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U.S. to test every chicken before slaughter

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Mike

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The title to your post suggests that "Every" chicken will be tested before slaughter. From reading the article that is not the case.

Seems they said a sampling will be tested to see if the virus has infected any flocks. Positive flocks will be euthanized.

I watched a conference on C-Span yesterday with the HHS officials conducting a forum on how to get ready, if and when, an outbreak of bird flu does become pandemic. They are hoping it does not happen this year as they do not have an inoculation yet. I wonder what the lag time between the shot and the onset of immunity will be?

The key is isolation and quarantine. They said "ALL workplaces and schools will have to be shut down.

I remember the flu outbreak in 1957 and 1968. Dairymen around the county helped each other by milking each others cows. I don't remember anyone dying but there sure were a lot that caught it.
 
U.S. to test every chicken before slaughter is a heck of a lot different than
The plan is for 11 birds to be tested from each chicken flock, or farm. The council said the average flock has 55,000 to 60,000 chickens and that there are an estimated 150,000 flocks produced year. That would mean more than 1.6 million chickens would be tested.
 
I looked into this "testing" that they do for bird flue. The currently take fat samples from poultry flocks because some companies were caught selling poultry contaminated with some dangerous stuff. They currently take fat samples ostensibly to check for "other chemicals". I am sure this is probably where they will get their test material.
 
BIRD Flu testing of chicken Flocks isn't much different than BSE random testing of Herds. Why is there such a Disparity between the 2 products or has somebody got more to loose.As Quoted ****Practically all the big ones are in it." Among the biggest companies in the industry are Tyson Foods Inc., Perdue Farms Inc. and Pilgrim's Pride Corp.

Just Guessing ,but it might be that Caroline Smith DeWaal, food safety director for the Center for Science in the Public Interest. "But it's critical that USDA ensure that all chicken producers are complying with the same requirements."
 
PORKER said:
BIRD Flu testing of chicken Flocks isn't much different than BSE random testing of Herds. Why is there such a Disparity between the 2 products or has somebody got more to loose.As Quoted ****Practically all the big ones are in it." Among the biggest companies in the industry are Tyson Foods Inc., Perdue Farms Inc. and Pilgrim's Pride Corp.

Just Guessing ,but it might be that Caroline Smith DeWaal, food safety director for the Center for Science in the Public Interest. "But it's critical that USDA ensure that all chicken producers are complying with the same requirements."

Why is there a difference? Because Bird Flu is highly contagious and BSE isn't.

WHO warns of dire flu pandemic
Monday, December 13, 2004 Posted: 9:59 AM EST (1459 GMT)

A likely instance of human-to-human transmission of bird flu has been discovered.

BANGKOK, Thailand -- The World Health Organization has issued a dramatic warning that bird flu will trigger an international pandemic that could kill up to seven million people.

The influenza pandemic could occur anywhere from next week to the coming years, WHO said.

"There is no doubt there will be another pandemic," Klaus Stohr of the WHO Global Influenza Program said on the sidelines of a regional bird flu meeting in Bangkok, Thailand.

"Even with the best case scenario, the most optimistic scenario, the pandemic will cause a public health emergency with estimates which will put the number of deaths in the range of two and seven million," he said.

"The number of people affected will go beyond billions because between 25 percent and 30 percent will fall ill."

Pandemics occur when a completely new flu strain emerges for which humans have no immunity.

With a human vaccine to the bird flu virus not expected until March 2005 at the earliest, urgency is being placed on containment.

"The countries that have the weakest health systems are in need of most support and clearly, usually it's together the poorest countries who have the least resources to invest in health," Dr. Bjorn Melgaard, head of WHO's Southeast Asia office, said.

The dire flu warning came ahead of a two-day meeting of regional health ministers in Bangkok, looking at how to pool efforts to combat a future outbreak.

It also comes just a few months after the first probable instance of human-to-human transmission of the bird-flu virus emerged.

The virus killed 32 people in Thailand and Vietnam earlier this year and led to the slaughter of millions of poultry birds across the region.

Pandemics usually occur every 20 to 30 years when the genetic makeup of a flu strain changes so dramatically that people have little or no immunity built up from previous flu bouts.

"During the last 36 years, there has been no pandemic, and there is a conclusion now that we are closer to the next pandemic than we have ever been before," Stohr told reporters.

"There is no reason to believe that we are going to be spared."

Stohr said if bird flu triggers the next pandemic, the virus would likely originate in Asia.

"An influenza pandemic will spare nobody. Every country will be affected," he said.

There have been three pandemics in the 20th century, all spread worldwide within a year of being detected.

The worst was the Spanish flu in 1918-19, when as many as 50 million people worldwide are thought to have died, nearly half of them young, healthy adults.

The Asian flu pandemic of 1957 claimed nearly 70,000 lives in the United States and one million worldwide after spreading from China.

In 1968, the Hong Kong flu pandemic is also said to have killed around one million.

Both pandemics were believed to be mutations of pig viruses.

It is important that countries act quickly to guard against a possible pandemic and take stock of their inventories of antivirals, Stohr said.

Scientists are busy working on vaccines for bird flu and other viruses. Two U.S. companies have said they plan to test experimental bird flu vaccines in January.

Thai health officials said Wednesday they expected that a vaccine to protect humans from bird flu would be ready by 2007, The Associated Press reports .

Health ministers and senior officials from 10 Southeast Asian countries, along with China, Japan and South Korea, are among the more than 100 people attending this week's meeting to develop strategies against flu and other infectious diseases.

Looks to me that the reason is that a flu pandemic from birds is a huge concern.
 
The BSE testing of US cattle was designed to find it if there is an extremely small number of cattle infected. Just read the numbers somewhere as to how many of the most likely to have BSE was and are being tested (that is 4D's), and how many apparently healthy were tested as what appears to me to be sort of a control group. I think the number of 4D types tested is over 500,000 now. Anyway, the story is in current ag publications if anyone wants to check for themselves.

My point, is it seems reasonable to believe the poultry industry has similar demographics for finding any Avian Influenza in their flocks.

BTW, doesn't all this illustrate the point that the "big" producers are easier to find and "encourage" to test? Whether cattle processing, or poultry processing or growing facilities. I trust that few big packers are abusing the BSE protection rules, and that they are more likely to be found out than the probable thousands of small to very small businesses processing cattle, let alone those who still process for home use or to sell to a very few customers. SD has excellent inspectors and, I believe, is certainly comparable or superior to Federal regulations, but each state is probably somewhat differently handled and numbers matter.......that high numbers of facilities to be inspected being more difficult to get to in a timely manner and conduct thorough inspections of seems reasonable.

MRJ
 
If there is an occurrance of avian flu, the bad strain, farmers will know it before they are tested.

This testing procedure announcement was probably more for calming the fears of poultry farmers than actual disease detection.
 
Econ101 said:
I looked into this "testing" that they do for bird flue. The currently take fat samples from poultry flocks because some companies were caught selling poultry contaminated with some dangerous stuff. They currently take fat samples ostensibly to check for "other chemicals". I am sure this is probably where they will get their test material.

