there are 9,200+ very suspect cases of BSE/TSE in the USA that went totally unanswered for of the 500,000 of the june 2004 enhanced cover-up.
other than the IHC test, the least likely to find a BSE/TSE in the bovine. now, they give you some excuse as to why the IHC was only used, but come on folks, this is GWs USDA et al now, have they ever lied or misslead? ggheeeee, how many times can we count. THE same test that MISSED the TEXAS mad cow that WAS documented (after it sat on a shelf for 7+ months before the honorable phyllis fong did the end around Johanns, that cow would have never been confirmed otherwise), plus the other suspect cow sample that sat on a shelf for 4 months while all this other BSe was going on.
i dont buy the fact some rancher could just put a suspect BSE/TSE sample up on a shelf and JUST forget about if for 4 months, while all this other BSe had been going on with the fong cow sitting up on a shelf for 7+ months. then you add in the purina gonzales feed mill incident, where the cows were fed 5.5 grams of ruminant feed, with the fda firing back how good a job they have done and the that it is OK to eat 5.5 grams, this will not infect a cow.
they knew all along that this was enough to infect 100+ cows. the whole damn thing is nothing more than a cover-up, from the very top. why do you think detwiler/miller et al kindly retired? the USA bovine is as much at risk of BSE if not more than Canada, and the sooner the ranchers in the USA admit this, the faster they will recover. this is one of the reason r-calf never got my ash up on a witness stand, i told them from the beginning, ask me what you want, but i would not stop at the Canadian border. ask yourself why GW et al did away with the BSE GBR risk assessment and went to the policy of legally force feeding policy of trading all strains of BSE/TSE globally with the BSE MRR policy$ i swear on my mothers grave there has been more case of BSE/TSE in the USA, they just have not documented/confirmed them,
this was proven in the honorable fong vs johanns. my only question is just how many more are out there? i know of one they rendered without testing at all ;
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Statement
May 4, 2004
Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242
Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA
Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms
On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.
FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse.
FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.
Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison).
FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly monitored and used only as feed for pigs.
To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K. showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to cattle.
Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to poultry.
FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make this strong system even stronger.
####
oooops, sorry, will do better
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/NEW01061.html
B. Investigation of Handling of CNS-Suspect Cow in San Angelo, Texas
Overview
On May 4, 2004, the FSIS Acting Regional Director in Dallas, Texas reported that a cow
identified as having Central Nervous System (CNS) symptoms by an FSIS veterinarian at
Lone Star Beef Processors (Lone Star Beef), a beef processing facility in San Angelo,
Texas was not tested for BSE after it had been slaughtered. The initial decision by the
FSIS Veterinary Medical Officer (VMO) on-site at Lone Star Beef to have the cow tested
for BSE was overturned by a senior APHIS official and the cow's carcass was sent to a
rendering plant. FSIS regulations at the time of the incident required VMOs to contact
the APHIS Assistant Area Veterinarian in Charge (AAVIC) to allow APHIS to collect a
BSE surveillance sample from suspect cattle.
OIG initiated an investigation to determine if the AAVIC in Austin, Texas, provided a
false statement to USDA FSIS investigators during their inquiry of his decision not to test
the animal at Lone Star Beef. To conduct our investigation, OIG reviewed previously
obtained statements, various documents and USDA regulations, and interviewed APHIS,
FSIS, beef processing facility, and rendering company personnel.
Summary of OIG Findings
The OIG investigation found no substantive evidence that the USDA official(s)
responsible for the decision not to take brain tissue samples from the cow for BSE
testing, or any other USDA personnel, provided false information or engaged in
intentional misconduct. We determined that a misjudgment was made by at least one
USDA veterinary official in the handling of the suspect cow. Sworn statements provided
by the two responsible USDA veterinary officials involved differ as to whether both
concurred in this decision.
The suspect cow's carcass was sent to a rendering plant in San Angelo on April 27, 2004
for processing as inedible by-product. APHIS then utilized its "Indemnity Plan"
10
procedures to purchase the by-products as a preventative safety measure, and disposed of
it at a local landfill in accordance with applicable environmental standards.
Evidence shows that at the time of this incident, communication problems occurred
between the APHIS and FSIS employees involved. Taken together, the statements of
both APHIS and FSIS personnel and other evidence indicate inconsistencies in their
understanding of procedures for BSE tissue sampling of CNS suspect cattle in certain
circumstances, and the handling of the carcass pending test results. It is apparent from
the sworn statements provided to OIG that APHIS and FSIS personnel and Lone Star
Beef officials could not resolve how best to proceed, and that confusion existed about
how to properly handle the CNS-suspect carcass.
On May 5, 2004, FSIS and APHIS Veterinary Services announced a new joint policy
regarding BSE sampling of condemned cattle at slaughter plants. The policy establishes
protocols for the agencies' responsibilities to obtain samples from condemned cattle
exhibiting signs of CNS disorders, regardless of age. ...
snip...
