to be careful that we don't get so set in the way we do things that we
forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We've gotten
away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We're using the brain
stem and we're looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a
project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did
not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the
cerebellum and the cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had to go
back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA,
we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got
away from it. They've recently gone back.
Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an
'official' test result as recognized by APHIS
.
Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't
they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking
only at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine
ourselves to one area.
snip...
FULL TEXT;
Completely Edited Version
PRION ROUNDTABLE
Accomplished this day, Wednesday, December 11, 2003, Denver, Colorado
OR, what about another top prion god, seems the USDA et al was the only one out of the loop with the most sensitive and up to date bse/tse testing protocol;
Q&A Dr. Jean-Philippe Deslys
What is the standard regime for testing of suspect animals in the EU?
The regime is an initial screening by a high-output test, the Bio-Rad test. If a result raises suspicion, a confirmatory test is conducted with the Western blot test.
How long has this been the case?
It's a fairly recent development. Only recently has the Western blot test become sensitive enough, with the addition of phospohtungstic acid precipitation step. The Bio-Rad test (which Deslys helped develop) is extremely sensitive, and the standard Western blot is extremely reliable with high-signal test results. However, it had to be made more sensitive for low-signal (samples with low density of malformed prions) samples. It has been made more sensitive.
Reproducibility is the problem with the IHC test. It is not standardized; depending on the lab and its protocols, or even on the technician involved in the test, one can get conflicting results.
Is there a way to measure the three tests in sensitivity, accuracy and objectivity?
Historically, yes. The IHC was the gold standard at one point, but we have shifted to the Western blot. It requires less work, it is more sensitive and its results are reproducible. IHC relies on localization. If you have a weak signal case, you may get lucky and test a spot with a high concentration of prions. But the opposite it true too; you can miss an infection by testing a sample with low concentrations. Western blot is much better for low signal situations.
The USDA in 2003 used the Western blot to confirm the BSE case in Washington state, and it sent samples to the U.K. for independent testing. In the case this November, which it announced was negative, it instead used the IHC test and did not send samples to the U.K. Is this good science?
It's not logical. If you have two consecutive questionable screenings, you do another test. I can only advise, it's management's duty at USDA to make the decisions. But when you have a discrepancy between the rapid test and the IHC, it is only logical to confirm it with another test.
We are hearing now about a new strain of BSE, atypical BSE or aBSE. Or BaSE. We have heard that IHC, the so-called gold standard, cannot detect the variant. Is this true?
Yes. There have been a few cases, one in Italy, one in Belgium, one here in France. It seems to only affect very old animals. The distribution in the brain is very different than we see with BSE, it looks very different. The IHC test will come back negative.
This his a very recent phenomenon. I have no opinion on its virulence. We do not know where it comes from. It could be a version of sporadic infection. Western blot caught them, but we would not even know it existed if we weren't running systematic testing in the EU.
BSE was around for a long time before we caught it and by then, it was everywhere. It had become highly infectious. It probably amplified due to low-temperature rendering. The disease was recycled through the food chain, and was given time to amplify. By the time it was identified, even good cooking couldn't eliminate it.
I can't stress enough that systematic testing is necessary. Withdrawing all positives from the food chain is the best way to break the cycle.
What can happen with testing of only cattle that are clearly at risk is that several can remain undetected. Canada has tested about 30,000 head of cattle and has three positives. That would indicate that there are probably undiscovered cases. And what happens then is that the disease is allowed to amplify. You have to maintain testing.
When people choose to protect their economic interests over public health, it can have a boomerang effect. It happened all through Europe. They always deny; it's not OUR problem, it is our neighbor's problem. And then a single case is discovered and the public reacts. The economic results are devastating. It would be better to just assume BSE is present and use systematic testing as protection. That way, the public is reassured that it is not entering the food supply.
By systematic testing, I mean doing as we do in the EU, which is to test every animal over 30 months of age when it is slaughtered. In Europe, three times as many cases of BSE have been caught by systematic testing as by clinical testing (of clearly sick animals). In 2004, eight clinical cases were discovered, 29 were discovered at rendering plants, and 17 at slaughter. We should be using these tests as a weapon to protect the public and to give them assurance that the food supply is being protected. ...snip...end
Dr. Jean-Philippe Deslys, Head, Prions Research Group, Atomic Energy Commission, France ...TSS
G Weber wrote:
If you want to understand the NCBA view of the US BSE situation, feel free to read our comments relative the recent FDA proposed rule to increase BSE prevention measures. You can access these comments at
www.beefusa.org/uDocs/feedrulecomments122005.pdf.
Lets also consider the BSE situation in Europe in 2001 when I wrote the note about criticism of the US situation. In 2001 the EU was finding a case of BSE, confirmed by IHC in 1 out of every 3.3 neurological suspects. They were also testing every healthy animal at processing and were finding 1 case out of every 27,492 cattle.
Ok, jump forward to 2006. In the US we have been testing neurological suspect cattle since 1990 for BSE and we have never found a case in that catagory of high risk cattle.
TSS WRITES;
THATS because you render or don't test properly the most suspect animals.