Would it be more like the blood test for breeding age cattle if they are sold thru the sale or go over state lines. If I sell breeding stock the test will not be based on results of my steers at slaughter!
 
mwj said:
Econ101 said:
I looked into this "testing" that they do for bird flue. The currently take fat samples from poultry flocks because some companies were caught selling poultry contaminated with some dangerous stuff. They currently take fat samples ostensibly to check for "other chemicals". I am sure this is probably where they will get their test material.

Would it be more like the blood test for breeding age cattle if they are sold thru the sale or go over state lines. If I sell breeding stock the test will not be based on results of my steers at slaughter!

Bird flu inside a poultry barn would spread rapidly. If the flu was pathnogenic, the results would be noticed quickly. Most of the numbers I have seen in poultry data suggest a 4 to 5% mortality over the whole flock spread out over the time the flock was in the barns. A little more mortality in the beginning when birth defects and culling are common and a little more on the end when crowding and stress are a factor. Variences from the normal patters would surely be noticed by the farmers that operate the facilities every day.

I don't really understand what you are asking. Breeding disease in cattle are a lot different than a communicable disease like the flu.
 
Econ101 said:
mwj said:
Econ101 said:
I looked into this "testing" that they do for bird flue. The currently take fat samples from poultry flocks because some companies were caught selling poultry contaminated with some dangerous stuff. They currently take fat samples ostensibly to check for "other chemicals". I am sure this is probably where they will get their test material.

Would it be more like the blood test for breeding age cattle if they are sold thru the sale or go over state lines. If I sell breeding stock the test will not be based on results of my steers at slaughter!

Bird flu inside a poultry barn would spread rapidly. If the flu was pathnogenic, the results would be noticed quickly. Most of the numbers I have seen in poultry data suggest a 4 to 5% mortality over the whole flock spread out over the time the flock was in the barns. A little more mortality in the beginning when birth defects and culling are common and a little more on the end when crowding and stress are a factor. Variences from the normal patters would surely be noticed by the farmers that operate the facilities every day.

I don't really understand what you are asking. Breeding disease in cattle are a lot different than a communicable disease like the flu.
I think the economic loss within the poultry barn would pale in comparison to the loss of human lives if the same strain reached the human population. That's where the real concern lies.
 
I think the economic loss within the poultry barn would pale in comparison to the loss of human lives if the same strain reached the human population. That's where the real concern lies

The spread of the flu in humans would go hand in hand with the loss in poultry flocks if and when (and it may have already) it jumps species.

Depopulating poultry could stop the spread to humans. I personally hope this is a non-event like Y2K was but the health officials say "not if, but when".
 
Mike said:
I think the economic loss within the poultry barn would pale in comparison to the loss of human lives if the same strain reached the human population. That's where the real concern lies

The spread of the flu in humans would go hand in hand with the loss in poultry flocks if and when (and it may have already) it jumps species.

Depopulating poultry could stop the spread to humans. I personally hope this is a non-event like Y2K was but the health officials say "not if, but when".
It already has jumped from birds to humans.

It also comes just a few months after the first probable instance of human-to-human transmission of the bird-flu virus emerged.

The virus killed 32 people in Thailand and Vietnam earlier this year and led to the slaughter of millions of poultry birds across the region.

http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/gen-info/avian-flu-humans.htm


Recent Avian Influenza Outbreaks in Asia and Europe


Avian Flu Outbreaks
North America
Asia & Europe
Embargo of Birds
Quarantine Executive Order
(From the White House)
Quarantine Executive Order Q & A
Current Situation
The World Health Organization (WHO) maintains situation updates and cumulative reports of human cases of avian influenza A (H5N1). Please visit the WHO links for additional information, as well as links to previous situation updates and cumulative reports.

(See also Turkey Reports Human Cases of H5 Avian Flu) - New Jan 5

Background
Influenza A (H5N1) is a subtype of type A influenza viruses. Wild birds are the natural hosts of the virus – hence, the name avian influenza or bird flu. Infected birds shed virus in their saliva, nasal secretions, and feces. Avian influenza viruses spread among susceptible birds when they have contact with contaminated excretions. The virus circulates among birds worldwide and is very contagious, but causes minimal disease in wild birds. In contrast, H5N1 viruses have recently begun to cause severe and fatal disease among domesticated birds, such as chickens.

The virus does not typically infect humans. In 1997, however, the first instance of direct bird-to-human spread of influenza A (H5N1) virus was documented during an outbreak of avian influenza among poultry in Hong Kong. The virus caused severe respiratory illness in 18 people, of whom 6 died. Since that time, there have been other instances of H5N1 infection among humans (see Avian Influenza Infection in Humans).

It is believed that most cases of H5N1 infection in humans have resulted from contact with infected poultry, uncooked poultry products, or contaminated surfaces. There is no evidence thus far to indicate that human infections with H5N1 virus have resulted in sustained human-to-human transmission. However, because of concerns about the potential for more widespread infection in the human population, public health authorities closely monitor outbreaks of human illness associated with avian influenza.

During late 2003 and early 2004, outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) occurred among poultry in 8 countries in Asia: Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam. At that time, more than 100 million birds either died from the disease or were destroyed in an attempt to prevent further spread of the disease.

From December 30, 2003 to March 17, 2004, 12 confirmed human cases of avian influenza A (H5N1) were reported in Thailand and 23 in Vietnam, resulting in 23 deaths. By late February 2004, however, the number of new human H5N1 cases being reported in Thailand and Vietnam slowed and then stopped. Within a month, countries in Asia were reporting that the avian influenza outbreak among poultry had been contained.

Recent Developments
H5N1 Among Animals
Beginning in late June 2004, new outbreaks of lethal avian influenza A (H5N1) infection among poultry were reported by several countries in Asia: Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam. Since May 2005, outbreaks of H5N1 disease have been reported among poultry in Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Romania, and Ukraine. China, Croatia, Mongolia, and Romania also have reported outbreaks of H5N1 in wild, migratory birds since May 2005. For additional information about H5N1 and other avian influenza outbreaks among animals, visit the World Organization for Animal Health Web site.

Human H5N1 Cases
During August to October 2004, sporadic human cases of avian influenza A (H5N1) were reported in Vietnam and Thailand. Since December 2004, a resurgence of poultry outbreaks and human cases has been reported in Vietnam. On February 2, 2005, the first of four human cases of H5N1 infection from Cambodia was reported. On July 21, 2005, the first human case of H5N1 in Indonesia was reported. Indonesia continued to report human cases in August, September, October, November, and December 2005. Thailand reported new human cases of H5N1 in October, November, and December 2005, and Vietnam reported new human cases in November 2005. China reported the country's first confirmed human cases in November 2005 and continued to report human cases in December 2005.

Assessment of Current Situation
The avian influenza A (H5N1) epizootic (animal outbreak) in Asia is not expected to diminish significantly in the short term. It is likely that H5N1 infection among birds has become endemic to the region and that human infections resulting from direct contact with infected poultry will continue to occur. So far, no sustained human-to-human transmission of the H5N1 virus has been identified, and no evidence for genetic reassortment between human and avian influenza A virus genes has been found; however, the epizootic in Asia continues to pose an important public health threat.