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/Testimony7-2004.pdf
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
P01-05
January 30, 2001
Print Media: 301-827-6242
Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: On Dec. 23, 2003, the U.S. Department of Agriculture reported that a cow in Washington state had tested positive for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or mad cow disease). As a result, information on this Web page stating that no BSE cases had been found in the United States is now incorrect. However, because other information on this page continues to have value, the page will remain available for viewing.
FDA ANNOUNCES TEST RESULTS FROM TEXAS FEED LOT
Today the Food and Drug Administration announced the results of tests taken on feed used at a Texas feedlot that was suspected of containing meat and bone meal from other domestic cattle -- a violation of FDA's 1997 prohibition on using ruminant material in feed for other ruminants. Results indicate that a very low level of prohibited material was found in the feed fed to cattle.
FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds.
It is important to note that the prohibited material was domestic in origin (therefore not likely to contain infected material because there is no evidence of BSE in U.S. cattle), fed at a very low level, and fed only once. The potential risk of BSE to such cattle is therefore exceedingly low, even if the feed were contaminated.
According to Dr. Bernard Schwetz, FDA's Acting Principal Deputy Commissioner, "The challenge to regulators and industry is to keep this disease out of the United States. One important defense is to prohibit the use of any ruminant animal materials in feed for other ruminant animals. Combined with other steps, like U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) ban on the importation of live ruminant animals from affected countries, these steps represent a series of protections, to keep American cattle free of BSE."
Despite this negligible risk, Purina Mills, Inc., is nonetheless announcing that it is voluntarily purchasing all 1,222 of the animals held in Texas and mistakenly fed the animal feed containing the prohibited material. Therefore, meat from those animals will not enter the human food supply. FDA believes any cattle that did not consume feed containing the prohibited material are unaffected by this incident, and should be handled in the beef supply clearance process as usual.
FDA believes that Purina Mills has behaved responsibly by first reporting the human error that resulted in the misformulation of the animal feed supplement and then by working closely with State and Federal authorities.
This episode indicates that the multi-layered safeguard system put into place is essential for protecting the food supply and that continued vigilance needs to be taken, by all concerned, to ensure these rules are followed routinely.
FDA will continue working with USDA as well as State and local officials to ensure that companies and individuals comply with all laws and regulations designed to protect the U.S. food supply.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ooops again, everything o.k. though ;
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2001/NEW00752.html
but in reality;
It is clear that the designing scientists must
also have shared Mr Bradley's surprise at the results because all the dose
levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s145d.pdf
2
6. It also appears to me that Mr Bradley's answer (that it would take less
than say 100 grams) was probably given with the benefit of hindsight; particularly if one
considers that later in the same answer Mr Bradley expresses his surprise
that it
could take as little of 1 gram of brain to cause BSE by the oral route
within the
same species. This information did not become available until the "attack
rate"
experiment had been completed in 1995/96. This was a titration experiment
designed to ascertain the infective dose. A range of dosages was used to
ensure
that the actual result was within both a lower and an upper limit within the
study
and the designing scientists would not have expected all the dose levels to
trigger
infection. The dose ranges chosen by the most informed scientists at that
time
ranged from 1 gram to three times one hundred grams. It is clear that the
designing
scientists must have also shared Mr Bradley's surprise at the results
because all the
dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s147f.pdf
Re: BSE .1 GRAM LETHAL NEW STUDY SAYS via W.H.O. Dr Maura Ricketts
[BBC radio 4 FARM news]
http://www.maddeer.org/audio/BBC4farmingtoday2_1_03.ram
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/03/slides/3923s1_OPH.htm
2) Infectious dose:
To cattle: 1 gram of infected brain material (by oral ingestion)
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/sci/bio/bseesbe.shtml
oral dose of BSE in primates--look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm) caused 7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE.
Published online
January 27, 2005
Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform
encephalopathy agent in primates
Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog, Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia,
Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe Deslys
The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)—which can lead to variant
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD)—is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the ef.ciency of oral infection
and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier to transmission. We therefore investigated oral
transmission of BSE to non-human primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenate from a
BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological disease 60 months after exposure, whereas the
other remained free of disease at 76 months. On the basis of these .ndings and data from other studies, we made a
preliminary estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which provides additional assurance that existing public
health measures can prevent transmission of BSE to man.
snip...
BSE bovine brain inoculum
100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mg
Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%)
Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%) 1/15 (7%)
RIII mice (icip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)
PrPres biochemical detection
The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculum used in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with a similar PrPres concentration that was
inoculated into mice and cattle.8 *Data are number of animals positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of disease in the .rst positive animal (%). The accuracy of
bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. icip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal.
Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infected orally with similar BSE brain inocula
snip...end
www.thelancet.com Published online January 27, 2005
=================================
just compare the Canadian BSE GBR i already posted to the USA BSE GBR risk assessment and you will see why GW et al had to force feed his BSE MRR policy to everyone ;
EFSA Scientific Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of the United States of America (USA)
Publication date: 20 August 2004
Adopted July 2004 (Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083)
Report
Summary
Summary of the Scientific Report
The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.