THIS was the case with BOTH TEXAS mad cowS ;
TEXAS STUMBLING STAGGERING MAD COW THAT WAS RENDERED WITHOUT ANY TEST
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/NEW01061.html
TEXAS MAD COW THAT TOOK AN ACT OF CONGRESS TO CONFIRM AFTER SITTING ON SHELF FOR 7+ MONTHS
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB?contentidonly=true&contentid=2005/06/0217.xml
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB?contentidonly=true&contentid=2005/06/0217.xml
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB?contentidonly=true&contentid=2005/06/0218.xml
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB?contentidonly=true&contentid=2005/06/0218.xml
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB?contentidonly=true&contentid=2005/06/0206.xml
TSS
G Weber wrote:
We have also tested, as of January 22, 2006 597,863 downer cattle and we have found 1 case of BSE. IN 2001 in Europe, they were finding 1 case of BSE out of every 1,037 animals..YES virtually 1/1,000. If you extrapolate from the EU test results ....and our BSE risk, we woudl then have a BSE prevalence rate in cattle of less than 1 case in over 15,000,000 cattle. That is low risk, and getting lower every day.
So there should be no question that the US situation is very different than the EU. This is beacuse we started taken all necessary steps to stop BSE BEFORE we ever had our first case. These steps started in 1989. We have been, consistently, the first country in the world to take preventative steps at every turn. Cattlemen lead the charge on takign these steps, asking government to analyze the situation and to put regulations in place, and fully enforce them, if the analysis supported such action.
TSS WRITES;
INDEED, the situation in the USA is very very different. THE USA has the most documented TSE in the most species than any other country.
ALL have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption. THIS is why GWs infamous BSE MRR policy (the legal trading of all strains of TSE Globally) was born $$$ TSS
G Weber wrote:
Lets hit on one other point, the Texas cow. Keep in mind that this cow was dead, she never was intended to enter the human food chain...even if she was a downer she would not be allowed in the human food supply. Once she showed up as a suspect case on the rapid BSE screening tests, the carcass was held, and the samples sent to Ames. There, apparently, the IHC test was negative. In this case, according to the OIE guidelines, the sample should have been run on the Western Blot. We supported that then and now. However, even though there was debate on how to handle this sample, animal health and public health were protected and in the end, the OIE process was reafirmed.
TSS WRITES;
ANOTHER BLATANT LIE. fact is, that cow went to A PACKING plant first, THEN was shipped to pet food plant. big difference. THE cow was first shipped to PACKING plant, NOT pet food, so if the cow would not have gone down, the damn thing would have entered the food chain for humans ;
The animal was sold through a livestock sale in November of 2004 and transported to a packing plant. The animal was dead upon arrival at the packing plant and was then shipped to a pet food plant where it was sampled for BSE. The plant did not use the animal in its product, and the carcass was destroyed in November 2004.
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB?contentidonly=true&contentid=2005/08/0336.xml
TSS
G Weber wrote:
Thanks Mike and vegsource.org for the reminder of this situation and giving me a chance to share the facts with you.
TSS WRITES ;
NO, thank you Gary, for giving me the chance to tell the public just how much you don't care about there public health, that it's about nothing more than a dollar with you and NCBA et al. ...TSS
G Weber wrote:
Oh, one last thing....BSE is well on its way to being eradicated from the US, make no mistake about that!! Sorry vegsource, you will have to attack the beef industry with some other smear tactic...but consumer demand for our products continues to grow..they believe cattlemen rather than vegitarian activists.
TSS writes;
YOU have to look to find, as oppose to looking to hide, or not find, first, then you might eradicate it. maybe.
it was once said, long ago ;
3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach
was to accord it a _very low profile indeed_. Dr. A Thiermann showed
the picture in the ''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and thought
this was a fanatical incident to be _avoided_ in the US _at all costs_...
snip...
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11b/tab01.pdf
These signs were followed by progressive deterioration of
neurologic function beginning with locomoior incoordination, long periods of somnolence
in which the affected mink would stand motionless with its head in the corner of the
cage, complete debilitation, and death. Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of
all the adult mink on the farm died from TME.
Since previous incidences of TME were associated with common or shared feeding
practices, we obtained a careful history of feed ingredients used over the past 12-18
months. The rancher was a "dead stock" feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy
cattle and a few horses. Sheep had never been fed.
DISCUSSION
These findings suggest that TME may result from feeding mink infected cattle and
we have alerted bovine practitioners that there may exist an as yet unrecognized
scrapie-like disease of cattle in the United States (Marsh and Hartsough, 1986). A new
bovine spongiform encephalopathy has recently been reported in England (Wells et al.,
1987), and investigators are presently studying its transmissibility and possible
relationship to scrapie. Because this new bovine disease in England is characterized by
behavioral changes, hyperexcitability, and agressiveness, it is very likely it would be
confused with rabies in the United Stales and not be diagnosed. Presently, brains from
cattle in the United States which are suspected of rabies infection are only tested with
anti-rabies virus antibody and are not examined histopathologically for lesions of
spongiform encephalopathy.