There is little preexisting natural immunity to H5N1 infection in the human population. If these H5N1 viruses gain the ability for efficient and sustained transmission among humans, an influenza pandemic could result, with high rates of illness and death. In addition, genetic sequencing of influenza A (H5N1) viruses from human cases in Vietnam and Thailand shows resistance to the antiviral medications amantadine and rimantadine, two of the medications commonly used for treatment of influenza. This would leave two remaining antiviral medications (oseltamivir and zanamivir) that should still be effective against currently circulating strains of H5N1 virus. Efforts to produce vaccine candidates that would be effective against avian influenza A (H5N1) virus are under way. However, it will likely require many months before such vaccines could be mass produced and made widely available.

Research suggests that currently circulating strains of H5N1 viruses are becoming more capable of causing disease (pathogenic) in mammals than were earlier H5N1 viruses. H5N1 viruses are becoming more widespread in birds in the region. One study found that ducks infected with H5N1 virus are now shedding more virus for longer periods without showing symptoms of illness. This finding has implications for the role of ducks in transmitting disease to other birds and possibly to humans as well. Additionally, other findings have documented H5N1 infection among pigs in China and H5N1 infection in felines
 
Bill, I totally agree with you:

I think the economic loss within the poultry barn would pale in comparison to the loss of human lives if the same strain reached the human population. That's where the real concern lies.

My point was that testing of all flocks will do little to stem this problem if it develops. The farmers will know before the tests results are in. Possibly with their lives, as you mention. The name Tyson will dissappear without the help of the government, as was the case in Canada with BSE.

Here is an article on the bird flu and farmers:

U. S. Department of Labor
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Directorate of Science, Technology and Medicine
Office of Occupational Medicine


---------------------------------------------------------------------
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Avian Influenza Protecting Poultry Workers at Risk
---------------------------------------------------------------------
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Safety and Health Information Bulletins

---------------------------------------------------------------------
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SHIB 12-13-2004

This Safety and Health Information Bulletin is not a standard or
regulation, and it creates no new legal obligations. The Bulletin is
advisory in nature, informational in content, and is intended to
assist employers in providing a safe and healthful workplace.
Pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act, employers must
comply with hazard-specific safety and health standards pro-mulgated
by OSHA or by a state with an OSHA-approved state plan. In addition,
pursuant to Section 5(a)(1), the General Duty Clause of the Act,
employers must provide their employees with a workplace free from
recognized hazards likely to cause death or serious physical harm.
Employers can be cited for violating the General Duty Clause if
there is a recognized hazard and they do not take reasonable steps
to prevent or abate the hazard. However, failure to implement any
recommendations in this Safety and Health Information Bulletin is
not, in itself, a violation of the General Duty Clause. Citations
can only be based on standards, regulations, and the General Duty
Clause.

Introduction

Avian influenza is a viral disease that can cause sickness and death
among poultry. On rare occasions, avian influenza virus can be
transmitted to poultry workers or others who come in contact with
infected poultry or contact contaminated surfaces. Examples of such
workers who could be at risk include poultry growers and their
employees; service technicians of poultry processing companies;
caretakers, layer barn workers, and chick movers at egg production
facilities; and workers involved in disease control and eradication
activities, including state, federal, contract, and company
employees.

This Safety and Health Information Bulletin describes measures for
protecting poultry workers when an avian influenza outbreak occurs.
It presents basic information about avian influenza and describes
measures for minimizing exposure to the virus. Links to Internet
sites are provided for those wanting more detailed information on
avian influenza, biosecurity measures, and personal protective
equipment. This document complements avian population disease
control and eradication strategies of state governments, industry,
and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).

Avian Influenza

Avian influenza is a disease caused by infection of poultry with
type A influenza viruses. The disease occurs worldwide, and all
species of birds are thought to be susceptible to it. Strains of
avian influenza are classified as being of either low pathogenicity
(most strains) or high pathogenicity.

Low-pathogenic strains typically cause few or no signs in infected
birds. When signs are seen, they may include respiratory problems,
diarrhea, a decline in egg production, or an increase in mortality.
However, under field conditions, some low-pathogenic strains (H5 and
H7 subtypes) can mutate and become highly pathogenic, leading to the
deaths of entire flocks. Highly pathogenic avian influenza is
extremely contagious and a fatal form of the disease for poultry.

Although avian influenza A viruses rarely infect humans, since 1997,
instances of human infection have occurred; some (outside the United
States) have resulted in death. The virus is excreted in the
droppings of infected birds and in their respiratory secretions.
Transmission to humans is thought to have resulted from contact with
infected sick or dead poultry or their droppings, or contact with
contaminated litter or surfaces (e.g., egg flats). The suspected
routes of entry of the virus to humans
are the mouth, nose, eyes, and lungs. Although the human health risk
of low-pathogenic avian influenza viruses is not well established,
protective measures should be taken by persons likely to have
prolonged direct or indirect exposure to any avian influenza virus
in an enclosed setting.

Measures for Protecting Poultry Workers

Follow biosecurity practices

Poultry workers should know and follow biosecurity practices to
prevent the introduction of avian influenza and other diseases into
a poultry flock. An understanding of how infection can be spread is
important for both effective biosecurity and worker safety and
health practices. Poultry processing companies should provide a
written copy of biosecurity practices to each of their contract
growers.

A 2004 USDA fact sheet lists eight general biosecurity practices for
poultry farms. Guidance is also available in the free biosecurity
CD, Infectious Disease Risk Management: Practical Biosecurity
Resources for Commercial Poultry Producers, which is available from
the U.S. Poultry and Egg Association.

Depending on temperature and moisture conditions, avian influenza A
viruses can survive in the environment for weeks. However, they are
generally sensitive to most detergents and disinfectants and are
inactivated by heating and drying. Contact with organic material
such as dust, dirt, litter, and manure can decrease the
effectiveness of some disinfectants, and thus the possibility
persists that viruses will survive. U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
(EPA)-registered products that have a claim of being effective
against influenza viruses should provide some measure of activity
against avian influenza A viruses.

The label of an EPA-registered disinfectant describes how to use the
product safely and effectively and includes measures that
applicators should take to protect themselves. The personal
protective equipment listed on a disinfectant label is based on the
chemical's toxicity and may not be appropriate for all exposure
conditions and handling activities. Thus, an exposure assessment
should also be done when selecting personal protective equipment for
applicators.

Know the signs indicating birds are infected with avian influenza
viruses

The signs of illness seen in domestic poultry infected with avian
influenza viruses are variable and affected by the virus strain, age
and species of infected birds, concurrent bacterial disease, and the
environment. Such signs may include --
Sudden death without any signs
Lack of coordination
Purple discoloration of the wattles, combs, and legs
Soft-shelled or misshapen eggs
Lack of energy and appetite
Diarrhea
Swelling of the head, eyelids, comb, wattles, and hocks
Nasal discharge
Decreased egg production
Coughing, sneezing

Some birds might be otherwise healthy-looking but still infected
with avian influenza virus. The severity of disease in poultry can
also vary during an outbreak. Poultry workers should be aware of
signs of disease in poultry so when necessary they can take
immediate steps to protect themselves and other workers, quarantine
the farm to prevent spread of disease, and report the disease to the
responsible animal health authorities.