The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge in the early nineties.
A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90's when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.
EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.
http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/efsa_scientific_reports/gbr_assessments/573_en.html
SUMMARY
Summary of Scientific Report
http://www.efsa.eu.int
1 of 1
Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority
on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of
United States of America (USA)
Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083
Adopted July 2004
Summary of scientific report
The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the
Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR)
were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on
the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more
cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific
report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period
1980-2003.
The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic cattle in
the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered
in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible
that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to
an internal challenge in the early nineties.
A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk
countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some
imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90's when
domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of
the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from
BSE risk countries.
EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed
that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as
there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very
unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the
BSE-agent persistently increases.
Key words: BSE, geographical risk assessment, GBR, USA, third countries
http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/efsa_scientific_reports/gbr_assessments/573/sr03_biohaz02_usa_report_summary_en1.pdf
REPORT (6 PAGES)
snip...
EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 3, 1-6 on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk of
Conclusions
The European Food Safety Authority concludes:
1. The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic
cattle in the middle of the eighties. This cattle imported in the mid eighties could have
been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early
nineties. It is possible that meat and bone meal (MBM) imported into the USA
reached domestic cattle and lead to an internal challenge in the early nineties.
2. A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE
risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together
with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the
mid 90's when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing.
Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued
imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.
3. The current geographical BSE risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed
that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent.
4. This assessment deviates from the previous assessment (SSC opinion, 2000) because
at that time several exporting countries were not considered a potential risk.
5. It is also worth noting that the current GBR conclusions are not dependent on the large
exchange of imports between USA and Canada. External challenge due to exports to
the USA from European countries varied from moderate to high. These challenges
indicate that it was likely that BSE infectivity was introduced into the North American
continent.
6. EFSA and its Scientific Expert Working group on GBR are concerned that the
available information was not confirmed by inspection missions as performed by the
Food and Veterinary office (FVO – DG SANCO) in Member States and other third
countries. They recommend including, as far as feasible, BSE-related aspects in
future inspection missions.
Expected development of the GBR
As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains
extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically)
infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.
A table summarising the reasons for the current assessment is given in the table below
snip...
http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/efsa_scientific_reports/gbr_assessments/573/sr03_biohaz02_usa_report_v2_en1.pdf
It should be noted that since the enhanced surveillance program began, USDA has also conducted approximately 9,200 routine IHC tests on samples that did not first undergo rapid testing. This was done to ensure that samples inappropriate for the rapid screen test were still tested, and also to monitor and improve upon IHC testing protocols. Of those 9,200 routine tests, one test returned a non-definitive result on July 27, 2005. That sample underwent additional testing at NVSL, as well as at the Veterinary Laboratories Agency in Weybridge, England, and results were negative.
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse_testing/test_results.html
simply put, i don't believe ;
> This was done to ensure that samples inappropriate for the rapid screen test were still tested, and also to monitor and improve upon IHC testing protocols.
what i believe is that they were suspect cows they did not want to confirm, but had to on one due to a slip of the IHC. if you dont want to find something, it is very easy, especially with the IHC. it's what Dr. Detwiler tried to tell them in 2003 at another BSE Roundtable event;
USDA 2003
We have to be careful that we don't get so set in the way we do things that
we forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We've gotten
away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We're using the brain
stem and we're looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a
project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did
not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the
cerebellum and the cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had to go
back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA,
we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got
away from it. They've recently gone back.
Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an
'official' test result as recognized by APHIS
.
Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't
they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking
only at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine
ourselves to one area.
snip.............
Dr. Detwiler: It seems a good idea, but I'm not aware of it.
Another important thing to get across to the public is that the negatives
do not guarantee absence of infectivity. The animal could be early in the
disease and the incubation period. Even sample collection is so important.
If you're not collecting the right area of the brain in sheep, or if
collecting lymphoreticular tissue, and you don't get a good biopsy, you
could miss the area with the PRP in it and come up with a negative test.
There's a new, unusual form of Scrapie that's been detected in Norway. We
have to be careful that we don't get so set in the way we do things that we
forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We've gotten
away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We're using the brain
stem and we're looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a
project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did
not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the
cerebellum and the cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had to go
back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA,
we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got
away from it. They've recently gone back.
Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an
'official' test result as recognized by APHIS
.
Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't
they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking
only at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine
ourselves to one area.
snip...
Completely Edited Version
PRION ROUNDTABLE
Accomplished this day, Wednesday, December 11, 2003, Denver, Colorado
MAYBE this is one of the reasons Dr. Detwiler retired/resigned ??? or was she forced for wanting to do the right thing??? why did Janice Miller resign there about the same time??? both TSE experts. ...
TSS