We are presently pursuing additional studies to further examine the possible
involvement of cattle in the epidemiology of TME. One of these is the backpassage of
our experimental bovine encephalopathy to mink. Because (here are as yet no agent-
specific proteins or nucleic acids identified for these transmissible neuropathogens, one
means of distinguishing them is by animal passage and selection of the biotype which
grows best in a particular host. This procedure has been used to separate hamster-
adapted and mink-udapted TME agents (Marsh and Hanson, 1979). The intracerebral
backpassage of the experimental bovine agent resulted in incubations of only four months
indicating no de-adaptation of the Stetsonville agent for mink after bovine passage.
Mink fed infected bovine brain remain normal after six months. It will be essential to
demonstrate oral transmission fiom bovine to mink it this proposed epidemiologic
association is to be confirmed.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
These studies were supported by the College of Agricultural and Life Sciences,
University of Wisconsin-Madison and by a grant (85-CRCR-1-1812) from the United
States Department of Agriculture. The authors also wish to acknowledge the help and
encouragement of Robert Hanson who died during the course of these investigations.
REFERENCES
Burger, D. and Hartsough, G.R. 1965. Encephalopathy of mink. II. Experimental and
natural transmission. J. Infec. Dis. 115:393-399.
Hanson, R.P., Eckroade, R.3., Marsh, R.F., ZuRhein, C.M., Kanitz, C.L. and Gustatson,
D.P. 1971. Susceptibility of mink to sheep scrapie. Science 172:859-861.
Hansough, G.R. and Burger, D. 1965. Encephalopathy of mink. I. Epizoociologic and
clinical observations. 3. Infec. Dis. 115:387-392.
Marsh, R.F. and Hanson, R.P. 1969. Physical and chemical properties of the
transmissible mink encephalopathy agent. 3. ViroL 3:176-180.
Marsh, R.F. and Hanson, R.P. 1979. On the origin of transmissible mink
encephalopathy. In Hadlow, W.J. and Prusiner, S.P. (eds.) Slow transmissible
diseases of the nervous system. Vol. 1, Academic Press, New York, pp 451-460.
Marsh, R.F. and Hartsough, G.R. 1986. Is there a scrapie-like disease in cattle?
Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Western Conference for Food Animal Veterinary
Medicine. University of Arizona, pp 20.
Wells, G.A.H., Scott, A.C., Johnson, C.T., Cunning, R.F., Hancock, R.D., Jeffrey, M.,
Dawson, M. and Bradley, R. 1987. A novel progressive spongiform encephalopathy
in cattle. Vet. Rec. 121:419-420.
MARSH
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf
again Gary, it is not about vegsource is it, it is the blatant disregards for science you and some others have in your industry i.e. USDA et al about BSE/TSE in the USA. all one has to do is read the BSE GBR risk assessment of the USA ;
EFSA Scientific Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of the United States of America (USA)
Publication date: 20 August 2004
Adopted July 2004 (Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083)
Report
Summary
Summary of the Scientific Report
The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.
The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge in the early nineties.
A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90's when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.
EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.
http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/efsa_scientific_reports/gbr_assessments/573_en.html
SUMMARY
Summary of Scientific Report
http://www.efsa.eu.int
1 of 1
Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority
on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of
United States of America (USA)
Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083
Adopted July 2004
Summary of scientific report
The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the
Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR)
were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on
the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more
cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific
report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period
1980-2003.
The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic cattle in
the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered
in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible
that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to
an internal challenge in the early nineties.
A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk
countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some
imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90's when
domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of
the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from
BSE risk countries.
EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed
that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as
there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very
unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the
BSE-agent persistently increases.
Key words: BSE, geographical risk assessment, GBR, USA, third countries
http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/efsa_scientific_reports/gbr_assessments/573/sr03_biohaz02_usa_report_summary_en1.pdf
REPORT (6 PAGES)
snip...
EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 3, 1-6 on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk of
Conclusions
The European Food Safety Authority concludes:
1. The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic
cattle in the middle of the eighties. This cattle imported in the mid eighties could have
been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early
nineties. It is possible that meat and bone meal (MBM) imported into the USA
reached domestic cattle and lead to an internal challenge in the early nineties.
2. A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE
risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together
with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the
mid 90's when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing.
Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued
imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.
3. The current geographical BSE risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed
that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent.
4. This assessment deviates from the previous assessment (SSC opinion, 2000) because
at that time several exporting countries were not considered a potential risk.
5. It is also worth noting that the current GBR conclusions are not dependent on the large
exchange of imports between USA and Canada. External challenge due to exports to
the USA from European countries varied from moderate to high. These challenges
indicate that it was likely that BSE infectivity was introduced into the North American
continent.
6. EFSA and its Scientific Expert Working group on GBR are concerned that the
available information was not confirmed by inspection missions as performed by the
Food and Veterinary office (FVO – DG SANCO) in Member States and other third
countries. They recommend including, as far as feasible, BSE-related aspects in
future inspection missions.
Expected development of the GBR
As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains
extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically)
infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.
A table summarising the reasons for the current assessment is given in the table below
snip...
http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/efsa_scientific_reports/gbr_assessments/573/sr03_biohaz02_usa_report_v2_en1.pdf
TSS