Take antiviral medication and get the current season's influenza
vaccine if appropriate

In the event of an avian influenza outbreak, workers who will be
involved in disease control and eradication activities should
consult their healthcare provider about the advisability of taking
antiviral medications for influenza. The Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) has recommended that workers receive an
influenza antiviral drug daily for the entire time they are in
direct contact with infected poultry or contaminated surfaces. In
the absence of sensitivity testing, oseltamavir is the antiviral
drug currently of choice because the likelihood that the virus will
be resistant to it is less than with amantadine or rimantadine.

The CDC recommends that workers involved in avian influenza disease
control and eradication activities should get the current season's
human influenza vaccine. Human influenza vaccine will not prevent
infection with low pathogenic or highly pathogenic avian influenza A
viruses, but this precautionary measure could reduce the possibility
of dual infection with avian and human influenza viruses. Although
dual infection is unlikely, it is plausible that such a situation
might cause new and different viral strains to be created; such new
strains might be transmissible among people and lead to more
widespread infections. Although this CDC recommendation is only for
workers involved in disease control and eradication activities,
other poultry workers should consider getting the current season's
influenza vaccine for the same reason.

Current information suggests that limited human-to-human
transmission of avian influenza A viruses has occurred but is very
uncommon. Public health authorities are monitoring outbreaks of
human illness associated with avian influenza, and to date, human
infections with avian influenza viruses identified since 1997 have
not resulted in sustained human-to-human transmission.

Additional CDC information on concerns about dual infection, the use
of antiviral medications, and vaccination of poultry workers is
available at http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/protectionguid.htm.

Know the signs and symptoms of human infection with avian influenza
viruses

All poultry workers should know the signs and symptoms of avian
influenza virus infection in humans so that measures can be taken
for immediate treatment. The signs and symptoms may include fever,
cough, sore throat, conjunctivitis (eye infections), and muscle
aches. Infection with avian influenza viruses can also lead to
pneumonia, acute respiratory distress, and other severe and life-
threatening complications. A worker who experiences any of these
symptoms or illnesses, or who might have been exposed to avian
influenza virus should seek medical care and tell the healthcare
provider before arrival that exposure to avian influenza virus may
have occurred.

More information concerning human infection with avian influenza
viruses is available at
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/professional/han081304.htm and
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2004_01_15/en/.

Wear personal protective equipment

People, including children, working daily in poultry confinement
units are at risk of exposure to a variety of contaminants including
organic dusts, gases such as ammonia, and microorganisms (viruses,
bacteria, and fungi) that can cause illness. Thus, for many poultry
workers, wearing personal protective equipment is a routine
practice. For example, wearing a respirator can reduce exposures to
airborne organic dusts that
might pose a risk of respiratory disease and decreased breathing
capacity. These exposures in the poultry industry can lead to
chronic lung disease and premature death. The National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) recommends that children
should not do any work that requires wearing a respirator.
Respirators are designed to fit adults and the likelihood that they
will fit and protect children is doubtful. (See NIOSH
Recommendations to the U.S. Department of Labor for Changes to
Hazardous Orders. This document and others concerning young workers
can be found at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/youth.)

Most cases of avian influenza virus infection in humans are thought
to have resulted from contact with infected poultry or contacting
contaminated surfaces followed by self-inoculation of the virus into
the eyes, nose or mouth. Other means of transmission are possible,
such as airborne material containing the virus entering a person's
mouth, nose, or eyes, or being inhaled into the lungs.

The CDC and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
have made recommendations for protecting workers involved in avian
influenza outbreak disease control and eradication activities
concerning the respiratory protection, eye protection, and
protective clothing that should be worn and the hand-hygiene
practices that should be followed. (See
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/protectionguid.htm and
http://www.osha.gov/dsg/guidance/avian-flu.html.)

The following information describes why respiratory protection, eye
protection, protective clothing, and hand-hygiene practices are
recommended for disease control and eradication activities and gives
guidance on selecting personal protective equipment for workers
responding to outbreaks of avian influenza. This information was
prepared as an aid to the development of biosecurity guidelines and
standard operating procedures for the various sectors of the poultry
industry.

The process of selecting an appropriate ensemble of personal
protective equipment requires an understanding of the work
activities associated with possible exposures; the health effects
that may result from exposure; properties of the virus (such as
whether it is low pathogenicity or high pathogenicity); host factors
(e.g., a worker's susceptibility and immunization status); and the
advantages, disadvantages, and protective capabilities of the
different types of personal protective equipment. Because changes to
the initial ensemble may occur during the course of a response to an
outbreak, the persons with responsibility for making revisions
should be identified in the biosecurity guidelines.

Respiratory Protection

Because infectious diseases such as avian influenza may be
transmitted by breathing contaminated dust, poultry workers should
wear respirators. Respirators that have filters or cartridges are
called air-purifying respirators. These types are the most practical
and appropriate choices for poultry workers to wear when they might
be exposed to infected birds or during day- to-day activities in
poultry barns. The table below lists the advantages, disadvantages,
and costs of the five types of air-purifying respirators in order of
increasing levels of protection. More information on the advantages
and disadvantages of different respirators and guidance on selecting
respirators for infectious agents can be found in the respirator
selection section of the CDC/NIOSH histoplasmosis guidelines at
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2005-109. Also, for guidance on the
protective capabilities of respirators, see 2004 NIOSH Respirator
Selection Logic.

While all of the listed respirators can protect poultry workers,
they will not be protective unless all of the elements of a written
respiratory protection program are followed. Examples include
providing respirator training to workers and fit testing tight-
fitting facepieces to ensure a secure and comfortable face seal.
Also, every respiratory protection program must have an
administrator who is responsible for overseeing the program?s
functioning and who can answer questions workers might have about
respirator use; workers need to
be informed about who the program administrator is.

The need for respiratory protection presents a challenge to many
poultry workers, such as contract poultry growers and their
employees. Workers at risk of prolonged direct or indirect exposure
to any avian influenza virus in an enclosed setting should always be
included in a respiratory protection program.

Information describing all of the elements of a complete respiratory
protection program and the use of respirators can be found at
http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/respiratoryprotection/index.html.

Eye Protection

Eye protection will reduce direct exposure of the eyes to
contaminated dust and aerosols and help keep workers from touching
their eyes with contaminated fingers. To prevent the mucous
membranes of the eyes from being exposed to the avian influenza
virus, poultry workers should wear safety goggles or a respirator
that has a full facepiece, hood, helmet, or loose-fitting facepiece.
If safety goggles are worn, they should be nonvented (eyecup
goggles, for example) or, at a minimum, indirectly vented.

Properly fitted, indirectly vented safety goggles with a good
antifog coating may be a good choice for poultry workers who have
lower risks of exposure. However, such goggles are not airtight, and
consequently, they will not completely prevent exposures to airborne
material. Directly vented goggles and safety glasses will provide
limited protection, but are not recommended for protection against
fine particles, splashes, or aerosols such as required in situations
when workers will be exposed to infected birds.

Workers who wear prescription lenses should wear eye protection that
has the correction built into the safety lenses of the protective
eyewear, has lens inserts, or can be fitted over regular street-
wear prescription glasses without compromising eye or respiratory
protection. Although regular prescription glasses cannot be worn
with full facepiece respirators, they can be worn with some types of
powered air-purifying respirators (those with hoods and some with
helmets) and some styles of goggles. However, for goggles to be
effective they must fit snugly, especially from the corners of the
eyes across the brow. Additionally, protective eyewear should be
selected that does not interfere with the worker?s vision by
disturbing the proper position of the prescription lenses. Contact
lenses may be worn with goggles, safety glasses, or any respirator
and thus provide excellent corrective vision while maximizing the
protective eyewear selected.

Eye protection should be fitted together with a respirator because
some goggles can alter the fit of a half-facepiece respirator. To
ensure that the eye protection does not interfere with a facepiece
seal, it should be worn when half-facepiece respirators are fit
tested and when workers conduct seal checks each time they put on
the respirator.

Caution should also be used when removing eye protection to ensure
that contaminated equipment does not come in contact with the eyes
or other mucous membranes. Eye protection that is properly selected
and used will help prevent conjunctivitis (redness, swelling and
pain in the
eyes and eyelids). Poultry workers exposed to birds infected with
avian influenza should see a physician at the first signs of
conjunctivitis.

More information on eye protection for infection control and other
documents concerning eye safety are available at
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/eye/.

Protective Clothing and Hand-hygiene Practices

Protective clothing (which includes gloves, aprons, outer garments
or coveralls, and boots or boot covers) should be used to prevent
direct skin contact with contaminated materials and surfaces and
reduce the likelihood of transferring contaminated material outside
a poultry barn or work site. Disposable protective clothing is
preferred.

Because protective clothing can be more insulating than regular work
clothing, precautions should be taken to protect workers from the
effects of heat stress. For example, wearing a lightweight cotton
coverall might create less of a heat stress risk for a worker than a
chemical resistant suit. Additionally, workers should know the
symptoms of heat-stress- related illnesses and be able to take
appropriate measures to ensure that such illnesses do not occur.
Information concerning heat stress and possible solutions can be
found at http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/heatstress/.

When selecting gloves, whether disposable ones made of nitrile or
vinyl that are lightweight (a thickness of 8 to 12 mil) or ones that
are heavy duty (a thickness of 18 mil or greater) that can be reused
after being disinfected, factors to consider include a worker?s
activities, the importance of dexterity, and whether the gloves need
to be durable and resistant to tearing and abrasion. Regardless of
the type of glove selected, care is needed to ensure that wearing
protective gloves does not aggravate existing dermatitis or damage
healthy skin because of prolonged exposure to water or sweating
hands. For example, a thin cotton glove can be worn beneath a glove
to protect against dermatitis, which can occur from prolonged skin
exposure to moisture in gloves caused by perspiration.

Workers should always remove protective clothing (except for gloves)
first and discard or secure the clothing for disinfection before
removing their respirators and goggles. It is important that workers
understand the importance of strict adherence to hand washing after
contacting infected birds or surfaces that might be contaminated.
Having suitable hand-washing facilities and a good supply of soap
and disposable towels is essential. Before removing their gloves,
workers should wash their gloved hands thoroughly with soap and
water, and after removing the gloves, they should wash their hands
again. If hand-washing facilities are unavailable at the site of an
outbreak response, alternative hand-disinfection procedures will be
specified. If waterless soaps or alcohol-based sanitizers are
provided, care should be taken because they are very harsh on the
skin, which might lead to dermatitis if used too frequently.

It is important to take measures for preventing the avian influenza
virus from being spread to other areas. To do this, disposable items
of personal protective equipment should be discarded properly, and
non- disposable items should be cleaned and disinfected according to
outbreak-response guidelines.

Where to get more Information

Links to Internet sites are provided in this Safety and Health
Information Bulletin for those wanting more detailed information on
the topics presented. In addition, for those wanting sources of
personal protective equipment, manufacturers of protective clothing,
respirators, eye protection, and other items of personal protective
equipment are listed in the Buyer's Guide of the International
Safety Equipment Association at http://www.safetyequipment.org.

For answers to workplace safety and health questions, check the Web
sites of NIOSH or OSHA, or telephone NIOSH at (800) 356-4674 or OSHA
at (800) 321-6742.

Acknowledgements

This Safety and Health Information Bulletin is a product of the OSHA-
NIOSH Issues Exchange Group. Appreciation is extended for the
insightful reviews of this document by scientists from the National
Center for Infectious Diseases of the CDC and the Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Appreciation is also extended to Ms. Priscilla Wopat of the NIOSH
Spokane Research Laboratory for editing the document.

Disclaimer

Mention of company names or products does not constitute endorsement
by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC).

Material contained in this document is in the public domain and
maybe reproduced, fully or partially, without the permission of the
Federal Government. Source credit is requested but not required.



Advantages, Disadvantages, and Costs of Air-purifying Respirators
for Protecting Poultry Workers

Respirator type Advantages Disadvantages Cost
(2004 dollars)
Filtering facepiece
(disposable;
dust mask) Lightweight.
No maintenance or cleaning needed.
No effect on mobility.
Provides no eye protection.
Provides no protection against irritant gases such
as ammonia.
Can add to heat burden.
Inward leakage at gaps in face seal.
Many models do not have adjustable head straps.
Difficult for a user to do a seal check.
Level of protection varies greatly among models.
Communication may be difficult.
Fit testing required to select proper facepiece size.
Some eyewear may interfere with facepiece fit.

$0.70 to $10
Elastomeric half-facepiece
Low maintenance.
Reusable facepiece and replaceable
filters and cartridges.
Dual cartridges can be used to protect workers from exposures to
particles, gases, and vapors.
No effect on mobility.

Provides no eye protection.
Can add to heat burden.
Inward leakage at gaps in face seal.
Facepiece must be cleaned and disinfected before
reuse, this can be a contact-exposure risk.
Communication may be difficult.
Fit testing required to select proper facepiece size.
Some eyewear may interfere with facepiece fit.
facepiece: $12 to $35
filters: $4 to $8 each

Powered with hood, helmet, or loose-fitting facepiece
Provides eye protection.
Protection for people with beards, missing
dentures, or facial scars.
Low breathing resistance.
Combination cartridges can be used for
exposures to particles, gases, and vapors.
Flowing air creates cooling effect.
Face seal leakage is generally outward.
Fit testing is not required.
Prescription glasses can be worn.
Communication less difficult than with rubber
half-facepiece or full-facepiece respirators.
Reusable components and replaceable filters.

Added weight of battery and blower.
Awkward to wear for some tasks.
Components must be cleaned and disinfected
before reuse; this can be a contact-exposure risk.
Battery requires charging.
Air flow must be tested with flow device before use.

unit: $400 to $1000
filters: $10 to $30


Elastomeric
full-facepiece with
N-100,
R-100, or P-100
filters Provides eye protection.
Low maintenance.
Reusable facepiece and replaceable filters
and cartridges.
Combination cartridges can be used for
exposures to particles, gases, and vapors.
No effect on mobility.
More effective face seal than that of filtering facepiece or rubber
half-facepiece respirators.

Can add to heat burden.
Reduced field-of-vision compared to half-facepiece.
Inward leakage at gaps in face seal.
Facepiece must be cleaned and disinfected before
reuse; this can be a contact-exposure risk.
Fit testing required to select proper facepiece size.
Facepiece lens can fog without nose cup
or lens treatment.
Spectacle kit needed for people who wear
corrective glasses.
facepiece: $90 to $240
filters: $4 to $8
each nose cup: $30

Powered with tight- fitting half-facepiece or
full-facepiece
Provides eye protection with full-facepiece.
Low breathing resistance.
Face seal leakage is generally outward.
Flowing air creates cooling effect.
Reusable components and replaceable filters.
Combination cartridges can be used for
exposures to particles, gases, and vapors.

Added weight of battery and blower.
Awkward to wear for some tasks.
No eye protection with half-facepiece.
Components must be cleaned and disinfected
before reuse; this can be a contact-exposure risk.
Fit testing required to select proper facepiece size.
Battery requires charging.
Communication may be difficult.
Spectacle kit needed for people who wear
corrective glasses with full-facepiece respirators.
Air flow must be tested with flow device before use.

unit: $500 to $1000
filters: $10 to $30
 
or MURDER IN THE MEDICINE CABINET
PART ONE
The Deadliest Killer of the 20th Century, With More Deaths Than All the World Wars, Lurks Right Inside Your House, and Threatens to Take You and Your Family. The Story No One Told You.


In 1918, a virulent, never seen before, form of influenza seemed to suddenly appear. It seemed to kill within hours,

and spread around the world within days. It seemed to appear simultaneously all around the world. Its spread was faster than any then known means of human travel.

In 2004, the Centers for Disease Control and the World Health Organization warned of repeats of such a rapid and deadly pandemic, through such variants of influenza as SARS and Bird Flu. But without knowing what caused the 1918 pandemic or how it spread, how can the CDC or WHO make such a claim? Unless they already know something they are not telling.

As yet no one has been able to identify the actual medical cause of the 1918 Flu, with only a few samples of a "bird-like" virus taken from only several cadaver tissue samples. But no sample is complete. And those are only one or two samples from among the estimated 20 to 40 million people who seemed to die mysteriously almost overnight. The 1918 Flu spread faster and was more deadly, killing more people than even the Plague and Black Death of the middle ages. Why does no one talk about it?

And even if the viral cause were identified, no one can explain the lightning fast spread of the disease. Maybe it wasn't a disease after all. Many researchers have even looked at some world-wide phenomena, such as extra-terrestrial biology filtering into the atmosphere from outer space. Or maybe, the jet stream spreading disease-laden dust from Asia all around the world in a matter of days. In an area of investigation where there seems to be no real facts and less logic, any "fringe theory" or "outre logic" is just as valid as any other. Maybe something about the 1918 Flu is being covered up. Something that we are not supposed to know.

Actually, there is another rather simple mundane solution to the medical mystery. There did exist in 1918 a then new technical invention by which the "disease" was spread almost at the speed of light. The "1918 Flu" was spread around the world almost instantaneously by telephone. Of course, that claim needs an explanation, and proof.

In the 1890's an American chemist made an improvement on an old home folk remedy called Willow or Aspen Tea. It seemed to relieve the pains of old-age gout, arthritis and other assorted pains. But the evil tasting tea containing acetylsalicylic acid was so strong that it caused many people to have nausea and vomiting, along with the pain relief if they could tolerate drinking the tea. This potion was later neutralized, synthesized and buffered, and then sold to the German Bayer company as a pain reliever.

I have researched the source and history of the name Aspirin and found no reasonable explanation has ever been found. I have found, instead, that the German Bayer company, in order to sell to both the American and European markets, used a name familiar in both markets. In America the common folk remedy form was called "Aspen Tea" made from boiling willow bark from the Aspen tree family. In Europe, the same home remedy was called "Spirain Tea" made from boiling the leaves of the common European shrub Spirae.

Both preparations were found to contain large amounts of natural acetylsalicylic acid, but unbuffered. Combining the common home-remedy folklore names Aspen and Spirain comes up with the Euro-American brand name Aspirin. My research is the sole source for the information about that unique derivation of the brand name.

The reason for the deep confusion and lack of any clear history about the trade name is that for almost a decade from 1905 to about 1915, the use of the trade name, and the source of the name Aspirin, was tied up in international courts. In the late 1890's when Aspirin became available as an easy to use "pop a pill" replacement to the sour tasting Aspen or Spirain Teas, many people used it to relieve the pain of joint arthritis. Many users also discovered, quite by accident, a unique side effect. If you had a fever when you took the Aspirin, it also made the fever suddenly go away. What a discovery! It appeared to be a cure for the the common cold and flu.

By 1905 many other drug companies were making acetylsalicylic acid preparations and calling it Aspirin, but they were selling it as a common cold remedy. Bayer took these other companies to court and sued over illegal use of their trademark. Many people believe that Bayer lost the decision and lost control of the name Aspirin. Most believe that Aspirin is now a generic name such as Kleenex, Scotch Tape or Xerox. Not so. It was an odd court decision and a confusing compromise. By 1915 it was decided in court that Bayer had the exclusive use of the tradename Aspirin, if it were sold as a pain-relieving analgesic.

The court also found that the other companies could also use the name Aspirin, if in their ads and packaging, they claimed that their product was an anti-febril agent or a fever reducer. This odd court decision is still in use today. You can still buy Bayer aspirin to relieve pain, and on the store shelf right next to it is Nyquil, Aleve, Tylenol, Motrin, Bufferin, Anacin and a whole long list of others, all containing aspirin or aspirin-like compounds and claiming to be treatments for Colds, Flu and Fever. Reducing fever was not in Bayer's original patent claim. Bayer didn't know in 1895 of the use of aspirin as a fever reducer and had not put that in their original trademark application.

And how does that strange court decision fit into the rapid spread of the 1918 Flu? The primary defense which the human body has, to stop the spread of viral infections is to produce a fever. The fever is not a symptom of disease, but is actually the body's primary anti-viral immune system. The fever stops the telomeres on the ends of viral RNA from making copies of itself.

The telomeres are like a zipper which unzips and separates the new RNA copy within miliseconds, but the telomeres are temperature sensitive and won't unzip at temperatures above 101F. Thus the high temperature of the fever, stops the flu virus from dividing and spreading. It is an immune system response which only mammals have developed to prevent the spread of viral flu infections, which mostly 99% come from the more ancient dinosaur-like earth life forms called birds. Almost all influenza is a form of "Avian Flu." A few influenza forms come from other dinosaur-like life forms, the modern reptiles, but these are usually classified as very rare tropical diseases, since that is where most reptiles live.

The doctors in the early 1900's didn't know about that, and even today few if any doctors are aware that fever is not a symptom of disease, but is the primary and only way for the human body to stop viral infections. If you stop or reduce the fever, viruses are allowed to divide and spread uncontrolled throughout the body. I have already described this process in detail in my articles posted in the Brother Jonathan Gazette in 2003, so I won't go into detail here. Do a search on "SARS" on the Gazette and you'll find the articles.

Normally the progress of a flu is that a virus enters the mucous membrane lining of the lungs, enters cells, then makes many copies of itself, which causes the cell to expand to such an degree that it bursts open. The new viruses then cloak themselves with a coating taken from the old damaged cell wall, thus hiding themselves from the human body's own T-cell antibody immune defense system. To the body's immune system the new viruses simply appear to be pieces of the body's own lung tissue.

By creating a fever, the viral infection is slowed down sufficiently so that the body's T cells can find the swollen infected lung cells, surround them and metabolize (literally eat) the damaged cell with strong acids which also breaks down the RNA viruses into basic amino acids. This effectively "kills" the viruses so that they can't reproduce. But viruses are not living things, and you can't kill something that's not alive. All the body can do is destroy or dissolve the RNA amino acid chain which makes up the virus.

Not knowing this, most doctors treat the flu with aspirin or fever reducers, as a palliative treatment to ease the aches, pains, and delerium fever effects. The result is that within hours, the fever goes down and the patient feels much better. What neither the patient nor the doctor knows is that with only a normal 98.6F body temperature, the viruses are allowed to reproduce unchecked. Within 72 hours, the viruses have grown from one or two virus bodies to millions or billions. The body is now completely overwhelmed. But while taking aspirin or cold medications, there are no symptoms or warnings of what is yet to come.

As a last resort the body tries to quickly flush the infection of billions of viruses from the lungs with massive amounts of T-cells, and fluid in the lungs to "cough out" the virus. This is called viral pneumonia. Soon within hours the patient is in the hospital. The doctors try to treat the now 105 degree fever with more anti-febril aspirins, or related medications to "treat the fever." Then within another 24 hours the patient, suffocating and gasping for breath, is dead.

You should note that the original infection did cause a mild fever, aches and pains, which the patient "self-medicated" with over-the-counter products. For the next several days, the patient seemed to have no symptoms, but was actually growing billions of copies of influenza virus in his lungs. Then days later, the patient and doctor seem to see a sudden rapid case of viral flu infection that is now overwhelming the body. Is that what really happened?

What caused the patient's death? Was it the original flu virus, or was it the use of Aspirin to lower the flu fever which then shutdown the patient's own immune system response? Obviously, the latter. So how did this cause the massive rapid spread of the 1918 Flu?

The Bayer court case had just been settled, and many companies other than Bayer, could now legally market aspirin to treat colds and fever. But then "The Great War to End all War" was on, and most aspirin products were going directly to the front lines in France to treat the soldiers in the diseased hell hole trenches of WWI.

The World War I medics knew that aspirin could quickly reduce a fever. If a soldier had a fever, the docs gave aspirin. Magically the fever went down, the soldier felt better and quickly went back to the fighting. Then three days later, the same soldier was back, now with severe pneumonia and died almost overnight.

No doctors then made the connection between aspirin and pneumonia death, since the trenches were filled with many other seemingly related diseases such as diphtheria or tuberculosis. Death and dying on the front line was common, so no investigation was done. Aspirin seemed to be a god-send since it allowed sick soldiers to swiftly get right back into the fighting.

After the Armistice of November 11, 1918 the fighting stopped and the soldiers went home. The soldiers around the world announced the good news to their families back home. Most of the low-ranked doughboys had to wait till they got back to their homebase in Kansas, or wherever, to call home. They couldn't afford the costly trans-Atlantic deep sea cable phone rates. But when the troop arrived in Kansas, the call from sergeant Tom was something like:

"Hey mom, I'm coming home. I'll see yu and dad next Tuesday in Chattanooga. How's everybody? Oh, Aunt Esther has a fever? Hey tell her to take some aspirin. Yeah, that stuff in the medicine cabinet for treatin' the aches and pains. Tell Esther, we used it in France. Works right away and the fever is gone. OK see yu Tuesday...."

So what does Esther do? She tries the aspirin, but the old Bayer label only says its for "aches and pains" and says nothing about fevers. She takes it and magically the fever is gone, and she feels much better, almost cured. She's so much better, she gets out the horse and buggy to go see her sister, Lucy in Mt Carmel, where Lucy and the kids are down with the fever. Mt. Carmel has no telephones and even no roads, only the buggy path to reach the outside world. But within hours of sergeant Tom's phone call home, by word of mouth, everybody in rural Mt. Carmel is now taking aspirin to treat fevers. Since the new information came from a soldier, from the US Army and the government, it must be true!

Within a week of the 1918 Armistice, by newfangled telephone, trans-oceanic telephone cables, and even the experimental ship-to-shore shortwave radios using Morse code, the message was flashed around the world -- "Have a fever? Take Aspirin. It worked in France, it'll work for you." That message spread at nearly the speed of light over millions of telephone lines all around the world. The news of the "miracle cure" even spread by word of mouth within a day or so, even to places with no phones nor roads.

Mysteriously, a week later, doctors round the world now had hundreds of sick and dying patients. Nobody could figure out why. The patients themselves never reported that just the week before they did have a mild fever. But it was so mild that when they took some aspirin, it simply went away. Nobody made the connection. The doctors only saw, by November 24, 1918 thousands of very sick patients with high fevers, lungs filled with fluid, and swift overnight death.

The medical profession had never seen anything like it before, nor since. It seemed to occur simultaneously all around the world and even reaching into such out of the way places like Mt. Carmel with no telephones nor roads. How could such a massive fast-spreading killer disease exist? It didn't. It wasn't a disease. It was a new use for an old home folk remedy which everybody already had in their medicine cabinet, Bayer Aspirin to reduce fever.

The medical profession, at a complete loss to explain it, simply called it the "Spanish Flu" or the "1918 Flu" or many similar names. It was a mystery with no known source, so it was assigned many place names. So far, nobody has been able to prove any single pathogen was responsible. And even if they did, they still can't explain how it seemed to spread world-wide at almost the speed of light, clear around the world within a week.

To this day there is no explanation. But, now you know. The "disease" was not a single pathogen, but many of the hundreds of similar types of flu which are always existing at any time around the world. What was different in November 1918 was the many hundreds of thousands of almost simultaneous phone calls from the millions of returning sergeant Toms saying, "...tell Aunt Esther to take the aspirin. It worked in France. It'll work for her..." Nobody traced the spread of the 1918 Flu to sergeant Tom. Nobody made the connection.

That very same source of disease still exists today. What is different today is that cold and flu products are sold and used all year long. This results in an estimated one million deaths from mysterious viral pneumonia reported every year, but also all around the year. In 1918, the new use of aspirin for treating colds and flu all started at the same time in November, thus creating the false impression of a sudden massive onset of a new disease. Even today SARS is not a disease. It is the improper use of a brand new high-tech flu fighter called Tamiflu. The FDA approved the use of Tamiflu several years ago. In 2003 it began to be used world-wide. But how is it used?

Many millions of people around the world still self-treat their own colds and flu with over-the-counter meds containing aspirin. Those are the most commonly sold medications in the world. The patient's mild fever quickly goes away. They forget about ever having felt sick. Then several days later the patient sees the doctor and now has a high fever, bad cough and fluid-filled lungs. The doctor, using the new CDC and WHO guidelines, treats the hospitalized "flu" patient with the new high-tech Tamiflu. But how often and at what dosage?

The doctors do what they've always done for the past 100 years. Tell the nurse to stick a thermometer in the patient's mouth, increase the Tamiflu dosage by 10cc's every hour until the fever starts to drop. Then maintain that dosage level until the patient dies. Then blame the death on some new highly contagious lethal virus. Nothing new here. It's the same old story, since 1918.

The only thing different is that they give it a new name like SARS, or Bird Flu or whatever sounds nifty and high-tech. Even today, each year about one million people world-wide die from the very same "disease" which first appeared in the fall of 1918. Has medicine, in the last 100 years, turned this "contagion" from Pandemic by Phone, into Illness by Internet? Is it the rapid and continuous spread of misinformation that is still killing millions?

So now, I have given you enough information that you are ready for Part Two. Coming next is a review of the curious scientific evidence, medical records and the biochemistry proof behind the Case of Murder in the Medicine Cabinet.

Marshall Smith
Editor, BroJon Gazette
 
Fever is in fact a natural way for the body to rid itself of certain bacterias and viruses. What is amazing is that the chills that accompany fever force us to change our microclimate in an attempt to raise our body temperature even more.

I remember being buried in a mountain of quilts when I was a kid. Just after the "Hot Toddy" of whiskey, honey, and lemon juice.
 
Human bird flu spreads to western Turkey
By Vincent Boland in Ankara
Published: January 8 2006 16:46 | Last updated: January 8 2006 22:36

The Turkish health ministry confirmed on Sunday that five more people have contracted the deadliest strain of bird flu as the disease spread westward reaching Ankara.


With seven cases of the H5N1 strain of the virus now confirmed, news that the deadly flu had reached the outskirts of the capital added to the growing sense of crisis gripping the country after the deaths of three children last week.

The latest cases are likely to raise fresh concerns about the government's handling of the outbreak. Opposition leaders have demanded the resignations of the health and agriculture ministers and media reports have been critical of what they claim is the country's lack of preparedness despite the known dangers.

Iran on Sunday began restricting the movement of people and vehicles across its border with Turkey, and a senior Russian epidemiologist advised against travel to the country because of the outbreak.

The health ministry said on Sunday, two children and an adult had tested positive for the H5N1 strain of the bird flu virus in the capital Ankara, and two children in the eastern city of Van, where the city's university hospital has been inundated with claimed or suspected cases of the disease.

Two other people in Van, about 1,000km east of Ankara, had already tested positive for the virus, and at least 40 people, many of whom are children, remain under observation there and elsewhere with bird flu symptoms. All leave has been cancelled for medical personnel around Turkey.

Officials from the government and the World Health Organisation battled severe winter weather as they attempted to reach an isolated area of eastern Turkey, near the borders with Iran and Armenia. The three dead children – two sisters and a brother aged 11, 14 and 15 – were contaminated there after apparently playing with the head of a chicken that had died of the disease.

The state-run Anatolian news agency reported that Iran, which borders western Turkey, has closed at least one border crossing

Tests in Turkey and at a WHO laboratory in London confirmed that at least two of the three children died from the H5N1 strain of the virus, the first fatalities in Europe. The strain has killed at least 74 people in Asia in the past three years.

A cull of domestic poultry was still under way late on Sunday in the area around Dogubayazit, the village where the children lived, and in other parts of the country where dead birds have been discovered. Eastern Turkey has many mountain lakes where migrating birds stop, and poor families in the region bring their poultry into their homes in winter.

The three cases in Ankara were announced hours after authorities in the capital set up "bird flu crisis centres" at two hospitals. Doctors said that "all the necessary measures" were being taken to deal with the outbreak, but there were fears that Turkey's health system could be overburdened if people continued to turn up at hospitals out of panic, fearing that they might have the disease, as appears to have happened in Van.
 
I don't know much about the temperature and its affects on the human body but a chicken's temperature is actually pretty high.

Here is a website on that: http://interests.caes.uga.edu/drought/articles/hotchick.htm

I do know that the bird flu actually makes the body overreact and that is what usually kills people. Smaller children are more susceptable. It is kind of like an allergic reaction instead of a bacterial infection from that standpoint. Maybe fever does delay the body's defense mechanism in some way to prevent this from happening. Interesting article, rkaiser. I don't think we know enough about it now. I think the Spanish flu was also one that was initially a bird strain. I am sure we will be hearing more about it.
 
Smaller children are more susceptable.

Actually they said on the Washington D.C. conference (C-Span) last week that young children and old people were not as susceptible as healthier people to this type virus (H5N1).

Reason being, the immunities are stronger and flood the lungs with fluid and drown. This was the HHS Director -Mike Leavitt saying this.
 
Mike said:
Smaller children are more susceptable.

Actually they said on the Washington D.C. conference (C-Span) last week that young children and old people were not as susceptible as healthier people to this type virus (H5N1).

Reason being, the immunities are stronger and flood the lungs with fluid and drown. This was the HHS Director -Mike Leavitt saying this.

I was thinking about my own. To me they are still small, I guess, but that was not what they meant when they said "smaller".
 
Econ101 said:
mwj said:
Econ101 said:
I looked into this "testing" that they do for bird flue. The currently take fat samples from poultry flocks because some companies were caught selling poultry contaminated with some dangerous stuff. They currently take fat samples ostensibly to check for "other chemicals". I am sure this is probably where they will get their test material.

Would it be more like the blood test for breeding age cattle if they are sold thru the sale or go over state lines. If I sell breeding stock the test will not be based on results of my steers at slaughter!

Bird flu inside a poultry barn would spread rapidly. If the flu was pathnogenic, the results would be noticed quickly. Most of the numbers I have seen in poultry data suggest a 4 to 5% mortality over the whole flock spread out over the time the flock was in the barns. A little more mortality in the beginning when birth defects and culling are common and a little more on the end when crowding and stress are a factor. Variences from the normal patters would surely be noticed by the farmers that operate the facilities every day.

Econ you were saying that it was not a primary test for the virus that it was a secondary test of materials(fat) that was used to test for residue of drug use. My point is that would be using materials already on hand from something totally unrelated to draw conclusions instead of m
taking a specific sample.
I don't really understand what you are asking. Breeding disease in cattle are a lot different than a communicable disease like the flu.
 

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